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
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# BACON'S ESSAYS:


WITH

## ANNOTATIONS

BY

RICHARD WHATELY, D.D.

*ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN.*



*FOURTH EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED.*


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## PREFACE.

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HAVING been accustomed to write down, from time to time, such observations as occurred to me on several of Bacon's Essays, and also to make references to passages in various books which relate to the same subjects, I have been induced to lay the whole before the Public in an Edition of these Essays. And in this I have availed myself of the assistance of a friend, who, besides offering several valuable suggestions, kindly undertook the task of revising and arranging the loose notes I had written down, and adding, in foot-notes, explanations of obsolete words and phrases. These notes are calculated, I think, to throw light on the language not only of Bacon's Essays, but also of our Authorized Version of the Scriptures, which belongs to the same Age. There are, in that language, besides some few words that are now wholly obsolete, many times more (as is remarked in the 'Annotations' on Essay XXIV.) which are now as commonly in use as ever, but with a change in their *meaning*, which makes them far more likely to mislead than those quite obsolete.<sup>1</sup>

In order to guard against the imputation of presumption in venturing to make additions to what Bacon has said on several subjects, it is necessary to call attention to the circumstance that the word ESSAY has been considerably changed in its application since the days of Bacon. By an *Essay* was originally meant—according to the obvious and natural sense of the word—a slight sketch, to be filled up by the reader; brief hints, designed to be followed out; loose thoughts on some

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<sup>1</sup> There is a very useful little work by the Rev. Mr. Booker, a Vocabulary of the obsolete words and phrases in our Version. It is a manual which no reader of the Bible ought to be without.

subjects, thrown out without much regularity, but sufficient to suggest further inquiries and reflections. Any more elaborate, regular, and finished composition, such as, in our days, often bears the title of an Essay, our ancestors called a *treatise*, *tractate*, *dissertation*, or *discourse*. But the more unpretending title of 'Essay' has in great measure superseded those others which were formerly in use, and more strictly appropriate.

I have adverted to this circumstance because it ought to be remembered that an Essay, in the original and strict sense of the word,—an Essay such as Bacon's, and also Montaigne's,—was designed to be suggestive of further remarks and reflections, and, in short, to *set the reader a-thinking* on the subject. It consisted of observations loosely thrown out, as in conversation; and inviting, as in conversation, the observations of others on the subject. With an Essay, in the modern sense of the word, it is not so. If the reader of what was designed to be a regular and complete treatise on some subject (and which would have been *so entitled* by our forefathers) makes additional remarks on that subject, he may be understood to imply that there is a deficiency and imperfection—a something *wanting*—in the work before him; whereas, to suggest such further remarks—to give outlines that the reader shall fill up for himself—is the very object of an Essay, properly so called—such as those of Bacon. A commentary to explain or correct, few writings need less: but they admit of, and call for, expansion and development. They are gold-ingots, not needing to be gilt or polished, but requiring to be hammered out in order to display their full value.

He is, throughout, and especially in his Essays, one of the most suggestive authors that ever wrote. And it is remarkable that, compressed and pithy as the Essays are, and consisting chiefly of brief hints, he has elsewhere condensed into a still smaller compass the matter of most of them. In his *Rhetoric* he has drawn up what he calls 'Antitheta,' or common-places, '*locos*,' *i.e.* *pros and cons*,—opposite sentiments and reasons, on

various points, most of them the same that are discussed in the Essays. It is a compendious and clear mode of bringing before the mind the most important points in any question, to place in parallel columns, as Bacon has done, whatever can be plausibly urged, fairly, or unfairly, on opposite sides ; and then you are in the condition of a judge who has to decide some cause after having heard all the pleadings. I have accordingly appended to most of the Essays some of Bacon's 'Antitheta' on the same subjects.

Several of these 'Antitheta' were either adopted by Bacon from proverbial use, or have (through him) become Proverbs.<sup>1</sup> And, accordingly, I prefixed a brief remark (which I here insert) to the selection from Bacon's 'Antitheta' appended to the *Elements of Rhetoric*. For, all the writers on the subject that I have met with (several of them learned, ingenious, and entertaining) have almost entirely overlooked what appears to me the real character, and proper office, of *Proverbs*.

'Considering that Proverbs have been current in all ages and countries, it is a curious circumstance that so much difference of opinion should exist as to the utility, and as to the design of them. Some are accustomed to speak as if Proverbs contained a sort of concentrated essence of the wisdom of all Ages, which will enable any one to judge and act aright on every emergency. Others, on the contrary, represent them as fit only to furnish occasionally a motto for a book, a theme for a school-boy's exercise, or a copy for children learning to write.

'To me, both these opinions appear erroneous.

'That Proverbs are not generally regarded, by those who use

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<sup>1</sup> There is appended to Prof. Sullivan's *Spelling-book superseded*, a collection (which is also published separate) of PROVERBS for Copy-lines, with short explanations annexed, for the use of young people. As a child can hardly fail to learn by heart, without effort or design, words which he has written, over and over, as an exercise in penmanship, if these words contain something worth remembering this is so much clear gain.

them, as, necessarily, propositions of universal and acknowledged truth, like mathematical axioms, is plain from the circumstance that many of those most in use are—like these common-places of Bacon—*opposed* to each other; as *e.g.* ‘Take care of the pence, and the pounds will take care of themselves;’ to ‘Be not penny-wise and pound-foolish;’ and again, ‘The more haste, the worse speed;’ or, ‘Wait awhile, that we may make an end the sooner;’ to ‘Take time by the firelock,’ or ‘Time and tide for no man bide,’ &c.

‘It seems, I think, to be practically understood, that a Proverb is merely a *compendious expression* of some principle, which will usually be, in different cases, and with or without certain modifications, true or false, applicable or inapplicable. When then a Proverb is introduced, the speaker usually employs it as a *Major-premise*, and is understood to imply, as a *Minor*, that the principle thus referred to is *applicable* in the existing case. And what is gained by the employment of the Proverb, is, that his judgment, and his reason for it, are conveyed—through the use of a *well-known* form of expression, clearly, and at the same time in an incomparably *shorter space*, than if he had had to explain his meaning in expressions framed for the occasion. And the brevity thus obtained is often still further increased by suppressing the full statement even of the very Proverb itself, if a very common one, and merely *alluding* to it in a word or two.

‘Proverbs accordingly are somewhat analogous to those medical Formulas which, being in frequent use, are kept ready-made-up in the chemists’ shops, and which often save the framing of a distinct Prescription.

‘And the usefulness of this brevity will not be thought, by any one well conversant with Reasoning, to consist merely in the saving of breath, paper, or time. Brevity, when it does *not* cause obscurity, conduces much to the *opposite* effect, and causes the meaning to be far *more* clearly apprehended than it would have been in a longer expression. More than half the cases, probably, in which men either misapprehend what is said,

or confuse one question with another, or are misled by any fallacy, are traceable in great measure to a want of sufficient *conciseness* of expression.'

Perhaps it may be thought by some to be a superfluous task to say anything at all concerning a work which has been in most people's hands for about two centuries and a-half, and has, in that time, rather gained than lost in popularity. But there are some qualities in Bacon's writings to which it is important to direct, from time to time, especial attention, on account of a tendency often showing itself, and not least at the present day, to regard with excessive admiration writers of a completely opposite character; those of a mystical, dim, half-intelligible kind of affected grandeur.<sup>1</sup>

'It is well known what a reproach to our climate is the prevalence of fogs, and how much more of risk and of inconvenience results from that mixture of light and obscurity than from the darkness of night. But let any one imagine to himself, if he can, a mist so resplendent with gay prismatic colours, that men should forget its inconveniences in their admiration of its beauty, and that a kind of nebular taste should prevail, for preferring that gorgeous dimness to vulgar daylight; nothing short of this could afford a parallel to the mischief done to the public mind by some late writers both in England and America;—a sort of 'Children of the Mist,' who bring forward their speculations—often very silly, and not seldom very mischievous—under cover of the twilight. They have accustomed their disciples to admire as a style sublimely philosophical, what may best be described as a certain haze of words imperfectly understood, through which some seemingly original ideas, scarcely distinguishable in their outlines, *loom*, as it were, on the view, in a kind of dusky magnificence, that greatly exaggerates their real dimensions.'

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<sup>1</sup> The passages that follow are chiefly extracted from No. 29 of the *Cautions for the Times*; of which I may be permitted to say,—as it was not written by myself—that a more admirable composition, both in matter and style, I never met with.

In the October number of the *Edinburgh Review*, 1851 (p. 513), the reviewer, though evidently disposed to regard with some favour a style of dim and mystical sublimity, remarks, that 'a strange notion, which many have adopted of late years, is that a poem cannot be profound unless it is, in whole or in part, obscure; the people like their prophets to foam and speak riddles.'

But the reviewer need not have confined his remark to poetry; a similar taste prevails in reference to prose writers also. 'I have ventured,' says the late Bishop Copleston (in a letter published in the Memoir of him by his nephew), 'to give the whole class the appellation of the *'magic-lantern school,'* for their writings have the startling effect of that toy; children delight in it, and grown people soon get tired of it.'

The passages here subjoined, from modern works in some repute, may serve as specimens (and a multitude of such might have been added) of the kind of style alluded to:—

'In truth, then, the idea (call it that of day or that of night) is threefold, not twofold:—day, night, and their relation. Day is the thesis, night the antithesis, their relation the mesothesis of the triad,—for triad it is, and not a mere pair or duad, after all. It is the same with all the other couples cited above, and with all couples, for every idea is a trinitarian. Positive pole, negative one, and that middle term wherein they are made one; sun, planet, their relation; solar atom, planetary one, their conjunction, and so forth. The term of relation betwixt the opposites in these ideal pairs is sometimes called the point of indifference, the mesoteric point, the mid-point. This mid-point is to be seen standing betwixt its right and left fellow-elements in every dictionary: for example, men, man, women; or adjectively, male, human, female. 'So God created man in His own image: in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them.'

'Now, this threefold constitution of ideas is universal. As all things seem to go in pairs to sense, and to the understand-



ing, so all are seen in threes by reason. This law of antinomy is no limited, no planetary law, nor yet peculiarly human ; it is cosmical, all-embracing, ideal, divine. Not only is it impossible for man to think beauty without simultaneously thinking deformity and their point of indifference, justice without injustice and theirs, unity without multiplicity and theirs, but those several theses (beauty, justice, unity, namely) cannot be thought without these their antitheses, and without the respective middle terms of the pairs. As the eye of common-sense cannot have an inside without an outside, nor a solar orb without a planetary orbicle (inasmuch as it ceases to be solar the instant it is stript of its planet), so the eye of reason cannot see an inside without seeing an outside, and also their connexion as the inside and the outside of one and the same thing, nor a sun without his planet and their synthesis in a solar system. In short, three-in-one is the law of all thought and of all things. Nothing has been created, nothing can be thought, except upon the principle of three-in-one. Three-in-one is the deepest-lying cypher of the universe.’<sup>1</sup>

Again : ‘The ‘relativity’ of human knowledge, *i.e.*, the metaphysical limitation of it, implies, we are told, the relation of a subject knowing to an object known. And what is known must be *qualitatively* known, inasmuch as we must conceive every object of which we are conscious, in the relation of a quality depending upon a substance. Moreover, this qualitatively known object must be *protended*, or conceived as existing in time, and *extended*, or regarded as existing in space ; while its qualities are *intensive*, or conceivable under degree. The thinkable, even when compelled by analysis to make the nearest approach that is possible to a negation of intelligibility, thus implies *phenomena objectified by thought, and conceived to exist in space and time*. With the help of these data, may we not

<sup>1</sup> This must have been in the mind of the poet who wrote—

‘So, down thy hill, romantic Ashbourne, glides  
The Derby Dilly, carrying three insides.’

discover and define the highest law of intelligence, and thus place the key-stone in the metaphysic arch?

‘If thou hast any tidings’ (says Falstaff to Ancient Pistol) ‘prithee deliver them like a man of this world.’

Again: ‘Thus to the ancient, well-known logic, which we might call the logic of identity, and which has for its axiom, *‘A thing can never be the contrary of that which it is,’* Hegel opposes his own logic, according to which *‘everything is at once that which it is, and the contrary of that which it is.’* By means of this he advances *a priori*; he proposes a *thesis*, from which he draws a new *synthesis*, not directly (which might be impossible), but indirectly, by means of an *antithesis*.’

Again: ‘It [Religion] is a mountain air; it is the embalmer of the world. It is myrrh, and storax, and chlorine, and rosemary. It makes the sky and the hills sublime; and the silent song of the stars is it. . . . Always the seer is a sayer. Somehow his dream is told, somehow he publishes it with solemn joy, sometimes with pencil on canvas, sometimes with chisel on stone; sometimes in towers and aisles of granite, his soul’s worship is builded. . . . Man is the wonder-maker. He is seen amid miracles. The stationariness of religion; the assumption that the age of inspiration is past, that the Bible is closed; the fear of degrading the character of Jesus by representing him as a man, indicate with sufficient clearness the falsehood of our theology. It is the office of a true teacher to show us that God is, not was—that He speaketh, not spoke. The true Christianity—a faith like Christ’s in the infinitude of Man—is lost. None believeth in the soul of Man, but only in some man or person old and departed! In how many churches, and by how many prophets, tell me, is Man made sensible that he is an infinite soul; that the earth and heavens are passing into his mind; and that he is drinking for ever the soul of God!

‘The very word Miracle, as pronounced by christian Churches, gives a false impression; it is a monster; it is not one with the

blowing clover and the falling rain. . . . Man's life is a miracle, and all that man doth. . . . A true conversion, a true Christ, is now, as always, to be made by the reception of beautiful sentiments. . . . The gift of God to the soul is not a vaunting, overpowering, excluding sanctity, but a sweet natural goodness like thine and mine, and that thus invites thine and mine to be, and to grow.'<sup>1</sup>

Now, without presuming to insinuate that such passages as these convey no distinct meaning to *any* reader, or to the writer, it may safely be maintained that to above ninety-nine hundredths—including, probably, many who admire them as profoundly wise—they are very dimly, if at all, intelligible. If the writers of them were called on to explain their meaning, as Mr. Bayes is, in *The Rehearsal*, they might perhaps confess as frankly as he does, that the object was merely 'to elevate and surprise.' Some knowledge of a portion of human nature was certainly possessed by that teacher of Rhetoric mentioned by Quintilian, whose constant admonition to his pupils was [*σκοτισσον*] 'darken, darken!' as the readiest mode of gaining admiration.

One may often hear some writers of the 'magic-lantern school' spoken of as possessing wonderful *power*, even by those who regret that this power is not better employed. 'It is pity,' we sometimes hear it said, 'that such and such an author does not express in simple, intelligible, unaffected English such admirable matter as his.' They little think that it is the strangeness and obscurity of the style that make the power

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<sup>1</sup> It is worth observing that this writer, as well as very many others of the same stamp, professes to be a believer in what he chuses to call *Christianity*; and would, of-course, not scruple to take the oath (so strenuously maintained by some, as a safeguard to the christian religion) 'on the true faith of a Christian,' though he is further removed from what is commonly meant by 'Christianity,' than a Jew or a Mussulman. And it should be remembered that this case is far different from that (with which it is sometimes confounded) of hypocritical profession. He who uses the word 'Christian' *avowedly* in a sense quite different from the established one, is to be censured indeed for an unwarrantable abuse of language, but is not guilty of *deception*.

displayed seem far greater than it is; and that much of what they now admire as originality and profound wisdom, would appear, if translated into common language, to be mere common-place matter. Many a work of this description may remind one of the supposed ancient shield which had been found by the antiquary Martinus Scriblerus, and which he highly prized, incrustated as it was with venerable rust. He mused on the splendid appearance it must have had in its bright newness; till, one day, an over-sedulous house-maid having scoured off the rust, it turned out to be merely an old pot-lid.

<sup>1</sup> 'It is chiefly in such foggy forms that the metaphysics and theology of Germany, for instance, are exercising a greater influence every day on popular literature. It has been zealously instilled into the minds of many, that Germany has something far more profound to supply than anything hitherto extant in our native literature; though what that profound something is, seems not to be well understood by its admirers. They are, most of them, willing to take it for granted, with an implicit faith, that what seems such *hard* thinking, must be very accurate and original thinking also. What is abstruse and recondite they suppose must be abstruse and recondite wisdom; though, perhaps, it is what, if stated in plain English, they would throw aside as partly trifling truisms, and partly stark folly.

'It is a remark which I have heard highly applauded, that a *clear* idea is generally a *little* idea; for there are not a few persons who estimate the depth of thought as an unskilful eye would estimate the depth of water. Muddy water is apt to be supposed to be deeper than it is, because you cannot see to the bottom; very clear water, on the contrary, will always seem less deep than it is, both from the well-known law of refraction, and also because it is so thoroughly penetrated by the sight. Men fancy that an idea must have been always obvious to every one, when they find it so plainly presented to the mind that every one can easily take it in. An explanation that is

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<sup>1</sup> This passage is from the *Cautions for the Times*, No. 29.

perfectly clear, satisfactory, and simple, often causes the unreflecting to forget that they had needed any explanation at all. And truths that are, in practice, frequently overlooked, they will deride as 'vapid truisms' if very *plainly* set forth, and will wonder that any one should think it worth while to notice them.'

Accordingly, if there should be two treatises on some science, one of them twice as long as the other, but containing nothing of much importance that is not to be found in the other (except some positions that are decidedly untenable), but in a style much more diffuse, and less simple and perspicuous, with a tone of lofty pretension, and scornful arrogance, many persons will consider this latter as far the more profound and philosophical work, and the other as containing merely 'beggarly elements,' fit only for the vulgar.

'Now, Bacon is a striking instance of a genius who could think so profoundly, and at the same time so clearly, that an ordinary man understands readily some of his wisest sayings, and, perhaps, thinks them so self-evident as hardly to need mention. But, on re-consideration and repeated meditation, you perceive more and more what extensive and important application one of his maxims will have, and how often it has been overlooked: and on returning to it again and again, fresh views of its importance will continually open on you. One of his sayings will be like some of the heavenly bodies that are visible to the naked eye, but in which you see continually more and more, the better the telescope you apply to them.

'The 'dark sayings,' on the contrary, of some admired writers, may be compared to a fog-bank at sea, which the navigator at first glance takes for a chain of majestic mountains, but which, when approached closely, or when viewed through a good glass, proves to be a mere mass of unsubstantial vapours.'

A large proportion of Bacon's works has been in great measure superseded, chiefly through the influence exerted by

those works themselves ; for, the more satisfactory and effectual is the refutation of some prevailing errors, and the establishment of some philosophical principles that had been overlooked, the less need is there to resort, for popular use, to the arguments by which this has been effected. They are like the trenches and batteries by which a besieged town has been assailed, and which are abandoned as soon as the capture has been accomplished.

‘I have been labouring,’ says some writer who had been engaged in a task of this kind (and Bacon might have said the same)—‘I have been labouring to render myself useless.’ Great part, accordingly, of what were the most important of Bacon’s works are now resorted to chiefly as a matter of curious and interesting speculation to the studious few, while the effect of them is practically felt by many who never read, or perhaps even heard of them.

But his *Essays* retain their popularity, as relating chiefly to the concerns of every-day life, and which, as he himself expresses it, ‘come home to men’s business and bosoms.’

‘In the Pure and in the Physical Sciences,’ says an able writer in the *Edinburgh Review*,<sup>1</sup> ‘each generation inherits the conquests made by its predecessors. No mathematician has to redemonstrate the problems of Euclid ; no physiologist has to sustain a controversy as to the circulation of the blood ; no astronomer is met by a denial of the principle of gravitation. But in the Moral Sciences the ground seems never to be incontestably won ; and this is peculiarly the case with respect to the sciences which are subsidiary to the arts of administration and legislation. Opinions prevail, and are acted on. The evils which appear to result from their practical application lead to inquiry. Their erroneousness is proved by philosophers, is acknowledged by the educated Public, and at length is admitted even by statesmen. The policy founded on

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<sup>1</sup> See *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1843, No. 157.

the refuted error is relaxed, and the evils which it inflicted, so far as they are capable of remedy, are removed or mitigated. After a time, new theorists arise, who are seduced or impelled by some moral or intellectual defect or error to reassert the exploded doctrine. They have become entangled by some logical fallacy, or deceived by some inaccurate or incomplete assumption of facts, or think that they see the means of acquiring reputation, or of promoting their interests, or of gratifying their political or their private resentments, by attacking the altered policy. All popular errors are plausible; indeed, if they were not so, they would not be popular. The plausibility to which the revived doctrine owed its original currency, makes it acceptable to those to whom the subject is new; and even among those to whom it is familiar, probably ninety-nine out of every hundred are accustomed to take their opinions on such matters on trust. They hear with surprise that what they supposed to be settled is questioned, and often avoid the trouble of inquiring by endeavouring to believe that the truth is not to be ascertained. And thus the cause has again to be pleaded, before judges, some of whom are prejudiced, and others will not readily attend to reasoning founded on premises which they think unsusceptible of proof.

To treat fully of the design and character of Bacon's greater works, and of the mistakes—which are not few or unimportant—that prevail respecting them, would be altogether unsuited to this Work. But it may be worth while to introduce two brief remarks on that subject.

(1.) The prevailing fault among philosophers in Bacon's time and long before, was hasty, careless, and scanty observation, and the want of copious and patient experiment. On supposed facts not carefully ascertained, and often on mere baseless conjecture, they proceeded to reason, often very closely and ingeniously; forgetting that no architectural skill in a superstructure will give it greater firmness than the foundation on which it

rests; and thus they of course failed of arriving at true conclusions; for, the most accurate reasoning is of no avail, if you have not well-established facts and principles to start from.

Bacon laboured zealously and powerfully to recall philosophers from the study of fanciful systems, based on crude conjectures, or on imperfect knowledge, to the careful and judicious investigation, or, as he called it, 'interrogation' and 'interpretation of nature;' the collecting and properly arranging of well-ascertained facts. And the maxims which he laid down and enforced for the conduct of philosophical inquiry, are universally admitted to have at least greatly contributed to the vast progress which physical science has been making since his time.

But though Bacon dwelt on the importance of setting out from an accurate knowledge of facts, and on the absurdity of attempting to substitute the reasoning-process for an investigation of nature, it would be a great mistake to imagine that he meant to disparage the reasoning-process, or to substitute for skill and correctness in that, a mere accumulated knowledge of a multitude of facts. And any one would be far indeed from being a follower of Bacon, who should despise logical accuracy, and trust to what is often called *experience*; meaning, by that, an extensive but crude and undigested observation. For, as books, though indispensably necessary for a student, are of no use to one who has not learned to read, though he distinctly sees black marks on white paper, so is all experience and acquaintance with facts, unprofitable to one whose mind has not been trained to read rightly the volume of nature, and of human transactions, spread before him.

When complaints are made—often not altogether without reason—of the prevailing ignorance of facts, on such or such subjects, it will often be found that the parties censured, though possessing less knowledge than is desirable, yet possess more than they know what to do with. Their deficiency in arranging and applying their knowledge, in combining facts, and correctly



deducing, and rightly employing, general principles, will be perhaps greater than their ignorance of facts. Now, to attempt remedying this defect by imparting to them additional knowledge,—to confer the advantage of wider experience on those who have not skill in profiting by experience,—is to attempt enlarging the prospect of a short-sighted man by bringing him to the top of a hill. Since he could not, on the plain, see distinctly the objects before him, the wider horizon from the hill-top is utterly lost on him.

In the tale of *Sandford and Merton*, where the two boys are described as amusing themselves with building a hovel, they lay poles horizontally on the top, and cover them with straw, so as to make a flat roof; of course the rain comes through; and Master Merton proposes then to *lay on more straw*. But Sandford, the more intelligent boy, remarks, that as long as the roof is flat, the rain must sooner or later soak through; and that the remedy is, to alter the building, and form the roof sloping. Now, the idea of enlightening incorrect reasoners by additional knowledge, is an error analogous to that of the flat roof: of course knowledge is necessary; so is straw to thatch the roof; but no quantity of materials will be a substitute for understanding how to build.

But the unwise and incautious are always prone to rush from an error on one side into an opposite error. And a reaction accordingly took place from the abuse of reasoning, to the undue neglect of it, and from the fault of not sufficiently observing facts, to that of trusting to a mere accumulation of ill-arranged knowledge. It is as if men had formerly spent vain labour in threshing over and over again the same straw, and winnowing the same chaff, and then their successors had resolved to discard those processes altogether, and to bring home and use wheat and weeds, straw, chaff, and grain, just as they grew, and without any preparation at all.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Lectures on Political Economy*, lect. ix.

If Bacon had lived in the present day, I am convinced he would have made his chief complaint against unmethodized inquiry, and careless and illogical reasoning; certainly he would *not* have complained of Dialectics as corrupting philosophy. To guard now against the evils prevalent in *his* time, would be to fortify a town against battering-rams instead of against cannon.

(2.) The other remark I would make on Bacon's greater works is, that he does not rank high as a 'Natural-philosopher.' His genius lay another way; not in the direct pursuit of Physical Science, but in discerning and correcting the errors of philosophers, and laying down the principles on which they ought to proceed. According to Horace's illustration, his office was not that of the razor, but the hone, '*acutum reddere quæ ferrum valet, exors ipsa secandi.*'

The poet Cowley accordingly has beautifully compared Bacon to Moses,

' Who did upon the very border stand  
Of that fair promised land;'

who had brought the Israelites out of Egypt, and led them through the wilderness, to the entrance into the 'land flowing with milk and honey,' which he was allowed to view from the hill-top, but not himself to enter.

It requires the master-mind of a great general to form the plan of a campaign, and to direct aright the movements of great bodies of troops: but the greatest general may perhaps fall far short of many a private soldier in the use of the musket or the sword.

But Bacon, though far from being without a taste for the pursuits of physical science, had an actual inaptitude for it, as might be shewn by many examples. The discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo, for instance, which had attracted attention before and in his own time, he appears to have rejected or disregarded.

But one of the most remarkable specimens of his inaptitude

for practically carrying out his own principles in matters connected with Physical Science, is his speculation concerning the well-known plant called *misselto*. He notices the popular belief of his own time, that it is a true plant, propagated by its berries, which are dropped by birds on the boughs of other trees; a fact alluded to in a Latin proverb applicable to those who create future dangers for themselves; for, the ancient Romans prepared birdlime for catching birds from the *misselto* thus propagated. Now this account of the plant, which has long since been universally admitted, Bacon rejects as a vulgar error, and insists on it that *misselto* is not a true plant, but an excrescence from the tree it grows on! Nothing can be conceived more remote from the spirit of the Baconian philosophy than thus to substitute a random conjecture for careful investigation: and that, too, when there actually did exist a prevailing belief, and it was obviously the first step to inquire whether this were or were not well-founded.

The matter itself, indeed, is of little importance; but it indicates, no less than if it were of the greatest, a deficiency in the application of his own principles. For, one who takes deliberate aim at some object, and misses it, is proved to be a bad marksman, whether the object itself be insignificant or not.

But rarely, if ever, do we find any such failures in Bacon's speculations on human character and conduct. It was there that his strength lay; and in that department of philosophy it may safely be said that he had few to equal, and none to excel him.

In several instances I have treated of subjects respecting which erroneous opinions are current; and I have, in other works, sometimes assigned this as a reason for touching on those subjects. Hence, it has been inferred by more than one critic, that I must be at variance with the generality of mankind in most of my opinions; or, at least, must wish to appear so, for the sake of claiming credit for originality. But there seems no good ground for such an inference. A man might, conceiv-

ably, agree with the generality on nineteen points out of twenty, and yet might see reason, when *publishing* is in question, to treat of the one point, and say little or nothing of the nineteen. For it is evidently more important to clear up difficulties, and correct mistakes, than merely to remind men of what they knew before, and prove to them what they already believe. He may be convinced that the sun is brighter than the moon, and that three and two make five, without seeing any need to proclaim to the world his conviction. There is no necessity to write a *book* to prove that liberty is preferable to slavery, and that intemperance is noxious to health. But when errors are afloat on any important question, and especially when they are plausibly defended, the work of refuting them, and of maintaining truths that have been overlooked, is surely more serviceable to the Public than the inculcation and repetition of what all men admit.

I have inserted in the 'Annotations,' extracts from several works of various authors, including some of my own. If I had, instead of this, merely given references, this would have been to expect every reader either to be perfectly familiar with all the works referred to, or at least to have them at hand, and to take the trouble to look out and peruse each passage. This is what I could not reasonably calculate on. And I had seen lamentable instances of an author's being imperfectly understood, and sometimes grievously misunderstood, by many of his readers who were not so familiar as he had expected them to be, with his previous works, and with others which had been alluded to, but not cited.

Cavillers, however—persons of the description noticed in the 'Annotations' on Essay XLVII.—will be likely to complain of the reprinting of passages from other books. And if the opposite course had been adopted, of merely giving references to them, the same cavillers would probably have complained that the reader of this volume was expected to sit down to the study of it with ten or twelve other volumes on the table before him,

and to look out each of the passages referred to. Again, if an author, in making an extract from some work of his own, gives a *reference* to it, the caviller will represent him as seeking to puff his own productions: if he *omit* to give the reference, the same caviller will charge him with seeking to pass off as new what had been published before. And again, a reader of this character, if he meet with a statement of something he was already convinced of, will deride it as a *truism* not worth mentioning; while anything that is new to him he will censure as an extravagant paradox. For 'you must think this, look you, that the worm will do his kind.'

I chose, then, rather to incur the blame of the fault—if it be one—of encumbering the volume with two or three additional sheets, which, to some readers, may be superfluous, than to run the risk of misleading, or needlessly offending, many others, by omitting, and merely referring to, something essential to the argument, which they might not have seen, or might not distinctly remember.

The passages thus selected are, of course, but a few out of many in which the subjects of these Essays have been treated of. I have inserted those that seemed most to the purpose, without expecting that all persons should agree in approving the selections made. But any one who thinks that some passages from other writers contain better illustrations than those here given, has only to edit the Essays himself with such extracts as he prefers.

To the present edition some additions have been made; one of which—a short 'Annotation' on Essay XLVI.—has been printed separate, for the use of purchasers of the former editions, and may be had of the Publishers.

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<sup>1</sup> *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act v.



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# BACON'S ESSAYS.

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## ESSAY I. OF TRUTH.

‘WHAT is truth?’ said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Certainly there be that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief—affecting<sup>1</sup> free-will in thinking, as well as in acting—and, though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there remain certain discoursing<sup>2</sup> wits which are of the same veins, though there be not so much blood in them as was in those of the ancients. But it is not only the difficulty and labour which men take in finding out of truth; nor again, that, when it is found, it imposeth<sup>3</sup> upon men’s thoughts, that doth bring lies in favour; but a natural, though corrupt love of the lie itself. One of the later schools of the Grecians examineth the matter, and is at a stand to think what should be in it, that men should love lies, where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets, nor for advantage, as with the merchant, but for the lie’s sake. But I cannot tell: this same truth is a naked and open daylight, that doth not show the masques, and mummeries, and triumphs of the world, half so stately and daintily<sup>4</sup> as candle-lights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the

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<sup>1</sup> Affect. *To aim at; endeavour after.*

‘This proud man affects imperial sway.’—Dryden.

<sup>2</sup> Discoursing. *Discursive; rambling.*

‘We, through madness,  
Form strange conceits in our *discoursing* brains,  
And prate of things as we pretend they were.’—Ford.

<sup>3</sup> Impose upon. *To lay a restraint upon.* (Bacon’s Latin original is, ‘*Cogitationibus imponitur captivitas.*’)

‘Unreasonable *impositions* on the mind and practice.’—Watts.

<sup>4</sup> Daintily. *Elegantly.*

‘The Duke exceeded in that his leg was *daintily* formed.’—Wotton.

price of a diamond or carbuncle that sheweth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would,<sup>1</sup> and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunk things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing<sup>2</sup> to themselves? One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy '*vinum dæmonum*,'<sup>3</sup> because it filleth the imagination, and yet is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in and settleth in it that doth the hurt, such as we spake of before. But howsoever<sup>4</sup> these things are thus in men's depraved judgments and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making, or wooing of it—the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it—and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it—is the sovereign good of human nature. The first creature of God, in the works of the days, was the light of the sense, the last was the light of reason, and his Sabbath work, ever since, is the illumination of his spirit. First he breathed light upon the face of the matter, or chaos, then he breathed light into the face of man; and still he breatheth and inspireth light into the face of his chosen. The poet,<sup>5</sup> that beautified the sect,<sup>6</sup> that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well, 'It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tost upon the sea; a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle, and the adventures<sup>7</sup> thereof below; but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth (a hill not to be

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<sup>1</sup> As one would. *At pleasure; unrestrained.*

<sup>2</sup> Unpleasing. *Unpleasant; distasteful.*

'How dares thy tongue  
Sound the *unpleasing* news?'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>3</sup> 'Wine of demons.'—*Augustine.*

<sup>4</sup> Howsoever. *Although.*

'The man doth fear God, *howsoever* it seems not in him.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>5</sup> Lucretius, ii.

<sup>6</sup> The Epicureans.

<sup>7</sup> Adventures. *Fortunes.*

'She smiled with silver cheer,  
And wished me fair *adventure* for the year.'—*Dryden.*

commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors, and wanderings, and mists, and tempests, in the vale below ;' so<sup>1</sup> always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride. Certainly it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.

To pass from theological and philosophical truth to the truth of civil business, it will be acknowledged, even by those that practise it not, that clear and round<sup>2</sup> dealing is the honour of man's nature, and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth<sup>3</sup> it ; for these winding and crooked courses are the goings of the serpent, which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the feet. There is no vice that doth so cover a man with shame as to be found false and perfidious ; and therefore Montaigne saith prettily, when he inquired the reason why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace, and such an odious charge, 'If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth, is as much as to say that he is brave towards God, and a coward towards man ; for a lie faces God, and shrinks from man.'<sup>4</sup> Surely the wickedness of falsehood and breach of faith cannot possibly be so highly expressed as in that it shall be the last peal to call the judgments of God upon the generations of men : it being foretold, that when 'Christ cometh,' he shall not 'find faith upon earth.'

<sup>1</sup> So. *Provided*. 'So that the doctrine be wholesome and edifying, a want of exactness in the manner of speech may be overlooked.'—*Atterbury*.

<sup>2</sup> Round. *Plain ; fair ; candid*.

'I will a round, unvarnished tale deliver.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>3</sup> Embase. *To vitiate ; to alloy*. 'A pleasure, high, rational, and angelic ; a pleasure embased by no appendant sting.'—*South*.

<sup>4</sup> *Essais*, liv. ii. chap. xviii.

## ANNOTATIONS.

‘ ‘ *What is truth ?* ’ said *jesting Pilate*, and would not stay for an answer.’

Any one of Bacon’s acuteness, or of a quarter of it, might easily have perceived, had he at all attended to the context of the narrative, that never was any one less in a *jesting* mood than Pilate on this occasion. He was anxious to release Jesus, which must have been from a knowledge of the superhuman powers of Him he had to do with. A man so unscrupulous as Pilate is universally admitted to have been, could not have felt any anxiety merely from a dislike of injustice; and therefore his conduct is one confirmation of the reality of the numerous miracles Jesus wrought. They, and they only, must have filled him with dread of the consequences of doing any wrong to such a person, and probably, also, inspired him with a hope of furthering some ambitious views of his own, by taking part with one whom he (in common with so many others) expected to be just about to assume temporal dominion, and to enforce his claim by resistless power. He tries to make Him proclaim Himself a King; and when Jesus does this, but adds that his kingdom is not of this world, still Pilate catches at the word, and says, ‘Art thou a king, then?’ Jesus then proceeds to designate *who* should be his *subjects*: ‘Every one that *is of the Truth* heareth my words:’ as much as to say, ‘I claim a kingdom, not over the Israelites by race; not over all whom I can subjugate by force, or who will submit to me through fear or interest; but over the *votaries of truth*,—those who are ‘of the truth,’—those who are willing to receive whatever shall be proved true, and to follow *wherever* that shall lead. And Pilate is at a loss to see what this has to do with his inquiry. ‘I am asking you about your claims to empire, and you tell me about truth: what has truth to do with the question?’

Most readers overlook the drift of our Lord’s answer, and interpret the words as a mere assertion (which every teacher makes) of the truth of what He taught; as if He had said, ‘Every one that heareth my words is of the Truth.’

And commentators usually satisfy themselves with such an interpretation as makes the expression *intelligible in itself*, without considering how far it is *pertinent*. A mere assertion of the truth of his teaching would not have been at all relevant to the inquiry made. But what he did say was evidently a description of the persons who were to be the subjects of the kingdom that 'is not of this world.'

Much to the same effect is his declaration that those who should be his disciples indeed should 'know the Truth,' and the 'Truth should make them free;' and that 'if any man will do' [is willing to do] 'the will of the Father, he shall know of the doctrine.' Men were not to become his disciples in consequence of their knowing and perceiving the truth of what He taught, but in consequence of their having sufficient candour to receive the evidence which his miracles afforded, and being so thoroughly 'of the Truth,' as to give themselves up to follow wherever that should lead, in opposition to any prejudices or inclinations of their own; and then knowledge of the Truth was to be their reward. There is not necessarily any moral virtue in receiving truth; for it may happen that our interest, or our wishes, are in the same direction; or it may be forced upon us by evidence as irresistible as that of a mathematical demonstration. The virtue consists in being a sincere votary of Truth;—what our Lord calls being 'of the Truth,'—rejecting 'the hidden things of dishonesty,' and carefully guarding against every undue bias. Every one wishes to have Truth *on his side*; but it is not every one that sincerely wishes to be *on the side of Truth*.

'The inquiry of truth, which is the love-making or  
wooing of it.'<sup>1</sup>

This love-making or wooing of Truth implies that first step towards attaining the establishment of the habit of a steady thorough-going adherence to it in all philosophic, and especially religious, inquiry—the strong conviction of its value. To this must be united a distrust of ourselves. Men miss truth

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<sup>1</sup> The chief part of what follows, I have taken the liberty to extract from the *Essay on Truth* (2nd Series). The different senses of the word 'truth' are treated of in the *Elements of Logic*, app. i.

more often from their indifference about it than from intellectual incapacity. A well-known statesman is reported to have said that 'no gentleman would ever change his religion.' And an author of some note, a professed Protestant Christian, has been heard to declare that he thought very ill of any one who did so; 'unless it were,' he said, 'one man in a million,—some person of surpassing genius.' And this sentiment (which implies a total indifference to truth and falsehood) has been cited with approbation.

Some men, again, from supposing themselves to have *found* truth, take for granted that it was *for* truth they were seeking. But if we either care not to be lovers of Truth, or take for granted that we are such, without taking any pains to acquire the habit, it is not likely that we ever shall acquire it.

Many objections have been urged against the very effort to cultivate such a habit. One is, that we cannot be required to make Truth our main object, but *happiness*; that our ultimate end is not the mere knowledge of what is *true*, but the attainment of what is *good* to ourselves and to others. But this, when urged as an objection to the maxim, that Truth should be sought for its own sake, is evidently founded on a mistake as to its meaning. It is evident, in the first place, that it does not mean the pursuit of *all* truth on all subjects. It would be ridiculous for a single individual to aim at universal knowledge, or even at the knowledge of all that is within the reach of the human faculties and worthy of human study. The question is respecting the pursuit of truth in each subject on which each person desires *to make up his mind and form an opinion*. And secondly, the purport of the maxim that in these points truth should be our object, is, that not mere barren knowledge without practice—truth without any *ulterior* end, should be sought, but that truth should be sought and followed confidently, not in each instance, only so far as we *perceive* it to be expedient, and from motives of policy, but with a full conviction both that it is, in the end, always expedient, with a view to the attainment of ulterior objects (no permanent advantage being attainable by departing from it), and also, that, even if some end, otherwise advantageous, *could* be promoted by such a departure, that alone would constitute it an evil;—that truth, in short, is in itself, independently of its results, preferable to error; that

honesty claims a preference to deceit, even without taking into account its being the best policy.

Another objection, if it can be so called, is that a perfectly candid and unbiassed state of mind—a habit of judging in each case entirely according to the evidence—is *unattainable*. But the same may be said of every other virtue: a perfect regulation of any one of the human passions is probably not more attainable than perfect candour; but we are not therefore to give a loose to the passions; we are not to relax our efforts for the attainment of any virtue on the ground that, after all, we shall fall short of perfection.

Another objection which has been urged is, that it is not even desirable, were it possible, to bring the mind into a state of perfectly unbiassed indifference, so as to weigh the evidence in each case with complete impartiality. This objection arises, I conceive, from an indistinct and confused notion of the sense of the terms employed. A candid and unbiassed state of mind, which is sometimes called *indifference*, or impartiality, *i. e.*, of the *judgment*, does not imply an indifference of the *will*—an absence of all wish on either side, but merely an absence of all influence of the wishes in forming our decision,—all leaning of the judgment on the side of inclination,—all perversion of the evidence in consequence. That we should *wish* to find truth on one side rather than the other, is in many cases not only unavoidable, but commendable; but to *think* that true which we wish, without impartially weighing the evidence on both sides, is undeniably a folly, though a very common one. If a mode of effectual and speedy cure be proposed to a sick man, he cannot but wish that the result of his inquiries concerning it may be a well-grounded conviction of the safety and efficacy of the remedy prescribed. It would be no mark of wisdom to be indifferent to the restoration of health; but if his wishes should lead him (as is frequently the case) to put implicit confidence in the remedy without any just grounds for it, he would deservedly be taxed with folly.

In like manner (to take the instance above alluded to), a good man will indeed *wish* to find the evidence of the christian religion satisfactory, but will weigh the evidence the more carefully, on account of the importance of the question.

But indifference of the *will* and indifference of the *judgment*

are two very distinct things that are often confounded. A conclusion may safely be adopted, though in accordance with inclination, provided it be not founded upon it. No doubt the judgment is often biassed by the inclinations; but it is possible, and it should be our endeavour, to guard against this bias. And by the way, it is utterly a mistake to suppose that the bias is always *in favour* of the conclusion wished for; it is often in the contrary direction. There is in some minds an unreasonable doubt in cases where their wishes are strong—a morbid distrust of evidence which they are especially anxious to find conclusive. The proverbial expression of ‘too good news to be true’ bears witness to the existence of this feeling. Each of us probably has a nature leaning towards one or the other (often towards both, at different times) of these infirmities;—the over-estimate or under-estimate of the reasons in favour of a conclusion we earnestly desire to find true. Our aim should be, not to fly from one extreme to the other, but to avoid both, and to give a verdict according to the evidence, preserving the indifference of the judgment even when the will *cannot*, and indeed *should not*, be indifferent.

There are persons, again, who, in supposed compliance with the precept, ‘Lean not to thine own understanding,’ regard it as a duty to suppress all exercise of the intellectual powers, in every case where the feelings are at variance with the conclusions of reason. They deem it right to ‘consult the heart more than the head;’ that is, to surrender themselves, advisedly, to the bias of any prejudice that may happen to be present; thus deliberately, and on principle, burying in the earth the talent entrusted to them, and hiding under a bushel the candle that God has lighted up in the soul. But it is not necessary to dwell on such a case, both because it is not, I trust, a common one, and also because those who are so disposed are clearly beyond the reach of argument, since they think it wrong to listen to it.

It is not intended to recommend presumptuous inquiries into things beyond the reach of our faculties,—attempts to be wise above what is written,—or groundless confidence in the certainty of our conclusions; but unless reason be employed in ascertaining what doctrines are revealed, humility cannot be exercised in acquiescing in them; and there is surely at least



as much presumption in measuring everything by our own feelings, fancies, and prejudices, as by our own reasonings. Such voluntary humiliation is a prostration, not of ourselves before God, but of one part of ourselves before another part, and resembles the idolatry of the Israelites in the wilderness: 'The people *stripped themselves* of their golden ornaments, and cast them into the fire, and there came out this calf.' We ought to remember that the disciples were led by the dictates of a sound *understanding* to say, 'No man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him;' and thence to believe and trust, and obey Jesus implicitly; but that Peter was led by his *heart* (that is, his inclinations and prejudices) to say, 'Be it far from thee, Lord! there shall no such thing happen unto thee.'

It is to be remembered also that the intellectual powers are sometimes pressed into the service, as it were, of the feelings, and that a man may be thus misled, in a great measure, through his own ingenuity. 'Depend on it,' said a shrewd observer, when inquired of, what was to be expected from a certain man who had been appointed to some high office, and of whose intelligence he thought more favourably than of his uprightness,—'depend on it, he will never take any step that is bad, without having a very good reason to give for it.' Now it is common to warn men—and they are generally ready enough to take the warning—against being thus misled by the ingenuity of *another*; but a person of more than ordinary learning and ability needs to be carefully on his guard against being misled by *his own*. Though conscious, perhaps, of his own power to dress up speciously a bad cause, or an extravagant and fanciful theory, he is conscious also of a corresponding power to distinguish sound reasoning from sophistry. But this will not avail to protect him from convincing himself by ingenious sophistry of his own, if he has allowed himself to adopt some conclusion which pleases his imagination, or favours some passion or self-interest. His own superior intelligence will then be, as I have said, pressed into the service of his inclinations. It is, indeed, no feeble blow that will suffice to destroy a giant; but if a giant resolves to commit suicide, it is a giant that deals the blow.

When, however, we have made up our minds as to the importance of seeking in every case for truth with an unprejudiced mind, the greatest difficulty still remains; which arises from

the confidence we are apt to feel that we have already done this, and have sought for truth with success. For every one must of course be convinced of the truth of his own opinion, if it be properly called *his* opinion; and yet the variety of men's opinions furnishes a proof how many must be mistaken. If any one, then, would guard against mistake, as far as his intellectual faculties will allow, he must make it the *first question* in each, 'Is this true?' It is not enough to believe what you maintain; you must maintain what you believe, and maintain it *because* you believe it; and that, on the most careful and impartial view of the evidence on both sides. For any one may bring himself to believe almost anything that he is inclined to believe, and thinks it becoming or expedient to maintain. Some persons, accordingly, who describe themselves—in one sense, correctly—as '*following* the dictates of conscience,' are doing so only in the same sense in which a person who is driving in a carriage may be said to *follow* his horses, which go in whatever direction he guides them. It is in a determination to 'obey the Truth,' and to follow wherever she may lead, that the genuine love of truth consists; and this can be realized in practice only by *postponing* all other questions to that which ought ever to come foremost—'What is the truth?' If this question be asked only in the *second* place, it is likely to receive a very different answer from what it would if it had been asked in the *first* place. The minds of most men are *preoccupied* by some feeling or other which influences their judgment (either on the side of truth or of error, as it may happen) and enlists their learning and ability on the side, whatever it may be, which they are predisposed to adopt.

I shall merely enumerate a few of the most common of these feelings that present obstacles to the pursuit or propagation of truth:—Aversion to *doubt*—desire of a supposed happy medium—the love of system—the dread of the character of inconsistency—the love of novelty—the dread of innovation—undue deference to human authority—the love of approbation, and the dread of censure—regard to seeming expediency.

The greatest of all these obstacles to the habit of following truth is the last mentioned—the tendency to look, in the first instance, to the *expedient*. It is this principle that influences men to the reservation, or to the (so-called) development, but real depravation, of truth; and that leads to pious frauds in

one or other of the two classes into which they naturally fall, of positive and negative—the one, the introduction and propagation of what is false; the other, the mere toleration of it. He who propagates a delusion, and he who connives at it when already existing, doth alike tamper with truth. We must neither *lead* nor *leave* men to mistake falsehood for truth. Not to undeceive is to deceive. The giving, or not correcting, false reasons for right conclusions—false grounds for right belief—false principles for right practice; the holding forth or fostering false consolations, false encouragements, and false sanctions, or conniving at their being held forth or believed, are all pious frauds. This springs from, and it will foster and increase, a want of veneration for truth; it is an affront put on ‘the Spirit of Truth:’ it is a hiring of the idolatrous Syrians to fight the battles of the Lord God of Israel. And it is on this ground that we should adhere to the most scrupulous fairness of statement and argument. He who believes that sophistry will always in the end prove injurious to the cause supported by it, is probably right in that belief; but if it be for that reason that he abstains from it,—if he avoid fallacy, wholly or partly, through fear of *detection*,—it is plain he is no sincere votary of truth.

It may be added that many who would never bring themselves to say anything positively false, yet need to be warned against the falsehood of suppression or extenuation;—against the unfairness of giving what is called a one-sided representation. Among writers (whether of argumentative works or of fictions), even such as are far from wholly unscrupulous, there are many who seem to think it allowable and right to set forth all the good that is on one side, and all the evil on the other. They compare together, and decide on, the gardens of A and of B, after having culled from the one a nosegay of the choicest flowers, and from the other all the weeds they could spy. And those who object to this, are often regarded as trimmers, or lukewarm, or inconsistent. But to such as deal evenhanded justice to both sides, and lay down Scylla and Charybdis in the same chart,—to them, and, generally speaking, to them only, it is given to find that the fair course, which they have pursued *because* it is the fair course, is also, in the long run, the most expedient.

On the same principle, we are bound never to countenance any erroneous opinion, however seemingly beneficial in its results—

never to connive at any salutary delusion (as it may appear), but to open the eyes (when opportunity offers, and in proportion as it offers) of those we are instructing, to any mistake they may labour under, though it may be one which leads them ultimately to a true result, and to one of which they might otherwise fail. The temptation to depart from this principle is sometimes excessively strong, because it will often be the case that men will be in some danger, in parting with a long-admitted error, of abandoning, at the same time, some truth they have been accustomed to connect with it. Accordingly, censures have been passed on the endeavours to enlighten the adherents of some erroneous Churches, on the ground that many of them thence become atheists, and many, the wildest of fanatics. That this should have been in some instances the case is highly probable; it is a natural result of the pernicious effects on the mind of any system of blind, uninquiring acquiescence; such a system is an Evil Spirit, which we must expect will cruelly rend and mangle the patient as it comes out of him, and will leave him half dead at its departure. There will often be, and oftener appear to be, danger in removing a mistake; the danger that those who have been long used to act rightly on erroneous principles may fail of the desired conclusions when undeceived. In such cases it requires a thorough love of truth, and a firm reliance on divine support, to adhere steadily to the straight course. If we give way to a dread of danger from the inculcation of any truth, physical, moral, or religious, we manifest a want of faith in God's power, or in his will to maintain his own cause. There may be danger attendant on every truth, since there is none that may not be perverted by some, or that may not give offence to others; but, in the case of anything which plainly appears to be truth, every danger must be braved. We must maintain the truth as we have received it, and trust to Him who is 'the Truth' to prosper and defend it.

That we shall indeed best further his cause by fearless perseverance in an open and straight course, I am firmly persuaded; but it is not only when we *perceive* the mischiefs of falsehood and disguise, and the beneficial tendency of fairness and candour, that we are to be followers of truth; the trial of our faith is when we *cannot* perceive this: and the part of a lover of Truth is to follow her at all seeming hazards, after the example of

Him who 'came into the world that he should bear witness to the Truth.' This straightforward course may not, indeed, obtain 'the praise of men.' Courage, liberality, activity, and other good qualities, are often highly prized by those who do not possess them in any great degree; but the zealous, thorough-going love of truth is not very much admired or liked, or indeed understood, except by those who possess it. But Truth, as Bacon says, 'only doth judge itself,' and, 'howsoever these things are in men's depraved judgments and affections, it teacheth that the inquiry of Truth, which is the love-making or wooing of it—the knowledge of Truth, which is the presence of it—and the belief of Truth, which is the enjoying of it—is the sovereign good of human nature.'

*'There is no vice that doth so cover a man with shame, as to be found false and perfidious.'*

This holds good when falsehood is practised solely for a man's private advantage: but, in a zealous and able partisan, falsehood in the cause of the party will often be pardoned, and even justified. We have lived to see the system called '*phenakism*,' '*double-doctrine*,' or '*economy*,'—that is, saying something quite different from what is inwardly believed,<sup>1</sup> not only practised, but openly avowed and vindicated, and those who practise it held up as models of pre-eminent holiness, not only by those of their own party, but by others also.

When men who have repeatedly brought forward, publicly, heavy charges against a certain Church, afterwards openly declare that those charges were what they knew, *at the time*, to be quite undeserved, they are manifestly proclaiming their own insincerity. Perhaps they did believe—and perhaps they believe still—that those charges are just; and if so, their present disavowal is a falsehood. But if, as they now profess, the charges are what they believed to be calumnious falsehoods, uttered because the *same things had been said by some eminent divines*, and because they were '*necessary for our position*' then, they confess themselves 'false and perfidious;' and yet they are not 'covered with shame.'

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<sup>1</sup> See an excellent discourse on 'Reserve,' by Archdeacon West. See also *Cautions for the Times*, No. xiii. See also the Essay on 'Simulation.'

## ESSAY II. OF DEATH.

MEN fear death as children fear to go into the dark ; and as that natural fear in children is increased with tales, so is the other. Certainly, the contemplation of death, as the wages of sin, and passage to another world, is holy and religious ; but the fear of it, as a tribute due unto nature, is weak. Yet in religious meditations there is sometimes mixture of vanity and of superstition. You shall read in some of the friars' books of mortification, that a man should think with himself what the pain is, if he have but his finger's end pressed, or tortured, and thereby imagine what the pains of death are when the whole body is corrupted and dissolved ; when many times death passeth with less pain than the torture of a limb—for the most vital parts are not the quickest of sense : and by him that spake only as a philosopher and natural man, it was well said, '*Pompa mortis magis terret quam mors ipsa.*'<sup>1</sup> Groans, and convulsions, and a discoloured face, and friends weeping, and blacks, and obsequies, and the like, show death terrible.

It is worthy the observing, that there is no passion in the mind of man so weak, but it mates<sup>2</sup> and masters the fear of death ; and therefore death is no such terrible enemy when a man hath so many attendants about him that can win the combat of him. Revenge triumphs over death : love slights it ; honour aspireth to it ; grief flieth to it ; fear pre-occupateth<sup>3</sup> it ; nay, we read, after Otho the emperor had slain himself, pity (which is the tenderest of affections) pro-

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<sup>1</sup> 'The pomp of death is more terrible than death itself.' Probably suggested by a letter of Seneca to Lucilius, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Mate. *To subdue ; vanquish ; overpower.*

'The Frenchmen he hath so mated  
And their courage abated,  
That they are but half men.'—*Skelton.*

'My sense she has mated.'—*Shakespere.*

So to give check-mate.

<sup>3</sup> Preoccupate. *To anticipate.*

'To provide so tenderly by preoccupation,  
As no spider may suck poison out of a rose.'—*Garnet.*

voked<sup>1</sup> many to die out of mere compassion to their sovereign, and as the truest sort of followers. Nay, Seneca adds, niceness and satiety: '*Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris; mori velle, non tantum fortis, aut miser, sed etiam fastidiosus potest.*'<sup>2</sup> 'A man would die, though he were neither valiant nor miserable, only upon a weariness to do the same thing so oft over and over.' It is no less worthy to observe, how little alteration in good spirits the approaches of death make; for they appear to be the same men till the last instant. Augustus Cæsar died in a compliment: '*Livia, conjugii nostri memor vive, et vale.*'<sup>3</sup> Tiberius in dissimulation, as Tacitus saith of him, '*Jam Tiberium vires et corpus, non dissimulatio, deserebant.*'<sup>4</sup> Vespasian in a jest, sitting upon the stool, '*Ut puto Deus fio.*' Galba with a sentence, '*Feri, si ex re sit populi Romani,*'<sup>5</sup> holding forth his neck: Septimus Severus in dispatch, '*Adeste, si quid mihi restat agendum,*'<sup>6</sup> and the like. Certainly the Stoics bestowed too much cost upon death, and by their great preparations made it appear more fearful. Better, saith he, '*qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera ponat naturæ.*'<sup>7</sup> It is as natural to die as to be born; and to a little infant, perhaps, the one is as painful as the other. He that dies in an earnest pursuit, is like one that is wounded in hot blood; who, for the time, scarce feels the hurt; and therefore a mind fixed and bent upon somewhat that is good, doth avert the dolours<sup>8</sup> of death: but, above all, believe it, the sweetest canticle is, '*Nunc dimittis,*' when a man hath obtained worthy ends and expectations. Death hath this also, that it openeth the gate to good fame, and extinguisheth envy: '*Extinctus amabitur idem.*'<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Provoke. *To excite; to move* (to exertion or feeling of any kind, not, as now, merely to anger). 'Your zeal hath provoked very many.'—2 Cor. ix. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ad Lucil.* 77.

<sup>3</sup> 'Livia, mindful of our wedlock, live, and farewell.'—Suet. *Aug. Vict.* c. 100.

<sup>4</sup> 'His powers and bodily strength had abandoned Tiberius, but not his dissimulation.'—*Annal.* vi. 50.

<sup>5</sup> 'Strike, if it be for the benefit of the Roman people.'—Tacit. *Hist.* i. 41.

<sup>6</sup> 'Hasten, if anything remains for me to do.'—*Dio. Cas.* 76, *ad fin.*

<sup>7</sup> 'He who accounts the close of life among the boons of nature.'—Juv. *Sat.* 357.

<sup>8</sup> Dolours. *Pains.*

'He drew the dolours from the wounded part.'—Pope's *Homer.*

<sup>9</sup> 'Now lettest thou thy servant depart.'—*Luke* ii. 29.

<sup>10</sup> 'The same man shall be beloved when dead.'

## ANTITHETA ON DEATH.

## PRO.

'Non invenias inter humanos affectum tam pusillum, qui si intendatur paulo vehementius, non mortis metum superet.

*'There is no human passion so weak and contemptible, that it may not easily be so heightened as to overcome the fear of death.'*

## CONTRA.

'Præstat ad omnia, etiam ad virtutem, curriculum longum, quam breve.

*'In all things, even in virtue, a long race is more conducive to success than a short one.'*

'Absque spatiis vitæ majoribus, nec perficere datur, nec perdiscere, nec pœnitere.

*'It is only in a long life that time is afforded us to complete anything, to learn anything thoroughly, or to reform oneself.'*

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 ANNOTATIONS.

*'There is no passion in the mind of man so weak but it mates and masters the fear of death.'*

Of all the instances that can be given of recklessness of life, there is none that comes near that of the workman employed in what is called *dry-pointing*; the grinding of needles and of table-forks. The fine steel-dust which they breathe brings on a painful disease of which they are almost sure to die before forty. And yet not only are men tempted by high wages to engage in this employment, but they resist to the utmost all the contrivances devised for diminishing the danger; through fear that this would cause more workmen to offer themselves, and thus lower wages!

The case of sailors, soldiers, miners, and others who engage in hazardous employments, is nothing in comparison of this; because people of a sanguine temper hope to *escape* the dangers. But the dry-pointers have to encounter, not the *risk*, but the *certainty*, of an early and painful death. The thing would seem incredible, if it were not so fully attested. All this proves that avarice overcomes the fear of death. And so may vanity: witness the many women who wear tight dresses, and will even employ washes for the complexion which they know to be highly dangerous and even destructive to their health.



*‘Certainly the contemplation of death, as the wages of sin and the passage to another world, is holy and religious.’*

It is when considered as the passage to another world that the contemplation of death becomes holy and religious ;—that is, calculated to promote a state of preparedness for our setting out on this great voyage,—our departure from this world to enter the other. It is manifest that those who are engrossed with the things that pertain to this life alone ; who are devoted to worldly pleasure, to worldly gain, honour, or power, are certainly not preparing themselves for the passage into another : while it is equally manifest that the change of heart, of desires, wishes, tastes, thoughts, dispositions, which constitutes a meetness for entrance into a happy, holy, heavenly state,—the hope of which can indeed ‘mate and master the fear of death,’—must take place here on earth ; not after death.

There is a remarkable phenomenon connected with insect life which has often occurred to my mind while meditating on the subject of preparedness for a future state, as presenting a curious analogy.

Most persons know that every *butterfly* (the Greek name for which, it is remarkable, is the same that signifies also the *Soul*,—*Psyche*) comes from a grub or caterpillar ; in the language of naturalists called a *larva*. The last name (which signifies literally a *mask*) was introduced by Linnæus, because the caterpillar is a kind of outward covering, or disguise, of the future butterfly within. For, it has been ascertained by curious microscopic examination, that a distinct butterfly, only undeveloped and not full-grown, is contained within the body of the caterpillar ; that this latter has its own organs of digestion, respiration, &c., suitable to its larva-life, quite distinct from, and independent of, the future butterfly which it encloses. When the proper period arrives, and the life of the insect, in this its first stage, is to close, it becomes what is called a pupa, enclosed in a chrysalis or cocoon (often composed of silk ; as is that of the silkworm which supplies us that important article), and lies torpid for a time within this natural coffin, from which it issues, at the proper period, as a perfect butterfly.

But sometimes this process is marred. There is a numerous tribe of insects well known to naturalists, called Ichneumon-

flies; which in their larva-state are *parasitical*; that is, inhabit, and feed on, other larvæ. The ichneumon-fly, being provided with a long sharp sting, which is in fact an *ovipositor* (egg-layer), pierces with this the body of the caterpillar in several places, and deposits her eggs, which are there hatched, and feed, as grubs (larvæ) on the inward parts of their victim. A most wonderful circumstance connected with this process is, that a caterpillar which has been thus attacked goes on feeding, and apparently thriving quite as well, during the whole of its larva-life, as those that have escaped. For, by a wonderful provision of instinct, the ichneumon-grubs within do not injure any of the organs of the larva, but feed only on the future butterfly enclosed within it. And consequently, it is hardly possible to distinguish a caterpillar which has these enemies within it from those that are untouched.—But when the period arrives for the close of the larva-life, the difference appears. You may often observe the common cabbage-caterpillars retiring, to undergo their change, into some sheltered spot,—such as the walls of a summer-house; and some of them—those that have escaped the parasites,—assuming the pupa-state, from which they emerge, butterflies. Of the unfortunate caterpillar that has been preyed upon, nothing remains but an empty skin. The hidden butterfly has been secretly consumed.

Now is there not something analogous to this wonderful phenomenon, in the condition of some of our race?—may not a man have a kind of secret enemy within his own bosom, destroying his soul,—*Psyche*,—though without interfering with his well-being *during the present stage* of his existence; and whose presence may never be detected till the time arrives when the *last great change* should take place?

*‘Death hath this also, that it openeth the gate to good fame, and extinguisheth envy.’*

Bacon might have added, that the generosity extended to the departed is sometimes carried rather to an extreme. To abstain from censure of them is fair enough. But to make an ostentatious parade of the supposed admirable qualities of persons who attracted no notice in their life-time, and again (which is much more common), to publish laudatory biographies (to say nothing of raising subscriptions for monumental testi-

monials) of persons who did attract notice in a disreputable way, and respecting whom it would have been the kindest thing to let them be forgotten,—this is surely going a little too far.

But private friends and partizans are tempted to pursue this course by the confidence that no one will come forward to contradict them : according to the lines of Swift,—

‘ De mortuis nil nisi bonum ;  
When scoundrels die, let all bemoan ’em.’

Then, again, there are some who bestow eulogisms that are really just, on persons whom they had always been accustomed to revile, calumniate, thwart, and persecute on every occasion ; and this they seem to regard as establishing their own character for eminent generosity. Nor are they usually mistaken in their calculation ; for if not absolutely commended for their magnanimous moderation, they usually escape, at least, the well-deserved reproach for not having done justice, during his life, to the object of their posthumous praises,—for having been occupied in opposing and insulting one who—by their own showing—deserved quite contrary treatment.

It may fairly be suspected that the one circumstance respecting him which they secretly dwell on with the most satisfaction, though they do not mention it, is that he is *dead* ; and that they delight in bestowing their posthumous honours on him, chiefly because they are *posthumous* ; according to the concluding couplet in the *Verses on the Death of Dean Swift* :—

‘ And since you dread no further lashes,  
Methinks you may forgive his ashes.’

But the public is wonderfully tolerant of any persons who will but, in any way, speak favourably of the dead, even when by so doing they pronounce their own condemnation.

Sometimes, however, the opposite fault is committed. Strong party feeling will lead zealous partizans to misrepresent the conduct and character of the deceased, or to ignore (according to the modern phrase) some of the most remarkable things done by him.<sup>1</sup>

But then they generally put in for the praise of generosity by eulogizing some very insignificant acts, and thus ‘ damn with faint praise.’

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<sup>1</sup> See an instance of this alluded to in the *Remains of Bishop Copleston*, pp. 89—93.

### ESSAY III. OF UNITY IN RELIGION.

RELIGION being the chief bond of human society, it is a happy thing when itself is well contained within the true bond of unity. The quarrels and divisions about religion were evils unknown to the heathen. The reason was, because the religion of the heathen consisted rather in rites and ceremonies than in any constant belief; for you may imagine what kind of faith theirs was, when the chief doctors<sup>1</sup> and fathers of their church were the poets. But the true God hath this attribute, that He is a jealous God;<sup>2</sup> and therefore his worship and religion will endure no mixture nor partner. We shall therefore speak a few words concerning the unity of the Church; what are the fruits thereof; what the bonds; and what the means.

The fruits of unity (next unto the well-pleasing of God, which is all in all) are two; the one towards those that are without the Church, the other towards those that are within. For the former, it is certain, that heresies and schisms are of all others the greatest scandals, yea, more than corruption of manners; for as in the natural body a wound or solution of continuity<sup>3</sup> is worse than a corrupt humour, so in the spiritual: so that nothing doth so much keep men out of the Church, and drive men out of the Church, as breach of unity; and, therefore, whensoever it cometh to that pass that one saith, 'Ecce in deserto,'<sup>4</sup> another saith, 'Ecce in penetralibus,'<sup>5</sup>—that is, when some men seek Christ in the conventicles of heretics, and others in an outward face of a Church, that voice had need continually to sound in men's ears, 'Nolite exire.'<sup>6</sup> The Doctor of the Gentiles (the propriety<sup>7</sup> of whose vocation<sup>8</sup> drew him to

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<sup>1</sup> Doctors. *Teachers.* 'Sitting in the midst of the doctors.'—*Luke* ii. 46.

<sup>2</sup> *Exodus* xx. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Solution of continuity. *The destruction of the texture, or cohesion of the parts of an animal body.* 'The solid parts may be contracted by dissolving their continuity.'—*Arbuthnot.*

<sup>4</sup> 'Lo! in the desert.'

<sup>5</sup> 'Lo! in the sanctuary.'—*Matt.* xxiv. 26.

<sup>6</sup> 'Go not out.'

<sup>7</sup> Propriety. *Peculiar quality; property.*

<sup>8</sup> Vocation. *Calling; state of life and duties of the embraced profession.* 'That every member of thy holy church in his vocation and ministry.'—*Collect for Good Friday.*

have a special care of those without) saith, 'If a heathen come in, and hear you speak with several tongues, will he not say that you are mad?'<sup>1</sup> and certainly it is little better: when atheists and profane persons do hear of so many discordant and contrary opinions in religion, it doth avert<sup>2</sup> them from the Church, and maketh them 'to sit down in the chair of the scorers.'

It is but a light thing to be vouched in so serious a matter, but yet it expresseth well the deformity; there is a master of scoffing, that in his catalogue of books of a feigned library, sets down this title of a book, *The Morris Dance of Heretics*:<sup>3</sup> for, indeed, every sect of them hath a diverse<sup>4</sup> posture, or cringe,<sup>5</sup> by themselves, which cannot but move derision in worldlings and depraved politics,<sup>6</sup> who are apt to contemn holy things.

As for the fruit towards those that are within, it is peace, which containeth infinite blessings; it establisheth faith; it kindleth charity; the outward peace of the Church distilleth into peace of conscience, and it turneth the labours of writing and reading controversies into treatises of mortification<sup>7</sup> and devotion.

Concerning the bonds of unity, the true placing of them importeth<sup>8</sup> exceedingly. There appear to be two extremes; for to certain zealots all speech of pacification is odious. 'Is it peace, Jehu?' 'What hast thou to do with peace? turn thee

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xiv. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Avert. *To repel; to turn away.* 'Even cut themselves off from all opportunities of proselyting others by averting them from their company.'—*Voss.*

<sup>3</sup> Rabelais. *Pantag.* ii. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Diverse. *Different.* 'Four great beasts came up from the sea, diverse one from another.'—*Daniel* vii. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Cringe. *A bow.* Seldom used as a substantive.

'Far from me

Be fawning cringe, and false dissembling looks.'—*Phillips.*

'He is the new court-god, and well applies

With sacrifice of knees, of crooks, and cringe.'—*Ben Jonson.*

<sup>6</sup> Politics. *Politicians.* 'That which time severs and politics do for earthly advantages, we will do for spiritual.'—*Bishop Hall.*

<sup>7</sup> Mortification. *The subduing of sinful propensities.* (Our modern use never occurs in Scripture, where the word always means 'to put to death.') 'You see no real mortification, or self-denial, or eminent charity in the common lives of Christians.'—*Lowe.*

<sup>8</sup> Import. *To be of weight or consequence.*

'What else more serious

Importeth thee to know—this bears.'—*Shakespeare.*

behind me.<sup>1</sup> Peace is not the matter, but following and party. Contrariwise, certain Laodiceans and lukewarm persons think they may accommodate<sup>2</sup> points of religion by middle ways, and taking part of both, and witty<sup>3</sup> reconcilements, as if they would make an arbitrement<sup>4</sup> between God and man. Both these extremes are to be avoided; which will be done if the league of Christians, penned by our Saviour Himself, were in the two cross clauses thereof soundly and plainly expounded: 'He that is not with us is against us;' and again, 'He that is not against us is with us;' that is, if the points fundamental, and of substance in religion, were truly discerned and distinguished from points not merely<sup>5</sup> of faith, but of opinion, order, or good intention. This is a thing may seem to many a matter trivial, and done already; but if it were done less partially, it would be embraced more generally.

Of this I may give only this advice, according to my small model. Men ought to take heed of rending God's Church by two kinds of controversies; the one is, when the matter of the point controverted is too small and light, nor worth the heat and strife about it, kindled only by contradiction; for, as it is noted by one of the fathers, Christ's coat indeed had no seam, but the Church's vesture was of divers colours; whereupon he saith, 'In veste varietas sit, scissura non sit,'<sup>6</sup>—they be two things, unity, and uniformity; the other is, when the matter of the point controverted is great, but it is driven to an over-great subtilty and obscurity, so that it becometh a thing rather ingenious than substantial. A man that is of judgment and understanding shall sometimes hear ignorant men differ, and know well within himself that those which so differ mean one thing, and yet they themselves would never agree: and if it come so to pass in that

<sup>1</sup> 1 Kings ix. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Accommodate. *To reconcile what seems inconsistent.* 'Part know how to accommodate St James and St. Paul better than some late reconcilers.'—Norris.

<sup>3</sup> Witty. *Ingenious; inventive.*

'The deep-revolving witty Buckingham.'—Shakespeare.

<sup>4</sup> Arbitrement. *Final decision; judgment.*

'We of the offending side

Must keep aloof from strict arbitrements.'—Shakespeare.

<sup>5</sup> Merely. *Absolutely; purely; unreservedly* (from the Latin *merus*).

'We are merely cheated of our lives by drunkards.'—Shakespeare.

<sup>6</sup> 'Let there be variety in the robe, but let there be no rent.'

distance of judgment which is between man and man, shall we not think that God above, that knows the heart, doth not discern that frail men, in some of their contradictions, intend the same thing, and accepteth<sup>1</sup> of both? The nature of such controversies is excellently expressed by St. Paul, in the warning and precept that he giveth concerning the same, 'Devita profanas vocum novitates et oppositiones falsi nominis scientiæ.'<sup>2</sup> Men create oppositions which are not, and put them into new terms so fixed; as<sup>3</sup> whereas the meaning ought to govern the term, the term in effect governeth the meaning.

There be also two false peaces, or unities: the one, when the peace is grounded but upon an implicit ignorance; for all colours will agree in the dark: the other, when it is pieced up upon a direct admission of contraries in fundamental points; for truth and falsehood in such things are like the iron and clay in the toes of Nebuchadnezzar's image<sup>4</sup>—they may cleave but they will not incorporate.

Concerning the means of procuring unity, men must beware, that in the procuring or muniting<sup>5</sup> of religious unity, they do not dissolve and deface the laws of charity and of human society. There be two swords amongst Christians, the spiritual and the temporal, and both have their due office and place in the maintenance of religion; but we may not take up the third sword, which is Mahomet's sword, or like unto it—that is, to propagate religion by wars, or by sanguinary persecutions to force consciences—except it be in cases of overt scandal, blasphemy, or intermixture of practice against the state; much less to nourish seditions; to authorise conspiracies and rebellions; to put the sword into the people's hands, and the like, tending to the subversion of all government, which is the ordinance of God;

<sup>1</sup> Accept of. *To approve; receive favourably.* 'I will appease him with the present that goeth before me, . . . peradventure he will accept of me.'—*Gen.* xxxii.

<sup>2</sup> 'Avoid profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called.'—*1 Tim.* vi. 20.

<sup>3</sup> As. *That (denoting consequence).* 'The mariners were so conquered by the storm as they thought it best with stricken sails to yield to be governed by it.'—*Sidney.*

<sup>4</sup> *Daniel* ii. 33.

<sup>5</sup> Muniting. *The defending; fortifying.* 'By protracting of tyme, King Henry might fortify and munite all dangerous places and passages.'—*Hall.* 'All that fight against her and her munitions.'—*Jer.* xxix. 7.

'The arm our soldier,

Our steed the leg, the tongue our trumpeter,

With other muniments and petty helps.'—*Shakespeare.*

for this is but to dash the first table against the second; and so to consider men as Christians, as<sup>1</sup> we forget that they are men. Lucretius the poet, when he beheld the act of Agamemnon, that could endure the sacrificing of his own daughter, exclaimed:—

‘Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.’<sup>2</sup>

What would he have said, if he had known of the massacre in France, or the powder treason of England? He would have been seven times more epicure<sup>3</sup> and atheist than he was; for as the temporal sword is to be drawn with great circumspection in cases of religion, so it is a thing monstrous to put it into the hands of the common people; let that be left to the anabaptists and other furies. It was great blasphemy when the devil said, ‘I will ascend and be like the Highest;’ but it is greater blasphemy to personate God, and bring him in saying, ‘I will descend and be like the prince of darkness;’ and what is it better, to make the cause of religion to descend to the cruel and execrable actions of murdering princes, butchery of people, and subversion of states and governments? Surely this is to bring down the Holy Ghost, instead of the likeness of a dove, in the shape of a vulture or raven; and to set out of the bark of a Christian church, a flag of a bark of pirates and assassins: therefore it is most necessary that the Church, by doctrine and decree, princes by their sword, and all learning, both christian and moral, as by their mercury rod to damn and send to hell for ever, those facts and opinions tending to the support of the same, as hath been already in good part done. Surely in councils concerning religion, that counsel of the Apostle should be prefixed, ‘Ira hominis non implet justitiam Dei;’<sup>4</sup> and it was a notable observation of a wise father, and no less ingenuously confessed, that those which held and persuaded<sup>5</sup> pressure of consciences, were commonly interested therein themselves for their own ends.

<sup>1</sup> As. *That*. See page 23.

<sup>2</sup> ‘So many evils could religion induce.’—*Lucret.* i. 95.

<sup>3</sup> Epicure. *Epicurean*; a follower of *Epicurus*. ‘Here he describeth the fury of the *Epicures*, which is the highest and deepest mischief of all; even to contempt of the very God.’

<sup>4</sup> *Isaiah* xiv. 14.

<sup>5</sup> ‘The wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God.’—*James* i. 20.

<sup>6</sup> Persuade. *To inculcate*. ‘To children afraid of vain images, we persuade confidence by making them handle and look near such things.’—*Bishop Taylor*.



## ANNOTATIONS.

*'It is a happy thing when Religion is well contained within the true bond of unity.'*<sup>1</sup>

It is, therefore, very important to have a clear notion of the nature of the christian unity spoken of in the Scriptures, and to understand in what this 'true bond of unity' consists, so often alluded to and earnestly dwelt on by our Sacred Writers. The unity they speak of does not mean *agreement* in doctrine. nor yet concord and mutual good will; though these are strongly insisted on by the Apostles. Nor, again, does it mean that all Christians belong, or ought to belong, to some *one society on earth*. This is what the Apostles never aimed at, and what never was actually the state of things, from the time that the christian religion extended beyond the city of Jerusalem. The Church is undoubtedly *one*, and so is the human race *one*; but not as a society or community, for, as such, it is only *one* when considered as to its future existence.<sup>2</sup> The teaching of Scripture clearly is, that believers on earth are part of a great society (church or congregation), of which the Head is in heaven, and of which many of the members only 'live unto God,' or exist in his counsels,—some having long since departed, and some being not yet born. The universal Church of Christ may therefore be said to be ONE in reference to HIM, its supreme Head in heaven; but it is not *one community* on earth. And even so the human race is *one* in respect of the *One Creator and Governor*; but this does not make it *one family* or *one state*. And though all men are bound to live in *peace*, and to be kindly disposed towards every fellow creature, and all bound to *agree* in thinking and doing whatever is right, yet they are not at all bound to live under *one single government*, extending over the whole world. Nor, again, are all nations bound to have the same form of government, regal or republican, &c. That is a matter left to their discretion. But all are bound to do their best to promote the great *objects* for which all government is instituted,—good order, justice, and public prosperity.

<sup>1</sup> Great part of what follows is extracted from a Charge of some years back.

<sup>2</sup> See Bishop Hind's *History of the Origin of Christianity*. See also *Cautions for the Times*, No. 2.

And even so the Apostles founded christian churches, all based on the same principles, all sharing common privileges,—‘One Lord, one faith, one baptism,’—and all having the same object in view, but all quite independent of each other. And while, by the inspiration of Him who knew what was in Man, they delineated those christian principles which man could not have devised for himself, each Church has been left, by the same divine foresight, to make the application of those principles in its symbols, its forms of worship, and its ecclesiastical regulations; and, while steering its course by the chart and compass which his holy Word supplies, to regulate for itself the sails and rudder, according to the winds and currents it may meet with.

Now, I have little doubt that the sort of variation resulting from this independence and freedom, so far from breaking the bond, is the best preservative of it. A number of neighbouring families, living in perfect unity, will be thrown into discord as soon as you compel them to form one family, and to observe in things intrinsically indifferent, the same rules. One, for instance, likes early hours, and another late; one likes the windows open, and another shut; and thus, by being brought too close together, they are driven into ill-will, by one being perpetually forced to give way to another. Of this character were the disputations which arose (though they subsequently assumed a different character) about church music, the posture of the communicants, the colours of a minister’s dress, the time of keeping Easter, &c.

This independence of each Church is not to be confounded with the error of leaving too much to individual discretion of the minister or members of each Church. To have absolutely no terms of communion at all,—no tests of the fitness of any one to be received as a member, or a member of each Church respectively,—would be to renounce entirely the character of a christian Church; since of such a body it is plain that a Jew, a Polytheist, or an Atheist might, quite as consistently as a Christian, be a member, or even a governor. And though the Scriptures, and the Scriptures only, are to be appealed to for a decision on questions of doctrine, yet to have (as some have wildly proposed) no test of communion but the very words of Scripture, would be scarcely less extravagant than having no

test at all, since there is no one professing Christianity who does not maintain that his sentiments are in accordance with the true meaning of Scripture, however absurd or pernicious these sentiments may really be. For it is notorious that Scripture itself is at least as liable as human formularies (and indeed more so) to have forced interpretations put on its language.

Accordingly, there is no christian community which does not, in some way or other, apply some other test besides the very words of Scripture. Some churches, indeed, do not reduce any such test to writing, or express it in any *fixed* form, so as to enable every one to know beforehand precisely how much he will be required to bind himself to. But, nevertheless, these Churches do apply a test, and very often a much more stringent, elaborate, and minute test than our *Liturgy* and *Articles*. In such communities, the candidate pastor of a congregation is not, to be sure, called on to subscribe in writing a definite confession of faith, drawn up by learned and pious persons after mature deliberation, and publicly set forth by common authority,—but he is called upon to converse with the leading members of the congregation, and satisfy them as to the soundness of his views; not, of course, by merely repeating texts of Scripture—which a man of any views might do, and do honestly; but by explaining *the sense* in which he understands the Scriptures. Thus, instead of subscribing the *Thirty-nine Articles*, he subscribes the sentiments of the leading members—for the time being—of that particular congregation over which he is to be placed as teacher.<sup>1</sup>

And thus it is that tests of some kind or other, written or unwritten (that is, transmitted by oral tradition), fixed for the whole Body, or variable, according to the discretion of particular governors, are, and must be, used in every christian Church. This is doing no more than is evidently allowable and expedient. But it is quite otherwise when any Church, by an unwarrantable assumption, requires *all* who would claim

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<sup>1</sup> *Cautions for the Times*, p. 451. I have known, accordingly, a minister of a continental Protestant Church strongly object to all subscriptions to Articles, saying, that a man should only be called on to profess his belief in Jesus Christ; and yet, a few minutes afterwards, denouncing as a 'Rationalist' another Protestant minister.

the christian name to assent to her doctrines and conform to her worship, whether they approve of them or not,—to renounce all exercise of their own judgment, and to profess belief in whatever the Church has received or may hereafter receive.

*‘The religion of the heathen consisted rather in rites and ceremonies than in any constant religious belief. . . . But the true God hath this attribute,’ &c.*

Bacon here notices the characteristic that distinguishes the christian religion from the religion of the heathen. The religion of the heathen not only was not true, but was not even supported as true; it not only deserved no belief, but it demanded none. The very pretension to truth—the very demand of faith—were characteristic distinctions of Christianity. It is truth resting on evidence, and requiring belief in it, on the ground of its truth. The first object, therefore, of the adherents of such a religion must be that Truth which its divine Author pointed out as defining the very nature of his kingdom, of his objects, and of his claims. ‘For this cause came I into the world, that I might bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice.’ And if Truth could be universally attained, Unity would be attained also, since Truth is one. On the other hand, Unity may conceivably be attained by agreement in error; so that while by the universal adoption of a right faith, unity would be secured, incidentally, the attainment of unity would be no security for truth.

It is in relation to the paramount claim of truth that the view we have given of the real meaning of Church Unity in Scripture is of so much importance; for the mistake of representing it as consisting in having one community on earth, to which all Christians belong, or ought to belong, and to whose government all are bound to submit, has led to truth being made the secondary, and not the paramount, object.<sup>1</sup>

What the Romanist means by renouncing ‘private judgment’ and adhering to the decisions of the Church, is, substantially, what many Protestants express by saying, ‘We make *truth* the first and paramount object, and the others, *unity*.’ The two

<sup>1</sup> John xviii. 37.

<sup>2</sup> See *Charge on the Claims of Truth and of Unity*.

expressions, when rightly understood, denote the same; but they each require some explanation to prevent their being understood incorrectly, and even unfairly.

A Roman Catholic does exercise private judgment, once for all, if (not through carelessness, but on earnest and solemn deliberation) he resolves to place himself completely under the guidance of that Church (as represented by his priest) which he *judges* to have been divinely appointed for that purpose. And in so doing he considers himself, not as manifesting indifference about truth, but as taking the way by which he will attain either complete and universal religious truth, or at least a greater amount of it than could have been attained otherwise. To speak of such a person as indifferent about truth, would be not only uncharitable, but also as unreasonable as to suppose a man indifferent about his health, or about his property, because, distrusting his own judgment on points of medicine or of law, he places himself under the direction of those whom he has judged to be the most trustworthy physician and lawyer.

On the other hand, a Protestant, in advocating private judgment, does not, as some have represented, necessarily maintain that every man should set himself to study and interpret for himself the Scriptures (which, we should recollect, are written in the Hebrew and Greek languages), without seeking or accepting aid from any instructors, whether under the title of translators (for a *translator*, who claims no inspiration, is, manifestly, a human *instructor* of the people as to the sense of Scripture), or whether called commentators, preachers, or by whatever other name. Indeed, considering the multitude of tracts, commentaries, expositions, and discourses of various forms, that have been put forth and assiduously circulated by Protestants of all denominations, for the avowed purpose (be it well or ill executed) of giving religious instruction, it is really strange that such an interpretation as I have alluded to should ever have been put on the phrase 'private judgment.' For, to advert to a parallel case of daily occurrence, all would recommend a student of mathematics, for instance, or of any branch of natural philosophy, to seek the aid of a well-qualified professor or tutor. And yet he would be thought to have studied in vain, if he should ever think of taking *on trust* any mathematical or physical truth on the word of his instructors. It is,

on the contrary, their part to *teach him how*—by demonstration or by experiment—to verify each point for himself.

On the other hand, the adherents of a Church claiming to be infallible on all essential points, and who, consequently, profess to renounce private judgment, these (besides that, as has been just said, they cannot but judge for themselves as to *one* point—that very claim itself) have also room for the exercise of judgment, and often do exercise it, on questions as to *what* points *are* essential, and for which, consequently, infallible rectitude is insured. Thus the Jansenists, when certain doctrines were pronounced heretical by the Court of Rome, which condemned Jansenius for maintaining them, admitted, as in duty bound, the decision that they *were* heretical, but denied that they were implied in Jansenius's writings; and of this latter point the Pope, they said, was no more qualified or authorised to decide than any other man. And we should be greatly mistaken if we were to assume that all who have opposed what we are accustomed to call '*the Reformation*' were satisfied that there was nothing in their Church that needed reform, or were necessarily indifferent about the removal of abuses. We know that, on the contrary, many of them pointed out and complained of, and studied to have remedied, sundry corruptions that had crept into their Church, and which were, in many instances, sanctioned by its highest authorities.

Sincere, one must suppose, and strong, must have been the conviction of several who both did and suffered much in labouring after such remedy. And it would be absurd, as well as uncharitable, to take for granted that Erasmus, for instance, and, still more, Pascal, and all the Jansenists, were withheld merely by personal fear, or other personal motives, from revolting against the Church of Rome. But they conceived, no doubt, that what they considered Church-Unity was to be preserved at *any* cost; that a *separation* from what they regarded as the Catholic (or Universal) Church, was a greater evil than all others combined. If, without loss of unity, they could succeed in removing any of those other evils, for such a reform they would gladly labour. But, if not, to *Unity* anything and everything was to be sacrificed.

Such seems to have been the sentiment of a Roman Catholic priest, apparently a man of great simplicity of character, who,

about three or four years ago, had interviews, at his own desire, with several of our bishops. He spoke very strongly of the unseemingly and lamentable spectacle (and who could not but agree with him in thinking it?) of disunion and contention among Christ's professed followers; and he dwelt much upon the duty of earnestly praying and striving for unity.

In reference to this point, it was thought needful to remind him, that two parties, while apparently agreeing in their prayers and endeavours for unity, might possibly mean by it different things; the one understanding by it the submission of all Christians to the government of one single ecclesiastical *community on earth*; the other, merely mutual kindness and agreement in faith. Several passages of Scripture were pointed out to him, tending to prove that the churches founded by the Apostles were all quite independent of each other, or of any one central Body. To one among the many passages which go to prove this, I directed his especial attention; that in which Paul's final interview (as he believed it) with the elders of Miletus and Ephesus is recorded (*Acts xx.*). Foreseeing the dangers to which they would be exposed, even from false teachers amongst themselves, and of which he had been earnestly warning them for three years, it is inconceivable that he should not have directed them to Peter or his successors at Rome or elsewhere, if he had known of any central supreme Church, provided as an infallible guide, to whose decisions they might safely refer when doubts or disputes should arise. It follows therefore inevitably that he knew of none. But all Christians were exhorted to 'keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace.' Such unity, he was reminded (for he was formerly a minister of our Church), is the subject of a special petition in our *Prayer for all Conditions of Men*, and in several others.

It was remarked to him, that Truth had a paramount claim to be the first object; and that since Truth is one, all who reach Truth will reach Unity; but that men may, and often do, gain Unity without Truth.

He was reminded, moreover, that agreement among Christians, though an object we should wish for, and endeavour by all allowable means to promote, must, after all, depend on *others* as much as on ourselves; and our endeavour may be completely defeated through their fault: whereas truth is a benefit

—and a benefit of the first importance—to those who receive it themselves, even though they should have to lament its rejection by many others.

And it was pointed out to him, that to pray and strive for truth; and to be ever open to conviction, does not (as he seemed to imagine) imply a *wavering* faith, and an anticipation of change. When any one prints from *moveable types*, this does not imply that he has committed, or that he suspects, typographical errors, any more than if he had employed an *engraved plate*. The types are not moveable in the sense of being *loose* and liable to casual change. He may be challenging all the world to point out an error, showing that any *can* be corrected if they do detect one; though, perhaps, he is fully convinced that there are none.

He was, in conclusion, reminded that ‘no man can serve two masters;’ not because they are necessarily *opposed*, but because they are not necessarily combined, and cases may arise in which the one must give way to the other. There is no necessary opposition even between ‘God and Mammon,’ if by ‘Mammon’ we understand worldly prosperity. For it will commonly happen that a man will thrive the better in the world from the honesty, frugality, and temperance which he may be practising from higher motives. And there is not even anything necessarily wrong in aiming at temporal advantages. But whoever is resolved on obtaining wealth in one way or another (‘*si possis, recte; si non, quocunque modo, rem*’) will occasionally be led to violate duty; and he, again, who is fully bent on ‘seeking first the kingdom of God and his righteousness,’ will sometimes find himself called on to incur temporal losses. And so it is with the occasionally rival claims of Truth, and of Unity, or of any two objects which may possibly be, in some instance, opposed. We must make up our minds which is, in that case, to give way. One must be the supreme,—must be the ‘master.’

‘Either he will love the one and hate the other.’ This seems to refer to cases in which a radical opposition between the two does exist: ‘or else he will cleave to the one, and despise (*i. e.* disregard and neglect) the other.’ This latter seems to be the description of those cases in which there is no such necessary opposition; only, that cases will



sometimes arise, in which the one or the other must be disregarded.

*'When Atheists and profane persons do hear of so many and contrary opinions in religion, it doth avert them from the Church.'*

One may meet with persons, not a few, who represent religious differences as, properly speaking, *designed* by the Most High, and acceptable to Him. (See the extract from the tragedy of *Tamerlane* in the Annotations on Essay XVI.)

Thus, in a very popular children's book (and such books often make an impression which is, unconsciously, retained through life), there is a short tale of a father exhibiting to his son the diversities of worship among Christians of different denominations, and afterwards their uniting to aid a distressed neighbour. The one, he tells the child, is 'a thing in which men are born to differ; and the other, one in which they are born to agree.' Now it is true that persons of different persuasions may, and often do, agree in practising the duties of humanity. But that they do not often differ, and differ very widely, not only in their natural *conduct*, but in their *principles* of conduct, is notoriously untrue. The writer of the tale must have overlooked (or else meant his readers to overlook) the cruel abominations of Paganism, ancient and modern,—the human sacrifices offered by some Pagans—the widow-burning and other atrocities of the Hindus; and (to come to the case of professed Christians) the 'holy wars' against the Huguenots and the Vaudois, the Inquisition, and all the other instances of persecution practised as a point of christian duty. Certainly, in whatever sense it is true that men are 'born to differ' in religion, in the same sense it is true that they are 'born to differ' in their moral practice as enjoined by their religion.

Somewhat to the same purpose writes the author of an able article in the *Edinburgh Review*, and also of an article on this volume, in the *North British* (Aug. 1857, p. 6), with whom I partly agree and partly not.

This writer maintains (1) that all, or nearly all, the divisions that have existed among Christians relate to points of a profoundly mysterious, and *purely speculative* character.

(2.) That on these points the language of Scripture is so obscure or ambiguous, that we must infer the Author of the revelation to have *designed* that it should receive different interpretations; while, on all matters of practical morality, the language is too plain to admit of doubt or difference of opinion.

(3.) That the dissent and schisms arising from diversity of interpretations of Scripture are on the whole beneficial; because, the union of great masses of men in one community does not tend to their improvement, but the contrary.

(4.) That the inexpediency of persecution may be demonstrated by an argument of universal application,—one to which a Mahometan or a Pagan must yield, as well as a Roman Catholic or a Protestant; namely, the impossibility of demonstrating that what is persecuted is really error.

With all this, as I have said, I partly concur, and partly not.

(I.) It is very true, and is a truth which I have most earnestly dwelt on in many publications, that what is *practical* in the christian revelation is clearly, and fully, and frequently set forth; and that, on matters more of a speculative character, we find in Scripture only slight and obscure hints.<sup>1</sup>

But nevertheless it cannot be admitted that no passages of a practical character have been variously interpreted; or that all, or nearly all, or all the most important, of the differences that have divided Christians, relate to questions purely speculative. Take, as one instance, that very early and very widespread heresy, of the Gnostics; most of whom were rank Antinomians, teaching that they, as ‘knowing the Gospel’—(whence their name),—were exempt from all moral duty, and would be accounted righteous by imputation, without ‘doing righteousness.’<sup>2</sup>

These, John in his Epistles manifestly had in view; and no doubt Peter also, when he speaks of those who ‘wrest the Scriptures,’ especially Paul’s Epistles, ‘to their own destruction.’ They, doubtless, as well as their successors (for, under various names Antinomians have always arisen from time to

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<sup>1</sup> This circumstance is pointed out as characteristic of our religion, in the Essay (1st Series) on the ‘*Practical Character of Revelation*,’ and also in the Lectures on ‘*A Future State*.’

<sup>2</sup> See *John*, Epis. i.

time, down to this day'), interpreted in their own way Paul's doctrine that we 'are justified by faith, without the works of the law.' Considering how earnestly that Apostle dwells on the necessity of 'denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, and living soberly and righteously,' it may seem very strange that his language should have been thus 'wrested;' and that he should have been thought to be speaking of himself individually, in his then-state, as being 'carnal, sold under sin,' when he had just before been congratulating his hearers on being 'made free from sin,' and just after, speaks of his walking 'not after the flesh, but after the spirit.'

But the fact, however strange, cannot be denied. And it is as to the matter of *fact* that the question now is. For if it be said that such and such passages are not 'susceptible of various interpretations' according to *reasonable principles*, this is what most of the contending parties will be disposed to say, each, of the texts they appeal to. They usually maintain, that to a *fair and intelligent* judge they do *not* admit of any interpretation but that which they themselves adopt. We can only reply, that, in point of *fact* they *have* been variously interpreted. It is probable, indeed, that, in very many instances, the various interpretations of Scripture have been not the *cause*, but the *effect* of men's differences; and that, having framed certain theories according to their own inclinations or fancies, they have then sought to force Scripture into a support of these. But still the fact remains, that men have differed in their interpretations of Scripture, on the most important *practical* questions.

Again, those Anabaptists who taught community of goods, and who were thus striking at the root of all civil society, made their appeal to Scripture.<sup>1</sup> So also do those who teach the doctrine of complete non-resistance; the consequence of which, if adopted by any one nation, would be to give up the peaceable as a prey to their unscrupulous neighbours. And so again do those who advocate vows of celibacy.<sup>2</sup>

Again, the Scripture-exhortations to 'unity' have been interpreted by some as requiring all Christians to live under a single

<sup>1</sup> See *Cautions for the Times*, No. 26.

<sup>2</sup> *Rom.* viii.

<sup>3</sup> *Acts* iv., xix., *Matt.* xxiv., and *Mark* x. 21.

<sup>4</sup> *Matt.* xix. 12, and *1 Cor.* vii.

ecclesiastical government; and the passages relating to the Church,<sup>1</sup> and to the powers conferred on the Apostles, as obliging us to renounce all private judgment, and submit implicitly to whatever is decreed by the (supposed) Catholic Church. Now this is most emphatically a practical question, since it involves, not this or that particular point of practice, but an indefinite number. Those who adopt the above interpretations must be prepared to acquiesce, at the bidding of their ecclesiastical rulers, in *any* the most gross superstitions and the most revolting moral corruptions, however disapproved by their own judgment, rather than exclude themselves (as they think) altogether from the Gospel-covenant.

And the difference between Christians as to this point, which for so many ages has divided so many millions, may be considered as not only the most important of all the divisions that have ever existed, but even greater than all the rest put together.

It cannot, therefore, be admitted that the practical precepts of Scripture have never admitted of various interpretations; or that the questions of doctrine on which Christians have been opposed are of a purely speculative character.

The difference, again, between the Christians and the unbelieving Jews, which is, emphatically, on a practical point, turns on the interpretations of the Scripture-prophecies; which the Jews of old (as at this day also) interpreted as relating to a Messiah who should be a great temporal prince and deliverer. And it was on that ground that they put to death the Lord Jesus as a blasphemous impostor. Indeed, a modern writer (speaking, we may presume, in bitter irony, and meaning a scoff at Christians) represents that murder as '*no crime*,' because by the sacrifice of Christ mankind were redeemed.

However clear to *us* may be the prophecies of a suffering Messiah, it cannot be said, looking to the *fact*, that 'they admit of no differences of interpretation.' And it is conceivable that they *might* have been so expressed as to force all men into the reception of Jesus; if, at least, there had been also such '*signs from Heaven*' as they looked for;—if, that is, He had been seen descending from the clouds, accompanied by Moses and

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<sup>1</sup> *Matt.* xvi. 18, and xviii. 17.

Elias, in the splendour which He displayed to three Apostles at the Transfiguration;—and if He had always appeared surrounded by a supernatural light (called a *GLORY*) as painters are accustomed to represent Him, and as He appeared to John the Baptist.

But as it is, 'because they knew Him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets, which are read every Sabbath day, they fulfilled them in condemning Him.'

(II.) I most fully admit that, in things confessedly beyond human reason, we ought to acquiesce in the scanty and obscure intimations given us in Revelation; not presuming to frame, on such points, explanations of what Scripture has left unexplained; nor (much less) to condemn, as unhappily has so often been done, our fellow-Christians who may reject those explanations; and on such grounds to create hostile separation.

But it is surely rash to pronounce that such separations were, properly speaking, *designed*; or, on any point, to draw inferences as to the Divine WILL from conjectures of our own, based on the events that actually take place. For, in a certain sense, it may be said that whatever happens must be according to the Will of the Most High, since He does not interpose to prevent it. But 'in our doings' (as is expressed in the 17th Article) 'that Will of God is to be followed which is expressly declared in Scripture.'

'It must needs be,' says our Lord, 'that offences come; but woe unto that man by whom the offence cometh.' And Paul, who tells his converts, that 'there must be heresies, that they who are approved may be made manifest,' bids them, nevertheless, 'reject a man that is an heretic.'

As for the analogy of a prince or master who, the reviewer says, always endeavours to give unmistakable directions, Bishop Butler has touched it very well when he says,<sup>2</sup> 'The reason why a prince would give his directions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires such an *external action* should be *done*, without concerning himself with the motive or principle on which it is done: *i.e.*, he regards only the external event, or the thing's being *done*, and not at all the *doing* it, or the *action*. Whereas, the whole of morality and religion consisting

<sup>1</sup> *Acts* xiii. 27.

<sup>2</sup> *Analogy*, part ii. chap. vi. p. 247, Fitzgerald's edition.

merely in *action* itself, there is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if the prince be supposed to regard only the action, —*i.e.*, only to desire to exercise, or in any way prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant, he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner.'

But as for the question why a state of trial does exist—why earth is not heaven—why any evil is permitted in the universe, —Bishop Butler had too much sense and modesty to attempt any solution.

(III.) I fully concur with the reviewer in disapproving of the union of vast masses of mankind under one government, ecclesiastical or civil. And in some instances, where men were so wedded to the erroneous view above alluded to, of the character of Christian 'unity,' as to think that the combining of all Christians in a single community on earth is a thing to be aimed at, their doctrinal disagreements, which prevented this, may have incidentally proved a benefit. But it is a mistake to suppose that there is no alternative but such a *combination*, or else, hostile separation and *opposition*. Considering, indeed, how many religious Bodies of Dissenters there are among us, and that all Protestants are *dissenters* from the Church of Rome—revolted subjects who have renounced their subjection,—it is not, perhaps, to be wondered that the two ideas, of independent *distinctness*, and of *disagreement*, which have no necessary connexion, should have become associated in men's minds.<sup>1</sup> But the Apostles, who certainly did not encourage diversities of doctrine, founded numerous distinct Churches, several even in the same province; which, though not at all at variance, were not placed under any common authority on earth, except that of the individual Apostle who founded them. And in the earliest ages the christian Churches were reckoned by hundreds. It was in later times, and very gradually, that the claims of Rome, and of Constantinople, to universal supremacy, were admitted.

And in the present day, the American Episcopalian Church is kept apart from our own, not by difference of doctrine, but simply by being American. The Churches of Sweden and of Denmark, again, and of some other Protestant States, are not,

<sup>1</sup> I have treated fully of this point in the *Lessons on Religious Worship*. lesson x.

I believe, at all *at variance* with each other, though not subject to any common government.

(IV.) I am as fully convinced as the reviewer that no uninspired man can justly pretend to infallible certainty as to what opinions are erroneous. But (1) no argument drawn from man's fallibility can at all avail to repress persecution, except with those who *acknowledge* fallibility. And it is well known that Churches comprising a majority of the christian world do lay claim to an unerring certainty in matters of doctrine. So that, with them, the argument which it is alleged all must admit, would have no force at all. To tell a Roman Catholic to admit that his Church can have no certainty as to what is or is not an error, would be simply telling him to *cease* to be a Roman Catholic.

If, however, all that is meant is that, however certain we may be, ourselves, we cannot always demonstrate to *others*—to the very persons in error—that their opinions *are* wrong, the persecutor would answer that since he cannot convince them, he must be content to make sure, in some way, whether by their death, banishment, incarceration, or otherwise, that they shall be effectually prevented from *propagating* their errors.

But (2) even if a ruler admits himself to be not completely infallible, still the above argument will not preclude persecution. As I observed in a former work,<sup>1</sup> 'In protesting against the claim of the civil magistrate to prescribe to his subjects what shall be their religious faith, I have confined myself to the consideration that such a decision is *beyond the province* of a secular ruler; instead of dilating, as some writers have done, on the impossibility of having any ruler whose judgment shall be *infallible*. That infallibility cannot be justly claimed by uninspired Man, is indeed very true, but nothing to the present purpose. A man may claim—as the Apostles did—infallibility in matters of faith, without thinking it allowable to enforce conformity by secular coercion; and, again, on the other hand, he may think it right to employ that coercion, without thinking himself infallible. In fact, *all* legislators do this in respect of temporal concerns; such as confessedly come within the province of human legislation. Much as we have heard of *religious*

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<sup>1</sup> *Essays on the Dangers to Christian Faith*, essay v. § 11. Third edition.

infallibility, no one, I conceive, ever pretended to universal *legislative* infallibility. And yet every legislature enforces obedience, under penalties, to the laws it enacts in civil and criminal transactions; not, on the ground of their supposing themselves exempt from error of judgment; but because they are bound to legislate—though conscious of being fallible—according to the best of their judgment; and to enforce obedience to each law till they shall see cause to repeal it. What should hinder them, if religion be one of the things coming within their province, from enforcing (on the same principle) conformity to their enactments respecting that? A lawgiver sees the expediency of a uniform rule, with regard, suppose, to weights and measures, or to the descent of property; he frames, without any pretensions to infallibility, the *best* rule he can think of; or, perhaps, merely a rule which he thinks as good as any other; and enforces uniform compliance with it: this being a matter confessedly within his province. Now if religion be so too, he may feel himself called on to enforce uniformity in that also; not believing himself infallible either in matters of faith or in matters of expediency; but holding himself bound, in each case alike, to frame such enactments as are in his judgment advisable, and to enforce compliance with them; as King James in his prefatory proclamation respecting the Thirty-nine Articles, announces his determination to allow of ‘no departure from them whatever.’ I do not conceive that he thought himself gifted with infallibility; but that he saw an advantage in religious *uniformity*, and therefore held himself authorized and bound to enforce it by the power of the secular magistrate. The whole question therefore turns, not on any claim to infallibility, but on the extent of the *province of the civil magistrate*, and of the applicability of legal coercion, or of exclusion from civil rights.’—[pp. 157, 8.]

And it may be added that (as I have elsewhere remarked)<sup>1</sup> a ruler who believed in no religion, as probably was the case with many of the ancient heathen lawgivers, might yet, like them, think the established religion a useful thing to keep the vulgar in awe, and might, on grounds of expediency, enforce conformity.

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<sup>1</sup> See Essay i. *On the Kingdom of Christ.*



*'It is certain, that heresies and schisms are, of all others, the greatest scandals.'*

*'Nothing doth so much keep men out of the Church, and drive men out of the Church, as breach of unity.'*

If proof of the truth of Bacon's remark were needed, it might be found in the fact, that among the more immediate causes of the stationary, or even receding, condition of the Reformation, for nearly three centuries,—a condition so strangely at variance with the anticipations excited in both friends and foes by its first rapid advance,—the one which has been most frequently remarked upon is the contentions among Protestants, who, soon after the first outbreak of the revolt from Rome, began to expend the chief part of their energies in contests with *each other*; and often showed more zeal, and even fiercer hostility, against rival-Protestants, than against the systems and the principles which they agreed in condemning. The adherents of the Church of Rome, on the contrary, are ready to waive all internal differences, and unite actively, as against a common enemy, in opposing the Greek Church, and all denominations of Protestants. They are like a disciplined army under a single supreme leader; in which, whatever jealousies and dissensions may exist among the individual officers and soldiers, every one is at his post whenever the trumpet gives the call to arms, and the whole act as one man against the hostile army. Protestants, on the contrary, labour under the disadvantages which are well known in military history, of an *allied* army—a host of *confederates*,—who are often found to forget the common cause, and desert, or even oppose one another.

Hence, it is continually urged against the Reformed Churches, 'See what comes of allowing private judgment in religion. Protestants, who profess to sacrifice everything to truth, do not, after all, attain it, for if they did, they would all (as has been just observed) be *agreed*. The exercise of their private judgment does but expose them to the disadvantages of divisions, without, after all, securing to them an infallible certainty of attaining truth; while those who submit to the decisions of one supreme central authority, have at least the advantage of being united against every common adversary.'

And this advantage certainly does exist, and ought not to be

denied, or kept out of sight. The principle is indeed sound, of making truth, as embraced on sincere conviction, the first object, and unity a secondary one; and if Man were a less imperfect Being than he is, all who adhered to that principle would, as has been said, be agreed and united; and truth and rectitude would have their natural advantages over their opposites. But as it is, what we generally find, is truth mixed with human error, and general religion tainted with an alloy of human weaknesses and prejudices. And this it is that gives a certain degree of advantage to any system—whether in itself true or false—which makes union, and submission to a supreme authority on earth, the first point.

If you exhort men to seek *truth*, and to embrace what, on deliberate examination, they are convinced *is* truth, they may follow this advice, and yet—considering what Man *is*—may be expected to arrive at different conclusions. But if you exhort them to agree, and with that view, to make a compromise,—each consenting (like the Roman Triumvirs of old, who sacrificed to each other's enmity their respective friends) to *proscribe* some of their own convictions,—then, if they follow this advice, the end sought will be accomplished.

But surely the advantages, great as they are, of union, are too dearly purchased at such a price; since, besides the possibility that men may be united in what is erroneous and wrong in itself, there is still this additional evil—and this should be remembered above all,—that whatever absolute truth there may be in what is assented to on such a principle, it is not truth *to* those who assent to it not on conviction, but for union's sake. And what is in itself right to be done, is wrong *to* him who does it without the approbation of his own judgment, at the bidding of others, and with a view to their co-operation. On the other hand, the unity—whether among all Christians, or any portion of them—which is the result of their all holding the same truth,—this unity is not the less perfect from its being incidental, and not the primary object aimed at, and to which all else was to be sacrificed. But those who have only incidentally adhered to what is in itself perfectly right, may be themselves wrong; even to a greater degree than those who may have fallen into error on some points, but who are on the whole sincere votaries of truth.

Another disadvantage that is to be weighed against the advantages of an unity based on implicit submission to a certain supreme authority, is that the adherents of such a system are deprived of the character of *witnesses*.

When a man professes, and we are unable to disprove the sincerity of the profession, that he has been, on examination, convinced of the truth of a certain doctrine, he is a *witness* to the force of the reasons which have convinced him. But those who take the contrary course give, in reality, no testimony at all, except to the fact that they have received so and so from their guide. They are like copies of some printed document (whether many or few, makes no difference), struck off from the same types, and which consequently can have no more weight as evidence, than one. So also, the shops supply us with abundance of busts and prints of some eminent man, 'all striking likenesses—of each other.'

If there were but a hundred persons in all the world who professed to have fully convinced themselves, independently of each other's authority, of the truth of a certain conclusion, and these were men of no more than ordinary ability, their declaration would have incalculably more weight than that of a hundred millions, even though they were the most sagacious and learned men that ever existed, maintaining the opposite conclusion, but having previously resolved to forego all exercise of their own judgment, and to receive implicitly what is dictated to them. For, the testimony (to use a simple and obvious illustration) of even a small number of *eye-witnesses* of any transaction, even though possessing no extraordinary powers of vision, would outweigh that of countless millions who should have resolved to close their eyes, and to receive and retail the report they heard from a single individual.

So important in giving weight to testimony, is the absence of all concert, or suspicion of concert, that probably one of the causes which induced the Apostles, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, to found *several* distinct and independent Churches, instead of a single community under one government on earth, was, the increased assurance thus afforded of the doctrines and of the Canon of Scripture received by all. For, it was not—as some have imagined—any General Council or Synod of the Universal Church, that determined what books and what doc-

trines should be received. No one of the early General Councils did more than declare what *had* been already received by the spontaneous decision of each of many distinct Churches,—which had thus borne, long before, their independent testimony to the books and the doctrines of Christ's inspired servants.

So well is all this understood by crafty controversialists, that they usually endeavour to represent all who chance to agree in maintaining what *they* would oppose, as belonging to some *School*, Party, or Association of some kind, and in some way *combined*, and acting in concert; and this when there is no proof, or shadow of proof, of any such combination, except coincidence of opinion. They are represented (to serve a purpose) as *disciples* of such and such a leader. But 'there are three senses in which men are sometimes called 'disciples' of any other person; (1.) *incorrectly*, from their simply maintaining something that he maintains, without any profession or proof of its being *derived* from him. Thus, Augustine was a predestinarian, and so was Mahomet; yet no one supposes that the one derived his belief from the other. It is very common, however, to say of another, that he is an Arian, Athanasian, Socinian, &c., which tends to mislead, unless it is admitted, or can be proved, that he learnt his opinions from this or that master. (2.) When certain persons *avow* that they have *adopted* the views of another, not however on his authority, but from holding them to be agreeable to reason or to Scripture; as the Platonic, and most other philosophical sects: the Lutherans, Zuinglians, &c. (3.) When, like the disciples of Jesus, and, as it is said, of the Pythagoreans, and the adherents of certain Churches, they profess to receive their system *on the authority* of their master or Church; to acquiesce in an 'ipse-dixit;' or, to receive all that the Church receives. These three senses should be carefully kept distinct.'<sup>1</sup>

One of the earliest of the assailants of Bishop Hampden's *Bampton Lectures* (a writer who afterwards seceded openly to Rome) distinctly asserted that Dr. H., Dr. Arnold, Dr. Hinds, Mr. Blanco White, and Archbishop Whately were 'united in the closest bonds of private friendship, as well as of agreement in doc-

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<sup>1</sup> Eden's *Theol. Dict.*, Art. 'Disciplea.'

trine.' Whether this was a *known* falsehood, or a mere random assertion, thrown out without any knowledge at all about the matter, one cannot decide. But the *fact* is, that Dr. Arnold never had any close intimacy with Dr. Hampden; and with Dr. Hinds, and Mr. B. White,—he had not so much as a visiting acquaintance !<sup>1</sup>

Now though the alleged 'private friendship'—had it existed—would have been nothing in itself blameable, one may easily see the purpose of the fabrication. That purpose evidently was, to impair in some degree the independent testimony of the persons mentioned, as to the points wherein they coincided, by insinuating that they had *conspired* together to found some kind of school or party; and that, in furtherance of such a plan, they might possibly have been biassed in their several judgments, or have made something of a compromise.

How very probable such a result is, was strikingly shown, shortly after, by the formation of the 'Tract-party.' Of the persons who (deliberately and avowedly) combined for the purpose of advocating certain principles, some—as they themselves subsequently declared—disapproved of much that was put forth in several of the *Tracts for the Times*, yet thought it best to suppress their disapprobation, and to continue to favour the publication, till the advocacy of unsound views had reached an alarming height.

The ingenuity displayed in many of those Tracts has given currency to doctrines in themselves open to easy refutation; and the high character for learning of some of the writers, doubtless contributed to their success; but their being known to have combined together ('*conspired*,' is the term used by one of themselves) for the propagation of certain doctrines agreed upon, took off just so much of the weight of their authority.

And when ministers of the Church of England, and Moravians, and Lutherans, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Congregationalists, &c., are, all and each, *without any concert*, teaching to their respective congregations certain fundamental Christian doctrines, this their concurrence furnishes a strong presumption in favour of those doctrines. Of these religious communities, some coincide on all fundamental points, while

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<sup>1</sup> See Letter on the *Church and the Universities*.

others, unhappily, are, on many important points, opposed to each other: but as long as they are independent of each other, their spontaneous coincidence, where they do coincide, gives great weight to their testimony. But if they formally combine together (in an Association, Alliance, Party, or whatever else it may be called), and pledge themselves to each other to propagate these doctrines, the presumption is proportionably weakened.

It is very strange, that some persons, not deficient, generally, in good sense, should fail to perceive the consequences of thus setting up what is in reality, though not in name, a new *Church*. Besides that, under a specious appearance of promoting union among Christians, it tends to foster *dis*-union and dissension in each Church, between those who do, and who do not, enrol themselves as members—besides this, the force of the spontaneous and independent testimony of members of distinct Churches, is, in great measure, destroyed, by the unwise means for strengthening it.

It is important that we should be fully aware, not only of the advantages which undoubtedly are obtained by this kind of union, but also of its disadvantages; for neither belong exclusively to any particular Church, or other community, but to every kind of Party, Association, Alliance, or by whatever other name it may be called, in which there is an express or understood obligation on the members to give up, or to suppress, their own convictions, and submit to the decisions of the leader or leaders under whom they are to act.

This principle of sacrificing truth to unity, creeps in gradually. The sacrifice *first* demanded, in such cases, is, in general, not a great one. Men are led on, step by step, from silence as to some mistake, to connivance at fallacies, and thence to suppression, and then to misrepresentation, of truth; and ultimately to the support of known falsehood.

It is scarcely necessary to say that I do not advocate the opposite extreme,—the too common practice of exaggerating differences, or setting down all who do not completely concur in all our views as ‘infidels,’ as ‘altogether heterodox,’ &c. The right maxim is one that we may borrow from Shakespere: ‘Nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in malice.’ But it is worth remarking, that what may be called the two opposite

extremes, in this matter, are generally found *together*. For it is the tendency of party spirit to pardon *anything* in those who heartily support the party, and *nothing* in those who do not.

*'Men ought to take heed of rending God's Church by two kinds of controversies.'*

Controversy, though always an evil in itself, is sometimes a necessary evil. To give up anything worth contending about, in order to prevent hurtful contentions, is, for the sake of extirpating noxious weeds, to condemn the field to perpetual sterility. Yet, if the principle that it is an evil only to be incurred when necessary for the sake of some important good, were acted upon, the two classes of controversies mentioned by Bacon would certainly be excluded. The first, controversy on subjects too deep and mysterious, is indeed calculated to gender strife. For, in a case where correct knowledge is impossible to any, and where all are, in fact, in the wrong, there is but little likelihood of agreement; like men who should rashly venture to explore a strange land in utter darkness, they will be scattered into a thousand devious paths. The second class of subjects that would be excluded by this principle, are those which relate to matters too minute and trifling. For it should be remembered that not only does every question that can be raised lead to differences of opinion, disputes, and parties, but also that the violence of the dispute, and the zeal and bigoted spirit of the party, are not at all proportioned to the importance of the matter at issue. The smallest spark, if thrown among very combustible substances, may raise a formidable conflagration. Witness the long and acrimonious disputes which distracted the Church concerning the proper time for the observance of Easter, and concerning the use of leavened or unleavened bread at the Lord's Supper. We of the present day, viewing these controversies from a distance, with the eye of sober reason, and perceiving of how little consequence the points of dispute are in themselves, provided they be so fixed as to produce a decent uniformity, at least among the members of each Church, can hardly bring ourselves to believe that the most important doctrines of the Gospel were never made the subject of more eager contentions than such trifles as these; and that for these

the peace and unity of the Church were violated, and Christian charity too often utterly destroyed. But we should not forget that human nature is still the same as it ever was; and that though the controversies of one age may often appear ridiculous in another, the disposition to contend about trifles may remain unchanged.<sup>1</sup>

Not only, however, should we avoid the risk of causing needless strife by the discussion of such questions as are *in themselves* trifling, but those also are to be regarded as *to us* insignificant, which, however curious, sublime, and interesting, can lead to no practical result, and have no tendency to make us better Christians, but are merely matters of speculative curiosity. Paul is frequent and earnest in his exhortations to his converts to confine themselves to such studies as tend to the edification of the Church,—the increase of the fruits of the Spirit,—the conversion of infidels,—and the propagation of the essential doctrines of the Gospel. And these doctrines are all of a *practical* tendency. While all the systems framed by human superstition, enthusiasm, and imposture, whether Pagan, Romish, or Mahometan, abound, as might be expected, in mythological fables and marvellous legends, it is one of the most remarkable characteristics of the true religion, that it reveals nothing that is not practically important for us to know with a view to our salvation. Our religion, as might no less be expected of one which comes not from man, but from God, reveals to us, not the philosophy of the human mind in itself, nor yet the philosophy of the divine Nature in itself, but (that which is properly religion) the relation and connection of the two Beings;—what God is *to us*,—what He has done, and will do for us,—and what we are to be and to do, in regard to Him.

Bacon, doubtless, does not mean to preclude all thought or mention of any subject connected with religion, whose practical utility we are unable to point out. On the contrary, he elsewhere urges us to pursue truth, without always requiring to perceive its practical application. But *all controversy*, and everything that is likely, under existing circumstances, to lead to controversy, on such points, must be carefully avoided.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Lessons on Religious Worship*.



When once a flame is kindled, we cannot tell how far it may extend. And since, though we may be *allowed*, we cannot be *bound* in duty to discuss speculative points of theology, the blame of occasioning needless dissension must lie with those who so discuss them as to incur a risk that hostile parties may arise out of their speculations.

*'Men create oppositions which are not, and put them into new terms so fixed, as whereas the meaning ought to govern the term, the term in effect governeth the meaning.'*

So important are words in influencing our thoughts, and so common is the error of overlooking their importance, that we cannot give too much heed to this caution of Bacon as to our use of language in religious discussion. The rules most important to be observed are, first, to be aware of the *ambiguity* of words, and watchful against being misled by it; since the *same* word not only may, but often must, be used to express *different* meanings; and so common a source of dissension is the mistake hence arising of the meaning of others, that the word *misunderstanding* is applied to disagreements in general: secondly (since, on the other hand, the *same* meaning may be expressed by *different* words), to guard against attaching too great importance to the use of any particular term: and lastly, to avoid, as much as possible, introducing or keeping up the use of any peculiar *set* of words and phrases, any '*fixed terms*,' as Bacon calls them, as the badge of a party.

A neglect of this last rule, it is obvious, must greatly promote causeless divisions and all the evils of party-spirit. Any system appears the more distinct from all others, when provided with a distinct, regular, technical phraseology, like a corporate Body, with its coat of arms and motto. By this means, over and above all the real differences of opinion which exist, a fresh cause of opposition and separation is introduced among those who would perhaps be found, if their respective statements were candidly explained, to have in their tenets no real ground of disunion. Nor will the consequences of such divisions be as trifling as their causes; for when parties are once firmly established and arrayed against each other, their opposition will usually increase; and the differences between them, which were

originally little more than imaginary, may in time become serious and important. Experience would seem to teach us that the technical terms which were introduced professedly for the purpose of putting down heresies as they arose, did but serve rather to multiply heresies. This, at least, is certain, that as scientific theories and technical phraseology gained currency, party animosity raged the more violently. Those who, having magnified into serious evils by injudicious opposition, heresies in themselves insignificant, appealed to the magnitude of those evils to prove that their opposition was called for: like unskilful physicians, who, when by violent remedies they have aggravated a trifling disease into a dangerous one, urge the violence of the symptoms which they themselves have produced, in justification of their practice. They employed that violence in the cause of what they *believed* to be divine truth, which Jesus Himself and his Apostles expressly forbade in the cause of what they *knew* to be divine truth. 'The servant of the Lord,' says Paul, 'must not strive, but be gentle unto all men, in meekness instructing them that oppose themselves, if God, peradventure, will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth.'<sup>1</sup>

On the whole, there is nothing that more tends to deprave the moral sense than Party, because it supplies that *sympathy* for which Man has a natural craving. To any one unconnected with Party, the temptations of personal interest or gratification are in some degree checked by the disapprobation of those around him. But a partizan finds himself surrounded by persons most of whom, though perhaps not unscrupulous in their private capacity, are prepared to *keep him in countenance* in much that is unjustifiable,—to overlook or excuse almost anything in a zealous and efficient partizan,—and even to applaud what in another they would condemn, so it does but promote some party-object. For, Party corrupts the conscience, by making almost all virtues flow, as it were, in *its own channel*. Zeal for truth becomes, gradually, zeal for the watchword—the shibboleth—of the party; justice, mercy, benevolence, are all limited to the members of that party, and are censured if extended to those of the opposite party, or (which is usually even

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<sup>1</sup> 2 Tim. xi. 25.

more detested) those of no party. Candour is made to consist in putting the best construction on all that comes from one side, and the worst on all that does not. Whatever is wrong, in any member of the party, is either boldly denied, in the face of all evidence, or vindicated, or passed over in silence; and whatever is, or can be brought to appear, wrong on the opposite side, is readily credited, and brought forward, and exaggerated. The principles of conduct originally the noblest,—disinterested self-devotion, courage, and active zeal,—Party perverts to its own purposes: veracity, submissive humility, charity—in short, every christian virtue,—it enlists in its cause, and confines within its own limits; and the conscience becomes gradually so corrupted that it becomes a guide to evil instead of good. The ‘light that is in us becomes darkness.’<sup>1</sup>

*‘We may not take up Mahomet’s sword, or like unto it; that is, to propagate religion by wars, or by sanguinary persecutions to force consciences.’*

Although Bacon thus protests against the ‘forcing of men’s consciences,’ yet I am not quite sure, whether he fully embraced the principle that *all* secular coercion, small or great, in what regards religious faith, is contrary to the spirit of Christianity; and that a man’s religion, as long as he conducts himself as a peaceable and good citizen, does not fall *within the province of the civil magistrate*. Bacon speaks with just horror of ‘*sanguinary persecutions*.’ Now, *any* laws that can be properly called ‘sanguinary’—any undue severity—should be deprecated in *all* matters whatever; as if, for example, the penalty of death should be denounced for stealing a pin. But if religious truth does properly fall within the province of the civil magistrate,—if it be the office of government to provide for the *good* of the subjects, universally, including that of their souls, the rulers can have no more right to tolerate heresy, than theft or murder. They may plead that the propagation of false doctrine—that is, what is contrary to what *they* hold to be true,—is the worst kind of robbery, and is a murder of the soul. On that supposition, therefore, the degree of severity of the penalty denounced

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<sup>1</sup> See Annotations on Essay XXXIX.

against religious offences, whether it shall be death, or exile, or fine, or imprisonment, or any other, becomes a mere political question, just as in the case of the penalties for other crimes.'<sup>1</sup>

But if, on the contrary, we are to understand and comply with, in the simple and obvious sense, our Lord's injunction to 'render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's;' and his declaration that his 'kingdom is not of this world;' and if we are to believe his Apostles sincere in renouncing, on behalf of themselves and their followers, all design of propagating their faith by secular force, or of monopolizing for Christians as such, or for any particular denomination of Christians, secular power and political rights, then, *all* penalties and privations, great or small, inflicted on purely religious grounds, must be equally of the character of persecution (though all are not equally *severe* persecution), and all alike unchristian. Persecution, in short, is not wrong *because* it is cruel, but it is cruel *because* it is wrong.'<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The following is an extract from a *Protestant* book, published a few years ago:—'The magistrate who restrains, coerces, or punishes one who is propagating a true religion, opposes himself to God, and is a persecutor; but the magistrate who restrains, coerces, or punishes one who is propagating a false religion, obeys the command of God, *and is not a persecutor.*'

This is a doctrine which every persecutor in the world would fully admit.

<sup>2</sup> See Essay 'On Persecution,' 3rd Series.

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## ESSAY IV. OF REVENGE.

REVENGE is a kind of wild justice, which the more Man's nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out; for as for the first wrong, it does but offend the law; but the revenge of that wrong putteth the law out of office. Certainly, in taking revenge a man is but even with his enemy, but in passing it over he is superior; for it is a prince's part to pardon: and Solomon, I am sure, saith, 'It is the glory of a man to pass by an offence.' That which is past is gone and irrecoverable, and wise men have enough to do with things present and to come; therefore they do but trifle with themselves, that labour in past matters. There is no man doth a wrong for the wrong's sake, but thereby to purchase himself profit, or pleasure, or honour, or the like; therefore why should I be angry with a man for loving himself better than me? And if any man should do wrong, merely out of ill-nature, why, yet it is but like the thorn or brier, which prick and scratch, because they can do no other. The most tolerable sort of revenge is for those wrongs which there is no law to remedy: but then, let a man take heed the revenge be such as there is no law to punish; else a man's enemy is still beforehand, and it is two for one.

Some, when they take revenge, are desirous the party should know whence it cometh: this is the more generous; for the delight seemeth to be not so much in doing the hurt, as in making the party repent: but base and crafty cowards are like the arrow that flieth in the dark.

Cosmus, Duke of Florence, had a desperate saying against perfidious or neglecting<sup>2</sup> friends, as if those wrongs were unpardonable. 'You shall read,' saith he, 'that we are commanded to forgive our enemies, but you never read that we are commanded to forgive our friends.' But yet the spirit of Job<sup>3</sup> was in a better tune: 'Shall we,' saith he, 'take good at God's hands, and not be content to take evil also?' and so of friends in a proportion. This is certain, that a man that studieth revenge keeps his own wounds green, which otherwise would

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Proverbs xix. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Neglecting. *Neglectful; negligent.*

<sup>3</sup> Job ii. 10.

heal and do well. Public revenges are for the most part fortunate; as that for the death of Cæsar; for the death of Pertinax; for the death of Henry III. of France; and many more. But in private revenges it is not so; nay, rather vindictive persons live the life of witches, who, as they are mischievous, so end they unfortunate.

## ANTITHETA ON REVENGE.

## PRO.

‘Vindicta privata, justitia agrestis.  
‘*Private revenge is wild justice.*’

‘Qui vim rependit, legem tantum violat, non hominem.

‘*He who returns violence for violence, offends against the law only — not against the individual.*’

‘Utilis metus ultionis privatis; nam leges nimium sæpe dormiunt.

‘*Private vengeance inspires a salutary fear, as the laws too often slumber.*’<sup>1</sup>

## CONTRA.

‘Qui injuriam fecit, principium malo dedit; qui reddidit, modum abstulit.

‘*He who has committed an injury has made a beginning of evil; he who returns it, has taken away all limit from it.*’

‘Vindicta, quo magis naturalis, eo magis coercenda.

‘*The more natural revenge is to man, the more it should be repressed.*’

‘Qui facile injuriam reddit, is fortasse tempore, non voluntate posterior erat.

‘*He who is ready in returning an injury, has, perhaps, been anticipated by his enemy only in time.*’

## ANNOTATIONS.

‘*Some, when they take revenge, are desirous the party should know whence it cometh.*’

It is certainly, as Bacon remarks, ‘more generous’—or less ungenerous—to desire that the party receiving the punishment should ‘know whence it cometh.’ Aristotle distinguishes *οργη*—(‘Resentment’ or ‘Anger’) from *μισος*,—‘Hatred,’ (and when active, ‘Malice’)—by this. The one who hates, he says, wishes the object of his hatred to suffer, or to be destroyed, no matter by whom; while Resentment craves that he should know *from* whom, and *for* what, he suffers. And he instances Ulysses in the *Odyssey*, who was not satisfied with the vengeance he had

<sup>1</sup> See, in *Guy Mannering*, Pleydell’s remark, that if you have not a regular chimney for the smoke, it will find its way through the whole house.

taken, under a feigned name, on the Cyclops, till he had told him who he really was.

So Shakespere makes Macduff, in his eager desire of vengeance on Macbeth, say,

‘ If thou be slain, and with no sword of mine,  
My wife’s and children’s ghosts will haunt me still.’

‘ In taking revenge, a man is but even with his enemy ; but in passing it over he is superior,’ &c.

Bacon, in speaking of the duty, and of the difficulty, of forgiving injuries, might have remarked that some of the things hardest to forgive are not what any one would consider *injuries* (i.e., *wrongs*) at all.

Many would reprobate the use, in such a case, of the word *forgive*. And the word ought not to be insisted on ; though that most intelligent woman, Miss Elizabeth Smith, says (in her commonplace-book, from which posthumous extracts were published) that ‘ a *woman* has need of extraordinary gentleness and modesty to be *forgiven* for possessing superior ability and learning.’ She would probably have found this true even now, to a certain degree ; though less than in her time.

But not to insist on a word, say, instead of ‘ forgive,’ that it is hard to ‘ judge fairly of’ and to ‘ feel kindly towards,’

(1.) One who adheres to the views which *were* yours, and which you have changed. This was, doubtless, one of the Apostle Paul’s trials. But in his case the miracle he had experienced, and the powers conferred on himself, could leave *no doubt* on his mind. But the trial is much harder when you hear arguments used against you which you had yourself formerly employed, and which you cannot now refute ; and when you rest on reasons which you had formerly shown to be futile, and which do not *quite* satisfy you now ; and when you know that you are suspected, and half-suspect yourself, of being in some way biassed. Then it is that you especially need some one to keep you in countenance ; and are tempted to be angry with those who will not, however they may abstain from reproaching you with apostasy.

Of course there is a trial on the opposite side also ; but it is far less severe. For, a *change* implies *error*, first or last ; and this is galling to one’s self-esteem. The one who had *adhered*

to his system, sect, or opinion, may hug himself on his (so-called) 'consistency;' and may congratulate himself—inwardly, if not openly,—on the thought that at least he *may* be quite right all through; whereas the other *must* have been wrong somewhere. 'I stand,' he may say to himself, 'where he *was*; I think as he thought, and do what he did; he cannot at any rate tax me with fickleness; nor can he blame anything in me which he was not himself guilty of.' All this is as soothing to the one party, as the thought of it is irritating to the other.

(2.) One who has proved right in the advice and warning he gave you, and which you rejected.

'I bear you no ill will, Lizzy' (says Mr. Bennet, in Miss Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*), 'for being justified in the warning you gave me. Considering how things have turned out, I think this shows some magnanimity.'

(3.) One who has carried off some prize from you; whether the woman you were in love with, or some honour, or situation,—especially if he has attained with little exertion what you had been striving hard for, without success.

This is noticed by Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, book ii.) as one great ground of *envy* ( $\phi\theta\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma$ ).

(4.) One who has succeeded in some undertaking whose failure you had predicted: such as the railroad over Chat Moss, which most of the engineers pronounced impossible; or the Duke of Bridgewater's aqueduct, which was derided as a castle in the air.

Again, with some minds of a baser nature, there is a difficulty, proverbially, in forgiving those whom one is conscious of having injured: and, again, those (especially if equals or inferiors) who have done *very great* and important services, beyond what can ever receive an adequate return. Rochefoucault even says that 'to *most* men it is less dangerous to do hurt than to do them too much good.' But then it was his system to look on the dark side only of mankind.

Tacitus, also, who is not very unlike him in this respect, says that 'benefits are acceptable as far as it appears they may be repaid; but that when they far exceed this, hatred takes the place of gratitude.' It is only, however, as has been said, the basest natures to whom any of these last-mentioned trials can occur, as trials.



In all these and some other such cases, there is evidently no *injury*; and some will, as has been just said, protest against the use of the word 'forgive,' when there is no *wrong* to be forgiven.

Then avoid the word, if you will; only do not go on to imagine that you have no need to keep down, with a *strong effort*, just the same kind of feelings that you *would* have had if there *had* been an injury. If you take for granted that no care is needed to repress such feelings, inasmuch as they would be so manifestly unreasonable, the probable result will be, that you will *not* repress but indulge them. You will not, indeed, *acknowledge to yourself* the *real* ground (as you do in the case of an actual injury) of your resentful feeling; but you will deceive yourself by finding out some *other* ground, real or imaginary. 'It is not that the man adheres to his original views, but that he is an uncharitable bigot:' 'It is not that I grudge him his success, but that he is too much puffed up with it:' 'It is not that I myself was seeking the situation, but that he is unfit for it;' &c.

He who cultivates, in the right way, the habit of forgiving injuries, will acquire it. But if you *content* yourself with this, and do not cultivate a habit of candour in such cases as those above alluded to, you will be deficient in that; for it does not *grow wild* in the soil of the human heart. And the unreasonableness and injustice of the feelings which *will* grow wild there, is a reason not why you should neglect to extirpate them, but why you should be the more ashamed of not doing so.

It is worth mentioning, that your judgment of any one's character who has done anything wrong, ought to be exactly the same, whether the wrong was done to *you* or to any one else. Any one by whom you have yourself been robbed or assaulted, is neither more nor less a robber, or a ruffian, than if he had so injured some other person, a stranger to you. This is evident; yet there is great need to remind people of it; for, as the very lowest minds of all regard with far the most disapprobation any wrong from which they themselves suffer, so, those a few steps, and only a few, above them, in their dread of such manifest injustice, think they cannot bend the twig too far the contrary way, and are for regarding (in theory, at least, if not in practice) wrongs to oneself as no wrongs at all. Such a person will reckon it a point of heroic generosity to let loose

on society a rogue who has cheated *him*, and to leave uncensured and unexposed a liar by whom *he* has been belied ; and the like in other cases. And if you refuse favour and countenance to those unworthy of it, whose misconduct has at all affected *you*, he will at once attribute this to personal vindictive feelings ; as if there could be no such thing as esteem and disesteem. One may even see tales, composed by persons not wanting in intelligence, and admired by many of what are called the educated classes, in which the virtue held up for admiration and imitation consists in selecting as a bosom friend, and a guide, and a model of excellence, one who had been guilty of manifest and gross injustice ; because the party had suffered personally from that injustice.

It is thus that ‘fools mistake reverse of wrong for right.’ The charity of some persons consists in proceeding on the supposition that to believe in the existence of an injury is to cherish implacable resentment ; and that it is impossible to forgive, except when there is nothing to be forgiven. It is obvious that these notions render nugatory the Gospel-precepts. Why should we be called upon to render good for evil, if we are bound always to explain away that evil, and call it good ? Where there is manifestly just ground for complaint, we should accustom ourselves to say, ‘That man owes me a hundred pence !’ thus at once estimating the debt at its just amount, and recalling to our mind the parable of him who rigorously enforced his own claims, when he had been forgiven ten thousand talents.

There is a whole class of what may be called *secondary* vulgar errors,—errors produced by a kind of re-action from those of people who are the very lowest of all, in point of intellect, or of moral sentiment,—errors which those fall into who are a few, and but a very few, steps higher.

Any one who ventures a remark on the above error, will be not unlikely to hear as a reply, ‘Oh, but most men are far *more* disposed to judge too severely than too favourably of one who has injured themselves or their friends.’ And this is true ; but it is nothing to the purpose, unless we lay down as a principle, that when one fault is more prevalent than another, the latter need not be shunned at all. ‘Of two evils, chuse the less,’ is a just maxim, then, and then only, when there is *no other alter-*

native,—when we *must* take the one *or* the other: but it is mere folly to incur either, when it is in our power to *avoid both*. Those who speak of ‘a fault on the right side,’ should be reminded that though a greater error is worse than a less, there is *no right side* in error. And in the present case, it is plain our aim should be to judge of each man’s conduct *fairly* and impartially, and on the same principles, whether we ourselves, or a stranger, be the party concerned.

It may be added, that though the error of unduly glossing over misconduct when the injury has been done to oneself, is far less common than the opposite, among the mass of mankind, who have but little thought of justice and generosity, it is the error to which those are more liable who belong to a superior class,—those of a less coarse and vulgar mind; and who, if they need admonition less, are more likely to profit by it, because they are striving to act on a right principle. The Patriarch Joseph, for instance, whose generous forgiveness of his brethren is justly admired, went into a faulty extreme when he told them (Gen. xlv. 5) ‘not to be angry with themselves,’ inasmuch as God had over-ruled for good the crime they had committed. If they were thence induced to feel no sorrow and shame, he had not done them any real benefit.

And a person of the disposition alluded to, will be liable to analogous errors in other matters also. For instance, he will perhaps show too little deference,—for fear of showing too much—for the judgment of those he highly esteems; and will do injustice to a friend, in some cause he has to decide, through over-dread of partiality. And perhaps he will under-rate the evidence for a religion he wishes to believe, from dread of an undue bias in its favour.<sup>1</sup>

An actual case has been known of a person most of whose relatives were accustomed to speak of him much less favourably than they really thought; not from want of good-will, but from dread of being thought partial. And the impression thus produced was such as might have been expected. It was supposed—very naturally—that they were giving the most favourable picture they could, when the contrary was the fact. What ought to have been taken at a *premium*, was taken at a

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<sup>1</sup> See *Elements of Logic*, app. i., article *Indifference*.

*discount*, and *vice versâ*: so that they damaged unfairly the reputation of one to whom they wished well.

It may be thought superfluous to warn any one against an excess of self-distrust. But in truth, there is the more danger of this, from the very circumstance that men are *not* usually warned against it, and fancy themselves quite safe from it. We should remember,—besides all other distrust,—to distrust our own self-distrust.

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## ESSAY V. OF ADVERSITY.

IT was a high speech of Seneca (after the manner of the Stoics), that the 'good things which belong to prosperity are to be wished, but the good things that belong to adversity are to be admired'—'Bona rerum secundarum optabilia, adversarum mirabilia.'<sup>1</sup> Certainly, if miracles be the command over nature, they appear most in adversity. It is yet a higher speech of his than the other (much too high for a heathen), 'It is true greatness to have in one the frailty of a man, and the security of a God'—'Vere magnum habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei.'<sup>2</sup> This would have done better in poesy,<sup>3</sup> where transcendencies<sup>4</sup> are more allowed; and the poets, indeed, have been busy with it—for it is in effect the thing which is figured in that strange fiction of the ancient poets, which seemeth not to be without mystery;<sup>5</sup> nay, and to have some approach to the state of a Christian, 'that Hercules, when he went to unbind Prometheus (by whom human nature is represented), sailed the length of the great ocean in an earthen pot or pitcher, lively describing christian resolution, that saileth in the frail bark of the flesh through the waves of the world.'<sup>6</sup> But to speak in a mean,<sup>7</sup> the virtue of prosperity is temperance, the virtue of adversity is fortitude, which in morals is the more heroical virtue. Prosperity is the blessing of the Old Testament, adversity is the blessing of the New, which carrieth the greater benediction, and the clearer revelation of God's

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<sup>1</sup> Sen. *Ad Lucil.* 66.

<sup>2</sup> Sen. *Ad Lucil.* 53.

<sup>3</sup> Poesy. *Poetry.*

'Musick and Poesy  
To quicken you.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>4</sup> Transcendencies. *Flights; soarings.*

<sup>5</sup> Mystery. *A secret meaning; an emblem.*

'Important truths still let your fables hold,  
And moral mysteries with art unfold.'—*Granville.*

<sup>6</sup> Apollod. *Deor. Orig.* 11.

<sup>7</sup> Mean. *Medium.*

'Temperance, with golden square,  
Betwixt them both can measure out a mean.'—*Shakespeare.*

favour. Yet even in the Old Testament, if you listen to David's harp, you shall hear as many heartse-like airs as carols; and the pencil of the Holy Ghost hath laboured more in describing the afflictions of Job than the felicities<sup>1</sup> of Solomon. Prosperity is not without many fears and distastes; and adversity is not without comforts and hopes. We see in needleworks and embroideries, it is more pleasing to have a lively work upon a sad<sup>2</sup> and solemn ground, than to have a dark and melancholy work upon a lightsome ground: judge, therefore, of the pleasure of the heart by the pleasure of the eye. Certainly virtue is like precious odours, most fragrant where they are incensed<sup>3</sup> or crushed; for prosperity doth best discover vice, and adversity doth best discover virtue.

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## ANNOTATIONS.

Some kinds of adversity are chiefly of the character of TRIALS, and others of DISCIPLINE. But Bacon does not advert to this difference, nor say anything at all about the distinction between *discipline* and *trial*; which are quite different in themselves, but often confounded together.

By 'discipline' is to be understood, anything—whether of the character of adversity or not—that has a *direct tendency to produce improvement*, or to create some qualification that did not exist before; and by trial, anything that tends to *ascertain* what improvement *has* been made, or what qualities exist. Both effects may be produced at once; but what we speak of is, the proper character of trial, as such, and of discipline, as such.

A college tutor, for instance, seeks to *make* his pupils good scholars; an *examiner*, to ascertain how far each candidate is such. It may so happen that the Tutor may be enabled to

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<sup>1</sup> Felicities (rarely used in the plural). 'The *felicities* of her wonderful reign.' —*Atterbury*.

<sup>2</sup> Sad. *Dark-coloured*. 'I met him accidentally in London, in *sad-coloured* clothes, far from being costly.'—Walton's *Lives*.

<sup>3</sup> Incensed. *Set on fire; burned*.

form a judgment of the proficiency of the pupils; and that a candidate may learn something from the Examiner. But what is essential in each case, is incidental in the other. For, no one would say that a course of lectures was a failure, if the pupils were well instructed, though the teacher might not have ascertained their proficiency; or that an examination had not answered its purpose, if the qualifications of the candidates were proved, though they might have learnt nothing from it.

A corresponding distinction holds good in a great many other things: for instance, what is called '*proving* a gun,' that is, loading it up to the muzzle and firing it—does not at all tend to increase its strength, but only proves that *it is* strong. Proper hammering and tempering of the metal, on the other hand, tends to *make* it strong.

These two things are, as has just been said, very likely to be confounded together: (1.) because very often they are actually *combined*; as *e.g.*, well-conducted exercise of the body, both displays, and promotes, strength and agility. The same holds good in the case of music, and various other pursuits, and in none more than in virtuous practice.

(2.) Because from discipline and from trial, and anything analogous to these, we may often draw the same inference, though by different reasonings: *e.g.*, if you know that a gun-barrel has gone through such and such processes, under a skilful metallurgist, you conclude *à priori* that it will be a strong one; and again you draw the same inference from knowing that it has been '*proved*.' This latter is an argument from a *sign*; the other, from *cause to effect*.<sup>1</sup> So also, if you know that a man has been under a good tutor, this enables you to form an *à priori* conjecture that he is a scholar; and by a different kind of argument, you infer the same from his having passed an examination.

Great evils may arise from mistaking the one of these things for the other. For instance, children's lives have been sacrificed by the attempt to *make* them hardy by exposing them to cold, and wet, and hardship. Those that have been so exposed are (as many of them as survive) hardy; because their having gone through it *proves* that they *were* of a strong constitution, though

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<sup>1</sup> *Rhetoric*, part i. chap. II.

it did not *make* them so. The 'proving' of a gun is the cause, not of its *being* strong, but of *our knowing* it to be strong. And it is wonderful how prevalent in all subjects is the tendency to confound these two things together: *e.g.*, Balak says to Balaam, 'I wot that he whom thou blessest is blessed, and he whom thou cursest is cursed.' And this must have been true, if Balaam was a true prophet; but the mistake was, to suppose that his curse or blessing brought on these results, when, in truth, it brought only the *knowledge* of the divine designs and sentences.

Different kinds of adversity, and also of prosperity, (for both are equally *trials*, though it is only *adversity* that is usually called such,) differ in this respect from each other, some being more of the character of discipline, and others of trial.

Generally speaking, a *small* degree of persecution and oppression is more of a discipline for humanity than very great and long-continued. It is everywhere observed that a liberated slave is apt to make a merciless master, and that boys who have been cruelly fagged at school are cruel faggers. Sterne introduces a tender-hearted negro girl, of whom it is remarked that 'she had suffered oppression, and had learnt mercy,' as if this was a natural consequence. It would have been more true to have said, '*Although* she had suffered much oppression,' &c.

Most of the early Reformers were intolerant. Most bitter was the persecution, in the Low Countries, of the Arminians by the Calvinists, who had very recently been delivered from persecution themselves.<sup>1</sup> And a people who have been so long and so severely persecuted as the Vaudois, and yet retain, as *they* do, a mild and tolerant character, give strong evidence of the domination of a real christian principle.

The celebrated 'Pilgrim Fathers,' who fled from the tyranny of Laud and his abettors, to America, and are described as having 'sought only freedom to *worship God*,' had no notion of allowing the same freedom to others, but enacted and enforced the most severe penalties against all who differed from

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<sup>1</sup> See, in Mr. Macaulay's *History*, a case of most atrocious cruelty perpetrated by Presbyterians who had witnessed cruel persecution of themselves or their fathers. — Vol. iv. p. 781.



them, and compelled the ever-venerated Roger Williams, the great champion of toleration, to fly from them to Rhode Island, where he founded a colony on his own truly christian system. One of the principal founders of the New England colony remonstrated with these persecutors, saying (in a letter given in a late number of the *Edinburgh Review*),<sup>1</sup> ‘Reverend and dear sirs, whom I unfeignedly love and respect, it doth not a little grieve my spirit to hear what sad things are reported daily of your tyranny and persecution in New England, as that you fine, whip, and imprison men for their consciences. First, you compel such to come into your assemblies as you know will not join you in your worship; and when they show their dislike thereof, or witness against it, then you stir up your magistrates to punish them, for such, as you conceive, their public affronts. Truly, friends, this your practice of compelling any, in matters of worship, to that whereof they are not fully persuaded, is to make them sin; for so the Apostle (*Romans* xiv. 23) tells us; and many are made hypocrites thereby, conforming in their outwards acts for fear of punishment. We pray for you, and wish you prosperity every way; hoping the Lord would have given you so much light and love there, that you might have been eyes to God’s people here, and not to practise those courses in a wilderness which you went so far to prevent.’ They replied, ‘Better be hypocrites than profane persons. Hypocrites give God part of his due—the outward man; but the profane person giveth God neither outward nor inward man. You know not if you think we came into this wilderness to practise those courses which we fled from in England. We believe there is a vast difference between men’s inventions and God’s institutions: we fled from men’s inventions, to which we else should have been compelled; we compel none to men’s inventions.’

About the same time Williams sent a warm remonstrance to his old friend and governor, Endicott, against these violent proceedings. The Massachusetts theocracy could not complain that none showed them their error: they did not persevere in the system of persecution without having its wrongfulness fully pointed out.

‘Had Bunyan,’ says the Reviewer,<sup>2</sup> ‘opened his conventicle in

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<sup>1</sup> Oct. 1855, p. 564.

<sup>2</sup> Page 510.

Boston, he would have been banished, if not whipped ; had Lord Baltimore appeared there, he would have been liable to perpetual imprisonment. If Penn had escaped with either of his ears, the more pertinacious Fox would, doubtless, have ended by mounting the gallows with Marmaduke Stephenson or William Leddra. Yet the authors of these extremities would have had no admissible pretext. They were not instigated by the dread of similar persecution, or by the impulse to retaliate. There was no hierarchy to invite them to the plains of Armageddon ; there was no Agag to hew in pieces, or kings and nobles to bind with links of iron. They persecuted spontaneously, deliberately, and securely. Or rather, it might be said, they were cruel under difficulties. They trod the grapes of their wine-press in a city of refuge, and converted their Zoar into a house of Egyptian bondage ; and, in this respect, we conceive they are without a parallel in history.'

On the other hand, a short or occasional oppression is a good discipline for teaching any one not very ill disposed to feel for others.

Mr. Macaulay beautifully illustrates this from the tale of the Fisherman and the Genie, in the *Arabian Nights*. 'The genie had at first vowed that he would confer wonderful gifts on any one who should release him from the casket in which he was imprisoned ; and during a second period he had vowed a still more splendid reward. But being still disappointed, he next vowed to grant no other favour to his liberator than to chuse what death he should suffer. Even thus, a people who have been enslaved and oppressed for some years are most grateful to their liberators ; but those who are set free after very long slavery are not unlikely to tear their liberators to pieces.'

Sickness is a kind of adversity which is both a trial and a discipline ; but much more of a discipline when short, and of a trial when very long. The kindness of friends during sickness is calculated, when it is newly called forth, to touch the heart, and call forth gratitude ; but the confirmed invalid is in danger of becoming absorbed in self, and of taking all kinds of care and of sacrifice as a matter of course.

*Danger* of death is another kind of adversity which has both characters ; but it is much more of a wholesome discipline

when the danger is from a storm, or from any other external cause than from *sickness*. The well-known proverb, 'the Devil was sick,' &c., shows how generally it has been observed that people, when they recover, forget the resolutions formed during sickness. One reason of the difference—and perhaps the chief—is, that it is so much easier to *recall* exactly the sensations felt when in perfect health and yet in imminent danger, and to act over again, as it were, in imagination, the whole scene, than to recall fully, when in health, the state of mind during some sickness, which itself so much affects the mind along with the body.

But it is quite possible either to improve, or to fail to improve, either kind of affliction.

And, universally, it is to be observed that, though, in other matters, there may be trials which are *nothing but* trials, and have no tendency to improve the subject tried, but merely to *test* it (as in the case of the *proving* of a gun alluded to above), this can never be the case in what relates to *moral conduct*. *Every* kind of trial, if well endured, tends to fortify the good principle. There are, indeed, many things which are more likely to hurt than to improve the moral character; and to such trials *we should be unjustifiable* in *exposing* ourselves or others unnecessarily. But these, if any one does go through them well, do not *merely prove* the moral principle to be good, but will have had the effect of still further fortifying it.

And the converse, unhappily, holds good also. Every kind of improving process—religious study, good example, or whatever else,—if it does not leave you the better, will leave you the worse. Let no one flatter himself that anything external will *make* him wise or virtuous, without his taking pains to *learn* wisdom or virtue from it. And if any one says of any affliction, 'No doubt it is all sent for my good,' he should be reminded to ask himself whether he is *seeking to get* any good out of it. 'Sweet,' says the poet, 'are the uses of adversity;' but this is for those only who take care to *make* a good use of it.

Most carefully should we avoid the error of which some parents, not (otherwise) deficient in good sense, commit, of imposing gratuitous restrictions and privations, and purposely inflicting needless disappointments, for the purpose of inuring

children to the pains and troubles they will meet with in after-life. Yes, be assured they *will* meet with quite *enough*, in every portion of life, including childhood, without your strewing their paths with thorns of your own providing. And often enough will you have to limit their amusements for the sake of needful study, to restrain their appetites for the sake of health, to chastise them for faults, and in various ways to inflict pain or privations for the sake of avoiding some greater evils. Let this always be explained to them whenever it is possible to do so; and endeavour in all cases to make them look on the parent as never the *voluntary* giver of anything but good. To any hardships which they are convinced you inflict reluctantly, and to those which occur through the dispensations of the All-Wise, they will more easily be trained to submit with a good grace, than to any gratuitous sufferings devised for them by fallible men. To raise hopes on purpose to produce disappointment, to give provocation merely to exercise the temper, and, in short, to inflict pain of any kind merely as a training for patience and fortitude—this is a kind of discipline which Man should not presume to attempt. If such trials prove a discipline not so much of cheerful fortitude as of resentful aversion and suspicious distrust of the parent as a capricious tyrant, you will have only yourself to thank for this result.

‘Since the end of suffering, as a moral discipline,’ says an excellent writer in the *Edinburgh Review* (January, 1847), on the Life of Pascal, ‘is only to enable us at last to bear unclouded happiness, what guarantee can we now have of its beneficial effect on us, except by partial experiments of our capacity of recollecting and practising the lessons of adversity in intervals of prosperity? It is true that there is no more perilous ordeal through which Man can pass—no greater curse which can be imposed on him, as he is at present constituted—than that of being compelled to walk his life long in the sunlight of unshaded prosperity. His eyes ache with that too untempered brilliance—he is apt to be smitten with a moral *coup de soleil*. But it as little follows that no sunshine is good for us. He who made us, and who tutors us, alone knows what is the exact measure of light and shade, sun and cloud, storm and calm, frost and heat, which will best tend to mature those flowers which are the

object of this celestial husbandry; and which, when transplanted into the paradise of God, are to bloom there for ever in amaranthine loveliness. Nor can it be without presumption that we essay to interfere with these processes; our highest wisdom is to fall in with them. And certain it is that every man will find by experience that he has enough to do, to bear with patience and fortitude the *real* afflictions with which God may visit him, without venturing to fill up the intervals in which He has left him ease, and even invites him to gladness, by a self-imposed and artificial sorrow. Nay, if his mind be well constituted, he will feel that the learning how to apply, in hours of happiness, the lessons which he has learned in the school of sorrow, is not one of the least difficult lessons which sorrow has to teach him; not to mention that the grateful reception of God's gifts is as true a part of duty—and even a more neglected part of it—than a patient submission to his chastisements.

'It is at our peril, then, that we seek to interfere with the discipline which is provided for us. He who acts as if God had mistaken the proportions in which prosperity and adversity should be allotted to us—and seeks by hair shirts, prolonged abstinence, and self-imposed penance, to render more perfect the discipline of suffering,—only enfeebles instead of invigorating his piety; and resembles one of those hypochondriacal patients—the plague and torment of physicians—who having sought advice, and being supposed to follow it, are found not only taking their physician's well-judged prescriptions, but secretly dosing themselves in the intervals with some quackish nostrum. Thus it was even with a Pascal—and we cannot see that the experiment was attended in his case with any better effects.'

*'Prosperity is the blessing of the Old Testament; Adversity is the blessing of the New.'*

The distinguishing characteristic of the Old Covenant, of the Mosaic Law, was that it was enforced by a system of *temporal rewards and judgments*, administered according to an extraordinary [miraculous] providence. The Israelites were promised, as the reward of obedience, long life, and health, and plentiful harvests, and victory over their enemies. And the punishments

threatened for disobedience were pestilence, famine, defeat, and all kinds of temporal calamity. These were the rewards and punishments that formed the *sanction* of the Mosaic Law. But the New Covenant, the Gospel, held out as its sanction rewards and punishments in the next world, and those only. The former kingdom of God was a kingdom of this world. The Lord Jesus, on the contrary, declared that the new kingdom of God, His kingdom, 'was not of this world.' And so far from promising worldly prosperity to his followers as a reward of their obedience to Him, He prepared them for suffering and death in his cause, even such as He endured Himself; and pronounced them 'blessed when men should hate and persecute' them in his cause, saying, 'great is your reward in Heaven.' The Disciples were indeed taught, and through them all Christians in every age are taught, that the painful trials sent to them were among the 'things that work together for good (that is, spiritual and eternal good) to them that love God;' and that they ought not to think it 'strange concerning the fiery trial which was to try them, as though some strange thing happened unto them,' but to look to the example of the Lord Jesus, and 'rejoice in Him always.'

Under the christian dispensation, therefore, chastisement is for a very different purpose from retribution; the allotment of good and evil, according to the character of each man (which is properly retribution), is reserved for the next world. The Apostle Paul points out as one of the *characteristics* of the Gospel, that in it God has 'commanded all men everywhere to repent, inasmuch as He has APPOINTED A DAY in which He will judge the world in righteousness.'

The novelty and peculiarity of this announcement consisted, not in declaring the Deity to be the *Judge* of the world (for this the Jews knew, and most of the Pagans believed), but in declaring that He had appointed a *day for that judgment*, before Christ's tribunal in the *next* world. They were henceforth to look for a retribution, not, as before with the Jews, regular, and with other nations occasionally, but prepared for *all* men according to the character of each; not, as before, immediate in the present life, but in the life to come.

It is true that some men, who are nearly strangers to such a habit, may be for a time more alarmed by the denunciation

of immediate temporal judgments for their sins, than by any considerations relative to 'the things which are not seen and which are eternal.' And when such denunciations rest not on *uncertain* predictions, but on an undeniable and notorious connexion of cause with effect,—as, for instance, of intemperance with disease, or of prodigality with penury—a salutary alarm may be created in some who are unmoved by higher considerations. But such an alarm should be regarded merely as a first step;—as a *scaffolding* which is to be succeeded by a building of better foundation. For, the effect thus produced, if we trust to that alone, is much less likely to be lasting, or while it lasts to be salutary, because temporal alarm does not tend to make men spiritually-minded, and any reformation of manners it may have produced, will not have been founded on christian principles. A man is not more acceptable in the sight of God than before, though more likely to attain the temporal objects he aims at, if he is acting on no higher motive than the goods and evils of the present world can supply. 'Verily I say unto you, they have their reward.'

But to look for temporal retribution, is surely inconsistent with the profession of a religion whose Founder was persecuted and crucified, and whose first preachers were exposed to 'hunger, and thirst, and cold, and nakedness,' and every kind of hardship, and were 'made the offscouring of all things;' so that they declared that 'if in this life only they had hope in Christ, they were of all men most miserable.' We should consider, too, that those very sufferings were a stumblingblock to the unbelieving Jews; not merely from their being unwilling to expose themselves to the like, according to the forewarnings of Jesus, such as 'In this world ye shall have tribulation;' but still more from their regarding these sufferings as a *mark of divine displeasure*, and consequently a proof that Jesus could not have come from God. Because He was 'a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief,' they 'did esteem Him stricken, SMITTEN OF GOD, and afflicted,' and they 'hid their face from Him.'

And it should be remembered, that the *Jews*, who had been brought up under a dispensation sanctioned by temporal rewards and punishments, were less inexcusable in this their error, than those *Christians* who presume to measure the divine favour and disfavour by temporal events.

## ESSAY VI. OF SIMULATION<sup>1</sup> AND DIS-SIMULATION.

**D**ISSIMULATION is but a faint kind of policy, or wisdom—for it asketh a strong wit and a strong heart to know when to tell truth, and to do it—therefore it is the weaker sort of politicians that are the greatest dissemblers.

Tacitus saith, ‘Livia sorted<sup>2</sup> well with the arts of her husband, and dissimulation of her son,’<sup>3</sup> attributing arts of policy to Augustus, and dissimulation to Tiberius; and again, when Mucianus encourageth Vespasian to take arms against Vitellius, he saith, ‘We rise not against the piercing judgment of Augustus, nor the extreme caution or closeness of Tiberius.’<sup>4</sup> These properties of arts, or policy, and dissimulation, and closeness, are indeed habits and faculties several,<sup>5</sup> and to be distinguished; for if a man have that penetration of judgment as<sup>6</sup> he can discern what things are to be laid open, and what to be secreted, and what to be showed at half-lights, and to whom and when (which indeed are arts of state, and arts of life, as Tacitus well calleth them), to him a habit of dissimulation is a hindrance and a poorness. But if a man cannot obtain to<sup>7</sup> that judgment, then it is left to him generally to be close, and a dissembler; for where a man cannot choose or vary in particulars, there it is good to take the safest and wariest way in general, like the going softly by one that cannot well see. Certainly the ablest men that ever were, have had all an openness and frankness of dealing, and a name of certainty and veracity; but then they were like horses well managed, for they could tell passing well when to stop or turn, and at such times when they thought the

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<sup>1</sup> Simulation. *The pretending that to be which is not.* ‘The feigning to be what one is not by gesture, action, or behaviour, is called *simulation*.’—*South*.

<sup>2</sup> Sort. *To fit; suit.*

‘It sorts well with your fierceness.’—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>3</sup> Tacit. *Annal.* v. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Tacit. *Hist.* ii. 76.

<sup>5</sup> Several. *Different; distinct.*

‘Four several armies to the field are led,

Which, high in equal hopes, four princes lead.’—*Dryden*.

<sup>6</sup> As. *That.* See page 23.

<sup>7</sup> Obtain to. *Attain to.*



case indeed required dissimulation, if then they used it, it came to pass that the former opinion, spread abroad, of their good faith and clearness of dealing, made them almost invisible.

There be three degrees of this hiding and veiling of a man's self: the first, closeness, reservation, and secrecy,—when a man leaveth himself without observation, or without hold to be taken, what he is; the second, dissimulation in the negative,—when a man lets fall signs and arguments that he is not that he is; and the third, simulation in the affirmative,—when a man industriously and expressly feigns and pretends to be that<sup>1</sup> he is not.

For the first of these, secrecy, it is indeed the virtue of a confessor; and assuredly the secret man heareth many confessions, for who will<sup>\*</sup> open himself to a blab or a blabber? But if a man be thought secret, it inviteth discovery, as the more close air sucketh in the more open; and as in confessing, the revealing is not for worldly use, but for the ease of a man's heart; so secret men come to the knowledge of many things in that kind, while men rather discharge their minds than impart their minds. In few words, mysteries are due to secrecy. Besides (to say truth) nakedness is uncomely, as well in mind as in body; and it addeth no small reverence to men's manners and actions, if they be not altogether open. As for talkers, and futile<sup>2</sup> persons, they are commonly vain and credulous withal; for he that talketh what he knoweth, will also talk what he knoweth not; therefore set it down, that a habit of secrecy is both politic and moral; and in this part it is good that a man's face give his tongue leave to speak; for the discovery of a man's self, by the tracts<sup>3</sup> of his countenance, is a great weakness and betraying, by how much it is many times more marked and believed than a man's words.

For the second, which is dissimulation, it followeth many times upon secrecy, by a necessity; so that he that will be secret, must be a dissembler in some degree,—for men are too

<sup>1</sup> That. *What; that which.* 'To do always *that* is righteous in thy sight.'—*English Liturgy.*

<sup>2</sup> Futile. *Talkative; loquacious.* 'The parable (Prov. xxix. 2), it seems, especially corrects not the *futility* of vaine persons which easily utter as well what may be spoken as what should be secreted; not garrulity whereby they fill others, even to a surfeit; but the government of speech.'—*On Learning.* By G. Watts.

<sup>3</sup> Tracts. *Trails (traits); features.*

cunning to suffer a man to keep an indifferent<sup>1</sup> carriage between both, and to be secret, without swaying the balance on either side. They will so beset a man with questions, and draw him on, and pick it out of him, that, without an absurd silence, he must show an inclination one way; or if he do not, they will gather as much by his silence as by his speech. As for equivocations, or oraculous<sup>2</sup> speeches, they cannot hold out long; so that no man can be secret, except he give himself a little scope of dissimulation, which is, as it were, but the skirts or train of secrecy.

But for the third degree, which is simulation and false profession, that I hold more culpable, and less politic, except it be in great and rare matters; and, therefore, a general custom of simulation (which is this last degree) is a vice rising either of a natural falseness, or fearfulness, or of a mind that hath some main faults, which, because a man must needs disguise, it maketh him practise simulation in other things, lest his hand should be out of use.

The advantages of simulation and dissimulation are three—first, to lay asleep opposition, and to surprise; for where a man's intentions are published, it is an alarm to call up all that are against them: the second is, to reserve to a man's self a fair retreat; for, if a man engage himself by a manifest declaration, he must go through, or take a fall: the third is, the better to discover the mind of another; for to him that opens himself, men will hardly show themselves averse, but will (fair<sup>3</sup>) let him go on, and turn their freedom of speech to freedom of thought; and therefore it is a good shrewd proverb of the Spaniard, 'Tell a lie and find a troth,' as if there were no way of discovery but by simulation. There be also three disadvantages to set it even: the first, that simulation and dissimulation commonly carry with them a show of fearfulness, which, in any business, doth spoil the feathers of round<sup>4</sup> flying up to the mark; the second,

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<sup>1</sup> Indifferent. *Impartial*. 'That they may truly and *indifferently* minister justice.'—*Prayer for the Church Militant*.

<sup>2</sup> Oraculous. *Oracular*.

'He spoke *oraculous* and aly;

He'd neither grant the question, nor deny.'—*King*.

<sup>3</sup> Fair (adverb). *Complaisantly*.

'Thus *fair* they parted till the morrow's dawn.'—*Dryden*.

<sup>4</sup> Round. *Direct*.

'Let her be *round* with him.'—*Shakespeare*.

that it puzzleth and perplexeth the conceits<sup>1</sup> of many, that perhaps would otherwise co-operate with him, and makes a man walk almost alone to his own ends; the third, and greatest, is, that it depriveth a man of one of the most principal instruments for action, which is trust and belief. The best composition and temperature<sup>2</sup> is, to have openness in fame and opinion; secrecy in habit; dissimulation in seasonable use; and a power to feign, if there be no remedy.

#### ANTITHETA ON SIMULATION AND DISSIMULATION.

##### PRO.

'Dissimulatio, compendiarie sapientia.

'The art of concealing is a short cut to the most important part of practical wisdom.'

'Sespes consiliorum, dissimulatio.

'Concealment is the hedge of our designs.'

'Qui indissimulanter omnia agit, æque decipit; nam plurimi, aut non capiunt, aut non credunt.

'He who acts in all things openly does not deceive the less; for most persons either do not understand, or do not believe him.'

##### CONTRA.

'Quibus artes civiles supra captum ingenii sunt, iis dissimulatio pro prudentia erit.

'Those whose minds cannot grasp political sagacity, substitute dissimulation for prudence.'

'Qui dissimulat, præcipuo ad agendum instrumento se privat—i.e., fide.

'He who practises concealment deprives himself of a most important instrument of action—namely, confidence.'

'Dissimulatio dissimulationem invitat.

'Dissimulation invites dissimulation.'

#### ANNOTATIONS.

##### 'Of Simulation.'

It is a pity that our language has lost the word 'simulation;' so that we are forced to make 'dissimulation' serve for both senses.

'Id quod abest, simulat, dissimulat quod adest.'<sup>3</sup>

'The ablest men have all had an openness and frankness,' &c.

There is much truth in Bacon's remark in the Antitheta, that those whose whole conduct is open and undisguised deceive

<sup>1</sup> Conceits. Conceptions—as:

'You have a noble and a true conceit  
Of godlike amity.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>2</sup> Temperature. Constitution. 'Memory depends upon the temperature of the brain.'—*Watts*.

<sup>3</sup> 'Simulates that which is not; dissimulates that which is.'

people not the less, because the generality either do not understand them, or do not believe them. And this is practically the case when those you have to deal with are of a crafty character. They expend great ingenuity in guessing what it is you mean, or what you design to do, and the only thing that never occurs to them is just what you have said.

It is to be observed, however, that some persons, who are not really frank and open characters, appear such from their want of delicacy and of refined moral taste. They speak openly of things pertaining to themselves (such as most people would suppress), not from incapacity for disguise, or from meaning to make a confidant of you, but from absence of shame. And such a person may be capable of much artifice when it suits his purpose. It is well, therefore, that the inexperienced should be warned against mistaking shamelessness for sincerity of character.

Those who are habitually very reserved, and (as Miss Edgeworth expresses it in one of her tales) ‘think that in general it is best not to mention things,’ will usually meet with fewer tangible failures than the more communicative, unless these latter possess an unusual share of sagacity; but the latter will (unless excessively imprudent) have a greater amount of success, on the whole, by gaining many advantages which the others will have missed.

*‘They will so beset a man with questions.’*

There is, as Bacon observes, a great difficulty in dealing with such persons; for a true answer to their impertinent questions might do great mischief; and to refuse an answer would be understood as the same thing. ‘Pray, do you know the author of that article? Is it your friend Mr. So-and-so?’ or, ‘Is it true that your friend Such-a-one has had heavy losses, and is likely to become insolvent?’ or, ‘Is he concealed in such-and-such a place?’ &c. If you reply, ‘I do not chuse to answer,’ this will be considered as equivalent to an answer in the affirmative.

It is told of Dean Swift, that when some one he had lampooned came and asked him whether he was the writer of those verses, he replied, that long ago he had consulted an experienced

lawyer what was best to be done when some scoundrel who had been shown up in a satire asked him whether he were the author; and that the lawyer advised him always, whether he had written it or not, to deny the authorship,—and, ‘accordingly,’ said he, ‘I now tell you that I am not the author.’

Some similar kind of *rebuke* is, perhaps, the best answer to give.

A well-known author once received a letter from a peer with whom he was slightly acquainted, asking him whether he was the author of a certain article in the *Edinburgh Review*. He replied that he never made communications of that kind, except to intimate friends, selected by himself for the purpose, when he saw fit. His refusal to answer, however, pointed him out—which, as it happened, he did not care for—as the author. But a case might occur, in which the revelation of the authorship might involve a friend in some serious difficulties. In any such case, he might have answered something in this style: ‘I have received a letter purporting to be from your lordship, but the matter of it induces me to suspect that it is a forgery by some mischievous trickster. The writer asks whether I am the author of a certain article. It is a sort of question which no one has a right to ask; and I think, therefore, that every one is bound to discourage such inquiries by answering them—whether one is or is not the author—with a rebuke for asking impertinent questions about private matters. I say ‘private,’ because, if an article be libellous or seditious, the law is open, and any one may proceed against the publisher, and compel him either to give up the author, or to bear the penalty. If, again, it contains false statements, these, coming from an anonymous pen, may be simply contradicted. And if the arguments be unsound, the obvious course is to refute them. But *who* wrote it, is a question of idle or of mischievous curiosity, as it relates to the private concerns of an individual.

‘If I were to ask your lordship, ‘Do you spend your income? or lay by? or outrun? Do you and your lady ever have an altercation? Was she your first love? or were you attached to some one else before?’ If I were to ask such questions, your lordship’s answer would probably be, to desire the footman to show me out. Now, the present inquiry I regard as no less unjustifiable, and relating to private concerns: and, therefore, I

think every one bound, when so questioned, always, whether he is author or not, to meet the inquiry with a rebuke.

‘Hoping that my conjecture is right, of the letter’s being a forgery, I remain,’ &c.

In any case, however, in which a refusal to answer does not convey any information, the best way, perhaps, of meeting impertinent inquiries, is by saying, ‘Can you keep a secret?’ and when the other answers that he can, you may reply, ‘Well, so can I.’

*‘Openness in fame and opinion.’*

‘Everybody (says one of Miss Edgeworth’s characters) says that my mother is the most artful woman in the world: and I should think so, if everybody *did not say it*; for if she *was*, you know, nobody would ever find it out.’ There is certainly no point in which the maxim is more applicable, that ‘it is a matter of Art to conceal the Art.’

*‘The power to feign when there is no remedy.’*

This power is certainly a dangerous one to possess, because one will be tempted to say, again and again, and on slighter and slighter occasions, ‘Now, there is no remedy; there is nothing for it but to feign:’ that is, perhaps, there is no other mode of effecting the object you have in view.

Certainly it is a nobler thing to have the *power* and not to use it, than to abstain from feigning, through incapacity. But there are few cases, and to most people none, in which it is justifiable. It is indeed quite allowable for a general to deceive the enemy by stratagems (so called from that very circumstance), because where no confidence is reposed, none can be violated. And again it is a kind of *war* that is carried on between policemen and thieves. In dealing with madmen, again, there is no more fraud in deceiving them than in angling for trout with an artificial fly; because you are not really dealing with fellow-men. For, though an insane patient considered as to his own proper *self*, apart from his malady, is, of course, entitled to justice and kindness, he is, in his present state, what is usually (and not incorrectly) called ‘one *beside himself*’—‘*not himself*’—‘*out of his mind*,’ and is regarded as not responsible for his acts, on the very ground that they are not properly *his own* acts, but those of an irrational being.

But with the exception of such cases, feigning cannot be justified.

A *pleader* is greatly exposed to temptations to this practice. He has indeed a right to urge all that can be fairly said in his client's favour, and to expose any flaws in the opposite evidence. But it will often serve his cause, to protest solemnly his own sincere conviction, when he feels none; to tax with falsehood the opposed witnesses, when there is no ground for it; and to bring forward fallacious arguments, and mis-statements of facts. [See the Essay on *Judicature*.] And perhaps he salves his conscience by the consideration that no one is bound to believe him; though it is evident he says what he does say, in the *hope* of being believed.

How little there is in the world of a really scrupulous reverence for truth, one may see but too many proofs every day. The sentiment expressed by an author of some repute (noticed in the Annotations on Essay I.), implies not only an utter disregard for truth, in what pertains to religion, but also a conviction (founded probably on some knowledge of the world) that the open *avowal* of this was not likely to do him any discredit. We see journalists, again, admitted—so they do but write ably—to be guides of public opinion, even when it is manifest and notorious that they have no principle but that of writing what will *sell* best, and are ready to pander to any popular prejudice, and to contradict to-day what they said yesterday, without the least regard for truth and justice, or for the public welfare, or even for decent consistency, when gain is in prospect.

And we may see men admired not only as eminently pious, but as *sincere*, who have openly professed and vindicated the system of 'reserve,' (or 'economy,') that is, the concealment of their own real sentiments, and the deliberate suppression of portions of God's revealed truth; which are to be kept back, it seems, from the mass of mankind. But then, what these men do teach, is, we are told, the truth, though not the whole truth: as if the omission of one portion did not materially affect, in practice, the character of the rest<sup>1</sup>. It has been

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<sup>1</sup> The reader is referred to Archdeacon West's *Discourse on Reserve*; to the Charge on *Instruction in the Scriptures* (1857), sec. 7, and to that useful and important work, the *Index to the Tracts for the Times*.

remarked that in a marble statue, every particle remains in exactly the same position in which it existed in the block; the sculptor has merely *removed* the other portions, and thus discovered the statue. Yet he is generally considered to have *made* a graven image.

Then again, these same Divines have found a mode of interpreting 'in a non-natural sense,' the Articles and other formularies of the Church to which they profess adherence; holding it allowable to take words in any sense they can be brought to bear, in open disregard of the sense in which the writers designed and knew them to be understood.<sup>1</sup>

And the same principle is sometimes acted on by persons of quite a different school. These have been known, for instance, to maintain that our Lord's declaration, 'My kingdom is not of this world,' may be interpreted as relating to the *then-present* time only, and does not imply that his kingdom—though 'not of this world,' *then*, was not to become such, hereafter! He however must have known that his words could not have been so *understood*; else He would have been *pleading guilty* to the charge brought against Him. For, the very design imputed to Him and his followers, and which they always disavowed, was that of designing *hereafter* to subvert existing governments, and monopolize temporal power. If therefore they *had* cherished such a design, while they expressed themselves ambiguously, so as to be understood to disclaim it, then, most fairly might the most fraudulent of the *Jesuits* call themselves 'companions of Jesus!'

It is really painful to be compelled to impute disingenuousness to persons who manifest much religious zeal. But when men are found using such arguments, and maintaining such principles, on some points, as, on others, they reprobate;—setting up, for instance, to serve a purpose, a tradition more recent by several centuries<sup>2</sup> than any of the Romish ones which they deride,—it is impossible to give them credit for sincerity in the *means* resorted to, however sincere may be their belief in the goodness of their end.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Tract XC.*, reprinted by Messrs. Hope, London.

<sup>2</sup> See *Thoughts on the Sabbath*.



*‘Dissimulation is but a faint kind of policy.’*

What Bacon says of the inexpediency of all insincere proceedings is very true. Nothing but the right can ever be the expedient, since that can never be true expediency which would sacrifice a greater good to a less,—‘For what shall it *profit* a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul.’ It will be found that all frauds, like the ‘wall daubed with untempered mortar,’ with which men think to buttress up an edifice, tend to the decay of that which they are devised to support. This truth, however, will never be steadily acted on by those who have no moral detestation of falsehood. It is not *given* to those who do not prize straightforwardness for its own sake to perceive that it is the wisest course. The maxim that ‘honesty is the best policy’ is one which, perhaps, no one ever is habitually guided by in practice. An honest man is always *before* it, and a knave is generally *behind* it. He does not find out, till too late,

‘What a tangled web we weave  
When first we practise to deceive.’

No one, in fact, is capable of fully appreciating the ultimate expediency of a devoted adherence to Truth, save the divine Being, who is ‘the Truth;’ because He alone comprehends the whole of the vast and imperfectly-revealed scheme of Providence, and alone can see the inmost recesses of the human heart, and alone can foresee and judge of the remotest consequences of human actions.

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## ESSAY VII. OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

THE joys of parents are secret, and so are their griefs and fears; they cannot utter the one, nor they will not<sup>1</sup> utter the other. Children sweeten labours, but they make misfortunes more bitter; they increase the cares of life, but they mitigate the remembrance of death. The perpetuity by generation is common to beasts; but memory, merit, and noble works, are proper to men—and surely a man shall see the noblest works and foundations have proceeded from childless men, which have sought to express the images of their minds, where those of their bodies have failed—so the care of posterity is most in them that have no posterity. They that are the first raisers of their houses are most indulgent towards their children, beholding them as the continuance, not only of their kind, but of their work; and so both children and creatures.

The difference in affection of parents towards their several children is many times unequal, and sometimes unworthy, especially in the mother; as Solomon saith, 'A wise son rejoiceth the father, but an ungracious son shames the mother.'<sup>2</sup> A man shall see, where there is a house full of children, one or two of the eldest respected, and the youngest made wantons; but in the midst some that are as it were forgotten, who, many times, nevertheless, prove the best. The illiberality of parents, in allowance towards their children, is a harmful<sup>3</sup> error, and makes them base, acquaints them with shifts, makes them sort<sup>4</sup> with mean company, and makes them surfeit more when they come to plenty; and therefore the proof is best when men keep their authority towards their children, but not their purse. Men have a foolish manner (both parents, and schoolmasters, and servants), in creating and breeding an emulation between brothers

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<sup>1</sup> Nor they will not. *Nor will they.*

<sup>2</sup> *Proverbs x. 1.*

<sup>3</sup> Harmful. *Pernicious.*

'Sleepy poppies harmful harvests yield.'—*Dryden.*

<sup>4</sup> Sort. *To associate with; to consort.* 'Metals sort and herd with other metals in the earth.'—*Woodward.*

during childhood, which many times sorteth<sup>1</sup> to discord when they are men, and disturbeth families. The Italians make little difference between children and nephews, or near kinsfolk; but so they be of the lump they care not, though they pass not through their own body—and, to say truth, in nature it is much a like matter: insomuch that we see a nephew sometimes resembleth an uncle, or a kinsman, more than his own parents, as the blood happens. Let parents chuse betimes the vocations and courses they mean their children should take, for then they are most flexible; and let them not too much apply themselves to the disposition of their children, as thinking they will take best to that which they have most mind to. It is true, that if the affection,<sup>2</sup> or aptness, of the children be extraordinary, then it is good not to cross it; but generally the precept is good, 'Optimum elige, suave et facile illud faciet consuetudo.'<sup>3</sup> Younger brothers are commonly fortunate, but seldom or never where the elder are disinherited.

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## ANNOTATIONS.

*'Let parents chuse betimes the vocations and courses they mean their children should take. . . . And let them not too much apply themselves to the dispositions of their children.'*

It is only in very rare and extreme cases that Bacon allows the inclination of children to be followed in the choice of a profession. But he surely makes too little allowance (and, perhaps, the majority of parents do so) for the great diversity of natural faculties. It is not only such marvellous geniuses as occur but in five out of a million, that will succeed in one course far better than in any other. Numbers of men who would never attain any extraordinary eminence in anything, are

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<sup>1</sup> Sort. *To issue in* (from sortir).

<sup>2</sup> All my pains is *sorted* to no proof.—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>3</sup> Affection. *Strong inclination to*. 'All the precepts of Christianity command us to temper our *affections* towards all things below.'—*Temple*.

<sup>4</sup> Chuse the best, and custom will render it agreeable and easy.'

yet so constituted as to make a very respectable figure in the department that is suited for them, and to fall below mediocrity in a different one.

The world has been compared by some one to a board covered with holes of many various shapes, and pegs fitted for each, but which are scattered about at random, so that it is a mere chance whether a peg falls into the hole that fits it.

A. B. was the son of a schoolmaster who had a great love of literature. The son had a perfect hatred of it, and was a mere dunce at his book. Various attempts were made, which proved perfect failures, to train him to some of what are called the learned professions; and he was, to all appearance, turning out what they call a 'ne'er-do-weel.' As a last resource he was sent out to a new colony. There he was in his element; for, when at school, though dull at learning and soon forgetting what he had read, he never saw a horse nor a carriage, once, that he did not always recognise; and he really understood all that belonged to each. In the colony he became one of the most thriving settlers; skilful in making roads, erecting mills, draining, cattle-breeding, &c., and was advanced to a situation of trust in the colony. And it is worth remarking that he became a very steady and well-conducted man, having been before the reverse. For it adds greatly to a young man's temptations to fall into habits of idleness and dissipation, if he is occupied in some pursuit in which he despairs of success, and for which he has a strong disinclination.

C. D., again, was at a university, and was below the average in all academical pursuits; but he was the greatest mechanical genius in the university, not excepting the professors. He never examined any machine, however complex, that he could not with his own hands construct a model of it, and sometimes with improvements. He would have made a first-rate engineer; but family arrangements caused him to take Orders. He was a diligent and conscientious clergyman, but a dull and commonplace one; except that, in repairing, and altering, and fitting up his parsonage and his church, he was unrivalled. In this sense no one could be more *edifying*.

When, however, a youth is supposed to have, and believes himself to have, a great *turn* for such and such a profession, you should make sure that he understands what the profession is,

and has faculties for what it really does require. A youth, *e.g.*, who is anxious to enter the Navy, and thinks only of sailing about to various countries, having an occasional brush with an enemy, and leading altogether a jolly life, without any notion of the study, and toils, and privations he will have to go through, should have his views corrected.

E. F. was thought by his friends to have made this mistake ; and when, at his earnest entreaty, he was sent to sea, they secretly begged the captain to make his life as unpleasant as possible, being anxious to sicken him. He was accordingly snubbed, and rated, and set to the most laborious duties, and never commended or encouraged. But he bore all, and did all, with unflinching patience and diligence. At last the captain revealed the whole to him, saying, ' I can carry on this disguise no longer ; you are the finest young man I ever had under me, and I have long admired your conduct while I pretended to scold you.' But perhaps part of his good conduct may have sprung from the cause which Bacon alludes to in the last sentence of his Essay on ' Marriage.'

G. H., who had, as a youth, a vehement longing to go to sea, was positively interdicted by his father. Hence, though possessing very good abilities, and not without aspirations after excellence, he never could be brought to settle down steadily to anything, but broke off from every promising pursuit that he was successively engaged in, in pursuit of some phantom.

It is observable that a parent who is unselfish, and who is never thinking of personal inconvenience, but always of the children's advantage, will be likely to make them selfish ; for she will let that too plainly appear, so as to fill the child with an idea that everything is to give way to him, and that his concerns are an ultimate end. Nay, the very pains taken with him in strictly controlling him, heightens his idea of his own vast importance ; whereas a parent who is selfish will be sure to accustom the child to sacrifice his own convenience, and to understand that he is of much less importance than the parent. This, by the way, is only one of many cases in which selfishness is caught from those who have least of it.

## ESSAY VIII. OF MARRIAGE AND SINGLE LIFE.

**H**E that hath wife and children hath given hostages to fortune; for they are impediments to great enterprises, either of virtue or mischief. Certainly the best works, and of greatest merit for the public, have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men, which, both in affection and means, have married and endowed the public. Yet it were great reason that those that have children should have greatest care of future times, unto which they know they must transmit their dearest pledges. Some there are, who, though they lead a single life, yet their thoughts do end with themselves, and account future times impertinencies;<sup>1</sup> nay, there are some other that account wife and children but as bills of charges;<sup>2</sup> nay, more, there are some foolish rich covetous men that take a pride in having no children, because they may be thought so much the richer; for, perhaps, they have heard some talk, 'Such a one is a great rich man,' and another except to it, 'Yea, but he hath a great charge of children,' as if it were an abatement to his riches. But the most ordinary cause of a single life is liberty, especially in certain self-pleasing and humorous<sup>3</sup> minds, which are so sensible of every restraint, as<sup>4</sup> they will go near to think their girdles and garters to be bonds and shackles. Unmarried men are best friends, best masters, best servants, but not always best subjects,

<sup>1</sup> Impertinencies. *Things wholly irrelevant; things of little or no importance.*

'O matter and impertinency mixed,  
Reason and madness.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>2</sup> There are many subtle *impertinencies* learnt in schools.'—*Watts.*

<sup>2</sup> Charges. *Cost; expense.*

'I'll be at *charges* for a looking-glass,  
And entertain a score or two of tailors.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>3</sup> Humorous. *Governed by one's own fancy or predominant inclination.*

'I am known to be a *humorous* patrician.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>4</sup> He that would learn to pass a just sentence upon man and things, must beware of a fanciful temper, and a *humorous* conduct in affairs.'—*Watts.*

'Or self-conceited, play the *humorous* Platonist.'—*Drayton.*

<sup>4</sup> As. *That.* See page 23.

for they are light to run away, and almost all fugitives ~~are~~ of that condition. A single life doth well with churchmen, for charity will hardly water the ground where it must first fill a pool. It is indifferent for judges and magistrates; for if they be facile and corrupt, you shall have a servant five times worse than a wife. For soldiers, I find the generals commonly, in their hortatives, put men in mind of their wives and children: and I think the despising of marriage among the Turks maketh the vulgar soldier more base. Certainly wife and children are a kind of discipline of humanity: and single men, though they be many times more charitable, because their means are less exhaust,<sup>1</sup> yet, on the other side, they are more cruel and hard-hearted (good to make severe inquisitors), because their tenderness is not so oft called upon. Grave natures, led by custom, and therefore constant, are commonly loving husbands, as was said of Ulysses, 'Vetulam suam prætulit immortalitati.' Chaste women are often proud and froward, as presuming upon the merit of their chastity. It is one of the best bonds, both of chastity and obedience, in the wife, if she thinks her husband wise, which she will never do if she find him jealous. Wives are young men's mistresses, companions for middle age, and old men's nurses, so as a man may have a quarrel<sup>2</sup> to marry when he will; but yet he was reputed one of the wise men that made answer to the question when a man should marry—'A young man not yet, an elder man not at all.'<sup>3</sup> It is often seen that bad husbands have very good wives; whether it be that it raiseth the price of their husband's kindness when it comes, or that the wives take a pride in their patience; but this never fails, if the bad husbands were of their own chusing, against their friends' consent; for then they will be sure to make good their own folly.

<sup>1</sup> Exhaust. Exhausted.

'The wealth  
Of the Canaries was exhaust, the health  
Of his good Majesty to celebrate.'—*Habington*.

<sup>2</sup> 'He preferred his old woman to immortality.'—*Plut. Gryll. 1.*

<sup>3</sup> Quarrel. A reason; a plea. (Perhaps, from Quare, wherefore, used in law for a plea in trespass.) Or perhaps this oldest use of it for reason or plea, is the original meaning of querela, retained in querulous—putting forth a pitiful plea.

'He thought he had a good quarrel to attack him.'—*Holinshed*.

<sup>4</sup> Thales. *Vid. Diog. Laert. i. 26.*

## ANTITHETA ON WIFE AND CHILDREN.

## PRO.

‘Charitas reipublicæ incipit a familia.

*‘The love of country has its rise in family affection.’*

‘Uxor et liberi disciplina quædam humanitatis; at cælibes tetrici et severi.

*‘A wife and children are a sort of training in courtesy and kindliness; while single men, on the other hand, are hard and severe.’*

‘Cælibatus et orbitas ad nil aliud conferunt, quam ad fugam.

*‘Celibacy and absence of kindred are a qualification only for flight.’*

## CONTRA.

‘Qui uxorem duxit, et liberos suscepit, obsides fortunæ dedit.

*‘He that has a wife and children has given hostages to fortune.’*

‘Brutorum eternitas soboles; virorum fama, merita, et instituta.

*‘The perpetuation of brutes is offspring; but that of man is their glory, their deserts, and their institutions.’*

‘Economicæ rationes publicas plerumque evertunt.

*‘Family considerations often overthrow public ones.’*

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 ANNOTATIONS.

It is remarkable that Bacon does not at all advert to the notion of the superior holiness of a single life, or to the enforced celibacy of the Roman-Catholic clergy.

It is hardly necessary to remark—much less to prove—that, even supposing there were some spiritual advantage in celibacy, it ought to be completely voluntary from day to day, and not to be enforced by a life-long vow or rule. For in this case, even though a person should not repent of such a vow, no one can be sure that there is not such repentance. Supposing that even a large majority of priests, and monks, and nuns, have no desire to marry, every one of them may not unreasonably be suspected of such a desire, and no one of them, consequently, can be secure against the most odious suspicions. It has been alleged, in reply to this, that the like reasoning would apply to the case of the *marriage contract*, since no one can be sure that a married couple may not repent of their union. To the most rightminded persons, the answer would at once occur, that there is a wide difference between any merely human institution, and one that has an express divine sanction: ‘what God hath joined together, let not Man put asunder.’ This distinction, however, would not be recognised by those who put the decrees of a (supposed) infallible Church on a level with Scripture. But even these may perceive that the permanence of the marriage-tie



is *necessary* for the due care of offspring—for the comfort of married life itself—and for the morality and welfare of society. And that there is no such necessity for the enforced celibacy of the clergy, is proved, not only by the experience of *all* Churches except that of Rome, but by the admission of that very Church itself; since it dispenses with the rule in favour of the clergy of the Eastern Churches.

No doubt there are many Roman-Catholic clergymen (as there are Protestant) who sincerely prefer celibacy. But, in the one case we have a ground of assurance of this, which is wanting in the other. No one can be sure, because no proof can be given, that a vow of perpetual celibacy may not some time or other be a matter of regret. But he who continues to live single while continuing to have a free choice, gives a fair evidence of a continued preference for that life.<sup>1</sup>

Accordingly, many of the most intelligent of the Roman-Catholic laity are very desirous of having the law of celibacy removed. It is not reckoned an article of the faith, but merely a matter of discipline. And accordingly, those of the Greek and Armenian Churches who have consented to acknowledge Romish supremacy, have been allowed to retain their own practice as to this matter; the Armenian Church *allowing* the marriage of their priests, and the Greek Church *requiring* the parish priests to be married.

When this was urged by an intelligent Roman-Catholic layman, to the late Archbishop Murray, he replied that but few Armenian priests do avail themselves of their privilege. This, answered the other, is a strong reason on my side; for the

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<sup>1</sup> It is worth observing, by the way, that if any one should maintain that enforced celibacy of the clergy is essential to such an unrestricted intercourse as is, on religious grounds, desirable between the pastor and the females of his flock, and should allege that a clergyman to whom marriage is permitted could not have any confidential communication with them, for fear of exciting rumours of some matrimonial designs—if any one should maintain this, he would hardly be thought serious. He would be answered—if, indeed, he were considered worth an answer—that the reasonable inference is the very opposite. Any groundless rumours of a tender attachment between parties who were *free* to marry, would be put an end to by their *not* marrying. But if their marriage were prohibited by law, it would be necessary to avoid any such intimacy as might possibly lead to the existence, or to the suspicion, of that sort of attachment which would naturally lead to matrimony. But it is remarkable that many persons to whom all this is quite clear, yet use, in a precisely parallel case, the very same kind of reasoning which, in this case, they would deride.—See *Remains of Bishop Copleston*, p. 42.

advantage which you think there is in an unmarried priesthood is secured in a great majority of instances, with the very great additional advantage that their celibacy is there understood to be completely voluntary.

But doubtless the Romish hierarchy have been much influenced by the consideration which Bacon mentions, that 'single men are the best servants.' It was wished to keep the clergy, who are the employed servants of the Roman Church, as distinct as possible from the Body of the people.

In the Greek Church, though every parish priest must be a married man, the bishops never are, being always taken from among the monks. The result of this is (1.) that the parish priests, since they cannot rise any higher, are regarded as an inferior order of men; and, according to the testimony of all travellers, are a very low set. And (2.) the bishop who has to govern, through the medium of the priests, all the parishes of his diocese, is necessarily a person destitute of all *experience*. It is as if the command of a fleet were given (as is sometimes done by the Russians) to a military officer.

A parish priest in the Greek Church, if his wife dies, is permanently suspended. For none can officiate who is not married; and he is not allowed to marry again. It is thus they interpret, as some Protestant divines also have done (besides Doctor Primrose), the rule that he is to be 'the husband of one wife.'

The rule is manifestly and confessedly of doubtful interpretation; some understanding it of a prohibition merely of polygamy; and others, as relating merely to conjugal fidelity. This last has more to be said in its favour than would appear from our translation, on account of the double meaning in the original *ἑνὴν* and also of *ἄνθρωπον* in Greek, and *Vir* in Latin.

It has been urged against this interpretation, that such a rule would have been superfluous; but surely the same might be said against the rule that the deacon should be 'no striker,' and 'not given to much wine.'

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## ESSAY IX. OF ENVY.

THERE be none of the affections which have been noted to fascinate or bewitch, but love and envy; they both have vehement wishes, they frame themselves readily into imaginations and suggestions, and they come easily into the eye, especially upon the presence of the objects, which are the points that conduce to fascination, if any such thing there be. We see, likewise, the Scripture calleth envy an evil eye, and the astrologers call the evil influences of the stars evil aspects, so that still there seemeth to be acknowledged, in the act of envy, an ejaculation<sup>1</sup> or irradiation of the eye; nay, some have been so curious<sup>2</sup> as to note, that the time when the stroke or percussion of an envious eye doth most hurt, are when the party envied is beheld in glory or triumph, for that sets an edge upon envy; and, besides, at such times, the spirits of the person envied do come forth most into the outward parts, and so meet the blow.

But leaving these curiosities<sup>3</sup> (though not unworthy to be thought on in fit place), we will handle<sup>4</sup> what persons are apt to envy others; what persons are most subject to be envied themselves; and what is the difference between public and private envy.

A man that hath no virtue in himself ever envieth virtue in others—for men's minds will either feed upon their own good, or upon others' evil; and who<sup>5</sup> wanteth the one will prey upon

<sup>1</sup> Ejaculation. *The act of throwing or darting out.* 'Which brief prayers of our Saviour (*Matt.* xxvi. 39) are probably such as we call *ejaculation*—an elegant similitude from the shooting or throwing out a dart or arrow.'—*South.*

'Its active rays *ejaculated* thence,  
Irradiate all the wide circumference.'—*Blackmore.*

<sup>2</sup> Curious. *Subtle; minutely inquiring; accurate; precise.* 'Both these senses embrace their objects with a more *curious* discrimination.'—*Holden.* 'Having inquired of the *curious*est and most observing makers of such tools.'—*Boyle.*

'For *curious* I cannot be with you.'—*Shakespeare.*

*Ingenious.* 'To devise *curious* works.'—*Exodus* xxxv. 32.

<sup>3</sup> Curiosities. *Niceties.* 'Equalities are so weighed, that *curiosity* in neither can make choice of either's moiety.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>4</sup> Handle. *To treat; to discuss.*

'He left nothing fitting for the purpose  
Untouched or slightly *handled* in discourse.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>5</sup> Who. *He who.* 'Who talks much, must talk in vain.'—*Gay.*

the other; and whoso<sup>1</sup> is out of hope to attain another's virtue, will seek to come at even hand, by depressing another's fortune.

A man that is busy and inquisitive is commonly envious; for to know much of other men's matters cannot be because all that ado<sup>2</sup> may concern his own estate; therefore it must needs be that he taketh a kind of play-pleasure in looking upon the fortunes of others; neither can he that mindeth but his own business find much matter for envy; for envy is a gadding passion, and walketh the streets, and doth not keep home; 'Non est curiosus, quin idem sit malevolus.'<sup>3</sup>

Men of noble birth are noted to be envious towards new men when they rise: for the distance is altered; and it is like a deceit of the eye, that when others come on they think themselves go back.

Deformed persons and eunuchs, and old men and bastards, are envious; for he that cannot possibly mend his own case, will do what he can to impair another's; except these defects light upon a very brave and heroical nature, which thinketh to make his natural wants part of his honour; in that it should be said, 'That an eunuch, or a lame man, did such great matters;' affecting<sup>4</sup> the honour of a miracle: as it was in Narses the eunuch, and Agesilaus and Tamerlane, that were lame men.

The same is the case of men who rise after calamities and misfortunes; for they are as men fallen out with the times, and think other men's harms a redemption of their own sufferings.

They that desire to excel in too many matters, out of levity and vain glory, are ever envious, for they cannot want work—it being impossible but many, in some one of those things, should surpass them; which was the character of Adrian the emperor,<sup>5</sup> that mortally envied poets and painters, and artificers in works wherein he had a vein<sup>6</sup> to excel.

Lastly, near kinsfolks and fellows in office, and those that

<sup>1</sup> Whoso. *Whoever*. 'Whoso offereth praise glorifieth me.'—*Ps.* l. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Ado. *Bustle*—really the infinitive mood of a verb equivalent to the expression 'to do.'—Used in the plural *adoes* in the old Scottish Acts of Parliament.—*Rev. H. Cotton*.

'Let's follow, to see the end of this *ado*.'

'Much *Ado* about Nothing.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>3</sup> 'There is none curious that is not also *malevolent*.'—*Cf. Plut. de Curios.* 1.

<sup>4</sup> Affecting. See page 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Spartian. Vit. Adrian.* 15.

<sup>6</sup> Vein. *Humour; fancy*.

'Thou troublest me; I am not in the vein.'—*Shakespeare*.

are bred together, are more apt to envy their equals when they are raised; for it doth upbraid unto them their own fortunes, and pointeth at them, and cometh oftener into their remembrance, and incurreth<sup>1</sup> likewise more into the note of others; and envy ever redoubleth from speech and fame. Cain's envy was the more vile and malignant towards his brother Abel, because, when his sacrifice was better accepted, there was nobody to look on. Thus much for those that are apt to envy.

Concerning those that are more or less subject to envy. First, persons of eminent virtue, when they are advanced, are less envied, for their fortune seemeth but due unto them; and no man envieth the payment of a debt, but rewards and liberality rather. Again, envy is ever joined with the comparing of a man's self; and where there is no comparison, no envy—and therefore kings are not envied but by kings. Nevertheless, it is to be noted, that unworthy persons are most envied at their first coming in, and afterwards overcome it better; whereas, contrarywise,<sup>2</sup> persons of worth and merit are most envied when their fortune continueth long; for by that time, though their virtue be the same, yet it hath not the same lustre, for fresh men grow up to darken it.

Persons of noble blood are less envied in their rising, for it seemeth but right done to their birth: besides, there seemeth not much added to their fortune; and envy is as the sunbeams, that beat hotter upon a bank, or steep rising ground, than upon a flat; and, for the same reason, those that are advanced by degrees are less envied than those that are advanced suddenly, and 'per saltum.'<sup>3</sup>

Those that have joined with their honour great travels, cares, or perils, are less subject to envy; for men think that they earn their honours hardly, and pity them sometimes, and pity ever healeth envy: wherefore you shall observe, that the more deep and sober sort of politic persons, in their greatness, are ever bemoaning themselves what a life they lead, chanting a 'quanta patimur;'<sup>4</sup> not that they feel it so, but only to abate

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<sup>1</sup> Incur. *To press on.* 'The mind of man is helped or hindered in its operations according to the different quality of external objects that *incur* into the senses.'—*South.*

<sup>2</sup> Contrarywise. *On the contrary.*

<sup>3</sup> 'At a bound.'

<sup>4</sup> 'How much we suffer!'

the edge of envy : but this is to be understood of business that is laid upon men, and not such as they call unto themselves ; for nothing increaseth envy more than an unnecessary and ambitious engrossing of business—and nothing doth extinguish envy more than for a great person to preserve all other inferior officers in their full rights and pre-eminences of their places ; for, by that means, there be so many screens between him and envy.

Above all, those are most subject to envy which carry the greatness of their fortunes in an insolent and proud manner—being never well but while they are showing how great they are, either by outward pomp, or by triumphing over all opposition or competition : whereas wise men will rather do sacrifice to envy, in suffering themselves, sometimes of<sup>1</sup> purpose, to be crossed and overborne in things that do not much concern them. Notwithstanding, so much is true, that the carriage of greatness in a plain and open manner (so it be without arrogancy<sup>2</sup> and vain-glory), doth draw less envy than if it be in a more crafty and cunning fashion ; for in that course a man doth but disavow fortune, and seemeth to be conscious of his own want in worth, and doth but teach others to envy him.

Lastly, to conclude this part, as we said in the beginning that the act of envy had somewhat in it of witchcraft, so there is no other cure of envy but the cure of witchcraft ; and that is, to remove the lot (as they call it), and to lay it upon another ; for which purpose, the wiser sort of great persons bring in ever upon the stage somebody upon whom to derive<sup>3</sup> the envy that would come upon themselves ; sometimes upon ministers and servants, sometimes upon colleagues and associates, and the like ; and, for that turn, there are never wanting some persons of violent and undertaking<sup>4</sup> natures, who, so they may have power and business, will take it at any cost.

Now, to speak of public envy. There is yet some good in

<sup>1</sup> Of. *By ; of purpose ; by design ; intentionally.* 'They do of right belong to you.'—*Tillotson.*

<sup>2</sup> Arrogancy. *Arrogance.* 'Let not *arrogancy* come out of your mouth.'—*1 Samuel xi.*

<sup>3</sup> Derive. *To divert ; to turn the course of.* 'Company abates the torrent of a common odium by *deriving* it into many channels.'—*South.*

<sup>4</sup> Undertaking. *Enterprising.* 'Men of renown, that is, of *undertaking* and adventurous natures.'—*Sir Walter Raleigh.*

public envy, whereas in private there is none; for public envy is as an ostracism, that eclipseth men when they grow too great; and therefore it is a bridle also to great ones to keep within bounds.

This envy, being in the Latin word '*invidia*,' goeth in the modern languages by the name of discontentment, of which we shall speak in handling sedition. It is a disease in a State like to infection; for as infection spreadeth upon that which is sound, and tainteth it, so, when envy is gotten once into a State, it traduceth even the best actions thereof, and turneth them into an ill odour; and therefore there is little won by intermingling of plausible<sup>1</sup> actions; for that doth argue but a weakness and fear of envy, which hurteth so much the more; as it is likewise usual in infections, which, if you fear them, you call them upon you.

This public envy seemeth to bear chiefly upon principal officers or ministers, rather than upon kings and States themselves. But this is a sure rule, that if the envy upon the minister be great, when the cause of it in him is small, or if the envy be general in a manner upon all the ministers of an estate, then the envy (though hidden) is truly upon the State itself. And so much of public envy or discontentment, and the difference thereof from private envy, which was handled in the first place.

We will add this in general, touching the affection of envy, that of all other affections it is the most importune<sup>2</sup> and continual; for of other affections there is occasion given but now and then; and therefore it was well said, '*Invidia festos dies non agit*,'<sup>3</sup> for it is ever working upon some or other. And it is also noted, that love and envy do make a man pine, which other affections do not, because they are not so continual. It is also the vilest affection, and the most depraved; for which cause it is the proper attribute of the Devil, who is called '*The*

<sup>1</sup> Plausible. *Deserving to meet with applause.* 'I hope they will plausibly receive our attempt.'—*Brown.*

<sup>2</sup> Importune. *Importunate; troublesome from frequency.*

'More shall thy penitent sighs, his endless mercy please  
Than their importune suits which dreame that words God's wrath appease.'—*Surrey.*

<sup>3</sup> 'Envy keeps no holidays.'

envious man, that soweth tares among the wheat by night ;' as it always cometh to pass, that envy worketh subtilly, and in the dark, and to the prejudice of good things, such as is the wheat.

## ANTITHETA ON ENVY.

## PRO.

'Invidia in rebuspublicis, tanquam salubris ostracismus.

*'In public affairs, envy acts the part of a wholesome ostracism.'*

## CONTRA.

'Nemo virtuti invidiam reconciliaverit præter mortem.

*'Nothing can reconcile envy to virtue but death.'*

'Invidia virtutes laboribus exercet, ut Juno Herculem.

*'Envy acts towards the virtues as Juno did towards Hercules ; she condemns them to toilsome labours.'*

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 ANNOTATIONS.

*'There seemeth to be acknowledged, in the act of envy, an ejaculation or irradiation of the eye.'*

There is a curious passage on this subject in a very able article in the *North British Review* (Aug. 1857), which I will take the liberty of citing.

'We once, in Cairo, conversed on this superstition with an intelligent Cairene, who described it as the great curse of his country.

'Does the mischievous influence of the evil eye,' we asked, 'depend on the will of the person whose glance does the mischief?'

'Not altogether,' he answered. 'An intention to harm may render more virulent the poison of the glance ; but envy, or the desire to appropriate a thing, or even excessive admiration, may render it hurtful without the consciousness, or even against the will, of the offender. It injures most the thing that it first hits. Hence the bits of red cloth that are stuck about the dresses of women, and about the trappings of camels and horses, and the large spots of lamp black which you may see on the foreheads of children. They are a sort of conductors. It is hoped that they will attract the glance, and exhaust its venom.'



“A fine house, fine furniture, a fine camel, and a fine horse, are all enjoyed with fear and trembling, lest they should excite envy and bring misfortune. A butcher would be afraid to expose fine meat, lest the evil eye of passers-by, who might covet it, should taint it, and make it spoil, or become unwholesome.”

“Children are supposed to be peculiarly the objects of desire and admiration. When they are suffered to go abroad, they are intentionally dirty and ill-dressed; but generally they are kept at home, without air or exercise, but safe from admiration. This occasions a remarkable difference between the infant mortality in Europe and in Egypt. In Europe it is the children of the rich who live; in Egypt, it is the children of the poor. The children of the poor cannot be confined. They live in the fields. As soon as you quit the city, you see in every clover field a group, of which the centre is a tethered buffalo, and round it are the children of its owner, with their provision of bread and water, sent thither at sunrise and to remain there till sunset, basking in the sun, and breathing the air from the desert. The Fellah children enter their hovels only to sleep, and that only in the winter. In summer, their days and nights are passed in the open air; and, notwithstanding their dirt and their bad food, they grow up healthy and vigorous. The children of the rich, confined by the fear of the evil eye to the ‘hareem,’ are puny creatures, of whom not a fourth part reaches adolescence. Achmed Pasha Tahir, one of the governors of Cairo under Mehemet Ali, had 280 children; only six survived him. Mehemet Ali himself had 87; only ten were living at his death.”

“I believe,” he added, “that at the bottom of this superstition is an enormous prevalence of envy among the lower Egyptians. You see it in all their fictions. Half of the stories told in the coffee-shops by the professional story-tellers, of which the *Arabian Nights* are a specimen, turn on malevolence. Malevolence, not attributed, as it would be in European fiction, to some insult or injury inflicted by the person who is its object, but to mere envy: envy of wealth, or of the other means of enjoyment, honourably acquired and liberally used.” (Pages 10-II.)

In Adam Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, the following

admirable remarks are made on the envy that attends a sudden rise:—

‘The man who, by some sudden revolution of fortune, is lifted up all at once into a condition of life greatly above what he had formerly lived in, may be assured that the congratulations of his best friends are not all of them perfectly sincere. An upstart, though of the greatest merit, is generally disagreeable, and a sentiment of envy commonly prevents us from heartily sympathizing with his joy. If he has any judgment, he is sensible of this, and instead of appearing to be elated with his good fortune, he endeavours, as much as he can, to smother his joy, and keep down that elevation of mind with which his new circumstances naturally inspire him. He affects the same plainness of dress, and the same modesty of behaviour, which became him in his former station. He redoubles his attention to his old friends, and endeavours more than ever to be humble, assiduous, and complaisant. And this is the behaviour which in his situation we must approve of; because, we expect, it seems, that he should have more sympathy with our envy and aversion to his happiness, than we have with his happiness. It is seldom that with all this he succeeds. We suspect the sincerity of his humility, and he grows weary of this constraint. In a little time, therefore, he generally leaves all his old friends behind him, some of the meanest of them excepted, who may, perhaps, condescend to become his dependents: nor does he always acquire any new ones; the pride of his new connections is as much affronted at finding him their equal, as that of his old ones had been by his becoming their superior: and it requires the most obstinate and persevering modesty to atone for this mortification to either. He generally grows weary too soon, and is provoked, by the sullen and suspicious pride of the one, and by the saucy contempt of the other, to treat the first with neglect, and the second with petulance, till at last he grows habitually insolent, and forfeits the esteem of all. If the chief part of human happiness arises from the consciousness of being beloved, as I believe it does, those sudden changes of fortune seldom contribute much to happiness. He is happiest who advances more gradually to greatness; whom the Public destines to every step of his preferment long before he arrives at it; in whom, upon that account, when it comes, it can excite no ex-

travagant joy, and with regard to whom it cannot reasonably create either any jealousy in those he overtakes, or any envy in those he leaves behind.<sup>1</sup>

*'Persons of eminent virtue, when they are advanced, are less envied.'*

Bacon might have remarked that, in one respect a rise by merit exposes a man to more envy than that by personal favour, through family connection, private friendship, &c. For, in this latter case, the *system* itself of preferring private considerations to public, is chiefly blamed, but the *individual* thus advanced is regarded much in the same way as one who is *born* to an estate or a title. But when any one is advanced on the score of desert and qualifications, the system is approved, but the individual is more envied, because his advancement is felt as an affront to all who think themselves or their own friends more worthy. 'It is quite right to advance men of great merit; but by this rule, it is I, or my friend So-and-so that should have been preferred.' When, on the other hand, a bishop or a minister appoints his own son or private friend to some office, every one else is left free to think 'If it had gone by merit, I should have been the man.'

When any person of really eminent virtue becomes the object of envy, the clamour and abuse by which he is assailed, is but the sign and accompaniment of his success in doing service to the Public. And if he is a truly wise man, he will take no more notice of it than the moon does of the howling of the dogs. Her only answer to them is 'to shine on.'

*'This public envy seemeth to bear chiefly upon principal officers or ministers, rather than upon kings.'*

This is a very just remark, and it might have suggested an excellent argument (touched on in the *Lessons on the British Constitution*<sup>2</sup>) in favour of hereditary Royalty. It is surely a good thing that there should be some feeling of loyalty unalloyed by envy, towards *something* in the Government. And this

<sup>1</sup> Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, chap. v.

<sup>2</sup> See *Introductory Lessons on the British Constitution*, lesson i.

feeling concentrates itself among us, upon the Sovereign. But in a pure Republic, the abstract idea of the State—the Commonwealth itself—is too vague for the vulgar mind to take hold of with any loyal affection. The President, and every one of the public officers, has been raised from the ranks; and the very circumstance of their having been so raised on the score of supposed fitness, makes them (as was observed above) the more obnoxious to envy, because their elevation is felt as an affront to their rivals.

An hereditary Sovereign, on the other hand, if believed to possess personal merit, is regarded as a Godsend; but he does not hold his place by that tenure.

In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, there is a Dissertation on Envy, Emulation, and Indignation (Nemesis), well worthy of Bacon; who certainly was carried away into an undue neglect and disparagement of Aristotle by the absurd idolatry of which he had been made the object.

‘Conculcatur enim cupide nimis ante metutum.’

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## ESSAY X. OF LOVE.

THE stage is more beholding<sup>1</sup> to love than the life of Man ; for as to the stage, love is even matter of comedies, and now and then of tragedies ; but in life it doth much mischief, sometimes like a syren, sometimes like a fury. You may observe, that amongst all the great and worthy persons (whereof the memory remaineth, either ancient or recent), there is not one that hath been transported to the mad degree of love ; which shows that great spirits and great business do keep out this weak passion. You must except, nevertheless, Marcus Antonius, the half-partner of the empire of Rome, and Appius Claudius, the decemvir and lawgiver ; whereof the former was indeed a voluptuous man, and inordinate, but the latter was an austere and wise man : and therefore it seems (though rarely) that love can find entrance, not only in an open heart, but also into a heart well fortified, if watch be not well kept. It is a poor saying of Epicurus, ‘ Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus,’<sup>2</sup> —as if a Man, made for the contemplation of heaven, and all noble objects, should do nothing but kneel before a little idol, and make himself a subject, though not of the mouth (as beasts are), yet of the eye, which was given him for higher purposes.

It is a strange thing to note the excess of this passion, and how it braves the nature and value of things by this, that the speaking in a perpetual hyperbole is comely in nothing but in love ; neither is it merely in the phrase ; for whereas it hath been well said, ‘ That the arch flatterer, with whom all the petty flatterers have intelligence, is a man’s self :’ certainly the lover is more ; for there was never a proud man thought so absurdly well of himself as the lover doth of the person loved ; and therefore it was well said, ‘ That it is impossible to love and be wise.’<sup>3</sup> Neither doth this weakness appear to others only, and not to the party loved, but to the loved most of all, except the

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<sup>1</sup> Beholding. *Beholden*.

‘ Thanks, lovely Virgins, now might we but know  
To whom we had been *beholden* for this love.’ — *Ford*.

<sup>2</sup> ‘ We are a sufficiently great spectacle to each other.’

<sup>3</sup> ‘ Amare et sapere vix Deo conceditur.’ — *Pub. Syr. Sent.* 15.

love be reciprocal; for it is a true rule, that love is ever rewarded either with the reciprocal, or with an inward or secret contempt; by how much more then, men ought to beware of this passion, which looseth not only other things, but itself. As for the other losses, the poet's relation doth well figure them: 'That he that preferreth Helena, quitted the gifts of Juno and Pallas;' for whosoever esteemeth too much of amorous affection, quitteth both riches and wisdom. This passion hath its floods in the very times of weakness, which are great prosperity and great adversity; though this latter hath been less observed; both which times kindle love, and make it more fervent, and therefore show it to be the child of folly. They do best who, if they cannot but admit love, yet make it keep quarter,<sup>1</sup> and sever it wholly from their serious affairs and actions of life; for if it check<sup>2</sup> once with business, it troubleth men's fortunes, and maketh men that they can no ways<sup>3</sup> be true to their own ends. I know not how, but martial men are given to love: I think it is, but as they are given to wine, for perils commonly ask to be paid in pleasures.<sup>4</sup> There is in man's nature a secret inclination and motion towards love of others, which, if it be not spent upon some one or a few, doth naturally spread itself towards many, and maketh men become humane and charitable, as it is seen sometimes in friars. Nuptial love maketh mankind; friendly love perfecteth it; but wanton love corrupteth and embaseth<sup>5</sup> it.

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<sup>1</sup> Quarter. *Proper place* (rarely used in the singular).

'Swift to their several quarters hasted then  
The cumbrous elements.'—*Milton*.

<sup>2</sup> Check with. *To interfere with; to clash with*. 'It was not comely or fitting that in prayers we should make a God or Saviour of any Saint in heaven; neither was it fitting to make them *check with* our Saviour.'—*Strype*, 1535.

<sup>3</sup> No ways. *In any wise; by no means*. 'And being *no ways* a match for the fleet, we set sail to Athens.'—*Swift*.

<sup>4</sup> It is remarked by Aristotle in his *Politics* that *warlike nations* are those who pay the highest regard to women. And this he suggests may have given rise to the fable of the love of Mars and Venus.

<sup>5</sup> Embase. *Degrade*.

'Love did *embase* him  
Into a kitchen-drudge.'—*Old Ballad*, 13th century.

## ANNOTATIONS.

*'Men ought to beware of this passion, which loseth not only other things, but itself.' . . . 'Whosoever esteemeth too much of amorous affection, quitteth both riches and wisdom.'*

The following passage is extracted from an article on Miss Austen's novels, in the *Quarterly Review* (No. 24, p. 374) which was reprinted—through a mistake—in the *Remains* of Sir W. Scott, though it was not written by him.

'Bacon, in these days, would hardly have needed to urge so strongly the dethronement of the God of Love. The prevailing fault is not now, whatever it may have been, to sacrifice all for love :—

'Venit enim magnum donandi parca juvenus,  
Nec tantum Veneris quantum studiosa culinæ.'

Mischievous as is the extreme of sentimental enthusiasm, and a romantic and uncalculating extravagance of passion, it is not the one into which the young folks of the present day are the most likely to run. Prudential calculations are not indeed to be excluded in marriage: to disregard the advice of sober-minded friends on an important point of conduct is an imprudence we would by no means recommend; indeed, it is a species of selfishness, if, in listening only to the dictates of passion, a man sacrifices to its gratification the happiness of those most dear to him as well as his own; though it is not now-a-days the most prevalent form of selfishness. But it is no condemnation of a sentiment to say, that it becomes blameable when it interferes with duty, and is uncontrouled by conscience. The desire of riches, power, or distinction,—the taste for ease and comfort,—are to be condemned when they transgress these bounds; and love, if it keep within them, even though it be somewhat tinged with enthusiasm, and a little at variance with what the worldly call prudence,—that is, regard for pecuniary advantage,—may afford a better moral discipline to the mind than most other passions. It will not, at least, be denied, that it has often proved a powerful stimulus to exertion where others have failed, and has called forth talents unknown before, even to the

possessor. What though the pursuit may be fruitless, and the hopes visionary? The result may be a real and substantial benefit, though of another kind; the vineyard may have been cultivated by digging in it for the treasure which is never to be found. What though the perfections with which imagination has decorated the beloved object, may, in fact, exist but in a slender degree? Still they are believed in and admired as real; if not, the love is such as does not merit the name; and it is proverbially true that men become assimilated to the character (that is, what they *think* the character) of the Being they fervently adore. Thus, as in the noblest exhibitions of the stage, though that which is contemplated be but a fiction, it may be realized in the mind of the beholder; and, though grasping at a cloud, he may become worthy of possessing a real goddess. Many a generous sentiment, and many a virtuous resolution, have been called forth and matured by admiration of one, who may herself, perhaps, have been incapable of either. It matters not what the object is that a man aspires to be worthy of, and proposes as a model of imitation, if he does but *believe* it to be excellent. Moreover, all doubts of success (and they are seldom, if ever, entirely wanting) must either produce or exercise humility; and the endeavour to study another's interests and inclinations, and prefer them to one's own, may promote a habit of general benevolence which may outlast the present occasion. Everything, in short, which tends to abstract a man in any degree, or in any way, from self—from self-admiration and self-interest,—has, so far at least, a beneficial influence on character.'

The effect of mere familiar intercourse in dispelling the illusions of a fancy-founded love, is well described by Crabbe in one of the *Tales of the Hall*, the 'Natural Death of Love.' A like effect, resulting from a wider acquaintance with the world, and intercourse with superior persons, is described in a still better poem (which if not by Crabbe also, is a most admirable imitation of him in his happiest vein), entitled, 'A Common Tale,' which appeared first in a periodical called *The True Briton*, and afterwards in a little book called the *Medley*.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Published by Messrs. Smith, in the Strand.



## ESSAY XI. OF GREAT PLACE.

**M**EN in great place are thrice servants—servants of the sovereign or State, servants of fame, and servants of business; so as<sup>1</sup> they have no freedom, neither<sup>2</sup> in their persons, nor<sup>2</sup> in their actions, nor in their times. It is a strange desire to seek power and to lose liberty, or to seek power over others, and to lose power over a man's self. The rising unto place is laborious, and by pains men come to greater pains; and it is sometimes base and by indignities<sup>3</sup> men come to dignities. The standing is slippery, and the regress is either a downfall, or at least an eclipse, which is a melancholy thing: 'Cum non sis qui fueris, non esse cur velis vivere.'<sup>4</sup> Nay, men cannot retire when they would, neither will they when it were reason,<sup>5</sup> but are impatient of privateness,<sup>6</sup> even in age and sickness, which require the shadow;<sup>7</sup> like old townsmen, that will be still sitting at their street door, though thereby they offer age to scorn. Certainly great persons had need to borrow other men's opinions to think themselves happy, for if they judge by their own feeling, they cannot find it; but if they think with themselves what other men think of them, and that other men would fain be as they are, then they are happy as it were by report, when, perhaps, they find the contrary within; for they are the first that find their own griefs, though they be the last that find their own faults. Certainly, men in great fortunes are strangers to themselves, and while they are in the puzzle of business, they have no time to tend their health, either of body or mind: 'Illi

<sup>1</sup> As. *That.* See page 23.

<sup>2</sup> Neither, nor—for *either*, or.

<sup>3</sup> Indignity. *Meanness.*

'Fie on the pelf for which good name is sold,  
And honour with indignity debased.'—*Spenser.*

<sup>4</sup> 'Since thou art no longer what thou wast, there is no reason why thou shouldst wish to live.'

<sup>5</sup> Reason. *Right; reasonable.* 'It is not reason that we should leave the word of God, and serve tables.'—*Acts vi. 2.*

<sup>6</sup> *Privateness.* *Privacy; retirement.* 'He drew him into the fatal circle from a resolved privateness at his house, when he would well have bent his mind to a retired course.'—*Wotton.*

<sup>7</sup> Shadow. *Shade.*

'Here, father, take the shadow of this tree  
For your good host.'—*Shakespeare.*

mors gravis incubat, qui notus nimis omnibus, ignotus moritur sibi.<sup>1</sup> In place there is licence to do good and evil, whereof the latter is a curse; for in evil, the best condition is not to will,<sup>2</sup> the second not to can.<sup>3</sup> But power to do good is the true and lawful end of aspiring; for good thoughts, though God accept<sup>4</sup> them, yet towards men are little better than good dreams, except they be put in act, and that cannot be without power and place, as the vantage and commanding ground. Merit and good works is the end of man's motion, and conscience<sup>5</sup> of the same is the accomplishment of man's rest; for if a man can be a partaker of God's theatre, he shall likewise be partaker of God's rest: 'Et conversus Deus, ut aspiceret opera, quæ fecerunt manus suæ, vidit quod omnia essent bona nimis;<sup>6</sup>' and then the Sabbath. In the discharge of thy place set before thee the best examples, for imitation is a globe<sup>7</sup> of precepts; and after a time set before thee thine own example, and examine thyself strictly whether thou didst not best at first. Neglect not also the examples of those that have carried themselves ill in the same place; not to set off thyself by taxing their memory, but to direct thyself what to avoid. Reform, therefore, without bravery<sup>8</sup> or scandal of former times and persons; but yet set it down to thyself, as well to create good precedents as to follow them. Reduce things to the first institution, and observe wherein and how they have degenerated; but yet ask counsel of both times—of the ancient

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<sup>1</sup> 'Death falls heavily upon him, who, too well known to all men, dies unacquainted with himself.'—Senec. *Thyest.* xi. 401.

<sup>2</sup> To will. *To be willing; to desire.* 'If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.'—John vii. 17.

<sup>3</sup> To can. *To be able; to have power.*

'Mecænas and Agrippa who can most with Cæsar.'—Dryden.

<sup>4</sup> Accept. *To regard favourably.* 'In every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh righteousness is accepted with Him.'—Acts x. 35.

<sup>5</sup> Conscience. *Consciousness.* 'The reason why the simpler sort are moved with authority is the conscience of their own ignorances.'—Hooker.

<sup>6</sup> 'When God turned to behold the works which his hand had made, He saw that they were all very good.'—Genesis i.

<sup>7</sup> Globe. *A body.*

'Him around

*A globe of fiery seraphim enclosed.*—Milton.

<sup>8</sup> Bravery. *Bravado; parade of defiance.*

'By Ashtaroth, thou shalt ere long lament  
These braveries in iron.'—Milton.

time what is best, and of the latter time what is fittest. Seek to make thy course regular, that men may know beforehand what they may expect; but be not too positive and peremptory, and express thyself well when thou digressest from thy rule. Preserve the right of thy place, but stir not questions of jurisdiction; and rather assume thy right in silence, and *de facto*,<sup>1</sup> than voice<sup>2</sup> it with claims and challenges. Preserve likewise the rights of inferior places, and think it more honour to direct in chief than to be busy in all. Embrace and invite helps and advices touching the execution of thy place; and do not drive away such as bring thee information, as meddlers, but accept of them in good part.

The vices of authority are chiefly four: delays, corruption, roughness, and facility. For delays, give easy access; keep times appointed; go through with that which is in hand, and interlace not business but of necessity. For corruption, do not only bind thine own hands or thy servants' hands from taking, but bind the hands of suitors also from offering; for integrity used doth the one, but integrity professed, and with a manifest detestation of bribery, doth the other; and avoid not only the fault, but the suspicion. Whosoever is found variable, and changeth manifestly without manifest cause, giveth suspicion of corruption; therefore, always, when thou changest thine opinion or course, profess it plainly, and declare it, together with the reasons that move thee to change, and do not think to steal<sup>3</sup> it. A servant or a favourite, if he be inward,<sup>4</sup> and no other apparent cause of esteem, is commonly thought but a by-way to close corruption. For roughness, it is a needless cause of discontent: severity breedeth fear, but roughness breedeth hate. Even reproofs from authority ought to be grave, and not taunting. As for facility, it is worse than bribery, for bribes

*did he change?*

<sup>1</sup> In fact. *Really; virtually.*

<sup>2</sup> Voice. *To assert; to declare.*

<sup>3</sup> When I shall voice aloud how good  
He is, how great should be.—*Lovelace.*

<sup>3</sup> Steal. *To do secretly.*

<sup>3</sup> 'Twere good to steal our marriage.—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>4</sup> Inward. *Intimate.*

<sup>4</sup> 'Who is most inward with the noble duke.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>4</sup> All my inward friends abhorred me.—*Job xix. 19.*

come but now and then; but if importunity or idle respects<sup>1</sup> lead a man, he shall never be without; as Solomon saith, 'To respect persons it is not good, for such a man will transgress for a piece of bread.'

It is most true what was anciently spoken—'A place showeth the man; and it showeth some to the better, and some to the worse.' 'Omnium consensu, capax imperii, nisi imperasset,'<sup>2</sup> saith Tacitus of Galba; but of Vespasian he saith, 'Solus imperantium, Vespasianus mutatus in melius,'<sup>3</sup>—though the one was meant of sufficiency, the other of manners and affection.<sup>4</sup> It is an assured sign of a worthy and generous spirit, whom honour amends—for honour is, or should be, the place of virtue—and as in nature things move violently to their place, and calmly in their place, so virtue in ambition is violent, in authority settled and calm. All rising to great place is by a winding stair; and if there be factions, it is good to side a man's self whilst he is in the rising, and to balance himself when he is placed. Use the memory of thy predecessor fairly and tenderly; for if thou dost not, it is a debt will surely be paid when thou art gone. If thou have colleagues, respect them; and rather call them when they look not for it, than exclude them when they have reason to look to be called. Be not too sensible or too remembering of thy place in conversation and private answers to suitors; but let it rather be said, 'When he sits in place, he is another man.'

#### ANTITHETA ON GREAT PLACE.

PRO.

\* \* \* \*

CONTRA.

'Dum honores appetimus, libertatem exuimus.

'While we are seeking for great place, we are stripping ourselves of liberty.'

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<sup>1</sup> Respects. *Considerations; motives.* 'Whatsoever secret respects were likely to move them.'—Hooker.

'I would have doff'd all other respects.'—Shakespeare.

<sup>2</sup> 'One whom all would have considered fit for rule, if he had not ruled.'

<sup>3</sup> 'Alone of all the emperors, Vespasian was changed for the better.'—Tacit. *Hist.* i. 9, 50.

<sup>4</sup> Affection. *Disposition; general state of mind.*

'There grows

In my most ill composed affection, such  
A stanchless avarice.'—Shakespeare.

PRO.

'Honores faciunt et virtutes et vitia conspicua; itaque illas provocant, hæc refrænant.'

*'Great place makes both virtues and vices conspicuous; accordingly it is an incentive to the one and restrains the other.'*

'Non novit quisquam, quantum in virtutis cursu profecerit; nisi honores ei campum præbeant apertum.'

*'No one knows how far he has advanced on the road of virtue, unless public office affords him a field for action.'*

\* \* \* \*

CONTRA.

'Honores dant fere potestatem earum rerum, quas optima conditio est nolle, proxima non posse.'

*'The things which are placed in a man's power by high office, are, for the most part, such as it would be the best thing to want the wish, and the next best to want the power to do.'*

'Honorum ascensus arduus, statio lubrica, regressus præceps.'

*'The ascent to high office is steep, the summit slippery, the descent precipitous.'*

'Qui in honore sunt, vulgi opinionem mutuentur oportet, ut seipso beatos putent.'

*'Those who hold high office must borrow the view which the vulgar take of them, in order to think themselves happy.'*

## ANNOTATIONS.

A work entitled *The Bishop* (by the late Dr. Cooke Taylor, but without his name); contains so many appropriate remarks, that I take the liberty of giving several quotations from it. It consists of letters professed to be addressed to a recently-appointed Bishop.

*'Power to do good is the true and lawful end of aspiring.'*

'Two classes of men occupy high station; those whose time has been spent in thinking how it could be attained; and those who have mainly bestowed their attention on the use that should be made of it when attained. Were there no world but this, the conduct of the latter would justly be reckoned preposterous; they would be regarded as 'seers of visions and dreamers of dreams.' When, however, they do by chance find themselves preferred, they are not only well disposed but ready qualified to use their advantages rightly; for the art of true obedience is the best guide to the art of true command. On the contrary, he who has thought only of the means by which he might climb, however good his intentions, is generally somewhat abroad when he has completed the ascent. He is like those whom we frequently meet, that have spent the best part of their life in

making a fortune, and then do not know what to do with it. Eager to get up, they forget to determine the nature of the ground on which they stand, and they consider not how it is related to that which they desire to attain: when they have ascended, their former station is at too great a distance to be surveyed accurately, and the reciprocal influences cannot be understood, because one side is removed beyond the reach of observation.' (Page 329.)

*'After a time set before thee thine own example.'*

'There is a strong temptation to sacrifice the consciousness of individuality for the sympathy of the multitude. The peril of being seduced from our proper orbit is not less great, when we seek to join, than when we try to avoid others. There are those who are willing to err with Plato, and there are those who are unwilling to go right with Epicurus. A cause is not necessarily good because some good men have favoured it, nor necessarily bad because bad men have supported it; yet we all know that many well-meaning men voted against the abolition of the slave-trade, because it was advocated by some partisans of the French Revolution. . . .'

'It might at first sight appear that the absurdities of party, so obvious to every thinking man, would render the adoption of a right course a matter of no very great difficulty; indeed, an aphorism is already provided for our guidance, which apparently is as simple and easy as the rule of party itself: 'Steer clear of both parties; hold the middle course.' But simple and sound as the maxim may appear, its validity will be greatly weakened by a close examination. Both parties are not absolutely wrong; each is partially wrong and partially right; to keep always equidistant from both is to keep away from the truths as well as from the falsehoods, and to expose yourself to the chance, or rather to the certainty, of being influenced by each in turn.

'It is impossible for a man to realize the fable of Mohammed's coffin, and remain for ever balanced between equipollent attractions, but he may oscillate like a pendulum between the two extremes. In such a case, he will yield to both parties, be duped by both, and be despised by all. The truly independent course is to act as if party had no existence; to follow that which is wisest and best in itself, irrespective of the side which

makes the loudest claim to the monopoly of goodness. No doubt, such a course will often approach, or rather be approached by, the orbit of one party at one time, and the other at another, just as each of them chances to come the nearer to what is really right. Nay more, as each party does possess some truth mingled with its falsehoods, it is perfectly possible to be identified with one of two bigoted and opposed parties on some special question, and to be similarly identified with the other party on a different question. . . .

‘These coincidences may be called the *Nodes* of the different orbits; and when they occur, the proper movements are most subject to disturbing influences. The attraction of party varies inversely as the square of the distance; when you are brought near a powerful and organized mass, there is a strong temptation to pass over the intervening space.’ (Pages 46-48.)

‘The demand on a great man’s liberality is greatly increased if he holds himself aloof from party; for this offence forgiveness can only be purchased by a very lavish system of disbursements; and, after all, he must be prepared to find that every shilling bestowed by party-men is equivalent to his pound. . . . It is not necessary to dilate on the merits of prudent economy, but assuredly nowhere is such a virtue more indispensably required than when demands on expenditure are regulated, not by realities, but by imaginations.

‘Great as is the evil of having your expenditure of money and time measured by the imagination of persons who do not trouble themselves to investigate realities, the evil is fearfully aggravated by the diversity of objects to which each set of imaginings refers. Those who surround you seem to act literally on Swift’s advice to servants, each of whom is recommended to do his best in his own particular department, to spend the whole of his master’s property. Thus it is with your money and time; every person seems to expect that both should be bestowed on his favourite project to their extreme amount, and no one is disposed to take into account that there are other claims and demands which should not be abridged in their fair proportions. There will be a combination to entrap you into a practical exemplification of ‘the sophism of composition;’ men will say, you can afford this, that, or the other expense: forgetting that all together will ruin you.’ (Page 84.)

*'Reform, therefore, without bravery or scandal of former times and persons; but yet set it down to thyself, as well to create good precedents as to follow them.'*

'To warn a public man (says the author of *The Bishop*) of ordinary sense, against innovation, is just as idle as to warn him against taking physic; he will have recourse to neither one nor the other, unless forced by necessity. The thing to be feared in both cases is, that he will delay the application of alteratives until the disease can only be cured by violent remedies. One of the finest mills in our manufacturing districts is also one of the oldest; the machinery in it has always kept abreast with the progress of modern invention, but it has never been closed a single day for the purpose of renovation or repair. I asked its proprietor the explanation of so remarkable a phenomenon; he gave it in one sentence, 'I am always altering, but never changing.' Men sometimes deal with institutions as Sir John Cutler did with his stockings; they darn them with worsted until, from silken, they are changed into woollen, while the stupid owners persist in asserting their continued identity. The cry of 'innovation' belongs exclusively to the Duncery; but reluctance to change is a feeling shared with them by sensible people.

'Among the many fallacies of the day that pass unquestioned, there is none more general nor more fallacious than that innovation is popular; the truth is, that a judicious innovator is likely to be, at least for a time, the most unpopular man in the universe; he will be hated by those who are satisfied with old evils; he will be disliked by the timid and the lazy, who dread the peril and the trouble of change; and he will receive little favour from those most conscious of the evil, because his remedies will not act as a charm, and remove in an instant the accumulated ills of centuries. . . .

'Some persons are not aware of the fact, that in all men the love of ease is far superior to the love of change; in the serious concerns of life, novelty is never desired for its own sake; then, habit becomes a second nature, and it is only the positive pressure of evil that can drive us to alteration. We do find men occasionally rash and insatiable in changing; but this is only



from their being impatient under the sense of real evils, and in error as to remedies. The violent vicissitudes of the first French Revolution were not the result of a mad love of experiments; they were produced by the national bankruptcy of France and the starving condition of the people of Paris. An ignorant man suffering under painful disease will try the prescription of every mountebank, and without waiting to see how one quack medicine operates, will have recourse to another. A fevered nation, like a feverish patient, turns from side to side—not through love of change, but because, while the disease continues, any fixed posture must be painful. The physician who superintends his condition knows that his restlessness and impatience are symptoms of the disease: it would be well if those who superintend our political and ecclesiastical state, while they justly regard discontents and disturbances as evils in themselves, would also look upon them as certain signs that there is something wrong somewhere.’ (Pages 315-318.)

*‘Embrace and invite helps and advices touching the execution of thy office.’*

‘The dread of unworthy imputations of undue influence may often drive a worthy man into a perilous course. The fear of being deemed an imitator is scarcely less dangerous than that of being supposed to be led. We frequently see those who regard the course of a wise and good man with mingled affection and veneration, influenced by his example for the worse rather than for the better, by indulging their ruling passion for originality, and by their abhorrence of being regarded as followers and imitators. To avoid coincidences becomes the great labour of their lives, and they take every opportunity of ostentatiously declaring the originality and independence of their course. Nay, they will not only declare their originality, but they will seek to make or find opportunities of exhibiting it, though the course they adopt in consequence may be contrary to their own secret judgment. A man who yields to this weakness, which is far more rife than the world generally believes, is the slave of any one who chuses to work upon his foible. The only thing requisite to make him commit any conceivable folly, is to dare him to depart from his friend’s counsel or example. Miss

Edgeworth, in her *Juvenile Tales*, has admirably illustrated the consequence of yielding to such fears; Tarlton in vain strove to persuade the weak Lovett to break bounds by appeals to his courage, but when he hinted that his refusal would be attributed to his dependence on the strong-minded Hardy, the poor boy sprang over the wall with nervous alacrity. This dread of imitation often leads to the neglect of valuable suggestions which might be derived from the tactics and example of adversaries. 'Fas est et ab hoste doceri,' is a maxim more frequently quoted than acted on, and yet its wisdom is confirmed by every day's experience. A casual remark made long ago to me by your Lordship contains the *rationale* of the whole matter—'It is ignorance, and not knowledge, that rejects instruction; it is weakness, and not strength, that refuses co-operation.' (Page 77.)

'In bestowing office, and in selecting instruments, a man anxious to do his duty must take into account both the kind and degree of fitness in the candidates. Of the *degrees* of intelligence the world is a very incompetent judge, and of the differences in *kind*, it knows little or nothing. With the vulgar everything is good, bad, or middling; and if three persons are worthy and intelligent men, you will find that the preference you show to any one of them is considered to be the result of mere caprice. For instance, you know that the clerical requisites for an agricultural parish are different from those necessary in a manufacturing district, and that both are dissimilar to the qualifications for a chaplaincy to a collegiate institution, or for a prebendal stall. Your choice will be guided by these considerations; but, beyond doubt, you will find very few who can appreciate or even understand such motives. . . . Now, this want of discriminating power and knowledge in the spectators of your career, will by no means induce them to suspend the exercise of their fallacious judgment; on the contrary, opinions will be pronounced most positively by those who are most wanting in opportunity to discover, and in capacity to estimate, your motives. But the erroneous judgments of others must not lead you to be suspicious of your own; the value of the tree will be finally known by its fruits,—it would be folly to neglect its training, or to grub it up, because people ignorant of the adaptations of soil to growth, tell you that another tree

in the same place would be more useful or more ornamental. You know both the soil and the plant—the vast majority of your censurers will know nothing of the one, and marvellously little of the other.’ (Page 174.)

‘When thou changest thine opinion or course, profess it plainly, and declare it, together with the reasons that moved thee to change.’

Considering that the course Bacon here recommends is not only the most ingenuous and dignified, but also the most prudent with a view to men’s approbation, it is wonderful how often this maxim is violated. Many persons will rather *back out* of an opinion or course of conduct, by the most awkward shifts, than frankly acknowledge a change of mind. They seem to dread nothing so much as a suspicion of what they call ‘inconsistency;’ that is, owning oneself to be wiser to-day than yesterday.

It has been pointed out in the *Elements of Rhetoric*,<sup>1</sup> that there is no *inconsistency* (though the term is often improperly so applied) in a change of opinion, provided it be frankly avowed; since this is what any sensible man, conscious of being fallible, holds himself always ready for, if good reasons can be shown. Indeed, any one who, while not claiming infallibility, yet resolves never to alter his opinion, is, in that, manifestly inconsistent. For, real inconsistency is the holding—either expressly or impliedly—two opposite opinions at the same time; as, for instance, proclaiming the natural right of all men to freedom, and yet maintaining a system of slavery; or condemning disingenuous conduct in one party, which, in the opposite party, you vindicate; or confessing yourself fallible, and yet resolving to be immutable.

It is remarkable that a change is sometimes falsely imputed to a man in high office, or otherwise influential, as a device of party-craft, or to cover a change in the way of treating him. When some Party has been vainly trying to hunt down (as the phrase is) by calumny and vexatious opposition, one who refuses to join them, and they find that their assaults instead of prevail-

<sup>1</sup> Part ii. chap. iii. sec. 5.

ing, rather recoil on themselves, or perhaps that he may be a useful help to them in some object, the most crafty of them will sometimes give out that *he* has changed, and is converted, —or in a fair way to be converted—to their party:—that he has ‘modified his views,’ and is becoming (suppose) ‘Conservative,’ or ‘Liberal,’ or ‘Orthodox,’ or ‘Evangelical,’ &c., as the case may be. Thus they escape the shame (as the vulgar account it) of frankly owning that they were wrong in their former persecution. And, moreover, they perhaps hope actually to win him to their Party; or at least, to persuade the multitude that they have done so; and thus enlist at least the influence of his name in their cause.

*‘A servant or a favourite, if he be inward, and no other apparent cause of esteem, is commonly thought but a by-way to close corruption.’*

‘If the relations you form with your subordinates, particularly those whose position brings them into frequent and immediate contact with you, be founded on intellectual sympathies, and common views of great principles, efforts will be made to sow discord between you, by representing him as the juggler, and you as the puppet. In this case calumny disguises its imputation by flattery, and compliments your heart at the expense of your head. ‘He is,’ the maligners will say, ‘a very worthy, well-meaning man, but he sees only with A. B.’s eyes, and acts only on A. B.’s suggestions; he is a very good and clever man, but he thinks by proxy.’

‘If you are a student,—if you have acquired any reputation for scholarship or literature,—but, above all, if you have ever been an author, this imputation will be circulated and credited; for one of the most bitter pieces of revenge which readers take on writers, is to receive implicitly the aphorism of the block-heads, that studious habits produce an inaptitude for the business of active life.

‘The imputation of being led is not very pleasant, but it may very safely be despised; in the long run men will learn to judge of your actions from their nature, and not from their supposed origin. But the nature of this calumny deserves to be more closely investigated, because there is nothing more injurious to

public men than the jealousy of subordinate strength which it is designed to produce. The cases are, indeed, very rare, of an upright, sensible man being led either by a knave or a fool; but there are countless examples of a weak man being led by a weaker, or a low-principled man by a downright rogue. Now, in most of these cases, it will be found that the subjugation arose from trusting to the impossibility of being led by one of obviously inferior strength. Cunning is the wisdom of weakness, and those who chuse the weak for their instruments, expose themselves to its arts.' (Pages 68-70.)

And here it is to be observed that it is (as Dr. Taylor hints in the passage above) a common artifice of those who wish to disparage some person of too high character to be assailed openly, to profess great esteem and veneration for him, but to lament his being 'in bad hands;'—*misled* by evil counsellors, who make him think and do whatever they will. This is just the manifesto put forth by most rebels; who honour, forsooth, their king, but rise in arms to drive away his bad advisers. Now, though a *little boy* may be on the whole a promising child, —notwithstanding that he may have been seduced or bullied into something wrong, by naughty seniors, a *man*, and one in high station, if he really does allow himself to be led blindfold by weak or wicked men, is evidently *good-for-nothing*. And such therefore must be the opinion really entertained of a person to whom this is imputed, how much soever of esteem and veneration may be professed.

*'As for facility, it is worse than bribery.'*

'It is scarcely necessary to dwell on the necessity of caution in bestowing confidence; it is the highest favour in your power to confer, and deliberation enhances an act of kindness just as much as it aggravates an act of malice. 'Favours which seem to be dispensed upon an impulse, with an unthinking facility, are received like the liberalities of a spendthrift, and men thank God for them.' It is of more importance to observe that even a greater degree of caution is necessary in suspending or withdrawing confidence; gross indeed should be the treachery, and unquestionable the proofs, that would justify such a course. The world generally will blame your original choice; your dis-

carded adherent will be lowered in his own esteem, and consequently will thus far have made a sad progress in moral degradation; and your own mind will not escape scatheless; for greater proneness to suspicion will of necessity develope itself in your character. Most of all is caution required in restoring confidence; constitutional changes are wrought in every moral principle during its period of suspended animation; though the falling-out of lovers be proverbially the renewal of love, it is questionable whether the suspended confidence of friends is ever wholly effaced in its influences. Had Cæsar recovered from the stab which Brutus gave him, he might, with his usual clemency, have pardoned the crime; but he would not have been the Cæsar I take him for, if he did not ever after adopt the precaution of wearing armour when he was in company with Brutus. The hatred of an enemy is bad enough, but no earthly passion equals in its intensity the hatred of a friend.' (Page 72.)

'There are people who believe that the voice of censure should never be heard in an interview, and that you have no right to rebuke presumption, check interference, or make men conscious of their weakness. You are to affect a humility, by which you tacitly confess yourself destitute of moral judgment. But you must remember that, in interviews connected with your official station, you appear for the most part as an adjudicator; an appeal is made to you, as holding the balance of justice, and also as wielder of its sword. 'A righteous humility,' says the author of the *Statesman*, 'will teach a man never to pass a sentence in a spirit of exultation: a righteous courage will teach him never to withhold it from fear of being disliked. Popularity is commonly obtained by a dereliction of the duties of censure, under a pretext of humility.' (Page 256.)

'There is great danger of praise from men in high place being identified with promise, and compliment tortured into grounds of hope,—not always hope of promotion, but hope of influencing promotion. Your approbation warmly expressed will be deemed to have a value beyond the mere expression of your opinion, and though you expressly guard against expectations, you will nevertheless raise them. A late chancellor, to whom more books were sent and dedicated than he could possibly read if his life was prolonged to antediluvian duration,

by the complimentary answers he sent to the authors, gathered round him a host of expectants, and produced a mass of suffering which would scarcely be credited save by those who were personally acquainted with it. Kindness and cordiality of manner are scarcely less pleasing to the feelings than express compliment, and they are the more safe for both parties, since they afford no foundation for building up expectations; a species of architecture sufficiently notorious for the weakness of the foundations that support an enormous superstructure.' (Page 163.)

*'Severity breedeth fear.'*

'It may be doubted whether it is politic, where a man has wholly lost your esteem, and has no chance of regaining it, to let him know that his doom is fixed irrevocably. The hope of recovering his place in your estimation may be a serviceable check on his conduct; and if he supposes you to be merely *angry* with him (a mistake commonly made by vulgar minds), he may hope and try to pacify you by an altered course, trusting that in time you will forget all. In such a case you need not do or say anything deceitful; you have only to leave him in his error. On the other hand, if he finds that you have no resentment, but that your feeling is confirmed disesteem, and that the absence of all anger is the very consequence of such a feeling—for you cannot be angry where you do not mean to trust again—he may turn out a mischievous hater.

'On the whole, however, the frank, open-hearted course is the more politic in the long run. If you use towards all whom you really esteem, a language which in time will come to be fully understood by all, from its being never used except where you really esteem, then, and then only, you will deserve and obtain the full reliance of the worthy. They will feel certain that they possess your esteem, and that if they do anything by which it may be forfeited, it will be lost for ever. To establish such a belief is the best means of preserving the peace and purity of your circle, and it is worth while risking some enmity to effect so desirable an object.

'It must, however, be observed that it is equally politic and christian-like to avoid breaking with anybody: while you purchase no man's forbearance by false hopes of his regaining your

esteem, you must not drive him into hostility through fear of your doing him a mischief. The rule of Spartan warfare is not inapplicable to the conduct of a christian statesman ; never give way to an assailing enemy,—never pursue a flying foe further than is necessary to secure the victory. Let it be always understood that it is safe to yield to you, and you will remove the worst element of resistance, despair of pardon.’ (Pages 72-76.)

*‘ Be not too remembering of thy place in conversation and private answers to suitors.’*

There may, however, be an error on the opposite side.— ‘ Men are often called affable and no way proud,’ says Dr. Cooke Taylor in the work already quoted, ‘ who really exhibit a vulgar sort of pride in taking liberties, and talking to their inferiors with a kind of condescending familiarity which is gratifying to mean minds, but which to every person of delicacy, is the most odious form of insolence. If you wish to be familiar with an inferior, let him rather feel that you have raised him to your own level than that you have lowered yourself to his. You may see the propriety of this aphorism unfortunately manifested in books written by clever men for the use of the humble classes, and for children. Many of these are rejected as offensive, because the writers deem it necessary to show that they are going down to a low level of understanding ; their familiarity becomes sheer vulgarity, and their affected simplicity is puzzle-headed obscurity. The condescension of some great people is like the ‘ letting down’ in such authors ; they render themselves more ridiculous than Hercules at the court of Omphale, for they assume the distaff without discarding the club and lion’s skin. It is also very unfair ; for those who go to admire the spinning, or to be amused at its incongruity, are exposed to the danger of getting an awkward knock from the club.’ (Page 180.)



*'Certainly, men in great fortunes are strangers to themselves, and while they are in the puzzle of business they have no time to tend their health either of body or mind.'*

The following passage from *The Bishop* bears upon this engrossment in public business:—‘There are two opposite errors into which many public men have fallen; on the one hand, allowing family concerns to intermingle with public business, on the other, sacrificing to their station all the enjoyments of private life. The former interference is rare; it is so obviously a source of perplexity and annoyance, that it soon works its own cure; but the latter ‘grows by what it feeds upon.’ Unless you habitually court the privacy of the domestic circle, you will find that you are losing that intimate acquaintance with those who compose it which is its chief charm, and the source of all its advantage. In your family alone can there be that intercourse of heart with heart which falls like refreshing dew on the soul when it is withered and parched by the heats of business and the intense selfishness which you must hourly meet in public life. Unless your affections are sheltered in that sanctuary, they cannot long resist the blighting influence of a constant repression of their development, and a compulsory substitution of calculation in their stead. Domestic privacy is necessary, not only to your happiness, but even to your efficiency; it gives the rest necessary to your active powers of judgment and discrimination; it keeps unclosed those well-springs of the heart whose flow is necessary to float onwards the determination of the head. It is not enough that the indulgence of these affections should fill up the casual chinks of your time; they must have their allotted portion of it, with which nothing but urgent necessity should be allowed to interfere. These things are the aliments of his greatness; they preserve within him that image of moral beauty which constant intercourse with the public world—that is, the world with its worst side outwards—is too likely to efface. ‘If our clergy had been permitted to marry,’ said an intelligent Romanist, ‘we never should have had inquisitors.’’ (Page 327.)

*'A place showeth the man: and it showeth some to the better,  
and some to the worse.'*

Bacon here quotes a Greek proverb, and a very just one. Some persons of great promise, when raised to high office, either are puffed up with self-sufficiency, or daunted by the 'high winds that blow on high hills,' or in some way or other disappoint expectation. And others, again, show talents and courage, and other qualifications, when these are called forth by high office, beyond what anyone gave them credit for before, and beyond what they suspected to be in themselves. It is unhappily very difficult to judge how a man will conduct himself in a high office, till the trial has been made. It must not, however, be forgotten that renown and commendation will, as in other cases, be indiscriminate. By those whose nearness, or easiness of access, enables them to form an accurate judgment, many a public man will be found neither so detestable nor so admirable as perhaps he is thought by opposite parties. This truth is well expressed in the fable of 'The Clouds.'

'Two children once, at eventide,  
Thus prattled by their parents' side :—  
'See, mother, see that stormy cloud !  
What can its inky bosom shroud ?  
It looks so black, I do declare  
I shudder quite to see it there.'  
'And father, father, now behold  
Those others, all of pink and gold !  
How beautiful and bright their hue !  
I wish that I were up there too :  
For, if they look so fine from here,  
What must they be when one is near !'  
'Children,' the smiling sire replied,  
'I've climbed a mountain's lofty side,  
Where, lifted 'mid the clouds awhile,  
Distance no longer could beguile :  
And closer seen, I needs must say  
That all the clouds are merely grey ;  
Differing in *shade* from one another,  
But each in *colour* like his brother.  
Those clouds you see of gold and pink,  
To others look as black as ink ;  
And that same cloud, so black to you,  
To some may wear a golden hue.  
E'en so, my children, they whom fate  
Has planted in a low estate,

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! See Fourth Book of the *Lessons for the Use of National Schools*, p. 49.

Viewing their rulers from afar,  
Admire what prodigies they are.  
O ! what a tyrant ! dreadful doom !  
His crimes have wrapped our land in gloom !  
A tyrant ! nay, a hero this,  
The glorious source of all our bliss !  
But they who haunt the magic sphere,  
Beholding then its inmates near,  
Know that the men, by some adored,  
By others flouted and abhorred,  
Nor sink so low, nor rise so high,  
As seems it to the vulgar eye.  
The man his party deems a hero,  
His foes, a Judas, or a Nero—  
Patriot of superhuman worth,  
Or vilest wretch that cumber earth,  
Derives his bright or murky hues  
From distant and from party views ;  
Seen close, nor black nor gold are they,  
But every one a *sober grey*."

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## ESSAY XII. OF BOLDNESS.

IT is a trivial grammar-school text, but yet worthy a wise man's consideration: question was asked of Demosthenes,<sup>1</sup> what was the chief part of an orator? He answered, action: what next? action: what next again? action. He said it that knew it best, and had by nature himself no advantage in that he commended. A strange thing, that that part of an orator which is but superficial, and rather the virtue of a player, should be placed so high above those other noble parts, of invention, elocution, and the rest; nay, almost alone, as if it were all in all. But the reason is plain. There is in human nature generally more of the fool than of the wise; and therefore those faculties by which the foolish part of men's minds is taken, are most potent. Wonderful like is the case of boldness in civil business; what first? boldness: what second and third? boldness. And yet boldness is a child of ignorance and baseness, far inferior to other parts: but, nevertheless, it doth fascinate, and bind hand and foot those that are either shallow in judgment or weak in courage, which are the greatest part, yea, and prevail with wise men at weak times; therefore we see it hath done wonders in popular States, but with senates and princes less—and more, ever upon the first entrance of bold persons into action, than soon after; for boldness is an ill keeper of promise. Surely, as there are mountebanks for the natural body, so there are mountebanks for the politic<sup>2</sup> Body—men that undertake great cures, and perhaps have been lucky in two or three experiments, but want the grounds of science, and therefore cannot hold out. Nay, you shall see a bold fellow many times do Mahomet's miracle. Mahomet made the people believe that he would call a hill to him, and from the top of it offer up his prayers for the observers of his law. The people assembled; Mahomet called the hill to come to him again and again; and when the hill stood still, he was never a whit<sup>3</sup> abashed, but

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<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Vit. Demosth.* 17, 18.

<sup>2</sup> Politic. *Political; civil.*

<sup>3</sup> Whit. *The least degree; the smallest particle.* 'Not a whit behind the very chiefest Apostles.'—2 Cor. xi. 5.

said, 'If the hill will not come to Mahomet, Mahomet will go to the hill.' So these men, when they have promised great matters, and failed most shamefully, yet, if they have the perfection of boldness, they will but slight it over,<sup>1</sup> and make a turn, and no more ado.<sup>2</sup> Certainly, to men of great judgment, bold persons are sport to behold—nay, and to the vulgar also boldness hath somewhat of the ridiculous: for, if absurdity be the subject of laughter, doubt you not but great boldness is seldom without some absurdity: especially it is a sport to see when a bold fellow is out of countenance, for that puts his face into a most shrunken and wooden posture, as needs it must—for in bashfulness the spirits do a little go and come—but with bold men, upon like occasion, they stand at a stay;<sup>3</sup> like a stale at chess, where it is no mate, but yet the game cannot stir; but this last were fitter for a satire than for a serious observation. This is well to be weighed, that boldness is ever blind, for it seeth not dangers and inconveniences: therefore it is ill in counsel, good in execution; so that the right use of bold persons is, that they never command in chief, but be seconds, and under the direction of others; for in counsel it is good to see dangers, and in execution not to see them, except they be very great.

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## ANNOTATIONS.

*'Boldness is a child of ignorance and baseness far inferior to other parts.'*

Bacon seems to have had that over-estimate of those who are called the 'prudent' which is rather common. One cause of the supposed superiority of wisdom often attributed to the over-cautious, reserved, non-confiding, non-enterprising charac-

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<sup>1</sup> Slight over. *To treat carelessly.*

*'His death, and your deliverance,  
Were themes that ought not to be slighted over.'*—Dryden.

<sup>2</sup> Ado. *'Much Ado about Nothing.'*—Shakespeare.

<sup>3</sup> Stay. *Stand; cessation of progression.*

*'Never to decay  
Until his revolution was at stay.'*—Milton.

ters, as compared with the more open, free-spoken, active, and daring, is the tendency to over-rate the amount of what is distinctly known. The bold and enterprising are likely to meet with a greater number of *tangible failures* than the over-cautious: and yet if you take a hundred average men of each description, you will find that the bold have had, on the whole, a more successful career. But the failures—that is, the non-success—of the over-cautious, cannot be so distinctly traced. Such a man only misses the advantages—often very great—which boldness and free-speaking might have gained. He who always goes on foot will never meet with a fall from a horse, or be stopped on a journey by a restive horse; but he who rides, though exposed to these accidents, will, in the end, have accomplished more journeys than the other. He who lets his land lie fallow, will have incurred no losses from bad harvests; but he will not have made so much of his land as if he had ventured to encounter such risks.

The kind of boldness which is most to be deprecated—or at least as much so as the boldness of ignorance—is daring, unaccompanied by firmness and steadiness of endurance. Such was that which Tacitus attributes to the Gauls and Britons; ‘Eadem in deposcendis periculis audacia; eadem in detrectandis, ubi advenerint, formido.’<sup>1</sup> This character seems to belong to those who have—in phrenological language—*Hope*, and *Combativeness*, large, and *Firmness* small.

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<sup>1</sup> ‘The same daring in rushing into dangers, and the same timidity in shrinking from them when they come.’

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### ESSAY XIII. OF GOODNESS, AND GOODNESS OF NATURE.

I TAKE goodness in this sense,—the affecting<sup>1</sup> of the weak of men, which is that the Grecians call Philanthropia; and the word humanity, as it is used, is a little too light to express it. Goodness, I call the habit, and goodness of nature the inclination. This, of all virtues and dignities of the mind, is the greatest, being the character of the Deity; and without it, man is a busy, mischievous, wretched thing, no better than a kind of vermin. Goodness answers to the theological virtue, Charity, and admits no excess but error. The desire of power in excess caused the angels to fall—the desire of knowledge in excess caused Man to fall; but in charity there is no excess, neither can angel or Man come in danger by it. The inclination to goodness is imprinted deeply in the nature of Man; insomuch, that if it issue not towards men, it will take unto other living creatures; as it is seen in the Turks, a cruel people, who, nevertheless, are kind to beasts, give alms to dogs and birds; insomuch as Busbechius<sup>2</sup> reporteth, a christian boy in Constantinople had liked to have been stoned for gagging, in a waggishness, a long-billed fowl. Errors, indeed, in this virtue, in goodness or charity, may be committed. The Italians have of it an ungracious proverb, ‘*Tanto buon che val niente,*’ and one of the doctors of Italy, Nicholas Machiavel, had the confidence to put in writing, almost in plain terms, ‘That the christian faith had given up good men in prey to those who are tyrannical and unjust.’ which he spake, because, indeed, there was never law, or sect, or opinion, did so much magnify goodness as the christian religion doth; therefore, to avoid the scandal, and the danger both, it is good to take knowledge<sup>4</sup> of the errors of a habit so excellent. Seek the good of other men, but be not in

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<sup>1</sup> Affecting, *The being desirous of; aiming at.* See page 1.

<sup>2</sup> Busbechius. A learned Fleming of the 16th century, in his *Travels in the East*.

<sup>3</sup> ‘So good that he is good for nothing.’

<sup>4</sup> Take knowledge of. *Take cognizance of.* ‘They took knowledge of them, that they had been with Jesus.’—*Acts* iv. 13.

bondage to their faces or fancies; for that is but facility or softness, which taketh an honest mind prisoner. Neither give thou Æsop's cock a gem, who would be better pleased and happier if he had a barley-corn. The example of God teacheth the lesson truly: 'He sendeth his rain, and maketh his sun to shine upon the just and the unjust;' but he doth not rain wealth nor shine honour and virtues upon men equally: common benefits are to be communicated with all, but peculiar benefits with choice. And beware how in making the portraiture thou breakest the pattern; for divinity maketh the love of ourselves the pattern—the love of our neighbours but the portraiture: 'Sell all thou hast, and give it to the poor, and follow me;' but sell not all thou hast, except thou come and follow me—that is, except thou have a vocation<sup>1</sup> wherein thou mayest do as much good with little means as with great—for otherwise, in feeding the streams thou driest the fountain.

Neither is there only a habit of goodness directed by right reason; but there is in some men, even in nature, a disposition towards it, as, on the other side, there is a natural malignity; for there be that in their nature do not affect the good of others. The lighter sort of malignity turneth but to a crossness, or frowardness, or aptness to oppose, or difficaleness,<sup>2</sup> or the like; but the deeper sort to envy, and mere mischief. Such men, in other men's calamities, are, as it were, in season, and are ever on the loading<sup>3</sup> part—not so good as the dogs that licked Lazarus' sores, but like flies that are still buzzing upon anything that is raw—misanthropi [men-haters], that make it their practice to bring men to the bough, and yet never have a tree for the purpose in their gardens, as Timon<sup>4</sup> had: such dispositions are the very errors of human nature, and yet they are the fittest timber to make great politics<sup>5</sup> of—like to knee-timber,<sup>6</sup> that is good for ships that are ordained to be tossed, but not for building houses that shall stand firm.

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<sup>1</sup> Vocation. See page 20.

<sup>2</sup> Difficaleness. *Difficulty to be persuaded.* 'The Cardinal, finding the Pope *difficile* in granting the dispensation.'—Bacon, *Henry VII.*

<sup>3</sup> Loading. *Loaden; burdened.*

<sup>4</sup> See an account of Timon in Plutarch's *Life of Marc Antony.*

<sup>5</sup> Politics. *Politicians.* See page 21.

<sup>6</sup> Knee-timber. *A timber cut in the shape of the knee when bent.*



The parts and signs of goodness are many. If a man be gracious and courteous to strangers, it shows he is a citizen of the world, and that his heart is no island cut off from other lands, but a continent that joins to them,—if he be compassionate towards the affliction of others, it shows that his heart is like the noble tree that is wounded itself when it gives the balm,—if he easily pardons and remits offences, it shows that his mind is planted above injuries, so that he cannot be shot,—if he be thankful for small benefits, it shows that he weighs men's minds, and not their trash ; but, above all, if he have St. Paul's perfection, that he would wish to be an anathema from Christ,<sup>1</sup> for the salvation of his brethren, it shows much of a divine nature, and a kind of conformity with Christ himself.

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## ANNOTATIONS.

*' Goodness admits no excess, but error.'*

Bacon is speaking of what is now called benevolence and beneficence ; and his remark is very just, that it admits of no excess in quantity, though it may be misdirected and erroneous. For if your liberality be such as to reduce your family to poverty, or—like the killing of the hen that laid the golden eggs—such as to put it out of your power hereafter to be liberal at all ; or if it be bestowed on the undeserving ; this is rather to be accounted an unwise and misdirected benevolence than an excess of it in quantity. And we have here a remarkable instance of the necessity of keeping the whole character and conduct, even our most amiable propensities, under the control of right principle guided by reason ; and of taking pains to understand the subject relating to each duty you are called on to perform. For there is perhaps no one quality that can produce a greater amount of mischief than may be done by thoughtless good-nature. For instance, if any one out of tenderness of

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<sup>1</sup> *Romans ix. 3.*

heart and reluctance to punish or to discard the criminal and worthless, lets loose on society, or advances to important offices, mischievous characters, he will have conferred a doubtful benefit on a few, and done incalculable hurt to thousands. So, also, to take one of the commonest and most obvious cases, that of charity to the poor,—a man of great wealth, by freely relieving all idle vagabonds, might go far towards ruining the industry, and the morality, and the prosperity, of a whole nation. ‘For there can be no doubt that careless, indiscriminate alms-giving does far more harm than good; since it encourages idleness and improvidence, and also imposture. If you give freely to ragged and filthy street-beggars, you are in fact *hiring* people to dress themselves in filthy rags, and go about begging with fictitious tales of distress. If, on the contrary, you carefully inquire for, and relieve, honest and industrious persons who have fallen into distress through unavoidable misfortune, you are not only doing good to those objects, but also holding out an encouragement, generally, to honest industry.

‘You may, however, meet with persons who say, ‘as long as it is my intention to relieve real distress, my charity is equally virtuous, though the tale told me may be a false one. The impostor alone is to be blamed who told it me; I acted on what he said; and if that is untrue, the fault is his, and not mine.’

‘Now this is a fair plea, if any one is deceived after making careful inquiry: but if he has not taken the trouble to do this, regarding it as no concern of his, you might ask him how he would act and judge in a case where he is thoroughly in earnest—that is, where his own interest is concerned. Suppose he employed a steward or other agent, to buy for him a house, or a horse, or any other article, and this agent paid an exorbitant price for what was really worth little or nothing, giving just the same kind of excuse for allowing his employer to be thus cheated; saying, ‘I made no careful inquiries, but *took the seller’s word*; and his being a liar and a cheat, is his fault, and not mine;’ the employer would doubtless reply, ‘The seller indeed is to be condemned for cheating; but so are you, for your carelessness of my interests. His being greatly in fault does not clear *you*; and your merely intending to do what was

right, is no excuse for your not taking pains to gain right information.'

'Now on such a principle we ought to act in our charities : regarding ourselves as stewards of all that Providence has bestowed, and as bound to expend it in the best way possible, and not shelter our own faulty negligence under the misconduct of another.'

It is now generally acknowledged that relief afforded to want, as mere want, tends to increase that want ; while the relief afforded to the sick, the infirm, and the disabled, has plainly no tendency to multiply its own objects. Now it is remarkable, that the Lord Jesus employed his miraculous power in healing the sick *continually*, but in feeding the hungry only twice ; while the power of multiplying food which He then manifested, as well as his directing the disciples to take care and gather up the fragments that remained that nothing might be lost, served to mark that the abstaining from any like procedure on other occasions was deliberate design. In this, besides other objects, our Lord had probably in view to afford us some instruction, from his example, as to the mode of our charity. Certain it is, that the reasons for this distinction are now, and ever must be, the same as at that time. Now to those engaged in that important and inexhaustible subject of inquiry, the internal evidences of Christianity, it will be interesting to observe here, one of the instances in which the super-human wisdom of Jesus forestalled the discovery of an important principle, often overlooked, not only by the generality of men, but by the most experienced statesmen and the ablest philosophers, even in these later ages of extended human knowledge, and development of mental power.

*'It is good to take knowledge of the errors of a habit so excellent.'*

As there are errors in its direction, so there are mistakes concerning its nature. For instance, some persons have a certain nervous horror at the sight of bodily pain, or death, or blood, which they and others mistake for benevolence ; which may or may not accompany it. Phrenologists have been de-

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<sup>1</sup> See *Introductory Lessons on Morals*, Lesson xvi. p. 139.

rided for attributing large *destructiveness* (which, however, is not inconsistent with large benevolence, though more prominently remarkable when not so combined) to a person who had never *killed* anything but a flea, or to one who could not bear to crush a wasp or fly that was keeping him awake all night; as if they had meant 'the organ of killing.' And yet such a person would, according to their own accounts of their own system, bear out their sentence, if he was harsh in admonishing or rebuking, bitter in resentment, trampling without pity on the feelings and the claims of others, &c.

We should not confound together physical delicacy of nerves, and extreme tenderness of heart and benevolence and gentleness of character. It is also important to guard against mistaking for *good nature*, what is properly *good humour*—a cheerful flow of spirits, and easy temper not readily annoyed, which is compatible with great selfishness.

It is curious to observe how people who are always thinking of their own pleasure or interest, will often, if possessing considerable ability, make others give way to them, and obtain everything they seek, *except happiness*. For, like a spoiled child, who at length cries for the moon, they are always dissatisfied. And the benevolent, who are always thinking of others, and sacrificing their own personal gratifications, are usually the happiest of mankind. There is this great advantage also, that the benevolent have over the selfish, as they grow *old*: the latter, seeking only their own advantage, cannot escape the painful feeling that any benefit they procure for themselves can last but a short time; but one who has been always seeking the good of others, has his interest kept up to the last, because he of course wishes that good may befall them after he is gone.

*'The Turks, a cruel people, are nevertheless kind to beasts.'*

In the article formerly mentioned, in the *North British Review* (Aug. 1857), occurs a curious confirmation of Bacon's remark. And I will accordingly take the liberty of extracting the passage.

*'The European cares nothing for brute life. He destroys the lower animals without scruple, whenever it suits his con-*

venience, his pleasure, or his caprice. He shoots his favourite horse and his favourite dog as soon as they become too old for service. The Mussulman preserves the lives of the lower animals solicitously. Though he considers the dog impure, and never makes a friend of him, he thinks it sinful to kill him, and allows the neighbourhood and even the streets of his towns to be infested by packs of masterless brutes, which you would get rid of in London in one day. The beggar does not venture to destroy his vermin: he puts them tenderly on the ground, to be swept up into the clothes of the next passer-by. There are hospitals in Cairo for superannuated cats, where they are fed at the public expense.

‘But to human life he is utterly indifferent. He extinguishes it with much less scruple than that with which you shoot a horse past his work. Abbas, the late Viceroy, when a boy, had his pastry-cook bastinadoed to death. Mehemet Ali mildly reproved him for it, as you would correct a child for killing a butterfly. He explained to his little grandson that such things ought not to be done without a motive.’

Bacon slightly hints at a truth most important to be kept in mind, that a considerable endowment of natural benevolence is not incompatible with cruelty; and that, consequently, we must neither infer absence of all benevolence from such conduct as would be called ferocious, or ‘ill-natured,’ nor again calculate, from the existence of a certain amount of good nature, on a man’s never doing anything cruel.

When Thurtell, the murderer, was executed, there was a shout of derision raised against the phrenologists for saying that his organ of *benevolence* was large. But they replied, that there was also large *destructiveness*, and a moral deficiency, which would account for a man goaded to rage (by having been cheated of almost all he had by the man he killed) committing that act. It is a remarkable confirmation of their view, that a gentleman who visited the prison where Thurtell was confined (shortly after the execution) found the jailors, &c., full of pity and affection for him. They said he was a kind, good-hearted fellow, so obliging and friendly, that they had never had a prisoner whom they so much regretted. And such seems to have been his general character, when not influenced at once by the desire of revenge and of gain.

Again, there shall be, perhaps, a man of considerable benevolence, but so fond of a joke that he will not be restrained by any tenderness for the feelings of others—

‘Dum modo risum

Excutiat sibi non hic cuiquam parcat amico.’<sup>1</sup>

And he may be, perhaps, also so sensitive himself as to be enraged at any censure or ridicule directed against himself; and also so envious as to be very spiteful against those whom he finds in any way advanced beyond him. Yet this same man may, perhaps, be very kind to his friends and his poor neighbours, as long as they are not rivals, and do not at all affront him, nor afford any food for his insatiable love of ridicule.

A benevolent *disposition* is, no doubt, a great *help* towards a course of uniform practical benevolence; but let no one trust to it, when there are other strong propensities, and no firm good principle.

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<sup>1</sup> ‘So he can but have his joke, he will spare no friend.’

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## ESSAY XIV. OF NOBILITY.

WE will speak of nobility first as a portion of an estate,<sup>1</sup> then as a condition of particular persons. A monarchy where there is no nobility at all, is ever a pure and absolute tyranny, as that of the Turks; for nobility attempts sovereignty, and draws the eyes of the people somewhat aside from the line royal: but for democracies, they need it not, and they are commonly more quiet, and less subject to sedition than where there are stirps<sup>2</sup> of nobles—for men's eyes are upon the business, and not upon the persons; or, if upon the persons, it is for the business' sake, as fittest, and not for flags and pedigree. We see the Switzers last well, notwithstanding their diversity of religion and of cantons; for utility is their bond, and not respects.<sup>3</sup> The United Provinces of the Low Countries in their government excel; for where there is an equality, the consultations are more indifferent,<sup>4</sup> and the payments and tributes more cheerful. A great and potent nobility addeth majesty to a monarch, but diminisheth power; and putteth life and spirit into the people, but presseth their fortune. It is well when nobles are not too great for sovereignty, nor for justice; and yet maintained in that height, as the insolency<sup>5</sup> of inferiors may be broken upon them before it come on too fast upon the majesty of kings. A numerous nobility causeth poverty and inconvenience in a State; for it is a surcharge of expense; and besides, it being of necessity that many of the nobility fall in time to be weak in fortune, it maketh a kind of disproportion between honour and means.

As for nobility in particular persons, it is a reverend thing to see an ancient castle or building not in decay, or to see a fair timber tree sound and perfect; how much more to behold an ancient noble family, which hath stood against the waves

<sup>1</sup> Estate. *State; a political body; a commonwealth.*

'The estate is green and yet ungoverned.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>2</sup> Stirps. *Race; family.* 'Sundry nations got footing on that land, of the which there yet remain divers great families and stirps.'—*Spenser.*

<sup>3</sup> Respects. *Personal considerations.* See page 108.

<sup>4</sup> Indifferent. *Impartial.* See page 74.

<sup>5</sup> Insolency. *Insolence.* 'The insolencies of traitors, and the violences of rebels.'—*Bishop Taylor.*

and weathers of time!—for new nobility is but the act of power, but ancient nobility is the act of time. Those that are first raised to nobility, are commonly more virtuous, but less innocent, than their descendants—for there is rarely any rising but by a commixture of good and evil arts,—but it is reason<sup>1</sup> the memory of their virtues remain to their posterity, and their faults die with themselves. Nobility of birth commonly abateth industry; and he that is not industrious, envieth him that is: besides, noble persons cannot go much higher; and he that standeth at a stay<sup>2</sup> when others rise, can hardly avoid motions<sup>3</sup> of envy. On the other side, nobility extinguisheth the passive envy from others towards them, because they are in possession of honour. Certainly, kings that have able men of their nobility shall find ease in employing them, and a better slide into their business; for people naturally bend to them as born in some sort to command.

## ANTITHETA ON NOBILITY,

## PRO.

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‘Nobilitas laurea, qua tempus homines coronat.

‘High birth is the wreath with which men are crowned by time.’

‘Antiquitatem etiam in mortuis monumentis veneramur: quanto magis in vivis?’

‘We reverence antiquity even in lifeless monuments; how much more in living ones?’

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‘Nobilitas virtutem invidiæ subducit, gratiæ tradit.

‘Nobility withdraws virtue from envy, and commends it to favour.’

## CONTRA.

‘Raro ex virtute nobilitas: rarius ex nobilitate virtus.

‘Nobility has seldom sprung from virtue: virtue still more rarely from nobility.’

‘Nobiles majorum deprecatione, ad veniam, sæpius utuntur, quam suffragatione, ad honores.

‘Persons of high birth oftener resort to their ancestors as a means of escaping punishment than as a recommendation to high posts.’

‘Tanta solet esse industria hominum novorum, ut nobiles præ illis tanquam status videantur.

‘Such is the activity of upstarts that men of high birth seem statues in comparison.’

‘Nobiles in stadio respectant nimis sæpe; quod mali cursoris est.

‘In running their race, men of birth look back too often; which is the mark of a bad runner.’

<sup>1</sup> Reason. Reasonable; right. See page 105.

<sup>2</sup> Stay. Check; cessation of progress. See page 125.

<sup>3</sup> Motions. Internal action; feelings; impulses. ‘The motions of sin, which were by the law.’—Romans vii. 5.



## ANNOTATIONS.

*'We will speak of nobility first as a portion of an estate.'*

In reference to nobility as an institution, it is important to remark how great a difference it makes whether the order of nobles shall include—as in Germany and most other countries—all the descendants of noble families, or, as in ours, only the eldest; the rest sinking down into commoners. The former system is very bad, dividing society into distinct castes, almost like those of the Hindus. *Our* system, through the numerous younger branches of noble families, *shades off*, as it were, the distinction between noble and not-noble, and keeps up the continuity of the whole frame.

*'As for nobility in particular persons.'*

In reference to nobility in individuals, nothing was ever better said than by Bishop Warburton—as is reported—in the House of Lords, on the occasion of some angry dispute which had arisen between a peer of noble family and one of a new creation. He said that, 'high birth was a thing which he never knew any one disparage, except those who had it not; and he never knew any one make a boast of it who had anything else to be proud of. This is worthy of a place among Bacon's '*Pros and Cons*,' though standing half-way between the two: '*Nobilitatem nemo contemnit, nisi cui abest; nemo jactitat, nisi cui nihil aliud est quo gloriatur.*'

It is curious to observe, however, that a man of high family will often look down on an upstart who is exactly such a person in point of merit and achievements as the very founder of his own family;—the one from whom his nobility is derived: as if it were more creditable to be the remote *descendant* of an eminent man, than to be that very man oneself.

It is also a remarkable circumstance that *noble* birth is regarded very much according to the etymology of the word, from '*nosco*:' for, a man's descent from any one who was much *known*, is much more thought of than the moral worth of his

ancestors. And it is curious that a person of so exceptionable a character that no one would like to have had him for a *father*, may confer a kind of dignity on his great-great-grand-children. An instance has been known of persons, who were the descendants of a celebrated and prominent character in the Civil War, and who was one of the Regicides, being themselves zealous royalists, and professing to be ashamed of their ancestor. And it is likely that if he were now living, they would renounce all intercourse with him. Yet it may be doubted whether they would not feel mortified if any one should prove to them that they had been under a mistake, and that they were in reality descended from another person, a respectable but obscure individual, not at all akin to the celebrated regicide.

It was a remark by a celebrated man, himself a gentleman born, but with nothing of nobility, that the difference between a man with a long line of noble ancestors, and an upstart, is that 'the one knows for certain, what the other only conjectures as highly probable, that several of his forefathers deserved hanging.' Yet it is certain, though strange, that, generally speaking, the supposed upstart would rather have this very thing a certainty—provided there were some *great* and celebrated exploit in question—than left to conjecture. If he were to discover that he could trace up his descent distinctly to a man who had deserved hanging, for robbing—not a traveller of his purse, but a king of his empire, or a neighbouring State of a province,—he would be likely to make no secret of it, and even to be better pleased, inwardly, than if he had made out a long line of ancestors who had been very honest farmers.

The happiest lot for a man, as far as birth is concerned, is that it should be such as to give him *but little occasion ever to think much about it*; which will be the case, if it be neither too high nor too low for his existing situation. Those who have sunk much below, or risen much above, what suits their birth, are apt to be uneasy, and consequently *touchy*. The one feels ashamed of his situation; the other, of his ancestors and other relatives. A nobleman's or gentleman's son, or grandson, feels degraded by waiting at table, or behind a counter; and a member of a liberal profession is apt to be ashamed of his father's having done so; and both are apt to take offence readily, unless they are of a truly magnanimous character. It was

remarked by a celebrated person, a man of a gentleman's family, and himself a gentleman by station, 'I have often thought that if I had risen like A. B., from the very lowest of the people, by my own honourable exertions, I should have rather felt proud of so great a feat, than, like him, sore and touchy; but I suppose I must be mistaken; for I observe that the far greater part of those who are so circumstanced, have just the opposite feeling.'

The characters, however, of true inward nobility are ashamed of nothing but base conduct, and are not ready to take offence at supposed affronts; because they keep clear of whatever *deserves* contempt, and consider what is undeserved as beneath their notice.

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## ESSAY XV. OF SEDITIONS AND TROUBLES.

SHEPHERDS of people had need know the calendars of tempests in State, which are commonly greatest when things grow to equality, as natural tempests about the equinoctia;<sup>1</sup> and as there are certain hollow blasts of wind and secret swellings of seas before a tempest, so are there in States:—

‘Ille etiam cæcos instare tumultus  
Sæpe monet, fraudesque et operta tumescere bella.’<sup>2</sup>

Libels and licentious discourses against the State, when they are frequent and open; and in like sort, false news often running up and down to the disadvantage of the State, and hastily embraced, are amongst the signs of troubles. Virgil, giving the pedigree of fame, saith, she was sister to the giants:—

‘Illam terra parens, ira irritata deorum,  
Extremam (ut perhibent) Cæo Enceladoque sororem  
Progeniit.’<sup>3</sup>

As if fames<sup>4</sup> were the relics of seditions past; but they are no less indeed the preludes of seditions to come. Howsoever, he noted it right, that seditious tumults and seditious fames differ no more but as brother and sister, masculine and feminine—especially if it come to that, that the best actions of a State, and the most plausible,<sup>5</sup> and which ought to give greatest contentment, are taken in ill sense, and traduced; for that shows the envy great, as Tacitus saith, ‘Conflata magna invidia, seu bene, seu male, gesta premunt.’<sup>6</sup> Neither doth it follow, that because these fames are a sign of troubles, that the suppressing of them with too much severity should be a remedy

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<sup>1</sup> Equinoctia. *Equinoxes.*

<sup>2</sup> ‘He often warns of dark fast-coming tumults, hidden fraud, and open warfare, swelling proud.’—Virgil, *Georg.* i. 465.

<sup>3</sup> Virg. *Æn.* iv. 179.

‘Enraged against the Gods, revengeful Earth  
Produced her, last of the Titanian birth.’—*Dryden.*

<sup>4</sup> Fames. *Reports; rumours.* ‘The fame thereof was heard in Pharaoh’s house, saying, Joseph’s brethren are come.’—*Genesis* xlv. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Plausible. *Laudable; deserving of applause.* See page 95.

<sup>6</sup> ‘Great envy being excited, they condemn acts, whether good or bad.’ (Quoted probably from memory.)—Tac. *Hist.* i. 7.

of troubles;' for the despising of them many times checks them best, and the going about to stop them doth but make a wonder long-lived. Also that kind of obedience, which Tacitus speaketh of, is to be held suspected: 'Errant in officio, sed tamen qui mallent mandata imperantium interpretari, quam exequi;'<sup>2</sup> disputing, excusing, cavilling upon mandates and directions, is a kind of shaking off the yoke, and assay<sup>3</sup> of disobedience: especially if in those disputings they which are for the direction speak fearfully and tenderly, and those that are against it, audaciously.

Also, as Machiavel noteth well, when princes, that ought to be common<sup>4</sup> parents, make themselves as a party, and lean to a side, that is, as a boat that is overthrown by uneven weight on the one side—as was well seen in the time of Henry III. of France; for, first himself entered league for the extirpation of the Protestants, and presently after the same league was turned upon himself; for when the authority of princes is made but an accessory to a cause, and that there be other bands that tie faster than the band of sovereignty, kings begin to be put almost out of possession.

Also, when discords, and quarrels, and factions, are carried openly and audaciously; it is a sign the reverence of government is lost; for the motions of the greatest persons in a government ought to be as the motions of the planets under *primum mobile*<sup>5</sup> (according to the old opinion), which is, that every of them<sup>6</sup> is carried swiftly by the highest motion, and softly in their own motion; and, therefore, when great ones in their own particular motion move violently, and, as Tacitus expresseth it well, 'Liberius quam ut imperantium meminissent'<sup>7</sup>—

<sup>1</sup> There is a law in our Statute Book against 'Slandrous Reports and Tales to cause Discord between King and People.'—Anno 5 Edward I., *Westminster Primer*, c. xxxi.

<sup>2</sup> 'They were in attendance on their duties, yet preferred putting their own construction on the commands of their rulers by executing them.'—Tacit. *Hist.* i. 39.

<sup>3</sup> Assay. *The first attempt, or taste, by way of trial.*

'For well he weened that so glorious bait  
Would tempt his guest to make thereof assay.'—*Spenser.*

<sup>4</sup> Common. *Serving for all.* 'The Book of Common Prayer.'

<sup>5</sup> *Primum mobile*, in the astronomical language of Bacon's time, meant a body drawing all others into its own sphere.

<sup>6</sup> Every of them. *Each of them; every one of them.* 'And it came to pass in every of them.'—*Apocrypha*, 2 Esdras iii. 10.

<sup>7</sup> 'More freely than is consistent with remembering the rulers.'

it is a sign the orbs are out of frame; for reverence is that wherewith princes are girt from God, who threateneth the dissolving thereof; 'Solvam cingula regum.'<sup>1</sup>

So when any of the four pillars of government are mainly shaken, or weakened (which are religion, justice, counsel, and treasure), men had need to pray for fair weather. But let us pass from this part of predictions (concerning which, nevertheless, more light might be taken from that which followeth), and let us speak first of the materials of seditions, then of the motives of them, and thirdly of the remedies.

Concerning the materials of seditions, it is a thing well to be considered—for the surest way to prevent seditions (if the times do bear it), is to take away the matter of them; for if there be fuel prepared, it is hard to tell whence the spark shall come that shall set it on fire. The matter of seditions is of two kinds, much poverty, and much discontentment. It is certain, so many overthrown estates, so many votes for troubles. Lucan noteth well the state of Rome before the civil war:—

'Hinc usura vorax, rapidumque in tempore fœnus,  
Hinc concussa fides, et multis utile bellum.'<sup>2</sup>

This same 'multis utile bellum,' is an assured and infallible sign of a State disposed to seditions and troubles; and if this poverty and broken estate<sup>3</sup> in the better sort be joined with a want and necessity in the mean people, the danger is imminent and great—for the rebellions of the belly are the worst. As for discontentments, they are in the politic body like to humours in the natural, which are apt to gather a preternatural heat, and to inflame; and let no prince measure the danger of them by this, whether they be just or unjust—for that were to imagine people to be too reasonable, who do often spurn at their own good,—nor yet by this, whether the griefs<sup>4</sup> whereupon they rise be in fact great or small; for they are the most dangerous discontentments, where the fear is greater than the feeling:

<sup>1</sup> 'I will loose the bond of kings.'—*Job* xii. 18.

<sup>2</sup> 'Hence usury voracious, and eager for the time of interest; hence broken faith, and war become useful to many.'—Lucan, *Phars.* i. 181.

<sup>3</sup> Estate. Condition; circumstances. 'All who are any ways afflicted or distressed in mind, body, or estate.'—*English Liturgy* (*Prayer for all Conditions of Men*).

<sup>4</sup> Griefs. Grievances.

'The king has sent to know the nature of your griefs.'—*Shakespeare*.

‘Dolendi modus, timendi non item’—besides, in great oppressions, the same things that provoke the patience do withal mate<sup>1</sup> the courage; but in fears it is not so—neither let any prince, or State, be secure concerning discontentments, because they have been often, or have been long, and yet no peril hath ensued—for as it is true that every vapour or fume<sup>2</sup> doth not turn into a storm, so it is nevertheless true, that storms, though they blow over divers times, yet may fall at last; and, as the Spanish proverb noteth well, ‘The cord breaketh at the last by the weakest pull.’

The causes and motives of seditions are, innovations in religion, taxes, alteration of laws and customs, breaking of privileges, general oppression, advancement of unworthy persons, strangers, deaths, disbanded soldiers, factions grown desperate; and whatsoever in offending people joineth and knitteth them in a common cause.

For the remedies, there may be some general preservatives, whereof we will speak: as for the just cure, it must answer to the particular disease, and so be left to counsel rather than rule.

The first remedy or prevention, is to remove, by all means possible, that material cause of sedition whereof we speak, which is, want and poverty in the estate:<sup>3</sup> to which purpose serveth the opening and well-balancing of trade; the cherishing of manufactures; the banishing of idleness; the repressing of waste and excess by sumptuary laws; the improvement and husbanding of the soil; the regulating of prices of things vendible; the moderating of taxes and tributes; and the like. Generally, it is to be foreseen that the population of a kingdom (especially if it be not mown down by wars), do not exceed the stock of the kingdom which should maintain them: neither is the population to be reckoned only by number, for a smaller number, that spend more and earn less, do wear out an estate sooner than a greater number that live low and gather more: therefore the multiplying of nobility, and other degrees of quality,<sup>4</sup> in an over-proportion to the common people, doth

<sup>1</sup> ‘There is a limit to the suffering, but none to the apprehension.’

<sup>2</sup> *Mate.* To subdue; to quell. See page 14.

<sup>3</sup> *Fume.* An exhalation.

‘That memory, the warden of the brain, shall be a fume.’—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>4</sup> *Estate.* *State.* See page 135.

<sup>5</sup> *Quality.* *Persons of superior rank.* ‘I will appear at the masquerade dressed

speedily bring a State to necessity; and so doth likewise an overgrown clergy, for they bring nothing to the stock; and in like manner, when more are bred scholars than preferments can take off.

It is likewise to be remembered, that, forasmuch as the increase of any estate must be upon the foreigner (for whatsoever is somewhere gotten, is somewhere lost), there be but three things which one nation selleth unto another—the commodity as nature yieldeth it, the manufacture, and the vecture, or carriage: so that, if these three wheels go, wealth will flow as in a spring tide. And it cometh many times to pass, that ‘*materiam superabit opus*’—that ‘the work and carriage is worth more than the material,’ and enricheth a State more; as is notably seen in the Low Countrymen, who have the best mines above ground in the world.

Above all things, good policy is to be used, that the treasures and monies in a State be not gathered into few hands; for otherwise, a State may have a great stock, and yet starve; and money is like muck, not good except it be spread. This is done chiefly by suppressing, or, at the least, keeping a strait hand upon the devouring trades of usury, engrossing<sup>1</sup> great pasturages and the like.

For removing discontentments, or, at least, the danger of them, there is in every State (as we know), two portions of subjects, the nobles and the commonalty. When one of these is discontent, the danger is not great; for common people are of slow motion, if they be not excited by the greater sort; and the greater sort are of small strength, except the multitude be apt and ready to move of themselves: then is the danger, when the greater sort do but wait for the troubling of the waters

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in my feather, that the *quality* may see how pretty they will look in their travelling habits.”—*Addison*.

The common people still speak of the upper classes as ‘*the quality*.’ It is to be observed that almost all our titles of respect are terms denoting qualities. ‘Her Majesty,’ ‘his Highness,’ ‘his Excellency,’ ‘his Grace,’ ‘the Most Noble,’ ‘the Honourable,’ ‘his Honour,’ ‘his Worship.’

<sup>1</sup> Engrossing. *Forestalling*. ‘*Engrossing* was also described to be the getting into one’s possession, or buying up large quantities of any kind of victuals, with intent to sell them again.’—*Blackstone*.

‘What should ye do, then, should ye suppress all this flowery crop of knowledge, and new light sprung up? Should ye set an oligarchy of twenty *engrossers* over it, to bring a famine upon our minds?’—*Milton*.



amongst the meaner, that then they may declare themselves. The poets feign that the rest of the gods would have bound Jupiter, which he hearing of, by the counsel of Pallas, sent for Briareus, with his hundred hands, to come in to his aid—an emblem, no doubt, to show how safe it is for monarchs to make sure of the good-will of common people.

To give moderate liberty for griefs and discontentments to evaporate (so it be without too great insolency or bravery<sup>2</sup>), is a safe way; for he that turneth the humours back, and maketh the wound bleed inwards, endangereth malign ulcers and pernicious imposthumations.

The part of Epimetheus might well become Prometheus, in the case of discontentments; for there is not a better provision against them. Epimetheus, when griefs and evils flew abroad, at last shut the lid, and kept hope in the bottom of the vessel. Certainly, the politic and artificial nourishing and entertaining of hopes, and carrying men from hopes to hopes, is one of the best antidotes against the poison of discontentments: and it is a certain sign of a wise government and proceeding, when it can hold men's hearts by hopes, when it cannot by satisfaction; and when it can handle things in such manner as no evil shall appear so peremptory but that it hath some outlet of hope: which is the less hard to do, because both particular persons and factions are apt enough to flatter themselves, or, at least, to brave<sup>3</sup> that which they believe not.

Also the foresight and prevention, that there be no likely or fit head whereupon discontented persons may resort, and under whom they may join, is a known, but an excellent point of caution. I understand a fit head to be one that hath greatness and reputation, that hath confidence with the discontented party, and upon whom they turn their eyes, and that is thought discontented in his own particular; which kind of persons are either to be won and reconciled to the State, and that is a fast and true manner, or to be fronted with some other of the same party that may oppose them, and so divide the reputation. Generally, the dividing and breaking of all factions and combinations that are adverse to the State, and setting them at

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<sup>1</sup> Hom. *Il.* i. 398.

<sup>2</sup> Brave. *To boast of.*

<sup>3</sup> Bravery. See page 106.

distance,<sup>1</sup> or, at least, distrust among themselves, is not one of the worst remedies; for it is a desperate case, if those that hold with the proceeding of the State be full of discord and faction, and those that are against it be entire and united.

I have noted, that some witty and sharp speeches, which have fallen from princes, have given fire to seditions. Cæsar did himself infinite hurt in that speech, 'Sylla nescivit literas, non potuit dictare;'<sup>2</sup> for it did utterly cut off that hope which men had entertained, that he would at one time or other give over his dictatorship. Galba undid himself by that speech, 'Legi a se militem, non emi;'<sup>3</sup> for it put the soldiers out of hope of the donative. Probus, likewise, by that speech, 'Si vixero, non opus erit amplius Romano imperio militibus;'<sup>4</sup> a speech of great despair for the soldiers; and many the like. Surely princes had need, in tender matter and ticklish times, to beware what they say, especially in these short speeches, which fly abroad like darts, and are thought to be shot out of their secret intentions; for, as for large discourses, they are flat things, and not so much noted.

Lastly, let princes, against all events, not be without some great person, one or rather more, of military valour, near unto them, for the repressing of seditions in their beginnings; for, without that, there useth to be more trepidation in court upon the first breaking out of trouble than were fit; and the State runneth the danger of that which Tacitus saith—'Atque is habitus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur;'<sup>5</sup> but let such military persons be assured<sup>6</sup> and well reputed of, rather than factious and

<sup>1</sup> Distance. *Enmity*.

'Banquo was your enemy,  
So is he mine; and in such bloody distance,  
That every minute of his being thrusts  
Against my near'st of life.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>2</sup> 'Sylla was ignorant of letters, and could not dictate.' (This pun is attributed to Cæsar by Suetonius.)—*Vit. C. Jul. Cæs.* 77, 1.

<sup>3</sup> 'He levied soldiers, and did not buy them.'—*Tac. Hist.* i. 5.

<sup>4</sup> 'If I live, the Roman Empire will need no more soldiers.'—*Flav. Vesp. Vit. Prob.* 20.

<sup>5</sup> 'And such was the state of their minds, that the worst villany a few dared, more approved of it, and all tolerated it.'—*Hist.* i. 28.

<sup>6</sup> Assured. *Not to be doubted; trust-worthy.* 'It is an assured experience, that flint laid at the root of a tree will make it prosper.'—*Bacon's Natural History*.

popular—holding also good correspondence with the other great men in the State, or else the remedy is worse than the disease.

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## ANNOTATIONS.

*'Neither let any prince or State be secure concerning discontentments, because they have been often, or have been long, and yet no peril hath ensued. . . . '*

Men underrate the danger of any evil that has been escaped. An evil is not necessarily unreal, because it has been often feared without just cause. The wolf does sometimes enter in, and make havoc of the flock, though there have been many false alarms. The consequence of feeling too secure, and not being prepared, may be most disastrous when the emergency does arise. And the existence of a power to meet the emergency is not the less important because the occasions for the exercise of it may be very few. If any one should be so wearied with the monotonous 'All's well' of the nightly guardians of a camp, hour after hour, and night after night, as to conclude that their service was superfluous, and, accordingly, to dismiss them, how much real danger, and how much unnecessary apprehension, would be the result.

*'Let no prince measure the danger of discontentments by this . . . . . whether the griefs whereupon they rise be great or small. . . . . '*

The importance of this caution with regard to 'small griefs' will not be denied by any one who has observed the odd *limitations* of power in those who seem despotic, and yet *cannot* do what seem *little* things. *E.g.*, when the Romans took possession of Egypt, the people submitted, without the least resistance, to have *their lives and property* at the mercy of a foreign nation: but one of the Roman soldiers happening to kill a cat in the *streets* of Alexandria, they rose on him and tore him limb from limb; and the excitement was so violent, that the

generals overlooked the outrage for fear of insurrection!—Claudius Cæsar tried to introduce a letter which was wanting in the Roman Alphabet—the consonant V as distinct from U,—they having but one character for both. He ordered that ¶ (an F reversed) should be that character. It appears on some inscriptions in his time; but he could not establish it, though he could KILL or *plunder his subjects at pleasure*. So can the Emperor of Russia; but he cannot change the *style*. It would displace the days of saints whom his people worship, and it would produce a formidable insurrection! Other instances of this strange kind of anomaly might doubtless be produced.

‘*The causes and motives of seditions are . . .*’

Amongst the causes of sedition Bacon has not noticed what is, perhaps, the source of the most dangerous kinds of sedition, the keeping of a certain portion of the population in a state of helotism,—as subjects without being citizens, or only imperfectly and partially citizens. For men will better submit to an undistinguishing despotism that bears down all classes alike, than to an invidious distinction drawn between privileged and subject classes.

On this point I will take the liberty of citing a passage from a former work :—

‘The exclusion from the rights of citizenship of all except a certain favoured class—which was the system of the Grecian and other ancient republics—has been vindicated by their example, and recommended for general adoption, by some writers, who have proposed to make *sameness of religion* correspond in modern States to the sameness of *race* among the ancients,—to substitute for their *hereditary citizenship* the profession of Christianity in one and the same *National Church*.

‘But attentive and candid reflection will show that this would be the worst possible *imitation* of one of the worst of the Pagan institutions; that it would be not only still more *unwise* than the unwise example proposed, but also even more opposite to the spirit of the *christian religion* than to the maxims of *sound policy*.

‘Of the system itself, under various modifications, and of its effects, under a variety of circumstances, we find abundant re-

cords throughout a large portion of history, ancient and modern ; from that of the Israelites when sojourners in Egypt, down to that of the Turkish Empire and its Greek and other christian subjects. And in those celebrated ancient republics of which we have such copious accounts in the classic writers, it is well known that a man's being born of free parents within the territory of a certain State, had nothing to do with conferring civil rights ; while his contributing towards the expenses of its government, was rather considered as the badge of an alien,<sup>1</sup> the imposing of a tax on the citizens being mentioned by Cicero<sup>2</sup> as something calamitous and disgraceful, and not to be thought of but in some extraordinary emergency.

‘Nor were the proportionate *numbers* at all taken into account. In Attica, the metœci or sojourners appear to have constituted about a third of the free population ; but the helots in Lacedæmon, and the subjects of the Carthaginian and Roman Republics, outnumbered the citizens, in the proportion probably of five, and sometimes of ten or twenty to one. Nor again were alien families considered as such in reference to a more recent settlement in the territory ; on the contrary, they were often the ancient occupiers of the soil, who had been subdued by another race ; as the Siculi (from whom Sicily derived its name), by the Siceliots or Greek colonists.

‘The system in question has been explained and justified on the ground that distinctions of race implied important religious and moral differences ; such that the admixture of men thus differing in the main points of human life, would have tended, unless one race had a complete ascendancy, to confuse all notions of right and wrong. And the principle, accordingly, of the ancient republics,—which has been thence commended as wise and good—has been represented as that of making agreement in religion and morals the test of citizenship.

‘That this however was not, at least in many instances, even the professed principle, is undeniable. The Lacedæmonians reduced to helotism the Messenians, who were of Doric race, like themselves ; while it appears from the best authorities, that the kings of those very Lacedæmonians were of a different race from the people, being not of Dorian, but of Achaian extrac-

<sup>1</sup> *Matt.* xvii. 25.

<sup>2</sup> *De Off.* b. 11, ch. xxi.

tion.<sup>1</sup> There could not have been therefore, at least universally, any such total incompatibility between the moral institutions and principles of the different races. The vindication, therefore, of the system utterly fails, even on the very grounds assumed by its advocates.

‘If, however, in any instance such an incompatibility did exist, or (what is far more probable) such a mutual dislike and jealousy, originating in a narrow spirit of clanship—as to render apparently hopeless the complete amalgamation of two tribes as fellow-citizens on equal terms, the wisest—the only wise—course would have been an entire separation. Whether the one tribe migrated in a mass to settle elsewhere, or the territory were divided between the two, so as to form distinct independent States,—in either mode, it would have been better for both parties, than that one should remain tributary subjects of the other. Even the expulsion of the Moors and Jews from Spain, was not, I am convinced, so great an evil, as it would have been to retain them as a degraded and tributary class; like the Greek subjects of the Turkish empire.

‘For, if there be any one truth which the deductions of reason alone, independent of history, would lead us to anticipate, and which again history alone would establish independently of antecedent reasoning, it is this: that a whole class of men placed permanently under the ascendancy of another as subjects, without the rights of citizens, must be a source, at the best, of weakness, and generally of danger, to the State. They cannot well be expected, and have rarely been found, to evince much hearty patriotic feeling towards a community in which their neighbours looked down on them as an inferior and permanently degraded species. While kept in brutish ignorance, poverty, and weakness, they are likely to feel—like the ass in the fable—indifferent whose panniers they bear. If they increase in power, wealth, and mental development, they are likely to be ever on the watch for an opportunity of shaking off a degrading yoke. Even a complete general despotism, weighing down all classes without exception, is, in general, far more

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<sup>1</sup> It is very remarkable that this fact has been adverted to, and prominently set forth by an author who, *in the very same work*, maintains the impossibility of different races being amalgamated together in the same community. He appears to have quite forgotten that he had completely disproved his own theory.

readily borne, than invidious distinctions drawn between a favoured and a depressed race of subjects; for men feel an *insult* more than a *mischief* done to them;<sup>1</sup> and feel no insult so much as one daily and hourly inflicted by their immediate neighbours. A Persian subject of the Great King had probably no greater share of civil rights than a helot; but he was likely to be less galled by his depression, from being surrounded by those who, though some of them possessed power and dignity, as compared with himself, yet were equally destitute of civil rights, and abject slaves, in common with him, of the one great despot.

‘It is notorious, accordingly, how much Sparta was weakened and endangered by the helots, always ready to avail themselves of any public disaster as an occasion for revolt. The frightful expedient was resorted to of thinning their numbers from time to time by an organized system of massacre; yet, though a great part of the territory held by Lacedæmon was left a desert,<sup>2</sup> security could not be purchased, even at this price.

‘We find Hannibal, again, maintaining himself for sixteen years in Italy against the Romans; and though scantily supplied from Carthage, recruiting his ranks, and maintaining his positions, by the aid of subjects of the Romans. Indeed, almost every page of history teaches the same lesson, and proclaims in every different form, ‘How long shall these men be a snare unto us? Let the people go, that they may serve their God: knowest thou not yet that Egypt is destroyed?’<sup>3</sup> ‘The remnant of these nations which thou shalt not drive out, shall be pricks in thine eyes, and thorns in thy side.’<sup>4</sup>

‘But beside the other causes which have always operated to perpetuate, in spite of experience, so impolitic a system, the difficulty of *changing* it, when once established, is one of the greatest. The false step is one which it is peculiarly difficult to retrace. Men long debarred from civil rights, almost always become ill-fitted to enjoy them. The brutalizing effects of oppression, which cannot immediately be done away by its removal, at once furnish a pretext for justifying it, and make relief hazardous. Kind and liberal treatment, if very cautiously

<sup>1</sup> Ἀδικούμενοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται, ἢ βιαζόμενοι.—Thucyd. b. i. § 77.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. b. iv.

<sup>3</sup> Exodus x. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Numbers xxxiii. 55.

and judiciously bestowed, will *gradually* and slowly advance men towards the condition of being worthy of such treatment; but treat men as aliens or enemies—as slaves, as children, or as brutes, and they will *speedily* and *completely* justify your conduct.’<sup>1</sup>

‘*To which purpose (the removing of sedition) serveth . . . .  
the repressing of waste and excess by sumptuary laws  
. . . . the regulating of prices of things vendible. . . .*’

Bacon here falls into the error which always prevails in the earlier stages of civilization, and which accordingly was more prevalent in his age than in ours—that of *over-governing*.

It may be reckoned a kind of puerility: for you will generally find young persons prone to it, and also those legislators who lived in the *younger* (i.e., the earlier) ages of the world. They naturally wish to enforce by law everything that they consider to be good, and forcibly to prevent men from doing anything that is unadvisable. And the amount of mischief is incalculable that has been caused by this meddlesome kind of legislation. For not only have such legislators been, as often as not, mistaken, as to what really is beneficial or hurtful, but also when they have been right in their judgment on that point, they have often done more harm than good by attempting to enforce by law what had better be left to each man’s own discretion.

As an example of the first kind of error, may be taken the many efforts made by the legislators of various countries to restrict foreign commerce, on the supposition that it would be advantageous to supply all our wants ourselves, and that we must be losers by purchasing anything from abroad. If a weaver were to spend half his time in attempting to make shoes and furniture for himself, or a shoemaker to neglect his trade while endeavouring to raise corn for his own consumption, they would be guilty of no greater folly than has often been, and in many instances still is, forced on many nations by their governments; which have endeavoured to withdraw from agriculture to manufactures a people possessing abundance of

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<sup>1</sup> *Essay on some of the Dangers to the Christian Faith.* 2nd edition, note F. pp. 212-217.



fertile land, or who have forced them to the home cultivation of such articles as their soil and climate are not suited to, and thus compelled them to supply themselves with an inferior commodity at a greater cost.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that early hours are healthful, and that men ought not to squander their money on luxurious feasts and costly dress, unsuited to their means; but when governments thereupon undertook to prescribe the hours at which men should go to rest, requiring them to put out their lights at the sound of the curfew-bell, and enacted sumptuary laws as to the garments they were to wear, and the dishes of meat they were to have at their tables, this meddling kind of legislation was always found excessively galling, and moreover entirely ineffectual; since men's dislike to such laws always produced contrivances for evading the spirit of them.

Bacon, however, was far from always seeing his way rightly in these questions; which is certainly not to be wondered at, considering that we, who live three centuries later, have only just emerged from thick darkness into twilight, and are far from having yet completely thrown off those erroneous notions of our forefathers. The regulating of prices by law still existed, in the memory of most of us, with respect to bread—and the error of legislating against engrossing of commodities has only very lately been exploded.

Many restrictions, of various kinds, have been maintained by persons who probably would not themselves have *introduced* them, but who have an over-dread of innovation; urging that the burden of proof lies on those who advocate any change; the *presumption* being on the side of leaving things unaltered. And as a general rule this is true. But in the case of any *restriction*, the presumption is the other way. For since no restriction is a good in itself, the burden of proof lies on those who would either introduce or continue it.

*'Whatsoever is somewhere gotten is somewhere lost.'*

This error—and it is a very hurtful one—was not exploded till long after Bacon's time. The following extract from the *Annual Register* for 1779, (Appendix, p. 114,) may serve to show what absurd notions on political economy were afloat even in the memory of persons now living. The extract is

from a 'Plan by Dr. Franklin and Mr. Dalrymple for benefiting distant Countries.'

'*Fair commerce* is, where equal values are exchanged for equal, the expense of transport included. Thus, if it costs A in *England* as much labour and charge to raise a bushel of wheat, as it costs B in *France* to produce four gallons of wine, then are four gallons of wine the fair exchange for a bushel of wheat, A and B meeting at half distance with their commodities to make the exchange. The advantage of this fair commerce is, that each party increases the number of his enjoyments, having, instead of wheat alone, or wine alone, the use of both wheat and wine.

'Where the labour and expense of producing both commodities are known to both parties, bargains will generally be fair and equal. Where they are known to one party only, bargains will often be unequal,—knowledge taking its advantage of ignorance.

'Thus, he that carries a thousand bushels of wheat abroad to sell, may not probably obtain so great a profit thereon as if he had first turned the wheat into manufactures, by subsisting therewith the workmen while producing those manufactures. Since there are many expediting and facilitating methods of working, not generally known; and strangers to the manufactures, though they know pretty well the expense of raising wheat, are unacquainted with those short methods of working, and thence being apt to suppose more labour employed in the manufactures than there really is, are more easily imposed on in their value, and induced to allow more for them than they are honestly worth. Thus, the advantage of having manufactures in a country, does not consist, as is commonly supposed, in their highly advancing the value of rough materials of which they are formed: since though six pennyworths of flax may be worth twenty shillings when worked into lace, yet the very cause of its being worth twenty shillings is, that, besides the flax, it has cost nineteen shillings and sixpence in subsistence to the manufacturer. But the advantage of manufactures is, that under their shape provisions may be more easily carried to a foreign market; and by their means our traders may more easily cheat strangers. Few, where it is not made, are judges

of the value of lace. The importer may demand forty, and perhaps get thirty shillings, for that which cost him but twenty.

‘Finally, there seem to be but three ways for a nation to acquire wealth. The first is by *war*, as the *Romans* did, in plundering their conquered neighbours. This is *robbery*. The second by *commerce*, which is generally *cheating*. The third is by *agriculture*, the only *honest way*, wherein man receives a real increase of the seed sown in the ground, in a kind of continual miracle wrought by the hand of God in his favour, as a reward for his innocent life and his virtuous industry.’

The reader will observe that, in this disquisition, *labour* is made the sole measure of value, without any regard to the questions, *whose labour?* or *how directed?* and, *with what results?* On this principle, therefore, if a Raphael takes only as much time and trouble in making a fine picture, as a shoemaker in making a pair of boots, he is a *cheat* if he receives more for his picture than the other for the boots! And if it costs the same labour to produce a cask of ordinary Cape-wine, and one of Constantia, they ought in justice to sell for the same price! Thus our notions of morality, as well as of political economy, are thrown into disorder.

Yet such nonsense as this passed current in the days of our fathers. And it is only in our own days that people have been permitted to buy food where they could get it cheapest.

‘*There useth to be more trepidation in court upon the first breaking out of troubles than were fit . . .*’

To expect to tranquillize and benefit a country by gratifying its agitators, would be like the practice of the superstitious of old with their sympathetic powders and ointments; who, instead of applying medicaments to the wound, contented themselves with *salving* the sword which had inflicted it. Since the days of Dane-gelt downwards, nay, since the world was created, nothing but evil has resulted from concessions made to intimidation.

## ESSAY XVI. OF ATHEISM.

I HAD rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind; and, therefore, God never wrought miracles to convince<sup>1</sup> atheism, because his ordinary works convince it. It is true, that a little philosophy inclineth Man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion; for while the mind of Man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no farther; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate, and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity: nay, even that school which is most accused of atheism, doth most demonstrate religion; that is, the school of Leucippus, and Democritus, and Epicurus—for it is a thousand times more credible, that four mutable elements and one immutable fifth essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of infinite small portions, or seeds, unplaced, should have produced this order and beauty without a divine marshal. The Scripture saith, 'The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God;'<sup>2</sup> it is not said, 'The fool hath thought in his heart;' so as<sup>3</sup> he rather saith it by rote to himself, as that<sup>4</sup> he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be persuaded of it; for none deny there is a God, but those for whom it maketh<sup>5</sup> that there were no God. It appeareth in nothing more, that atheism is rather in the lip than in the heart of Man, than by this, that atheists will ever be talking of that their opinion, as if they fainted in it themselves, and would be glad to be strengthened by the consent<sup>6</sup> of others; nay, more, you shall have atheists strive to get disciples, as it fareth with other sects; and, which is most of all, you shall have them that will suffer for atheism, and

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<sup>1</sup> Convince. *Convict; prove guilty.* 'To convince all that are ungodly among them of all their ungodly deeds.'—*Epistle of Jude.*

<sup>2</sup> *Psalm xiv. 1.*

<sup>3</sup> *As. That.* See page 23.

<sup>4</sup> *That. What.* See page 73.

<sup>5</sup> For whom it maketh. *To whom it would be advantageous.*

<sup>6</sup> Consent. *Agreement in opinion.* 'Socrates, by the consent of all excellent writers that followed him, was approved to be the wisest man of all Greece.'—*Sir J. Elyot.*

not recant : whereas, if they did truly think that there were no such thing as God, why should they trouble themselves ? Epicurus is charged, that he did but dissemble for his credit's sake, when he affirmed there were blest natures, but such as enjoy themselves without having respect to the government of the world, wherein they say he did temporize, though in secret he thought there was no God ; but certainly he is traduced, for his words are noble and divine ; ' Non deos vulgi negare profanum : sed vulgi opiniones diis applicare profanum.'<sup>1</sup> Plato could have said no more ; and although he had the confidence<sup>2</sup> to deny the administration, he had not the power to deny the nature. The Indians of the West have names for their particular gods, though they have no name for God ; as if the heathens should have had the names Jupiter, Apollo, Mars, &c., but not the word Deus : which shows, that even those barbarous people have the notion, though they have not the latitude and extent of it ; so that against atheists the very savages take part with the very subtlest philosophers. The contemplative atheist is rare—a Diagoras, a Bion, a Lucian, perhaps, and some others : and yet they seem to be more than they are, for that all that impugn a received religion, or superstition, are, by the adverse part, branded with the name of atheists ; but the great ~~atheists~~ indeed are hypocrites, which are ever handling holy things, but without feeling, so as they must needs be cauterized in the end.

The causes of atheism are, divisions in religion, if there be many ; for any one main division addeth zeal to both sides, but many divisions introduce atheism : another is, scandal of priests, when it is come to that which St. Bernard saith, ' Non est jam dicere, ut populus, sic sacerdos ; quia nec sic populus, ut sacerdos.'<sup>3</sup> A third is, a custom of profane scoffing in holy matters, which doth by little and little deface the reverence of religion : and lastly, learned times, especially with peace and prosperity ; for troubles and adversities do more bow men's minds to religion. They that deny a God destroy a man's

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<sup>1</sup> 'It is not profane to deny the gods of the common people, but it is profane to apply to the gods the notions of the common people.'—*Diog. Laert.* x. 123.

<sup>2</sup> Confidence. *Boldness.*

<sup>3</sup> 'It is not now to be said, As the people, so the priest ; because the people are not such as the priests are.'

nobility, for certainly Man is of kin to the beasts by his body ; and if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base and ignoble creature. It destroys likewise magnanimity, and the rising human nature ; for, take an example of a dog, and mark what a generosity and courage he will put on when he finds himself maintained by a man, who to him is instead of a God, or *melior natura*<sup>1</sup>—which courage is manifestly such as that creature, without that confidence<sup>2</sup> of a better nature than his own, could never attain. So man, when he resteth and assureth himself upon divine protection and favour, gathereth a force and faith which human nature in itself could not obtain ; therefore, as atheism is in all respects hateful, so in this, that it depriveth human nature of the means to exalt itself above human frailty. As it is in particular persons, so it is in nations :—never was there such a state for magnanimity as Rome. Of this state hear what Cicero saith : ‘ Quam volumus, licet, patres conscripti, nos amemus, tamen nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Pœnos, nec artibus Græcos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus gentis et terræ domestico nativoque sensu Italos ipsos et Latinos ; sed pietate, ac religione, atque hac una sapientia, quod deorum immortalium numine omnia regi, gubernarique per-speximus, omnes gentes nationesque superavimus.’<sup>3</sup>

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## ANNOTATIONS.

‘ *I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind.*’

It is evident from this, that Bacon had seized the just view respecting *credulity* ; seeing plainly that ‘ to *disbelieve* is to

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<sup>1</sup> A better nature.

<sup>2</sup> Confidence. *Firm belief*. ‘ Society is built upon trust, and trust upon *confidence* of one another’s integrity.’—*South*.

<sup>3</sup> ‘ Let us be as partial to ourselves as we will, Conscript Fathers, yet we have not surpassed the Spaniards in number, nor the Gauls in strength, nor the Carthaginians in cunning, nor the Greeks in the arts, nor, lastly, the Latins and Italians of this nation and land, in natural intelligence about home-matters ; but we have excelled all nations and people in piety and religion, and in this one wisdom of fully recognising that all things are ordered and governed by the power of the immortal gods.’—Cic. *De Har. Resp.* 9.

believe.' If one man believes that there is a God, and another that there is no God, whichever holds the less reasonable of these two opinions is chargeable with credulity. For the only way to avoid credulity and incredulity—the two necessarily going together—is to listen to, and yield to, the best evidence, and to believe and disbelieve on good grounds.

And however imperfectly and indistinctly we may understand the attributes of God—of the Eternal Being who made and who governs all things—the 'mind of this universal frame,' the proof of the existence of a Being possessed of them is most clear and full; being, in fact, the very same evidence on which we believe in *the existence of one another*. How do we know that men exist? (that is, not merely Beings having a certain *visible* bodily form—for *that* is not what we chiefly imply by the word Man,—but *rational agents*, such as we call men). Surely not by the *immediate* evidence of our senses, (since mind is not an object of sight), but by observing the *things performed*—the manifest result of rational contrivance. If we land in a strange country, doubting whether it be inhabited, as soon as we find, for instance, a boat, or a house, we are as perfectly certain that a man has been there, as if he had appeared before our eyes. Yet the atheist believes that 'this universal frame is without a mind;' that it was the production of chance; that the particles of matter of which the world consists, moved about at random, and accidentally fell into the shape it now bears. Surely the atheist has little reason to make a boast of his 'incredulity,' while believing anything so strange and absurd as that 'an army of infinitely small portions or seeds, unplaced, should have produced this order and beauty without a divine marshal.'

In that phenomenon in language, that both in the Greek and Latin, nouns of the neuter gender, *denoting things*, invariably had the *nominative* and the *accusative* the same, or rather, had an *accusative* only, employed as a *nominative* when required,—may there not be traced an indistinct consciousness of the persuasion that a mere *thing* is not capable of being an agent, which a *person* only can really be; and that the possession of power, strictly so called, by physical causes, is not conceivable, or their capacity to maintain, any more than to produce at first, the system of the Universe?—whose continued existence, as

well as its origin, seems to depend on the continued operation of the great Creator. May there not be in this an admission that the laws of nature presuppose an agent, and are incapable of being the cause of their own observance?

*'Epicurus is charged, that he did but dissemble for his credit's sake, when he affirmed there were blessed natures . . . wherein they say he did but temporize, though in secret he thought there was no God. But certainly he is traduced.'* . . .

It is remarkable that Bacon, like many others very conversant with ancient Mythology, failed to perceive that the pagan nations were in reality atheists. They mistake altogether the real character of the pagan religions.<sup>1</sup> They imagine that all men, in every age and country, had always designed to worship one Supreme God, the Maker of all things;<sup>2</sup> and that the error of the Pagans consisted merely in the false accounts they gave of Him, and in their worshipping other inferior gods besides. But this is altogether a mistake. Bacon was, in this, misled by words, as so many have been,—the very delusion he so earnestly warns men against. The Pagans used the word 'God;' but in a different sense from us. For by the word God, we understand an Eternal Being, who made and who governs all things. And if any one should deny that there *is* any such Being, we should say that he was an atheist; even though he might believe that there do exist Beings *superior to Man*, such

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<sup>1</sup> See *Lessons on Religious Worship*, L. ii.

<sup>2</sup> See Pope's *Universal Prayer* :—

'Father of all, in every age,  
In every clime adored;  
By saint, by savage, and by sage,  
Jehovah, Jove, or Lord.'

See also Rowe's *Tragedy of Tamerlane*, Act 3, Sc. ii.—

'Look round how Providence bestows alike  
Sunshine and rain to bless the fruitful year,  
On different nations, all of different faiths;  
And (tho' by several names and titles worshipp'd)  
Heaven takes the various tribute of their praise;  
Since all agree to own, at least to mean,  
One best, one greatest, only Lord of all.  
Thus when he viewed the many forms of Nature  
He said that all was good, and bless'd the fair variety.'



as the Fairies and Genii, in whom the uneducated in many parts of Europe still believe.

Accordingly, the apostle Paul (*Ephes.* ii. 12) expressly calls the ancient Pagans atheists (*ἄθεοι*), though he well knew that they worshipped certain supposed superior Beings which they called gods. But he says in the *Epistle to the Romans*, that 'they worshipped the creature more than<sup>1</sup> (that is, instead of) the Creator.' And at Lystra (*Acts* xiv. 15), when the people were going to do sacrifice to him and Barnabas, mistaking them for two of their gods, he told them to 'turn from those vanities, to serve the *living God who made heaven and earth.*'

This is what is declared in the first sentence of the *Book of Genesis*. And so far were the ancient Pagans from believing that 'in the beginning God made the heavens and the earth,' that, on the contrary, the heavens, and the earth, and the sea, and many other natural objects, were among *the very gods they adored*. They did, indeed, believe such extravagant fables as Bacon alludes to, and which he declares to be less incredible than that 'this universal frame is without a mind;' and yet, they did also believe that it *is* without a mind; that is, without what he evidently means by 'a mind'—an eternal, intelligent Maker and Ruler. Most men would understand by 'an atheist' one who disbelieves the existence of any such *personal agent*; though believing (as every one must) that there is some kind of *cause* for everything that takes place.

It may be added, that, as the pagan-worship has been generally of *evil* Beings,<sup>2</sup> so, the religions have been usually of a corresponding character. We read of the ancient Canaanites that 'every abomination which the Lord hateth, have these nations done, *unto their gods.*' And among the Hindus, the foulest impurities, and the most revolting cruelties, are not merely permitted by their religion, but are a part of their worship. Yet one may hear it said, not unfrequently, that 'any religion is better than none.' And a celebrated writer, in an article in a Review (afterwards published by himself), deriding the attempt to convert the Hindus, represents their religion as being (though absurd) on the whole beneficial;

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<sup>1</sup> Παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα.

<sup>2</sup> See *Lessons on Religious Worship*, L. ii.

because 'it is better that a man should look for reward or punishment from a deity with a hundred arms, than that he should look for none at all.' But he forgot to take into account the question, 'rewarded or punished FOR WHAT?' The hundred-armed deity makes it an unpardonable sin to put into the mouth a cartridge greased with beef-fat, but a meritorious act to slaughter, with circumstances of unspeakable horror, men, women, and children, of Christians!

*'A custom of profane scoffing in holy matters.'*

In reference to 'the profane scoffing in holy matters,' it is to be observed that jests on sacred subjects are, when men are so disposed, the most easily produced of any; because the *contrast* between the dignified and a low image, exhibited in combination (in which the whole force of the ludicrous consists), is, in this case, the most striking. It is commonly said, that there is no wit in profane jests; but it would be hard to frame any definition of wit that should exclude them. It would be more correct to say (and I really believe that is what is really meant) that the practice displays no great *powers* of wit because the subject matter renders it so particularly easy; and that (for the very same reason) it affords the least gratification (apart from all higher considerations) to judges of good taste; since a great part of the pleasure afforded by wit results from a *perception* of skill displayed and difficulty surmounted.

We have said, apart from all higher considerations; for surely, there is something very shocking to a well-disposed mind in such jests, as those, for instance, so frequently heard, in connexion with Satan and his agency. Suppose a rational Being—an inhabitant of some other planet—could visit this, our earth, and witness the gaiety of heart with which Satan, and his agents, and his victims, and the dreadful doom reserved for them, and everything relating to the subject, are, by many persons, talked of and laughed at, and resorted to as a source of amusement; what inference would he be likely to draw?

Doubtless he would, at first, conclude that no one believed anything of all this, but that we regarded the whole as a string of fables, like the heathen mythology, or the nursery tales of fairies and enchanters, which are told to amuse children. But when he came to learn that these things are not only *true*, but

are actually believed by the far greater part of those who, nevertheless, treat them as a subject of *mirth*, what would he think of us then? He would surely regard this as a most astounding proof of the great art, and of the great influence of that Evil Being who can have so far blinded men's understandings, and so depraved their moral sentiments, and so hardened their hearts, as to lead them, not merely to regard with careless apathy their spiritual enemy, and the dangers they are exposed to from him, and the final ruin of his victims, but even to find *amusement* in a subject of such surpassing horror, and to introduce allusions to it by way of a jest! Surely, generally speaking, right-minded persons are accustomed to regard wickedness and misery as most unfit subjects for jesting. They would be shocked at any one who should find *amusement* in the ravages and slaughter perpetrated by a licentious soldiery in a conquered country; or in the lingering tortures inflicted by wild Indians on their prisoners; or in the burning of heretics under the Inquisition. Nay, the very Inquisitors themselves, who have thought it their duty to practise such cruelties, would have been ashamed to be thought so brutal as to regard the sufferings of their victims as a subject of mirth. And any one who should treat as a jest the crimes and cruelties of the French Revolution, would generally be deemed more depraved than even the perpetrators themselves.<sup>1</sup>

It is, however, to be observed, that we are not to be offended as if sacred matters were laughed at, when some folly that has been *forced into connexion* with them is exposed. When things really ridiculous are mixed up with religion, who is to be blamed? Not he who shows that they are ridiculous, and no parts of religion, but those who disfigure truth by blending falsehood with it. It is true, indeed, that to attack even error in religion with *mere* ridicule is no wise act; because good things may be ridiculed as well as bad. But it surely cannot be our duty to abstain from showing plainly that absurd things *are* absurd, merely because people cannot help smiling at them. A tree is not injured by being cleared of moss and lichens; nor truth, by having folly or sophistry torn away from around it.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See *Lectures on a Future State*.

<sup>2</sup> See *Cautions for the Times*.

It is a good plan, with a young person of a character to be much affected by ludicrous and absurd representations, to show him plainly, by examples, that there is *nothing* which may not be so represented; he will hardly need to be told that everything is not a mere joke; and he may thus be secured from falling into a contempt of those particular things which he may at any time happen to find so treated; and, instead of being led by 'profane scoffing on holy matters into atheism,' as Bacon supposes, he will be apt to pause and reflect that it may be as well to try over again, with serious candour, everything which has been hastily given up as fit only for ridicule, and to abandon the system of scoffing altogether; looking at everything on the right side as well as on the wrong, and trying how any system will look, standing upright, as well as topsy-turvy.

*'The causes of atheism are . . . . .'*

Among the causes of atheism, Bacon has omitted one noticed by him as one of the causes of superstition, and yet it is not less a source of infidelity—'the taking an aim at divine matters by human, which cannot but breed mixture of imaginations.' Now, in human nature there is no more powerful principle than a *craving for infallibility* in religious matters. To examine and re-examine,—to reason and reflect,—to hesitate and to decide with caution,—to be always open to evidence,—and to acknowledge that, after all, we are liable to error;—all this is, on many accounts, unacceptable to the human mind,—both to its diffidence and to its pride,—to its indolence,—its dread of anxious cares,—and to its love of self-satisfied and confident repose. And hence there is a strong prejudice in favour of any system which promises to put an end to the work of inquiring, at once and for ever, and to relieve us from all embarrassing doubt and uncomfortable distrust. Consequently this craving for infallibility predisposes men towards the pretensions, either of a supposed unerring Church, or of those who claim or who promise immediate inspiration. And this promise of infallible guidance, not only meets Man's wishes, but his conjectures also. When we give the reins to our own feelings and fancies, such a provision appears as probable as it is desirable. If antecedently to the

distinct announcement of any particular revelation, men were asked what kind of revelation they would *wish* to obtain, and again, what kind of revelation they would think it the most reasonable and *probable* that God should bestow, they would be likely to answer *both* questions by saying, 'Such a revelation as should provide some infallible guide on earth, readily accessible to every man; so that no one could possibly be in doubt, on any point, as to what he was required to believe and to do; but should be placed, as it were, on a kind of plain high road, which he would only have to follow steadily, without taking any care to look around him; or, rather, in some kind of vehicle on such a road, in which he would be safely carried to his journey's end, even though asleep, provided he never quitted that vehicle. For,' a man might say, 'if a book is put into my hands containing a divine revelation, and in which are passages that may be differently understood by different persons, —even by those of learning and ability, —even by men professing each to have earnestly prayed for spiritual guidance towards the right interpretation thereof, —and if, moreover, this book contains, in respect of some points of belief and of conduct, no directions at all, —then there is a manifest *necessity* that I should be provided with an infallible interpreter of this book, who shall be always at hand to be consulted, and ready to teach me, without the possibility of mistake, the right meaning of every passage, and to supply all deficiencies and omissions in the book itself. For, otherwise, this revelation is, to *me*, no revelation at all. Though the book itself be perfectly free from all admixture of error, —though all that it asserts be true, and all its directions right, still it is no guide for *me*, unless I have an infallible certainty, on each point, what its assertions, and directions *are*. It is in vain to tell me that the pole-star is always fixed in the north; I cannot steer my course by it when it is obscured by clouds, so that I cannot be certain where that star is. I need a *compass* to steer by, which I can consult at all times. There is, therefore, a manifest necessity for an infallible and universally accessible interpreter on earth, as an indispensable accompaniment —and indeed essential part — of any divine revelation.'

Such would be the reasonings, and such the feelings, of a man left to himself to consider what sort of revelation from

Heaven would be the most acceptable, and also the most *probable*,—the most adapted to meet his *wishes* and his *wants*. And thus are men predisposed, both by their feelings and their antecedent conjectures, towards the admission of such pretensions as have been above alluded to.

And it may be added, that any one who is thus induced to give himself up implicitly to the guidance of such a supposed infallible authority, without presuming thenceforth to exercise his own judgment on any point relative to religion, or to think for himself at all on such matters,—such a one will be likely to regard this procedure as the very perfection of pious *humility*,—as a most reverent observance of the rule of ‘lean not to thine own understanding;’ though in reality it is the very error of improperly leaning to our own understanding. For, to resolve to believe that God *must* have dealt with mankind just in the way that *we* could *wish* as the most *desirable*, and in the way that to *us* seems the most *probable*,—this is, in fact, to *set up ourselves as his judges*. It is to dictate to Him, in the spirit of Naaman, who *thought* that the prophet would recover him by a touch; and who *chose* to be healed by the waters of Abana and Pharpar, the rivers of Damascus, which he deemed better than all the waters of Israel.

But anything that falls in at once with men’s *wishes*, and with their *conjectures*, and which also presents itself to them in the guise of a *virtuous humility*,—this they are often found readily and firmly to believe, not only *without* evidence, but *against* all evidence.

And thus it is in the present case. The principle that every revelation from Heaven necessarily requires, as an indispensable accompaniment, an infallible interpreter always at hand,—this principle clings so strongly to the minds of many men, that they are even found still to maintain it after they have ceased to believe in any revelation at all, or even in the existence of a God.

There can be no doubt of the fact, that very great numbers of men are to be found,—they are much more numerous in some parts of the Continent than among us; men not deficient in intelligence, nor altogether strangers to reflection, who, while they, for the most part conform externally to the prevailing religion, are inwardly utter unbelievers in Christianity; yet still

hold to the principle,—which, in fact, has had the chief share in *making* them unbelievers,—that the idea of a DIVINE REVELATION implies that of a universally accessible, INFALLIBLE INTERPRETER; and that the one without the other is an absurdity and contradiction.

And this principle it is that has mainly contributed to *make* these men unbelievers. For, when a tolerably intelligent and reflective man has fully satisfied himself that in point of fact no such provision *has* been made,—that no infallible and universally accessible interpreter does exist on earth (and this is a conclusion which even the very words of Paul, in his discourse at Miletus (*Acts xx.*) would be alone fully sufficient to establish).—when he has satisfied himself of the *non-existence* of this interpreter, yet still adheres to the principle of its supposed *necessity*, the consequence is inevitable, that he will at once reject all belief of Christianity. The ideas of a REVELATION, and of an unerring INTERPRETER, being, in his mind, inseparably conjoined, the overthrow of the one belief cannot but carry the other along with it. Such a person, therefore, will be apt to think it not worth while to examine the reasons in favour of any other form of Christianity, *not* pretending to furnish an infallible interpreter. This—which, he is fully convinced, is essential to a Revelation from Heaven—is, by some Churches, *claimed*, but not *established*, while the rest do not even claim it. The pretensions of the one he has listened to, and deliberately rejected; those of the other he regards as not even worth listening to.

The system, then, of reasoning from our own conjectures as to the necessity of the Most High doing so and so, tends to lead a man to proceed from the rejection of his own form of Christianity to a rejection of revelation altogether. But does it stop here? Does not the same system lead naturally to ATHEISM also? Experience shows that that consequence, which reason might have anticipated, does often actually take place. He who gives the reins to his own conjectures as to what is *necessary*, and thence draws his conclusions, will be likely to find a *necessity* for such divine interference in the affairs of the world as does not in fact take place. He will deem it no less than necessary, that an omnipotent and all-wise and beneficent Being should interfere to rescue the oppressed from the oppressor,

—the corrupted from the corruptor,—to deliver men from such temptations to evil as it is morally impossible they should withstand;—and, in short, to banish *evil* from the universe. And, since this is not done, he draws the inference that there cannot possibly be a God, and that to believe otherwise is a gross absurdity. Such a belief he may, indeed, consider as useful for keeping up a wholesome awe in the minds of the vulgar; and for their sakes he may outwardly profess Christianity also; even as the heathen philosophers of old endeavoured to keep up the popular superstitions; but a real belief he will regard as something impossible to an intelligent and reflective mind.

It is not meant that all, or the greater part, of those who maintain the principle here spoken of, are Atheists. We all know how common it is for men to fail of carrying out some principle (whether good or bad) which they have adopted;—how common, to maintain the premises, and not perceive the conclusion to which they lead. But the *tendency* of the *principle* itself is what is here pointed out: and the danger is anything but imaginary, of its leading, in fact, as it does naturally and consistently, to Atheism as its ultimate result.

But surely, the Atheist is not hereby excused. To reject or undervalue the revelation God has bestowed, urging that it is no revelation to *us*, or an insufficient one, because unerring certainty is not bestowed also,—because we are required to exercise patient diligence, and watchfulness, and candour, and humble self-distrust,—this would be as unreasonable as to disparage and reject the bountiful gift of eye-sight, because men's eyes have sometimes deceived them—because men have mistaken a picture for the object imitated, or a mirage of the desert for a lake; and have fancied they had the evidence of sight for the sun's motion; and to infer from all this that we ought to blindfold ourselves, and be led henceforth by some guide who pretends to be himself not liable to such deceptions.

Let no one fear that by forbearing to forestall the judgment of the last day,—by not presuming to dictate to the Most High, and boldly to pronounce in what way He *must* have imparted a revelation to Man,—by renouncing all pretensions to infallibility, whether an immediate and personal, or a derived infallibility,—by owning themselves to be neither impeccable nor infallible



(both claims are alike groundless), and by consenting to undergo those trials of vigilance and of patience which God has appointed for them,—let them not fear that by this they will forfeit all cheerful hope of final salvation,—all ‘joy and peace in believing.’ The reverse of all this is the reality. While such Christians as have sought rather for *peace*,—for mental tranquillity and satisfaction,—than for *truth*, will often fail both of truth and peace, those of the opposite disposition are more likely to attain both from their gracious Master. He has taught us to ‘take heed that we be not deceived,’ and to ‘beware of false prophets;’ and He has promised us His own peace and heavenly comfort. He has bid us watch and pray; He has taught us, through His blessed Apostle, to ‘take heed to ourselves,’ and to ‘work out our salvation with fear and trembling;’ and He has declared, through the same Apostle, that ‘He worketh in us;’ He has bid us rejoice in hope; He has promised that He ‘will not suffer us to be tempted above what we are able to bear;’ and He has taught us to look forward to the time when we shall no longer ‘see as by means of a mirror, darkly, but face to face;’—when we shall know, ‘not in part, but even as we are known;’—when faith shall be succeeded by certainty, and hope be ripened into enjoyment. His precepts and His promises go together. His support and comfort are given to those who seek for them in the way He has Himself appointed.

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## ESSAY XVII. OF SUPERSTITION.

IT were better to have no opinion of God at all, than such an opinion as is unworthy of Him ; for the one is unbelief, the other is contumely : and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity. Plutarch saith well to that purpose : ‘ Surely,’ saith he, ‘ I had rather a great deal, men should say there was no such a man at all as Plutarch, than that they should say there was one Plutarch, that would eat his children as soon as they were born ;’ as the poets speak of Saturn : and as the contumely is greater towards God, so the danger is greater towards men. Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation—all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not,—but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the minds of men ; therefore atheism did never perturb<sup>2</sup> States ; for it makes men wary of themselves, as looking no further ; and we see the times inclined to atheism, as the time of Augustus Cæsar, were civil<sup>3</sup> times ; but superstition hath been the confusion of many States, and bringeth in a new *primum mobile*,<sup>4</sup> that ravisheth all the spheres of government. The master of superstition is the people, and in all superstition wise men follow fools ; and arguments are fitted to practice in a reversed order. It was gravely said, by some of the prelates in the Council of Trent, where the doctrine of the schoolmen bare great sway, that the schoolmen were like astronomers, which did feign eccentrics and epicycles, and such engines of orbs, to save the phenomena, though they knew there were no such things ; and, in like manner, that the schoolmen had framed a number of subtile and intricate axioms and theorems, to save the practice of the Church.

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<sup>1</sup> Plut. *De Superstit.* x.

<sup>2</sup> Perturb. *To disturb.* ‘ They are content to suffer the penalties annexed, rather than perturb the public peace.’—*King Charles I.*

<sup>3</sup> Civil. *Orderly ; tranquil ; civilized.*

‘ For rudest minds by harmony were caught,  
And civil life was by the Muses taught.’—*Roscommon.*

<sup>4</sup> *Primum mobile.* See page 141.

The causes of superstition are pleasing and sensual<sup>1</sup> rites and ceremonies; excess of outward and pharisaical holiness; overgreat reverence of traditions, which cannot but load the Church; the stratagems of prelates for their own ambition and lucre; the favouring too much of good intentions, which openeth the gate to conceits and novelties; the taking an aim at divine matters by human, which cannot but breed mixture of imaginations; and, lastly, barbarous times, especially joined with calamities and disasters. Superstition, without a veil, is a deformed thing; for as it addeth deformity to an ape to be so like a man, so the similitude of superstition to religion makes it the more deformed; and as wholesome meat corrupteth to little worms, so good forms and orders corrupt into a number of petty observances. There is a superstition in avoiding superstition, when men think to do best if they go farthest from the superstition formerly received; therefore care would<sup>2</sup> be had that (as it fareth in ill purgings) the good be not taken away with the bad, which commonly is done when the people is the reformer.

#### ANTITHETA ON SUPERSTITION.

##### PRO.

'Qui zelo peccant, non probandi, sed tamen amandi sunt.'

*'Those who go wrong from excess of zeal, cannot indeed be approved, but must nevertheless be loved.'*

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##### CONTRA.

'Ut simiæ, similitudo cum homine, deformitatem addit; ita superstitioni, similitudo cum religione.

*'As an ape is the more hideous for its resemblance to a man, so is superstition from its resemblance to religion.'*

'Præstat nullam habere de diis opinionem, quam contumeliosam.'

*'It is better to have no opinion at all of the gods, than a degrading one.'*

#### ANNOTATIONS.

Some use the word superstition to denote any belief which they hold to be absurd, if those who hold it can give no explanation of it. For example, some fancy that the hair will not grow well if it be cut in the wane of the moon. But such

<sup>1</sup> Sensual. *Affecting the senses.*

<sup>2</sup> Would. *Should.*

a notion, though it may be a groundless fancy, is not to be called, in the strict sense, a superstition, unless it be connected with some sort of religious reverence for some supposed super-human agent. Neither is superstition (as it has been defined by a popular though superficial writer) ‘an excess of religion’ (at least in the ordinary sense of the word *excess*), as if any one *could* have *too much* of true religion: but any *misdirection* of religious feeling; manifested either in showing religious veneration or regard to objects which deserve *none*; that is, properly speaking, the worship of false gods; or, in the assignment of such a degree, or such a kind of religious veneration to any object, as that object, though worthy of some reverence, does not deserve; or in the worship of the true God through the medium of improper rites and ceremonies.

It was the unsparing suppression of both those kinds of superstition which constituted the distinguished and peculiar merit of that upright and zealous prince, Hezekiah. He was not satisfied, like many other kings, with putting down that branch of superstition which involves the breach of the *first* Commandment—the setting up of false gods; but was equally decisive in his reprobation of the other branch also—the worship of the true God by the medium of prohibited emblems, and with unauthorized and superstitious rites. Of these two kinds of superstition, the latter is continually liable, in practice, to slide into the former by such insensible degrees, that it is often hard to decide, in particular cases, *where* the breach of the second Commandment ends, and that of the first begins. The distinction is not, however, for that reason useless; perhaps it is even the more useful on that very account, and was for that reason preserved, in those two Commandments, of which the second serves as a kind of outwork to the first, to guard against all gradual *approaches* to a violation of it—to keep men at a distance from infringing the majesty of ‘the jealous God.’ Minds strongly predisposed to superstition, may be compared to heavy bodies just balanced on the verge of a precipice. The slightest touch will send them over, and then, the greatest exertion that can be made may be insufficient to arrest their fall.

*'The one is unbelief, the other is contumely; and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity.'*

Bacon might have said that both are unbelief; for, he who rashly gives heed to superstitious delusions, errs not from *excess of faith*, but from want of faith; since what is true in his belief, he receives not *because it is true*,—but because it agrees with some prejudice or fancy of his own; and he is right when he *is* right, only by chance. Having violated the spirit of the first Commandment, by regarding what is human with the veneration due to that only which is divine, his worship, even of the true God, becomes an abomination. 'He has set up idols in his heart, and the Lord, the jealous God, will set His face against that man.'

And in reference to the contumely of God, it is a circumstance very remarkable, that, in many instances at least, superstition not only does not promote true religion, but even tends to generate profaneness. In proof of the strange mixture of superstition and profaneness that leads to the jokes and sallies of wit that are frequently heard among the Spanish peasantry, even in respect to the very objects of superstitious reverence, I can cite the testimony of an eminently competent witness. The like strange mixture is found in other Roman Catholic, and also in Pagan countries, particularly among the Hindus, who are described as habitually reviling their gods in the grossest terms, on the occasion of any untoward event. And in our own country nothing is so common a theme of profane jests among the vulgar of all ranks as the Devil; a large proportion of the superstition that exists being connected more or less with the agency of Evil Spirits.

This curious anomaly may perhaps be, in a great measure at least, accounted for, from the consideration, that, as superstition imposes a yoke rather of fear than of love, her votaries are glad to *take revenge*, as it were, when galled by this yoke, and to indemnify themselves in some degree both for the irksomeness of their restraints and tasks, and also for the *degradation* (some sense of which is always excited by a consciousness of slavish dread), by taking liberties *whenever they dare*, either in the way of insult or of playfulness, with the objects of their dread.

But how comes it that they ever do *dare*, as we see is the fact, to take these liberties? This will perhaps be explained by its being a characteristic of superstition to enjoin, and to attribute efficacy to, the mere performance of some specific outward acts,—the use of some material object, without any loyal, affectionate devotion of heart being required to accompany such acts, and to pervade the whole life as a ruling motive. Hence, the rigid observance of the precise directions given, leaves the votary secure, at ease in conscience, and at liberty, as well as in a disposition, to indulge in profaneness. In like manner a patient, who dares not refuse to swallow a nauseous dose, and to confine himself to a strict regimen, yet who is both vexed, and somewhat ashamed, at submitting to the annoyance, will sometimes take his revenge as it were, by abusive ridicule of the medical attendant and his drugs; knowing that this will not, so long as he does but take the medicines, diminish their efficacy. Superstitious observances are a kind of distasteful or disgusting remedy, which, however, is to operate if it be but swallowed, and on which accordingly the votary sometimes ventures gladly to revenge himself. Thus does superstition generate profaneness.

*‘As the contumely is greater towards God, so the danger is greater towards men.’*

It is somewhat strange that it should be necessary to remark on the enormity—the noxious character—of all superstition. The mischiefs of superstition are, I conceive, much underrated. It is by many regarded, not as any sin, but as a mere harmless folly, at the worst;—as, in some instances, an amiable weakness, or even a salutary delusion. Its votaries are pitied, as in some cases subjected to needless and painful restraints, and undergoing groundless terrors;—sometimes they are ridiculed as enslaved to absurd and puerile observances: but whether pitied or laughed at, superstitious Christians are often regarded as likely—at least as not the *less* likely on account of their superstition,—to have secured the essentials of religion:—as believing and practising what is needful towards salvation,

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<sup>1</sup> See Essay ‘On Superstition,’ 3rd Series.

and as only carrying their faith and their practice, unnecessarily and unreasonably, to the point of weak credulity and foolish scrupulosity. This view of the subject has a strong tendency to confirm the superstitious, and even to add to their number. They feel that if there is any doubt, they are surely on the *safe* side. 'Supposing I am in error on this or that point' (a man may say), 'I am merely doing something superfluous; at the worst I suffer some temporary inconvenience, and perhaps have to encounter some ridicule; but if the error be on the other side, I risk my salvation by embracing it; my present course therefore is evidently the safest—I am, after all, on the safe side.'—As if there were any *safe* side but the side of truth; and as if it could be safe to manifest distrust of a skilful physician by *combining* with his medicines all the nostrums of all the ignorant practitioners in the neighbourhood.

'How far the superstition of any individual may be excusable or blameable in the sight of God, can be pronounced by Him alone, who alone is able to estimate each man's strength or weakness, his opportunities of gaining knowledge, and his employment or neglect of those opportunities. But the same may be said of every other offence, as well as of those in question. Of superstition itself, in all its various forms and degrees, I cannot think otherwise than that it is not merely a folly to be ridiculed, but a mischief to be dreaded; and that its tendency is, in most cases, as far as it extends, destructive of true piety.

'The disposition to reverence some superhuman Power, and in some way or other to endeavour to recommend ourselves to the favour of that Power, is (more or less in different individuals) a natural and original sentiment of the human mind. The great enemy of Man finds it easier in most cases to misdirect, than to eradicate this. If an exercise for this religious sentiment can be provided—if this natural craving after divine worship (if I may so speak) can be satisfied—by the practice of superstitious ceremonies, true piety will be much more easily extinguished; the conscience will on this point have been set at rest; God's place in the heart will, as it were, have been pre-occupied by an idol; and that genuine religion which consists in a devotedness of the affections to God, operating on the improvement of the moral character, will be more effectually

another vent, and exhausted themselves on vanities of man's devising.' <sup>1</sup>

Too *religious*, in the proper sense of the word, we cannot be. We cannot have the religious sentiments and principles too strong, or too deeply fixed, if only they have a right object. We cannot *love* God too warmly—or *honour* Him too highly—or strive to *serve* Him too earnestly—or trust Him too implicitly; because our duty is to love Him 'with *all* our heart, and *all* our soul, and *all* our mind, and *all* our strength.'

But too religious, in another sense, we may, and are very apt to be;—that is, we are very apt to make for ourselves too many *objects* of religious feeling.

Now, Almighty God has revealed Himself as the proper object of religion—as the one only Power on whom we are to feel ourselves continually dependent for all things, and the one only Being whose favour we are continually to seek. And, lest we should complain that an Infinite Being is an object too remote and incomprehensible for our minds to dwell upon, He has manifested Himself in his Son, the man Jesus Christ, whose history and character are largely described to us in the Gospels; so that, to love, fear, honour, and serve Jesus Christ, is to love, fear, honour, and serve Almighty God; Jesus Christ being 'one with the Father,' and 'all the fulness of the Godhead' dwelling in Him.

But as long as our characters are not *like* God's, and we are unwilling to have them *made* like his, we are naturally averse to being brought thus into immediate contact with Him; and we shrink from holding (as it were) direct converse, or 'walking with' God,—from making Him the object towards which our thoughts and affections directly turn, and the person to whom we come straight in our prayers, and in whose control and presence we feel ourselves at all times. Hence, men wish to put between themselves and God some other less perfect Beings, with whom they can be more familiar, and who (they hope) will 'let them off' more easily, when they sin, than He would.

Now, indulging this disposition is not merely *adding* to true

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<sup>1</sup> *Errors of Romanism*, 3rd edition, Essay I. § 3, pp. 34-37.



their consciences—their mediators, and substitutes in the service of God, and their despotic spiritual rulers.

‘There is undoubtedly much truth in such a representation ; but it leaves on the mind an erroneous impression, because it is (at the utmost) only *half* the truth.

‘If, indeed, in any country, priests had been Beings of a different species—or a distinct caste, as in some of the Pagan nations where the priesthood is hereditary ;—if this race had been distinguished from the people by intellectual superiority and moral depravity, and if the people had been sincerely desirous of knowing, and serving, and obeying God for themselves, but had been persuaded by these demons in human form that this was impossible, and that the laity must trust *them* to perform what was requisite, in their stead, and submit implicitly to their guidance,—then, indeed, there would be ground for regarding priestcraft as altogether the work of the priests, and in no degree of the people. But we should remember, that in every age and country (even where they were, as the Romish priests were not, a distinct caste), priests must have been mere men, of like passions with their brethren ; and though sometimes they might have, on the whole, a considerable intellectual superiority, yet it must always have been impossible to delude men into the reception of such gross absurdities, if they had not found in them a readiness—nay, a craving—for delusion. The reply which is recorded of a Romish priest, is, (not in the sight of God indeed, but) as far as regards any complaint on the part of the laity, a satisfactory defence ; when taxed with some of the monstrous impostures of his Church, his answer was, ‘The people wish to be deceived ; and let them be deceived.’<sup>1</sup> Such, indeed, was the case of Aaron, and similar the defence he offered, for making the Israelites an image, at their desire. Let it not be forgotten, that the *first recorded* instance of departure from purity of worship, as established by the revelation to the Israelites, was forced on the *priest* by the *people*.

‘The truth is, mankind have an innate propensity, as to other errors, so, to that of endeavouring to serve God by proxy ; —to commit to some distinct Order of men the care of their religious concerns, in the same manner as they confide the care

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<sup>1</sup> ‘Populus vult decipi, et decipitur.’

of their bodily health to the physician, and of their transactions to the lawyer; deeming it sufficient to implicitly their directions, without attempting themselves become acquainted with the *mysteries* of medicine or of Law. For, Man, except when unusually depraved, retains enough the image of his Maker, to have a natural reverence for Religion, and a desire that God should be worshipped; but, through the corruption of his nature, his heart is (except when divinely purified) too much alienated from God to take delight in serving Him. Hence the disposition men have ever shown to substitute the devotion of the priest for their own; to leave the duties of piety in his hands, and to let him serve God *in stead*. This disposition is not so much the *consequence* itself the origin of priestcraft. The Romish hierarchy did not take advantage from time to time of this natural propensity, ingrafting successively on its system such practices and portions of doctrine as favoured it, and which were naturally converted into a source of profit and influence to the priesthood. Hence sprung—among other instances of what Bacon calls ‘the strange gems of prelates for their own ambition and lucre,’—the gradual transformation of the christian minister—the Presbyter—the sacrificing priest, the Hiericus (in Latin, ‘sacerdos,’ as the Romanists call theirs) of the Jewish and Pagan religion. Hence sprung the doctrine of the necessity of Confession to a priest, and of the efficacy of the Penance he enjoins, and of Absolution he bestows. These corruptions crept in one by one, originating for the most part with an ignorant and depraved *people*, but connived at, cherished, consecrated, and successively established, by a debased and worldly-minded Ministry; and modified by them just so far as might best favour the views of their secular ambition. The system thus gradually compacted was not—like Mahometism—the deliberate contrivance of a designing impostor. Mahomet did indeed most artfully accommodate his system to Man’s nature, but did not wait for the gradual and spontaneous operations of human nature to produce it. He reared at once the standard of proselytism, and imposed on his followers a code of doctrines and laws ready framed for their reception. The tree which he planted did indeed find a congenial soil; but he planted it at once with its trunk full formed and its branches displayed. The Romish

system, on the contrary, rose insensibly, like a young plant from the seed, making a progress scarcely perceptible from year to year, till at length it had fixed its roots deeply in the soil, and spread its baneful shade far around.

‘ Infecunda quidem, sed læta et fortia surgunt,  
Quippe solo *natura* subest ;’

it was the natural offspring of man’s frail and corrupt character, and it needed no sedulous culture. It had its source in human passions, not checked and regulated by those who ought to have been ministers of the Gospel, but who, on the contrary, were ever ready to indulge and encourage men’s weakness and wickedness, provided they could turn it to their own advantage. The good seed ‘fell among thorns;’ which, being fostered by those who should have been occupied in rooting them out, not only ‘sprang up with it,’ but finally choked and overpowered it.

‘ *In all superstition wise men follow fools ; and arguments are fitted to practice in a reverse order.*’

‘ It is a mistake, and a very common, and practically not unimportant one, to conclude that the *origin* of each tenet or practice is to be found in those arguments or texts which are urged in support of it ;—that they furnish the cause, on the removal of which the effects will cease of course; and that when once those reasonings are exploded, and those texts rightly explained, all danger is at an end, of falling into similar errors.

‘ The fact is, that in a great number of instances, and by no means exclusively in questions connected with religion, the erroneous belief or practice has arisen first, and the theory has been devised afterwards for its support. Into whatever opinions or conduct men are led by any human propensities, they seek to defend and justify these by the best arguments they can frame: and then, assigning (as they often do in perfect sincerity) these arguments as the *cause* of their adopting such notions, they misdirect the course of our inquiry ; and thus the chance (however small it may be at any rate) of rectifying their errors is diminished. For if these be in reality traceable to some deep-seated principle of our nature, as soon as ever one false foundation on which they have been placed is removed, another will be substituted ; as soon as one theory is proved untenable,

can fail to perceive how opposite this is to true piety. It forms not only supersede piety by standing in its place, gradually alter the habits of the mind, and render it unfit for the exercise of genuine pious sentiment. Even the natural food of religion (if I may so speak) is thus converted into poison. Our very prayers, for example, and our perusal of holy Scriptures, become superstitious, in proportion as any one expects them to operate as a charm—attributing efficacy to mere words, while his feelings and thoughts are not occupied with what he is doing.<sup>1</sup>

‘Every religious ceremony or exercise, however well calculated, in itself, to improve the heart, is liable, as I have thus shown, to degenerate into a mere form, and consequently become superstitious: but in proportion as the outward observances are the more complex and operose, and the more meaningless or unintelligible, the more danger is there of superstitiously attaching a sort of magical efficacy to the bare outward act, independent of mental devotion. If, for example, even prayers are liable, without constant watchfulness, to become superstitious form, by our ‘honouring God with our lips, while our heart is far from Him,’ this result is almost unavoidable when the prayers are recited in an unknown tongue, and with a prescribed number of ‘vain repetitions,’ crossings, and telling of beads. And men of a timorous mind, having once taken a wrong notion of what religion consists in, seek a refuge from doubt and anxiety, a substitute for inward piety, and, too often, a compensation for an evil life, in an endless multiplication of superstitious observances;—of pilgrimages, sprinklings with holy water, veneration of relics, and the like. And hence the enormous accumulation of superstitions, which, in the course of many centuries, gradually arose in the Romish and Greek Churches.’

But were there no such thing in existence as a corrupt church, we are not to suppose that we are safe from superstition. There are a great many things which *cannot* be compensated, that, though not superstitious in themselves, may be abused into occasions of superstition. Such are the sacraments, prayer, public and private; instructions from the ministers

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<sup>1</sup> See *Essays*, (2nd series,) Essay X. ‘On Self-denial.’

Roman Catholic, *what* are so received. If a man when 'Such is the tradition of the Church,' should ask, 'how did learn that?' it will be found, by pushing such inquiries, the priest learnt it from a book, which *reports* that somet has been *reported* by one of the ancient fathers as having *reported* to him as believed by those who had heard it *report* that the Apostles taught it. So that, to found faith on an appeal to such tradition, is to base it on the *report of a report a report of a report*. And, therefore, the discussions one sometimes meets with, as to the 'credibility of traditions' generally are as idle as Hume's respecting the credit due to *testimony*. One might as well inquire, 'What degree of regard should be paid to books?' As common sense would dictate in reply, 'What book?' as also 'Whose testimony?—*what* tradition?' As each particular testimony, and each particular book, just as it is, should each alleged tradition be examined on its own merits.

'Tradition is not the *interpreter of Scripture*, but Scripture is the interpreter of tradition. It is foolish to say that tradition is to be held to, rather than Scripture, *because* tradition was before Scripture; since the Scriptures (that is, written records) were used on purpose, after traditions had been tried, to guard against the uncertainties of mere tradition. Scripture is the test; and yet many defend oral tradition on the ground that we have the Scriptures themselves by tradition. Would they think that, because they could trust most servants to deliver a letter, however long or important, therefore they could trust them to deliver its contents in a message by word of mouth? Take a familiar case. A footman brings you a letter from a friend, upon whose word you can perfectly rely, giving an account of something that has happened to himself, and the exact account of which you are greatly concerned to know. While you are reading and answering the letter, the footman goes into the kitchen, and there gives your cook an account of the same thing; which, he says, he overheard the upper servant at home talking over, as related to them by the valet, who said he had it from your friend's son's own lips. The cook relates the story to your groom, and he, in turn, tells you. Would you judge of that *story* by the letter, or the *letter* by the story?'

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<sup>1</sup> *Cautions for the Times*, 1st edition, No. XI. pp. 20, 21.

Well might Bacon speak of the 'over-loading' by tradition, for it does over-load, whether—according to the pretended distinction—it be made co-ordinate with, or subordinate to, Scripture. To make these countless traditions the substitute for Scripture by offering them to the people as proofs of doctrine, is something like offering to pay a large bill of exchange in farthings, which, you know, it would be intolerably troublesome to count or carry. And tradition when made subordinate to, and dependent on, Scripture, is made so much in the same way that some parasite plants are dependent on the trees that support them. The parasite at first clings to, and rests on, the tree, which it gradually overspreads with its own foliage, till by little and little, it weakens and completely smothers it.

‘Miraturque novas frondes, et non sua poma.’

But, with regard to this distinction attempted to be set up between co-ordinate and subordinate tradition, it is to be observed, that, ‘if any human comment or interpretation is to be received implicitly and without appeal, it is placed practically, as far as relates to everything except a mere question of *dignity*, on a level with Scripture. Among the Parliamentarians at the time of the Civil War, there were many—at first a great majority—who professed to obey the King’s commands, *as notified to them by Parliament*, and levied forces in the King’s name, against his person. If any one admitted Parliament to be the sole and authoritative interpreter and expounder of the regal commands, and this without any check from any other power, it is plain that he virtually admitted the sovereignty of that Parliament, just as much as if he had recognized their formal deposition of the King.’<sup>1</sup>

‘*The taking aim at divine matters by human.*’

The desire of prying into mysteries relative to the invisible world, but which have no connexion with practice, is a characteristic of human nature, and to it may be traced the immense mass of presumptuous speculations about things unrevealed, respecting God and his designs, and his decrees, ‘secret to us,’<sup>2</sup> as well as all the idle legends of various kinds respecting wonder-

<sup>1</sup> *Kingdom of Christ*, 4th edition, Essay II. § 26, p. 216.

<sup>2</sup> See 17th Article.

working saints, &c. The sanction afforded to these by people who did not themselves believe them, sprang from a dishonest pursuit of the expedient rather than the true; but it is probable that the far greater part of such idle tales had not their origin in any deep and politic contrivance, but in men's natural passion for what is marvellous, and readiness to cater for that passion each other;—in the universal fondness of the human mind for speculative knowledge respecting things curious and the hidden, rather than (what alone the Scriptures supply) practical knowledge respecting things which have a reference to our welfare. It was thus the simplicity of the Gospel was corrupted by 'the nature of imaginations.' When the illumination from Heaven—the rays of revelation—failed to shed the full light men desired, they brought to the dial-plate the lamp of human philosophy.

*'Men think to do best if they go furthest from the superstitions formerly received; therefore care would be had that the good should be not taken away with the bad.'*

There is a natural tendency to 'mistake reverse of right for wrong.' It is not enough, therefore, to act upon the traditional familiar rule of guarding especially against the error which occurs on each occasion, or in each place, you find men especially liable to; but you must remember, at the same time, this other caution, not less important and far more likely to be overlooked, to guard against a tendency to a *reaction*—against the proneness to rush from one extreme into the opposite.

One cause of this is, that a painful and odious association sometimes formed in men's minds with anything at all connected with that from which they have suffered much; and thus they are led to reject the good and the evil together. This is figured in the *Tale of a Tub*, by Jack's eagerness to be 'as unlike the rogue Peter as possible;' and he accordingly tears off the top of his coat, and flings it away, because it had been overlaid with lace.

'Since almost every erroneous system contains truth blended with falsehood, hence its tendency usually is, first, to recommend the falsehood on account of the truth combined with it; and afterwards, to bring the truth into contempt or odium on account of the intermixture of falsehood.'

those capable of learning from other experience than their own, than in what relates to the history of *reactions*.

‘It has been often remarked by geographers that a river flowing through a level country of soft alluvial soil, never keeps a straight course, but winds regularly to and fro, in the form of the letter S many times repeated. And a geographer, on looking at the course of any stream as marked on a map, can at once tell whether it flows along a plain (like the river *Meander*, which has given its name to such windings) or through a rocky and hilly country. It is found, indeed, that if a straight channel be cut for any stream in a plain consisting of tolerably soft soil, it never will long continue straight, unless artificially kept so, but becomes crooked, and increases its windings more and more every year. The cause is, that any little wearing away of the bank in the softest part of the soil, on one side, occasions a *set* of the stream against this hollow, which increases it, and at the same time drives the water aslant against the opposite bank a little lower down. This wears away that bank also; and thus the stream is again driven against a part of the first bank, still lower; and so on, till by the wearing away of the banks at these points on each side, and the deposit of mud (gradually becoming dry land) in the comparatively still water between them, the course of the stream becomes sinuous, and its windings increase more and more.

‘And even thus, in human affairs, we find alternate movements, in nearly opposite directions, taking place from time to time, and generally bearing some proportion to each other in respect of the violence of each; even as the highest flood-tide is succeeded by the lowest ebb.

‘We find—in the case of political affairs,—that the most servile submission to privileged classes, and the grossest abuses of power by these, have been the precursors of the wildest ebullitions of popular fury,—of the overthrow indiscriminately of ancient institutions, good and bad,—and of the most turbulent democracy; generally proportioned, in its extravagance and violence, to the degree of previous oppression and previous degradation. And again, we find that whenever men have become heartily wearied of licentious anarchy, their eagerness has been proportionably great to embrace the opposite extreme



of rigorous despotism ; like shipwrecked mariners clinging bare and rugged rock as a refuge from the waves.

‘And when we look to the history of *religious* change prospect is similar. The formalism, the superstition, and priestcraft which prevailed for so many ages throughout tendom, led, in many instances, by a natural reaction, to wildest irregularities of fanaticism or profaneness. We antinomian licentiousness, in some instances, the success the pretended merit of what were called ‘good works’ others, the rejection altogether of the christian Sacraments succeeding the superstitious abuse of them ; the legitimate claims of every visible Church utterly disowned by the descendants of those who had groaned under a spiritual tyranny ; pretensions to individual personal inspiration set up by those who had revolted from that tyranny ; and in short, every variety of extravagance that was most contrasted with the excesses and abuses that had before prevailed.’

Such are the lessons which Reason and wide Experience would teach to those who ‘have ears to hear,’ and which the wisest men in various ages have laboured, and generally laboured in vain, to inculcate. For all Reason, all Experience, and authority of all the wise, are too often powerless when opposed to excited party-spirit.<sup>1</sup>

We cannot, then, be too much on our guard against rash actions, lest we rush from one fault into another contrary fault. We should remember also that all admixture of truth and error has a double danger : some admit both together ; others reject both. And hence, nothing is harmless that is mistaken either for a truth or for a virtue.

In no point, we may be assured, is our spiritual enemy more vigilant. He is ever ready not merely to tempt us with the unmingled poison of known sin, but to corrupt even our food and to taint even our medicine, with the venom of his falsehood. For, religion is the medicine of the soul ; it is the signed and appropriate preventive and remedy for the evils of human nature. The subtle Tempter well knows that no other allurement to sin would be of much avail, if this medicine were

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<sup>1</sup> See *Cautions for the Times*, No. XIX.

## ESSAY XVIII. OF TRAVEL.

TRAVEL, in the younger sort, is a part of education ; elder, a part of experience. He that travelleth into a country before he hath some entrance into the language, goeth to see and not to travel. That young men travel under some tutor or grave servant, I allow<sup>1</sup> well ; so that he be such a one who hath the language, and hath been in the country before whereby he may be able to tell them what things are worth to be seen in the country where they go, what acquaintance they are to seek, what exercises or discipline the place yields for else young men shall go hooded, and look abroad. It is a strange thing that, in sea voyages, where there is nothing to be seen but sky and sea, men should make diaries ; but in land-travel, wherein so much is to be observed, for the most part they omit it—as if chance were fitter to be registered than observation : let diaries, therefore, be brought in use. The things to be seen and observed are the courts of princes, especially when they give audience to ambassadors ; the courts of justice, while they sit and hear causes ; and so of consistories ecclesiastic ; the churches and monasteries, with the monuments which are therein extant ; the walls and fortifications of cities and towns ; and so the havens and harbours, antiquities and ruins, libraries, colleges, disputations and lectures, where they are ; shipping and navies ; houses and gardens of state and pleasure near great cities ; armories, arsenals, magazines, changes, burses,<sup>2</sup> warehouses, exercises of horsemanship, fencing, training of soldiers, and the like ; comedies, such where the better sort of persons do resort ; treasuries of jewels and robes ; cabinets and rarities ; and, to conclude, whatsoever is memorable in the places where they go—after all which the tutors or servants ought to make diligent inquiry. A

<sup>1</sup> Allow. *Approve*. 'The Lord *alloweth* the righteous.'—*Psalms*.

<sup>2</sup> Burse. *Exchange* ; *bourse*. (So called from the sign of a purse anciently set over the places where merchants met.) 'Fraternities and companies I approve of, such as merchants' *burses*.'—*Burton*.

triumphs, masks, feasts, weddings, funerals, capital executions, and such shows, men need not be put in mind of them; yet they are not to be neglected. If you will have a young man to put his travel into a little room, and in short time to gather much, this you must do: first, as was said, he must have some entrance into the language before he goeth; then he must have such a servant, or tutor, as knoweth the country, as was likewise said; let him carry with him also some card, or book, describing the country where he travelleth, which will be a good key to his inquiry; let him keep also a diary; let him not stay long in one city or town, more or less as the place deserveth, but not long; nay, when he stayeth in one city or town, let him change his lodging from one end and part of the town to another, which is a great adamant<sup>2</sup> of acquaintance; let him sequester himself from the company of his countrymen, and diet in such places where there is good company of the nation where he travelleth; let him, upon his removes from one place to another, procure recommendation to some person of quality residing in the place whither he removeth, that he may use his favour in those things he desireth to see or know; thus he may abridge his travel with much profit.

As for the acquaintance which is to be sought in travel, that which is most of all profitable, is, acquaintance with the secretaries, and employed men of ambassadors; for so in travelling in one country he shall suck the experience of many. Let him also see and visit eminent persons in all kinds, which are of great name abroad, that he may be able to tell how the life agreeth with the fame. For quarrels, they are with care and discretion to be avoided—they are commonly for mistresses, healths, place, and words: and let a man beware how he keepeth company with cholerick and quarrelsome persons; for they will engage him into<sup>3</sup> their own quarrels. When a traveller returneth home, let him not leave the countries where he hath travelled altogether behind him, but maintain a corre-

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<sup>1</sup> Triumphs. *Public shows of any kind.*

*'Hold those justs and triumphs.'*—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>2</sup> Adamant. *For loadstone.*

*'You drew me, you hard-hearted adamant.'*—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>3</sup> Into. *Id.* *'How much more may education induce by custom good habits into a reasonable creature.'*—*Locke.*

conviction that they were, and ever must be, quite unworthy of notice ; and having, of course, left Italy with the same opinion on that point, with which he entered it ; knowing as much of its inhabitants as of those in the interior of Africa ; only, with the difference that, concerning the latter, he was *aware* of his own ignorance, and had formed *no* opinion at all.

And travellers who do seek for knowledge on any point, are to be warned against hasty induction and rash generalization, and consequent presumptuous conclusions. For instance, a lady who had passed six weeks in Jamaica, in the house of a friend, whom she described as eminently benevolent, and *remarkably* kind to his slaves, spoke with scorn of any one who had not *been* in the West Indies, and who doubted whether slaves were always well treated. And Goldsmith, who had travelled on the Continent, decided that the higher classes were better off in republics, but the lower classes in absolute monarchies. Had he lived a few years longer he might have seen the French populace, goaded to madness by their intense misery under the monarchy, rushing into that awful Revolution.

During the short reign of Louis the Eighteenth, at his first restoration, a letter was received (by a person who afterwards regretted not having kept it as a curious document) from the nephew of one of our then ministers, saying that all the travellers from France with whom he had conversed agreed in the conviction that the Bourbon Government was firmly fixed, and was daily gaining strength. The letter was dated on the very day that Buonaparte was sailing from Elba ! and in a few days after, the Bourbons were expelled without a struggle. Those travellers must surely have belonged to the class of the one-eyed.

It often happens that a man seeks, and obtains, much intercourse with the people of the country in which he travels, but falls in with only *one particular set*, whom he takes for representatives of the whole nation. Accordingly, to Bacon's admonition about procuring letters of introduction, we should add a caution as to the point of '*from whom ?*' or else the traveller may be *consigned*, as it were, to persons of some particular party, who will *forward* him to others, of their own party, in the next city, and so on through the chief part of Europe. And two persons who may have been thus treated, by those of

opposite parties, may perhaps return from corresponding with as opposite impressions of the people of the country they have visited, as the knights of the fable, of whom one has seen only the silver side of the shield, and the other only the golden. Both will perhaps record quite faithfully all they have seen and heard; and one will have reported a certain nation full of misery and complaint, and ripe for revolt, while the other has found them prosperous, sanguine, and enthusiastically loyal.

In the days when travelling by post-chaise was common, there were usually certain *lines* of inns on all the principal roads; a series of good, and a series of inferior ones, each in connexion all the way along; so that if you once get into a worse line, you could not easily get out of it to the journey's end. The 'White Hart' of one town would *drive* you—a literally—to the 'White Lion' of the next; and so on, all the way; so that of two travellers by post from London to Exeter or York, the one would have had nothing but bad horses, bad dinners, and bad beds, and the other, very good. This is analogous to what befalls a traveller in any new country, with respect to the impressions he receives, if he falls into the hands of a bad party. They *consign* him, as it were, to those allied with him, and pass him on, from one to another, all in the same connexion, each showing him and telling him, just what suits the party, and concealing from him everything else.

This is nowhere more the case than in Ireland; from a country in which two travellers will sometimes return, each faithfully reporting what he has seen and heard, and having been perhaps nothing *more* than the truth on any point, but only one side of the truth; and the impressions received will be perfectly opposite. The Irish jaunting-car, in which the passengers sit back to back, is a sort of type of what befalls many travellers in Ireland. Each sees a great deal, and reports faithfully what he has seen, one on one side of the road, and the other on the other. One will have seen all that is *green*, and the other all that is *orange*.

It often, indeed, happens that men place themselves willingly and wilfully in the hands of a party. But sometimes they are, from one cause or another, deluded into it, when they have no such thought. This sometimes takes place th

Francis I., king of France, and Charles V., emperor, th  
 such a watch kept that none of the three could win a p  
 ground, but the other two would straightways<sup>2</sup> balance it  
 by confederation, or, if need were, by a war, and would  
 any wise take up peace at interest; and the like was d  
 that league (which Guicciardine saith was the security of  
 made between Ferdinando, king of Naples, Lorenzious M  
 and Ludovicus Sforza, potentates, the one of Florence, th  
 of Milan. Neither is the opinion of some of the school  
 be received, that a war cannot justly be made, but upon  
 cedent<sup>3</sup> injury or provocation; for there is no question  
 just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no  
 given, is a lawful cause of war.

For their wives, there are cruel examples of them. .  
 is infamed<sup>4</sup> for the poisoning of her husband; Roxolana,  
 man's wife, was the destruction of that renowned prince, S  
 Mustapha, and otherwise troubled his house and succes  
 Edward II. of England's queen had the principal hand i  
 deposing and murder of her husband. This kind of dang  
 then to be feared chiefly when the wives have plots for the  
 ing of their own children, or else that they be advoutresse

For their children, the tragedies likewise of dangers  
 them have been many; and generally the entering of  
 fathers into suspicion of their children hath been ever u  
 tunate. The destruction of Mustapha (that we named be  
 was so fatal to Solyman's line, as the succession of the T  
 from Solyman until this day is suspected to be untrue, a  
 strange blood, for that Selymus II. was thought to be su

<sup>1</sup> Palm. *Hand's breadth*. 'The *palm*, or hand's breadth, is a twenty  
 part of the stature.'—Holder.

<sup>2</sup> Straightways. *Immediately*.

'Like to a ship that having 'scap'd a tempest,  
 Is *straightway* claim'd and boarded with a pirate.'—Shakespeare.

<sup>3</sup> Precedent. *Preceding*.

'Do it at once,  
 Or thy *precedent* services are all  
 But accidents unpurposed.'—Shakespeare.

<sup>4</sup> Infamed. *Infamous*. 'Whosoever for any offence be *infamed*, by the  
 hang rings of gold.'—Sir T. More.

<sup>5</sup> Advoutress. *Adulteress*. (So called from breach of the marriage-vow.

'In *advoury*  
 God's commandments break.'—Song, 1550.

being the most immediate in authority with the common they do best temper popular commotions.

For their merchants, they are *vena porta*,<sup>1</sup> and if they be not, a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty and nourish little. Taxes and imposts upon them do good to the king's revenue, for that which he wins in the hundred<sup>2</sup> he loseth in the shire: the particular rates being increased but the total bulk of trading rather decreased.

For their commons, there is little danger from them, it be where they have great and potent heads, or when they meddle with the point of religion, or their customs, or of life.

For their men of war, it is a dangerous state where they stand and remain in a Body, and are used to donatives, where they see examples in the janizaries, and pretorian bands of Rome but trainings of men, and arming them, in several places under several commanders, and without donatives, are their defence, and no danger.

Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or times, and which have much veneration, but no rest. All precepts concerning kings are in effect comprehended in those remembrances:<sup>3</sup> 'Memento quod es homo,' and 'Memento es Deus,' or 'vice Dei'—the one bridled their power, and the other their will.

#### ANTITHETA ON EMPIRE.

##### PRO.

'Felicitate frui, magnum bonum est ;  
sed eam et aliis impertiri posse, adhuc  
majus.

'To enjoy happiness is a great good ;  
but to be able to confer it also on others  
is a greater still.'

##### CONTRA.

'Quam miserum, habere nil  
quod appetas ; infinita, quæ metu

'How wretched is he who has  
anything to hope, and many things  
to fear.'

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<sup>1</sup> 'The great vein of the body.'

<sup>2</sup> Hundred. *A division of a county.* 'Lands taken from the enemy divided into centuries or hundreds, and distributed amongst the soldiers.' *Arbuthnot.*

<sup>3</sup> 'Remember that thou art man,' and 'Remember that thou art God—or vice-gerent.'

election, would have been in a minority, though a very minority.

There have been in the United States several elections for President, in which the candidates were so nearly equal, that no one can doubt that if the Americans had had the constitution as ours, the Sovereign might have fixed on one as Premier. Now, this is undoubtedly a matter of great importance; and whether it be thought a good or an evil that our Sovereign should have such a power, that he does possess and that it is no trifle, is evident.

If, therefore, our Sovereign is to be accounted a *cypher*, he must be, not in the sense in which that metaphor is ordinarily applied, but in a stricter sense. A cypher,—a mere round number—stands for nothing by *itself*; but adds tenfold to what figures are placed before it. And even so, our Sovereign, standing alone, and at variance in his political views with his subjects, or nearly all of them, is powerless; but as a mouth-piece of this or of that person, party, or measure, that may be favoured by a considerable portion of his subjects, he may have the preponderance to either. 5 is less than 6; but 50, with a cypher added, is more.

And after all, the same kind of check (in a minor degree and in a less convenient form) on the power of the Sovereign must exist even under a despotism. No despot can govern completely against the will of nearly all those of his subjects—whether the People or the Army—who possess physical force. A Dey in Barbary must have some—and that not inconsiderable in number—to execute his commands. He may, however, go on misgoverning longer than a constitutionally elected king could do; and the check comes at last, not in the shape of a remonstrance, on which he might amend, but of a revolution, a string or a dagger.

On the whole, the degree, and the kind of regal power, and of check to that power, existing under our constitution, what the most judicious will perceive to be the best adapted to give steadiness to an administration, and to moderate the violence of political agitations in the most effectual way that is consistent with the liberty we enjoy. 'We combine the advantages of different forms by having a king holding the office



Be taught in time, that moderation  
Will best secure your lofty station.  
Who soars unchecked may find too late  
A sudden downfall is his fate.'

'There are many persons now living who can remember time when almost all the countries of Europe, except ours, were under absolute governments. Since then, most of our countries have passed through, at least, one or two, and some of them six or seven, violent and bloody revolutions; and some of them, even yet, have settled under a constitution which the people of those States themselves would think better than ours, if as good.'<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This passage is from *Lessons on the British Constitution*, L. ii. §

## ESSAY XX. OF COUNSEL.

THE greatest trust between man and man, is the trust of giving counsel; for in other confidences men commit the parts of life, their lands, their goods, their children, their credit, some particular affair; but to such as they make their counsellors they commit the whole—by how much the more they are obliged to all faith and integrity. The wisest princes need not think it any diminution to their greatness, or derogation to their sufficiency, to rely upon counsel. God himself is not without, but hath made it one of the great names of the blessed Son, the ‘Counsellor.’<sup>1</sup> Solomon hath pronounced that ‘in counsel is stability.’<sup>2</sup> Things will have their first or second agitation; if they be not tossed upon the arguments of counsel, they will be tossed upon the waves of fortune, and be full of inconstancy, doing and undoing, like the reeling of a drunken man. Solomon’s son found the force of counsel, as his father saw the necessity of it: for the beloved kingdom of God was first rent and broken by ill counsel—upon which counsel there are set for our instruction the two marks whereby bad counsel is for ever best discerned, that it was young counsel, for the persons, and violent counsel, for the matter.

The ancient times do set forth in figure both the incorporation and inseparable conjunction of counsel with Kings, and the wise and politic use of counsel by Kings; the one, in that they say Jupiter did marry Metis, which signifieth counsel, whereby they intend that sovereignty is married to counsel; the other in that which followeth, which was thus:—they say, after Jupiter was married to Metis, she conceived by him and was with child, but Jupiter suffered her not to stay till she brought forth, but ate her up, whereby he became himself with child, and was delivered of Pallas armed out of his head.<sup>3</sup> Which monstrous fable containeth a secret of empire how kings are to make use of their counsel of state—that first, they ought to refer matters unto them, which is the first begetting or impregnation: but when they are elaborate, moulded, and shaped in the womb of

<sup>1</sup> *Isaiah* ix. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Prov.* xx. 18.

<sup>3</sup> *Hesiod. Theog.* 886.

their council, and grow ripe and ready to be brought for then they suffer not their council to go through with th lution<sup>1</sup> and direction, as if it depended on them, but t matter back into their own hands, and make it appear world, that the decrees and final directions (which, becau come forth with prudence and power, are resembled to armed) proceeded from themselves, and not only from authority, but (the more to add reputation to themselves their head and device.

Let us now speak of the inconveniences of counsel of the remedies. The inconveniences that have been in calling and using counsel, are three:—first, the rev of affairs, whereby they become less secret; secondly weakening of the authority of princes, as if they wen of themselves; thirdly, the danger of being unfaithfully sold, and more for the good of them that counsel, of him that is counselled—for which inconveniences, the trine of Italy, and practice of France, in some kings' t hath introduced cabinet councils—a remedy worse than disease.

As to secrecy, princes are not bound to communicate matters with all counsellors, but may extract and sele neither is it necessary, that he that consulteth what he sh do, should declare what he will do; but let princes beware the unsecreting<sup>2</sup> of their affairs comes not from themse and as for cabinet councils, it may be their motto, 'Pl rimarum sum.'<sup>3</sup> One futile<sup>4</sup> person, that maketh it his to tell, will do more hurt than many that know it their du conceal. It is true there be some affairs which require ext secrecy, which will hardly go beyond one or two persons be the king—neither are those counsels unprosperous,—for

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<sup>1</sup> Resolution. *Final decision.*

'I' the progress of this business,  
Ere a determinate *resolution*,  
The bishops did require a respite.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>2</sup> Unsecreting. *The disclosing; the divulging.* Shakespeare has the ad  
'unsecret:'

'Why have I blabbéd? Who should be true to us  
When we are so *unsecret* to ourselves?'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>3</sup> 'Full of chinks am I.'—*Ter. Eun.* l. 11, 25.

<sup>4</sup> Futile. *Talkative.* See page 73.

and, in consort,<sup>1</sup> men are more obnoxious to others' h  
therefore it is good to take both—and of the inferi  
rather in private to preserve freedom,—of the greater, m  
consort to preserve respect. It is in vain for princes  
counsel concerning matters, if they take no counsel l  
concerning persons—for all matters are as dead images, l  
life of the execution of affairs resteth in the good ch  
persons; neither is it enough to consult concerning p  
'secundum genera'<sup>2</sup> as in an idea of mathematical desc  
what the kind and character of the person should be; i  
greatest errors are committed, and the most judgment is  
in the choice of individuals. It was truly said, 'Optim  
siliarii mortui'<sup>3</sup>—Books will speak plain when coun  
blanch,' therefore it is good to be conversant in them, sp  
the books of such as themselves have been the actors up  
stage.

The councils at this day in most places are but fa  
meetings, where matters are rather talked on than det  
and they run too swift to the order or act of council. It  
better that, in causes of weight, the matter were propos  
one day, and not spoken to till next day, 'in nocte consili  
so was it done in the commission of union between Eng  
and Scotland, which was a grave and orderly assembly  
commend set days for petitions; for both it gives the su  
more certainty for their attendance, and it frees the mee  
for matters of estate,<sup>4</sup> that they may 'hoc agere.'<sup>5</sup> In c  
of committees for ripening business for the council, it is l  
to chuse indifferent<sup>7</sup> persons, than to make an indifferenc  
putting in those that are strong on both sides. I com  
also standing commissions; as for trade, for treasure, for

<sup>1</sup> Consort. *Assembly; council.*

'In one consort there sat,  
Cruel Revenge, and rancorous Despite,  
Disloyal Treason, and heart-burning Hate.'—*Spenser.*

<sup>2</sup> 'According to their kinds.'

<sup>3</sup> 'The dead are the best counsell

<sup>4</sup> 'In night is counsel.'

<sup>5</sup> Matters of estate. *Public affairs.* 'I hear her talk of matters of  
and the Senate.'—*Ben Jonson.*

<sup>6</sup> 'Do this one thing.'

<sup>7</sup> Indifferent. *Neutral; not inclined to one side more than another.*

'Cato knows neither of them,  
*Indifferent* in his choice to sleep or die.'—*Addison.*

of history would regard as wholly or chiefly the work of men fully sensible of the advantages of a government so mixed and balanced. It was in great measure the result of the efforts, partially neutralizing each other, of men who leaned, more or less, some of them towards pure Monarchy, and others towards Republicanism. And again, though no one can doubt how great an advance (it is as yet only an *advance*) of the principle of religious *toleration*, and of making a final appeal to *Scripture alone*, is due to the Reformation, yet the Reformers were slow in embracing these principles. They were at first nearly as much disposed as their opponents to force their own interpretations of Scripture on every one, and to call in the magistrate to suppress heresy by force. But not being able to agree among themselves *whose* interpretation of Scripture should be received as authoritative, and *who* should be entrusted with the sword that was to extirpate heresy, compromises and mutual concessions gradually led more and more to the *practical* adoption of principles whose theoretical truth and justice is, even yet, not universally perceived.

‘And similar instances may be found in every part of history. Without entering into a detailed examination of the particular mode in which, on each occasion, a superior party is influenced by those opposed to them—either from reluctance to drive them to desperation, or otherwise,—certain it is, that, looking only to the results,—the practical working of any government,—in the long run, and in the general course of measures,—we do find something corresponding to the composition of forces in Mechanics; and we find, oftener than not, that the course actually pursued is better (however faulty) than could have been calculated from the character of the greater part of those who administer the government. The wisest and most moderate, even when they form but a small minority, are often enabled amidst the conflict of those in opposite extremes, to bring about decisions, less wise and just indeed than they themselves would have desired, but far better than those of either of the extreme parties.

‘Of course we are not to expect the same exact uniformity of effects in human affairs as in Mechanics. It is not meant that each decision of every Assembly or Body of men will necessarily be the precise ‘resultant’ (as it is called in Natural Philosophy)

## ESSAY XXI. OF DELAYS.

**F**ORTUNE is like the market, where, many times, if you stay a little, the price will fall; and again, it is soon like Sibylla's<sup>1</sup> offer, which at first offereth the commodity full, then consumeth part and part, and still holdeth price; for occasion (as it is in the common verse) turneth bald noddle after she hath presented her locks in front, and hold taken; or, at least, turneth the handle of the bottle to be received, and after the belly,<sup>2</sup> which is hard to turn. There is surely no greater wisdom than well to time the beginnings and onsets of things. Dangers are no more light, if once seem light; and more dangers have deceived men, who have forced them: nay, it were better to meet some danger head-on way, though they come nothing near, than to keep too long watch upon their approaches; for if a man watch too long, it is odds he will fall asleep. On the other side, to be deluged with too long shadows (as some have been when the moon was low, and shone on their enemies' backs), and so to show before the time, or to teach dangers to come on, by over-buckling<sup>4</sup> towards them, is another extreme. The ripeness or unripeness of the occasion (as we said) must ever be weighed; and generally it is good to commit the beginning of all great actions to Argus with his hundred eyes, and then to Briareus with his hundred hands—first to watch, and then to speed; for the helmet of Pluto,<sup>5</sup> which maketh the man go invisible, is secrecy in the counsel, and celerity in execution; for when things are once come to the execution, there is no secrecy comparable to celerity—like the motion of a bullet in the air, which flieth so swift as it outruns the eye.

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<sup>1</sup> Sibylla. *The Sibyl*.

<sup>2</sup> Belly. *That protuberance or cavity of anything resembling the hump of an Irish harp hath the concave, or belly, at the end of the strings.* *Nat. Hist.*

<sup>3</sup> Phæd. viii.

<sup>4</sup> Buckle. *To go; to hasten towards.*

<sup>5</sup> 'Soon he buckled to the field.'—*Spenser*.

<sup>6</sup> Homer, *Il.* v. 845.

But still worse are those mock-wise men who mix two systems together, and are slow and quick just in degree that a really wise man is ; only, in the wrong who make their decisions hastily, and are slow in the execution begin in a hurry, and are dilatory in proceeding ; who cut their battery hastily, and then think of loading their gun cut their corn green, (according to the French proverb expression of ' manger son blé en herbe,') and let their fruit to ripen till it has been blown down by the winds and is on the ground.

*'The ripeness or unripeness of the occasion must ever weighed.'*

It is a common phrase with the indiscriminating advocates of delay, that 'The World is not yet ripe for such and such a measure.' But they usually forget to inquire 'Is it ripe? When, and how, is it likely to become ripe? or, Are men's minds to ripen like winter pears, merely by laying them by, and letting them alone?'

'Time,' as Bishop Copleston has remarked, (*Remains*, p. 1) 'is no agent.' When we speak of such and such changes brought about *by* time, we mean *in* time,—by the gradual imperceptible operation of some gentle agency. We observe, therefore, whether there is any such agency at all, and in what direction ;—whether to render a certain course more difficult or easier. If you are surrounded by the sea and want to escape, you should observe whether the tide is flowing or ebbing. In the one case, you should at once cross the ford, at all hazards ; in the other, you have to wait patiently. And if the water be still, and neither rising nor falling, then you should consider that though there is no danger of drowning, you must remain insulated for ever, unless you cross the ford. And that if this is to be done at all, it may be as well done at once.

The case of slavery in the United States is one of a similar kind. The rapid multiplication of slaves which has rendered their emancipation a difficult and hazardous task makes it more so every year, and increases the danger of a servile war such as that of St. Domingo.

The serfdom of the Russians is, perhaps, rather a

The one ministry would have capitulated on terms; the other surrendered nearly at discretion. The one proposed to something of a free-will boon; the other yielded avowed intimidation.

*' There is no secrecy comparable to celerity.'*

We have an illustration of the importance of 'celerity execution,' in circumstances in the history of our government of a later date than the instance above mentioned. A measure which had established a certain system about which there had been much controversy, was succeeded by those of the opposite party; and these were eagerly looked to, by men of all parties to see whether they would support that system in its integrity or abolish, or materially modify it. They were warned of the importance of coming to a *speedy* decision one way or other, and of clearly proclaiming it at once, in order to put stop to false hopes and false fears. And it was pointed out to them that those who had hitherto opposed that system now, *avowedly*, resting on their oars, and waiting to see what course the ministers they favoured would adopt. This was conveyed in a letter, pressing for a speedy answer: answer came in a *year and a half!* and after every encouragement had been given, during the interim of hesitation, to the opponents of the system to come forward to *commit themselves anew* to their opposition (which they did), then at length the system was adopted and approved, and carried on in the face of these marshalled opponents, embittered by disappointment and indignant at what they regarded as betrayal!

So much for taking one's time, and proceeding leisurely

In another case, a measure of great benefit to the empire was proposed, which was approved by almost all sensible and spirited men acquainted with the case, but unacceptable to those who wished to 'fish in troubled waters,' and had sagacity enough to perceive the tendency of the measure,—and also by some whose private interest was opposed to that of the Public by several others who were either misled by the above, or afraid of losing popularity with them. The wise course would have been, to make the exact arrangements, secretly, for all details, and then at once to bring forward the measure;



which is now irrecoverably silted up, and how he co  
years hence, though not at present, reclaim from the  
sands of acres of fertile land at the delta of some river.

Hence the proverb—

‘ He that is truly wise and great,  
Lives both too early and too late.’<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See *Proverbs and Precepts* for Copy-pieces for Schools.

## ESSAY XXII. OF CUNNING.

WE take cunning for a sinister, or crooked wisdom; and certainly there is a great difference between a cunning man and a wise man, not only in point of honesty, but in point of ability. There be that can pack the cards, and yet cannot play well; so there are some that are good in canvasses and factions, that are otherwise weak men. Again, it is one thing to understand persons, and another thing to understand matters; for many are perfect in men's humours, that are not greatly capable of the real part of business, which is the constitution of one that hath studied men more than books. Such men are fitter for practice than for counsel, and they are good but in their own alley: turn them to new men, and they have lost their aim; so as<sup>1</sup> the old rule, to know a fool from a wise man, 'Mitte ambos nudos ad ignotos, et videbis,'<sup>2</sup> doth scarce hold for them. And because these cunning men are like haberdashers of small wares, it is not amiss to set forth their shop.

It is a point of cunning to wait<sup>3</sup> upon him with whom you speak, with your eye, as the Jesuits give it in precept—for there be many wise men that have secret hearts and transparent countenances; yet this would<sup>4</sup> be done with a demure abasing of your eye sometimes, as the Jesuits also do use.

Another is, that when you have anything to obtain of present dispatch, you entertain and amuse the party with whom you deal with some other discourse, that he be not too much awake to make objections. I know a counsellor and secretary, that never came to Queen Elizabeth of England with bills to sign, but he would always first put her into some discourse of state, that she might the less mind the bills.

The like surprise may be made by moving<sup>5</sup> things when the

<sup>1</sup> As. *That*. See page 23.

<sup>2</sup> 'Send both naked to strangers, and thou shalt know.'

<sup>3</sup> Wait upon him with your eye. *To look watchfully to him*. 'As the eyes of servants look unto the hands of their masters, . . . so our eyes wait upon the Lord our God.'—*Ps.* cxxiii. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Would. *Should*.

<sup>5</sup> Move. *To propose*.

'Let me but *move* one question to your daughter.'—*Shakspeare*.

party is in haste, and cannot stay to consider advisedly is moved.

If a man would cross a business that he doubts some would handsomely and effectually move, let him pretend it well, and move it himself, in such sort as may foil it.

The breaking off in the midst of that one was about as if he took himself up, breeds a greater appetite in him whom you confer to know more.

And because it works better when anything seemeth gotten from you by question, than if you offer it of you you may lay a bait for a question, by showing another and countenance than you are wont; to the end, to give sion for the party to ask what the matter<sup>2</sup> is of the change Nehemiah did,—‘And I had not before that time been before the king.’<sup>3</sup>

In things that are tender and displeasing, it is good to let the ice be broken by some whose words are of less weight, and to let the more weighty voice to come in as by chance, so that they may be asked the question upon the other’s speech; as Cissus did, in relating to Claudius the marriage of Messius and Silius.<sup>4</sup>

In things that a man would not be seen in himself, it is a point of cunning to borrow the name of the world; as to ‘The world says,’ or, ‘There is a speech abroad.’

I know one that, when he wrote a letter, he would put in which was most material in the postscript, as if it had been by matter.

I knew another that, when he came to have speech, he would pass over that he intended most, and go forth, and come again, and speak of it as a thing he had almost forgot.

Some procure themselves to be surprised at such times as is like the party, that they work upon, will suddenly come upon them, and be found with a letter in their hand, or doing something which they are not accustomed, to the end they

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<sup>1</sup> That. *That which.* See page 73.

<sup>2</sup> Matter. *Cause.*

‘To your quick-conceiving discontent,  
I’ll read you *matter* deep and dangerous.’—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>3</sup> *Nehemiah* ii. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Tacit. Ann.* xi. 29,

diversas spes, sed incolumitatem imperatoris simplicitate.<sup>1</sup>

Some have in readiness so many tales and stories, as nothing they would insinuate but they can wrap it into which serveth both to keep themselves more in<sup>2</sup> guard, make others carry it with more pleasure.

It is a good point of cunning for a man to shape the he would have in his own words and propositions, for it the other party stick<sup>3</sup> the less.

It is strange how long some men will lie in wait to somewhat they desire to say, and how far about they will and how many other matters they will beat over to come it; it is a thing of great patience, but yet of much use.

A sudden, bold, and unexpected question, doth many surprise a man, and lay him open. Like to him that, he changed his name, and walking in Paul's, another suddenly came behind him, and called him by his true name, where straightways<sup>4</sup> he looked back.

But these small wares and petty points of cunning infinite, and it were a good deed to make a list of them that nothing doth more hurt in a State than that cunning pass for wise.

But certainly some there are that know the resorts<sup>5</sup> and of business, that cannot sink into the main of it; like a house that hath convenient stairs and entries, but never a fair room therefore you shall see them find out pretty<sup>7</sup> looses<sup>6</sup> in the

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<sup>1</sup> 'He did not look to various hopes, but solely to the safety of the emperor Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. 57.

<sup>2</sup> In. *On.* 'Let fowls multiply in the earth.'—*Genesis* i.

<sup>3</sup> Stick. *To hesitate; to scruple.* 'Rather than impute our miscarriages our own corruption, we do not stick to arraign Providence.'—*South.*

<sup>4</sup> Straightways. *Immediately.*

<sup>5</sup> Resorts. *Springs.*

<sup>6</sup> Fortune,

Whose dark resorts since prudence cannot know,  
In vain it would provide for what shall be.'—*Dryden.*

<sup>6</sup> Falls. *Chances.* 'To resist the falls of fortune.'—*Golden Book.*

<sup>7</sup> Pretty. *Suëtable; fit; tolerable.*

'My daughter's of a pretty age.'—*Romeo and Juliet.*

<sup>8</sup> Looses. *Issues; escapes from restraint, such as is difficulty or perplex deliberation.*

'And shot they with the square, the round, or forket pile, (head of an arrow)  
The loose gave such a twang as might be heard a mile.'—*Drayton.*

clusion,<sup>1</sup> but are no ways able to examine or debate matters ; and yet commonly they take advantage of their inability, and would be thought wits of direction. Some build rather upon the abusing<sup>2</sup> of others, and (as we now say) putting tricks upon them, than upon the soundness of their own proceedings ; but Solomon saith, 'Prudens advertit ad gressus suos ; stultus divertit ad dolos.'<sup>3</sup>

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## ANNOTATIONS.

*'We take cunning for a sinister or crooked wisdom.'*

Those who are for making *etymology* decisive as to the *actual* meaning of words<sup>4</sup> might maintain that, as the word is derived from 'ken'—*i. e.* 'know,'—it is properly to be applied, now (as it was formerly), to all knowledge and skill.

And, again, a plausible disquisition might be written on human depravity ; the present use of the word being taken as a proof that all who possess knowledge are likely to make an ill-use of it. Such disquisitions may be met with, by writers who either do not understand, or trust to their readers not understanding, the principles on which languages are formed and modified, and who would fain pass for profound moral philosophers.<sup>5</sup>

But, in truth, it is quite natural, and very common, to use

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This use of the word 'loose' seems to correspond with our use of the word 'solution,' from *solvo*, to LOOSE—'Solve the question :'

'He had red her riddle, which no wight  
Could ever loose.'—*Spenser.*

<sup>1</sup> Conclusion. *The close ; the result of deliberation.* 'I have been reasoning, and in *conclusion* have thought it best to return to what Fortune had made my home.'—*Swift.*

Bacon's meaning in the use of the words taken together, 'Pretty looses in the conclusion,' is best explained by the original Latin of this Essay—'*Tales videtis in conclusionibus deliberationum quosdam exitus reperire.*'

<sup>2</sup> Abuse. *To deceive.*

'The Moor's *abused* by some most villanous knave.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>3</sup> 'The wise man looks to his steps ; the fool turns aside to the snare.'

<sup>4</sup> See 'Annotations' on Essay L.

<sup>5</sup> See *English Synonyms* : Preface.

*softened* expressions in speaking of anything odious. the words, accordingly, which now denote something were originally *euphemisms*, and gradually became applied to a bad sense. Thus (to take one example out of a multitude) *wicked* must have originally meant 'lively;' being formed from *quick*, or *wick*, i. e. *alive*. This latter is the word used in Cumberland for 'alive.' And hence the *wick* burning—part of a lamp or candle, is called the *wick*.

*'Certainly there is a great difference between a cunning and a wise man,—not only in point of honesty, but of ability.'*

Whatever a man may be, intellectually, he labours under this disadvantage if he is of low moral principle, that he has only the weak and bad parts of human nature, and is no better.

It was remarked by an intelligent Roman Catholic theologian, that the *Confessional* trains the priest to a knowledge not of human nature, but of mental *nosology*. 'It may therefore be said,' he said, 'for the treatment of a depraved, but not a sound mind.'

Now, what the *Confessional* is to the priest, *that*, a man knows of his own heart is to *him*. He can form no notion of a human nature than his own. He is like the goats in Robinson Crusoe's island, who saw clearly everything *below* them, but very imperfectly what was above them; so that Robinson could never get at them from the valleys, but when he looked upon them from the hill-top, took them quite by surprise.

Miss Edgeworth describes such a person as one who looks at all mankind into rogues and fools, and when he meets with an honest man of good sense, does not know what to make of him. Nothing, it is said, more puzzled Buonaparte. He would talk of *money*; if that failed, he would talk of *glory*, or of *power*; but if all these temptations failed, he would knock him down for an idiot, or a half-mad dreamer. Conscience is a thing he could not understand. Other things, then, are equal, an honest man has this advantage over a knave, that he understands more of human nature: for he knows that an honest man exists; and concludes that there must be more

he also knows, if he is not a mere simpleton, that there are some who are knavish ; but the knave can seldom be brought to believe in the existence of an honest man. The honest man *may* be deceived in particular persons, but the knave is *sure* to be deceived whenever he comes across an honest man who is not a mere fool.

There are some writers of fiction whose productions have lately (1854) obtained considerable reputation, who have given spirited and just representations of particular characters, but an unnatural picture of society as a whole, from omitting (what they appear to have no notion of) all characters of good sense combined with good principle. They seem to have formed no idea of any, but what one may call *ευνθελς* and *κακωνθελς* ; —simpletons and crafty knaves ; together with some who combine portions of each ; profligacy with silliness. But all their worthy people are represented as weak, and all those of superior intelligence as morally detestable. One of these writers was, in conversation, reprobating as unjust the censure passed on slavery, and maintaining that any ill-usage of a slave was as rare in America, as a hump-back or a club-foot among us ;—quite an exception. If so, the Americans must be a curious contrast to all that his fictions represent ; for, in them, *all* of superior intelligence, and most of those of no superior intelligence, are just the persons who would make the most tyrannical slave-masters ; being not only utterly unprincipled, but utterly hard-hearted, and strangers to all human feeling !

The sort of advantage which those of high moral principle possess, in the knowledge of mankind, is analogous to that which Man possesses over the brute. Man is an animal, as well as the brute ; but he is something more. He has, and therefore can understand, most of their appetites and propensities : but he has also faculties which they want, and of which they can form no notion. Even so, the bodily appetites, and the desire of gain, and other propensities, are common to the most elevated and the most degraded of mankind ; but the latter are deficient in the higher qualifications which the others possess ; and can, accordingly, so little understand them, that, as Bacon remarks, ‘ of the highest virtues, the vulgar have no perception.’ (Supremarum sensus nullus.)

*' These small wares and petty points of cunning are infin*

To these small wares, enumerated by Bacon, might I add a very hackneyed trick, which yet is wonderfully successful to affect a delicacy about mentioning particulars, and what you *could* bring forward, only you do not wish to offend. ' We could give many cases to prove that such a medical system is all a delusion, and a piece of quackery; but we abstain, through tenderness for individuals, from mentioning names before the Public.' ' I have observed many—*which, however, I will not particularize*—*which convince me* that Mr. Such-a-one is unfit for his office; and others have made the same remark; but I do not like to bring forward,' &c. &c.

Thus an unarmed man keeps the unthinking in a false security, assuring them that he has a pair of loaded pistols in his pocket, though he is loath to produce them.

The following trick is supposed (for no certain knowledge could be, or ever can be, obtained) to have been successfully practised in a transaction which occurred in the memory of persons now living:—A person whose conduct was about to undergo an investigation which it could not well stand, communicated to one who was likely to be called on as a witness, the details—a complete fabrication—of some atrocious misconduct: and when the witness narrated the conversation, he denied the whole, and easily proved that the things described could not possibly have occurred. The result was, an acquittal, and a belief that *all* the accusations were the result of an atrocious conspiracy. But those who best knew the characters of the parties, were convinced that the witness had spoken nothing but the truth as to the alleged conversation, and had been tricked by the accused party, who had introduced a false accusation in order to defeat a true one.

One not very uncommon device of some cunning person is an *affectation* of *extreme* simplicity; which often has the effect for the time at least, of throwing the company off their guard. And their plan is to affect a hasty, blunt, and what the French call ' brusque ' manner. The simple are apt to conclude that a person who is not smooth and cautious, must be honest, and who



envies, to the overthrow of their master's great and important affairs. And for the most part, the good such servants receive is after the model of their own fortune, but the hurt they sell for that good is after the model of their master's fortune. And certainly it is the nature of extreme self-lovers, as<sup>1</sup> they will set a house on fire and<sup>2</sup> it were but to roast their eggs; and yet these men many times hold credit with their masters, because their study is but to please them, and profit themselves; and for either respect<sup>3</sup> they will abandon the good of their affairs.

Wisdom for a man's self is, in many branches thereof, a depraved thing: it is the wisdom of rats, that will be sure to leave a house some time before its fall: it is the wisdom of the fox, that thrusts out the badger, who digged and made room for him: it is the wisdom of crocodiles, that shed tears when they would devour. But that which is specially to be noted is, that those which (as Cicero says of Pompey) are 'sui amantes sine rivali'<sup>4</sup> are many times unfortunate; and whereas they have all their time sacrificed to themselves, they become in the end themselves sacrifices to the inconstancy of fortune, whose wings they thought by their self-wisdom to have pinioned.

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## ANNOTATIONS.

*'An ant is a shrewd thing in a garden.'*

This was probably the established notion in Bacon's time, as it is with some, perhaps, now. People seeing plants in a sickly state covered with ants, attributed the mischief to them; the fact being that the ants do them neither harm nor good, but are occupied in sucking the secretion of the aphides which swarm on diseased plants, and are partly the cause, partly the effect of disease. If he had carefully watched the ants, he

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<sup>1</sup> As. *That*. See page 23.

<sup>2</sup> And. *If*. '*As*' it like you.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>3</sup> Respect. *Consideration*.

<sup>4</sup> There's the *respect*

That makes calamity of so long life.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>4</sup> 'Lovers of themselves without a rival.'—*Cic. ad. Q. F.* III, 8.

*'Divide with reason between self-love and society; and be so true to thyself as thou be not false to others.'*

The difference between self-love and selfishness has been well explained by Aristotle, though he has not accounted for the use of the word *φιλαυτία*. It is clear that selfishness exists only in reference to others, and could have no place in one who lived alone on a desert island, though he might have of course every degree of self-love; for selfishness is not an excess of self-love, and consists not in an over-desire of happiness, but in placing your happiness in something which interferes with, or leaves you regardless of, that of others.<sup>1</sup> Nor are we to suppose that selfishness and want of feeling are either the same or inseparable. For, on the one hand, I have known such as have had very little feeling, but felt for others as much nearly as for themselves, and were, therefore, far from selfish; and, on the other hand, some, of very acute feelings, feel for no one but themselves, and, indeed, are sometimes amongst the most cruel.

Under this head of the 'dividing between self-love and society' may be placed a distinction made by Bishop Copleston<sup>2</sup> between two things which he says are occasionally confounded by Locke, as well as most other writers on education. 'Two things,' he remarks, 'ought to be kept perfectly distinct—viz., that mode of education which would be most beneficial, as a system, to society at large, with that which would contribute most to the advantage and prosperity of an individual. Now, the peculiar interest of the individual is not always the same, is seldom precisely the same, is even frequently at variance, with the interest of the public. And he who serves the one most faithfully always forgets, and often injures, the other. The latter is that alone which deserves the attention of a philosopher; the former—individual interest—is narrow, selfish, and mercenary. It is the mode of education which would fit for a specific employment, or contribute most to individual advantage and prosperity, on which the world are most eager to inform themselves; but the persons who instruct them, however they may deserve the thanks and esteem of those whom they benefit, do no service to mankind. There are but so many

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<sup>1</sup> See *Lessons on Morals*, L. xvi. § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Memoir of Bishop Copleston*, p. 307.

good places in the theatre of life ; and he who puts 1 way of procuring one of them does to *us* indeed a great but none to the whole assembly.' He adds a little : wide space is left to the discretion of the individual, while claims of the community are either not pressing or silent.'

Another point in which the advantage of the individual is quite distinct from that of the public, I have touched in a *Lecture on the Professions*,<sup>1</sup> from which I take the following adding an extract. 'It is worth remarking that there is a point wherein some branches of the Law differ from others, and agree with some professions of a totally different class. *Ability and professional skill*, in a Judge, or a Counselor, are, if combined with integrity, a *public* benefit. They confer a service on certain individuals, *not at the expense of any others*: and the death or retirement of a man thus qualified is a loss to the *community*. And the same may be said of a physician, a manufacturer, a navigator, &c., of extraordinary ability. A *pleader*, on the contrary, of powers far above the average, is not, *as such*, serviceable to the Public. He acquires wealth and credit for himself and his family ; but any advantage accruing from his superior ability, to the chance to be his clients, is just so much loss to those he is to be *opposed* to : and *which* party is, on each occasion, the right, must be regarded as an even chance. His death, therefore, would be no loss to the Public ; only, to those particular persons who might have benefited by his superior abilities at their opponents' expense. It is not that advocates, generally, are not useful to the Public. They are even necessary. Extraordinary ability in an advocate, is an advantage to himself and his friends. To the Public, the most desirable is, that pleaders should be as *equally matched* as possible, so that neither John Doe nor Richard Roe should have any advantage independent of the goodness of his cause.'<sup>2</sup> Extraordinary

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<sup>1</sup> Reprinted in the *Elements of Rhetoric*.

<sup>2</sup> On this it has been remarked by an intelligent writer, that, when two very superior pleaders in existence, the death of *one* of them would be a national loss. And this would hold good, if the two were always engaged on *opposite sides*. But that is so far from being necessarily, or usually, the case, on the contrary, it is a common practice for a party who has engaged

tion for the benefit of the *government* at home (which out something for them) that they complained of.

And this did not arise from comparative indifference to the welfare of our colonial fellow-subjects; for the like policy has been long pursued at home. We imported inferior quality from Canada, when better was to be had at a tenth part of the distance, lest saw-mills in Canada, and ships engaged in that trade, should suffer a diminution though the total value of them all put together did not equal the *annual* loss sustained by the Public. And we prohibited the refining of sugar in the sugar colonies, and import it in the most bulky and most perishable form to the benefit of a few English sugar-bakers; whose total profit did not probably amount to as many shillings as the national loss.

And the land-owners maintained, till very lately, a struggle against the bread-consumers, which amounted virtually to a tax on every loaf, for the sake of keeping up rents.

‘Other selfishness,’ says Mr. Senior, in his *Lectures on Political Economy*, ‘may be as intense, but none is so tolerated, because none so much tolerated, as that of a man claiming a *vested interest* in a public injury.’ But, do not many of these claimants persuade *themselves*, as well as the nation, that they were promoting the *public* good.

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## ESSAY XXIV. OF INNOVATIONS.

AS the births of living creatures at first are ill-shapen, so are all innovations, which are the births of time: yet, notwithstanding, as those that first bring honour into their family are commonly more worthy than most that succeed, so the first precedent (if it be good) is seldom attained by imitation: for ill, to man's nature as it stands perverted, hath a natural motion, strongest in continuance; but good, as a forced motion, strongest at first. Surely every medicine is an innovation, and he that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils: for time is the greatest innovator; and if time of course alters things to<sup>1</sup> the worse, and wisdom and counsel shall not alter them to the better, what shall be the end? It is true that what is settled by custom, though it be not good, yet at least it is fit; and those things which have long gone together, are, as it were, confederate with themselves; whereas new things piece not so well; but, though they help by their utility, yet they trouble by their inconformity;<sup>2</sup> besides, they are like strangers, more admired, and less favoured. All this is true, if time stood still; which, contrariwise, moveth so round,<sup>3</sup> that a froward retention of custom is as turbulent a thing as an innovation; and they that reverence too much old times, are but a scorn to the new. It were good, therefore, that men in their innovations, would follow the example of time itself, which indeed innovateth greatly, but quietly, and by degrees scarce to be perceived; for otherwise, whatsoever is new is unlooked for—and ever it mends some, and pairs<sup>4</sup> others; and he that is holpen takes it for a fortune, and thanks the time; and he that is hurt, for a wrong, and imputeth it to the author. It is good also not to try

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<sup>1</sup> To. *For*.

'Marks and points out each man of us to slaughter.'—*Ben Jonson*.

<sup>2</sup> Inconformity, *Incongruity*; *discordance*.

<sup>3</sup> Round. *Rapid*. 'Sir Roger heard them on a round trot.'—*Addison*.

<sup>4</sup> Pair. *To impair*.

'No faith so fast,' quoth she, 'but flesh does *paire*.'

'Flesh may *impair*,' quoth he, 'but reason can repaire.'—*Spenser*.

'What profiteth it to a man if he wyne all the world, and do *peyringe* to his soul?'—*Wickliff's Translation of Mark viii*.

experiments in States, except the necessity be urge utility evident; and well to beware, that it be the re that draweth on the change, and not the desire of ch pretendeth <sup>1</sup> the reformation: and lastly, that the novelt it be not rejected, yet be held for a suspect;<sup>2</sup> and Scripture saith, 'That we make a stand upon the anc and then look about us, and discover what is the str right way, and so to walk in it.'<sup>3</sup>

#### ANTITHETA ON INNOVATIONS.

##### PRO.

'Omnis medicina innovatio.

'Every medicament is an innovation.'

'Qui nova remedia fugit, nova mala operitur.

'He who shuns new remedies must expect new evils.'

'Novator maximus tempus: quidni igitur tempus imitemur?

'Time is the great innovator; why then not imitate Time?'

'Morosa morum retentio, res turbulenta est æque ac novitas.

'A stubborn adherence to old practices breeds tumults no less than novelty.'

'Cum per se res mutantur in deterius, si consilio in melius non mutantur, quis finis erit mali?

'Since things spontaneously change for the worse, if they be not by design changed for the better, evils must accumulate without end.'

##### CONTRA.

'Nullus auctor placet, præst

'One bows willingly to no but Time.'

'Nulla novitas absque in præsentia convellit.

'Every novelty does some h unsettle what is established.'

'Quæ usu obtinuere, si non saltem apta inter se sunt.

'Things that are settled by if not absolutely good, at leas together.'

'Quis novator tempus imitat novationes ita insinuat, ut sensu

'Show me the innovator who Time, that slides in change ceptibly.'

'Quod præter spem evenit, dest, minus acceptum; cui obe molestum.

'What happens unexpected, that reason, less welcome to h it profits, and more galling to h it hurts.'

<sup>1</sup> Pretend. To put forward or exhibit as a cover.

'Lest that heavenly form, pretended To hellish falsehood, snare them.'—Milton.

<sup>2</sup> Suspect. Something suspicious. 'If the king ends the difference, away the suspect.'—Suckling.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Jer. vi. 16.

*'Time is the greatest innovator.'*

When Bacon speaks of time as an 'innovator,' he might have remarked, by the way—what of course he well knew—that though this is an allowable and convenient form of expression, it is not literally correct. Bishop Copleston, in the remark already referred to in the notes on 'Delays,' terms the regarding *time as an agent*, one of the commonest errors; for, 'in reality time *does* nothing and *is* nothing. We use it,' he goes on to say, 'as a compendious expression for all those causes which act slowly and imperceptibly. But, unless some positive cause is in action, no change takes place in the lapse of one thousand years; as, for instance, in a drop of water enclosed in a cavity of silex. The most intelligent writers are not free from this illusion. For instance, Simond, in his *Switzerland*, speaking of a mountain-scene, says—'The quarry from which the materials of the bridge came, is just above your head, and the miners are still at work: air, water, frost, weight, and *time*.' Thus, too, those politicians who object to any positive enactments affecting the Constitution, and who talk of the gentle operation of time, and of our Constitution itself being the work of time, forget that it is human agency all along which is the efficient cause. Time does nothing.' Thus far Bishop Copleston.<sup>1</sup>

But we are so much influenced by our own use of language, that, though no one can doubt, when the question is put before him, that effects are produced not *by* time, but *in* time, we are accustomed to represent time as armed with a scythe, and mowing down all before him.

*'New things are like strangers, more admired, and less favoured.'*

Bacon has omitted to notice, in reference to this point, what nevertheless is well worth remarking as a curious circumstance, that there are in most languages proverbial sayings respecting it, apparently opposed to each other; as for instance, that men

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<sup>1</sup> *Remains of Bishop Copleston.*

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troducton and spr  
looked the distinc  
men do or do not

And the like  
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should at length come to some house whose inhabitant direct him, or to some more open spot from which take a survey of the different roads, and observe which led. After proceeding a long time in this manner, he was surprised to find a perfect uniformity in the country through which he passed, and to meet with no human being, nor come to any habitation. He was, however, encouraged by all that he advanced, the prints of horses' feet, which indicated he was in no unfrequented track: these became common and more numerous the further he went, so as to give him a still increasing assurance of his being in the neighbourhood of some great road or populous village; accordingly he paid the less anxious attention to the bearings of the country, from being confident that he was in the right way. But still he saw neither house nor human creature; and at length the recurrence of the same objects by the road opened his eyes to the fact, that all this time, misled by the multitude of the turnings, he had been riding in a circle, so that the footmarks, the sight of which had so cheered him, were those of his own horse; their number, of course, increasing with every circuit he took. Had he not fortunately made this discovery, perhaps he might have been riding there still.

The truth of the tale (and we can assure our readers that it at least did not invent it) does not make it the less useful as a way of apologue: and the moral we would deduce from that in many parts of the conduct of life, and not less in government and legislation, men are liable to *follow the footsteps of their own footsteps*,—to set themselves an example,—to flatter themselves that they are going right, from their conformity to their own precedent.

It is commonly and truly said, when any new and untried measure is proposed, that we cannot fully estimate the inconveniences it may lead to in practice; but we are convinced it is even still more the case with any system which has long been in operation. The evils to which it may contribute, and the obstacles it may present to the attainment of any good, are partly overlooked, or lightly regarded, on account of familiarity, partly attributed to such other causes as probably do co-operate in producing the same effects, and go along with the unavoidable alloys of human happiness.

inconveniences from which no human policy can entirely exempt us. In some remote and unimproved districts, if you complain of the streets of a town being dirty and dark, as those of London were for many ages, the inhabitants tell you that the nights are cloudy and the weather rainy: as for their streets, they are just *such as they have long been*; and the expedient of paving and lighting has occurred to nobody. The ancient Romans had, probably, no idea that a civilized community could exist without slaves. That the same work can be done much better and cheaper by freemen, and that their odious system contained the seeds of the destruction of their empire, were truths which, familiarized as they were to the then existing state of society, they were not likely to suspect. 'If you allow of no plundering,' said an astonished Mahratta chief to some English officers, 'how is it possible for you to maintain such fine armies as you bring into the field?' He and his ancestors, time out of mind, had doubtless been *following their own footsteps* in the established routine; and had accordingly never dreamed that pillage is inexpedient as a source of revenue, or even one that can possibly be dispensed with. 'That is the way it is always done, Sir;' or 'We always do so and so;' are the answers generally returned by the vulgar to an inquiry as to the reason of any practice. *Recent* experiment, indeed, may bring to light and often exaggerate the defects of a new system; but *long familiarity* blinds us to those very defects.<sup>1</sup>

And among the obstacles those have to encounter who are advocating any kind of novelty, this is one: that every instance of *failure* in the application of any new system is sure to be, by most people, attributed to the *system itself*; while in the case of an old and established system, any failure is either reckoned a mere unavoidable accident, or is attributed to the *individual*.

If, for instance, some crop turns out ill, under an established system of agriculture, this failure is attributed either to the weather, or else to unskilfulness in the individual farmer; but if it takes place under a new system of husbandry, it will usually be taken as a decisive proof that the system itself is wrong. So again, if a patient dies, under the routine-system of Medicine, blame is laid, if there be any, on the *individual* practi-

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<sup>1</sup> *London Review*, 1829.

tioner: but if a patient die who has been treated to some new system, this is likely to be taken as against the system itself. And so, in other cases.

One practical consequence of the attachment of n they have *long* been used to is, that it is a great po when there does exist need for a change, to have bro *some* change, even though little or nothing of im because we may look forward with cheering hope t *of the remedy*—a removal of the newly introduced c change far more easily to be brought about than the fi Alterations in any building are easily made *while the wet*. 'So it is in legislation and in all human affair the most inconvenient and absurd laws are suffered unchanged for successive generations, hardly an act that any defects in it are not met by 'acts to amend' next and in succeeding sessions.

'Those who remember the University of Oxford at mencement of this century, when, in fact, it hardly the name of an university,—who remember with what and after what long delay, the first statute for degree tions was introduced—how palpable were the defects statute, and how imperfectly it worked,—and, lastly, he in comparison, these defects were, one by one, remed successive improvements from time to time introduce persons must have profited little by experience, if they the application of any remedy to any existing law or in that is in itself evil, for fear the remedy should not be the first essay, as to meet their wishes.'

*'A froward retention of custom is as turbulent as an tion; and they that reverence old times too much c scorn to the new.'*

To avoid the two opposite evils—the liability to su violent changes, and the adherence to established usa inconvenient or mischievous,—to give the requisite st governments and other institutions, without shutting against improvement,—this is a problem which both an

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<sup>1</sup> See *Kingdom of Christ*, Appendix to Essay ii. note O, p. 355, 4th

modern legislators have not well succeeded in solving. Some, like the ancient Medes and Persians, and like Lycurgus, have attempted to prohibit all change; but those who constantly appeal to the wisdom of their ancestors as a sufficient reason for perpetuating everything these have established, forget two things: first, that they cannot hope to persuade all successive generations of men that there was once one generation of such infallible wisdom as to be entitled to control all their descendants for ever; which is to make the earth, in fact, the possession not of the living, but of the dead; and, secondly, that even supposing our ancestors gifted with such infallibility, many cases must arise in which it may be reasonably doubted whether they themselves would not have advocated, if living, changes called for by altered circumstances. For instance, those who denoted the southern quarter from *meridies* (noon) would not have been so foolish as to retain that language had they gone to live in a hemisphere where the sun at noon is in the north. But, as Dr. Cooke Taylor remarks in *The Bishop*: ‘An antiquated form, however perverted from its original purpose, gratifies the lazy in their love of ease; it saves them the trouble of exchanging their old *mumpsimus* for the new *sumpsimus*: and *new* the *sumpsimus* must appear, though it be a restoration; it averts the mortification of confessing error, which is always so abhorrent to the self-satisfied stupidity of those who grow old without gaining experience.’

‘Vel quia nil rectum, nisi quod placuit sibi, ducunt;  
Vel quia turpe putant parere minoribus, et quæ  
Imberbi didicere, senes perdenda fateri.’

It is to be observed, however, that in almost every department of life, the evil that has very long existed will often be less clearly perceived, and less complained of, than in proportion to the actual extent of the evil.

‘If you look to any department of government, or to any parish or diocese, that has long been left to the management of apathetic or inefficient persons, you will usually find that there are few or no *complaints*; because complaints having long since been found vain, will have long since ceased to be made. There will be no great arrears of business undone, and of applications unanswered; because business will not have been brought before those who it is known will not transact it; nor applications

undrained portion of the lake did at length burst ; and considerable damage ensued ; perhaps a fourth part *would* have taken place had things been left to it. But they were wise in not deferring their operations ; in the hope that matters would mend spontaneously, saw that the evil was daily increasing. And after having gated in a great degree the calamity that did ensue, measures to provide against the like in future.

‘ Still, however, we must expect to be told by many sooner or later, matters will come right spontaneous untouched ;—that, *in time*, though we cannot tell how long a period of extraordinary excitement is sure to be succeeded by one of comparative calm. In the meantime it is for *what cost* such spontaneous restoration of tranquillity is purchased—how much the fire will have consumed and what shall have burnt out of itself. The case is very similar to what takes place in the natural body : the anguish of acute inflammation, when left to itself, is succeeded by the calm of resolution : a limb is amputated, or drops off ; and the body is no longer the whole body—is restored to a temporary state at the expense of a mutilation. Who can say that a large portion of those who are now irrecoverably alienated from the Church, might not have been at this moment sound members of it, had timely steps been taken, not by any departure from the principles of our Reformers, but by following more closely the track they marked out for us ?’

It is true, that whatever is established and already existing has a presumption on its side ; that is, the burden of proof is on those who propose a change. No one is called on to give reasons *against* any alteration, till some reasons have been offered *for* it. But the deference which is thus claimed for laws and institutions is sometimes extended (through the ambiguity of language—the use of ‘ old ’ for ‘ ancient ’)<sup>1</sup> to what is called ‘ the good old times ;’ as if the world had formerly been older, instead of younger, than it is now. But it is not the fact that the advantage possessed by old *men*—that of long experience—must belong to the present age more than to any preceding.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Elements of Logic*, Appendix.

as there not, then, some reason for the remark which Bacon speaks of, as attaching to those 'who too much reverence old times?' To say that no changes shall take place is to talk idly. We might as well pretend to control the motions of the earth. To resolve that none shall take place *except* what are undesigned and accidental, is to resolve that though a clock may gain or lose indefinitely, at least we will take care that it shall never be regulated. 'If time' (to use Bacon's warning words) 'alters things to the worse, and wisdom and counsel shall not alter them to the better, what shall be the end?'

*'It were good that men, in their innovations, would follow the example of Time itself, which indeed innovateth greatly, but quietly and by degrees scarce to be perceived.'*

There is no more striking instance of the silent and imperceptible changes brought about by what is called 'Time,' than that of a language becoming dead. To point out the precise period at which Greek or Latin ceased to be a living language, would be as impossible as to say when a man becomes *old*. And much confusion of thought and many important practical results arise from not attending to this. For example, many persons have never reflected on the circumstance that one of the earliest translations of the Scriptures into a vernacular tongue was made by the Church of Rome. The Latin *Vulgate* was so called from its being in the vulgar, i.e. the popular language then spoken in Italy and the neighbouring countries; and that version was evidently made on purpose that the Scriptures might be intelligibly read by, or read to, the mass of the people. But gradually and imperceptibly Latin was superseded by the languages derived from it—Italian, Spanish, and French,—while the Scriptures were still left in Latin: and when it was proposed to translate them into modern tongues, this was regarded as a perilous innovation, though it is plain that the real innovation was that which had taken place imperceptibly, since the very object proposed by the Vulgate-version was, that the Scriptures might *not* be left in an unknown tongue. Yet we meet with many among the fiercest declaimers against the Church of Rome, who earnestly deprecate any the slightest changes in our authorized version, and cannot endure even the

gradual substitution of other words for such as *h* obsolete, for fear of 'unsettling men's minds.' It n to them that it was this very dread that kept tures in the Latin tongue, when that gradually beca language.

It has been suggested in a popular Periodical, t mass of the People had been habitual readers of th Latin might have never *become* a dead language. N printing had been in use in those days, and the Pe rally had had as ready access to cheap Bibles as would have retarded and modified the change of the But the case which is adduced as parallel is very far fi such: namely, the stability given to *our* language by of our English version. For, it ought not to have gotten that our country was not, like Italy—subjug overrun (subsequently to the translation of the Bible) l rous tribes speaking a different language. As it is, t indeed be no doubt that our Authorized Version, Prayer-book (and, in a minor degree, Shakespere and have contributed to give some fixedness to our langua after all, the changes that have actually taken place i greater than perhaps some persons would at first sight For, though the words in our Bible and Prayer-booc have become wholly obsolete, are but few, the number times greater, of words which, though still in common t greatly changed their meaning: such as 'conversation venient,' 'carriage,' (Acts xxi. 15) 'prevent,' 'rea 'lively,' 'incomprehensible,' those most important word and 'will,' and many others.<sup>1</sup> And words which ha changed their meaning are, of course, much more l perplex and bewilder the reader, than those entirely ou These latter only leave him in darkness; the others him by a false light.

Universally, the removal at once of the accumulate gradually produced in a very long time, is apt to st

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<sup>1</sup> See Bishop Hinds on the *Authorized Version*; and also a most u *Vocabulary of Obsolete Words* in our version, by the Rev. Mr. Booker

proverb—‘A tile in time saves nine.’ A house mages if some very small repairs and alterations are made from time to time as they are needed ; where is suffered to go on unheeded, it may become necessary to demolish and rebuild the whole house. The longer a reform is delayed, the greater and the more difficult it becomes, and the more sudden, and the more dangerous and unsettled it will be. And then, perhaps, those who had caused their pertinacious resistance to any change at all, will find themselves brought on by themselves—in justice to their conduct. If they would have allowed a few bricks on the roof to be at once replaced by new ones, the roof would not have rotted, nor the walls, in consequence, nor would the house have thence needed to be demolished and rebuilt.

Most wise, therefore, is Bacon’s admonition, to great innovator Time, by vigilantly watching for, and counteracting, the first small insidious approaches of evil, by introducing gradually, from time to time, such small reforms (individually small, but collectively great) as will give room for, and which will prevent the necessity of violent sweeping reformatations.

*‘It is good not to try experiments in States, except the necessity be urgent, or the utility evident ; and well to beware of the reformation that draweth on the change, and the desire of change that pretendeth the reformation.’*

It has been above remarked that most men have been averse to change, as change, in what concerns the serious business of life. True it is, that great and sudden and violent changes do take place—that ancient institutions have been recklessly thrown—that sanguinary revolutions have taken place in succession, and that new schemes, often the most extravagant, both in civil and religious matters, have been again introduced. We need not seek far to find examples that have had, within the memory of persons now living, less than nine or ten perfectly distinct systems of government. But no changes of this kind ever originate in the mere desire of change for its own sake. Never do men adopt a new



about introducing some different, and, perhaps, greater, evils into its place. It is seldom very difficult to dam up a river; but it incommodes us; only we should remember that it is a force for itself a new channel, or else spread over an unwholesome marsh. The evils of contested elections, bribery, the intimidation, and the deception which give rise to, are undeniable; and they would be cured by suppressing the House of Commons altogether, and making the seats in it hereditary; but we should not do this by the exchange. There are evils belonging specifically to pure monarchy, and to an oligarchy, and to a democracy, and to a mixed government: and a change in the form of government would always remedy one class of evils, and create another. And under all governments, civil and ecclesiastical, there are evils arising from the occasional incapacity and misconduct of those to whom power is entrusted; even anarchy might be at once remedied by introducing the far greater evils of anarchy, and leaving every man to 'do as is right in his eyes.' There are inconveniences, again, from being governed by fixed laws, which must always bear hard on some particular cases; but we should be no gainers by leaving every man to act like a Turkish *cadi*, entirely at his own discretion. The like holds good in all departments of life. The ignorant and careless and inefficient clergymen: abolish endowments, and resort to what is called the 'voluntary system,' and you will have no inactive ministers; only, 'preaching' will, as Mr. Cobden observes, 'become a mode of begging: and a Minister of the Gospel consists of persons *all* engaged in some one bad trade, such as smugglers, rebels, slave-dealers, or wreckers. The Minister find that he is a man hired to keep their consciences quiet in a wrong course. This also may be cured by prohibiting the ministers receiving any contributions; only, to do this, confine the ministry to men of fortune. And so rest.

One of the greatest evils produced by the thorough Reformer is that the *alarm* which he excites is the strengthener of the ultra-conservative principle. 'See how things shall come to if we listen to these lovers of change!' is one of the infinite number of cases in which evils are produced by their *contraries*: in short, by a re-action.

## ESSAY XXV. OF DISPATCH.

**A**FFECTED dispatch is one of the most dangerous business that can be : it is like that which the call predigestion, or hasty digestion, which is sure body full of crudities, and secret seeds of diseases ; measure not dispatch by the time of sitting, but by the management of the business : and as in races it is not the length or high lift, that makes the speed, so in business, the more close to the matter, and not taking of it too much, procureth dispatch. It is the care of some, only to proceed speedily for the time, or to contrive some false business, because<sup>1</sup> they may seem men of dispatch : but nothing to abbreviate by contracting, another by cutting business so handled at several sittings or meetings goes commonly backward and forward in an unsteady manner. a wise man that had it for a by-word, when he saw men come to a conclusion, ‘ Stay a little, that we may make an end sooner.’<sup>2</sup>

On the other side, true dispatch is a rich thing ; for the measure of business, as money is of wares ; and business bought at a dear hand where there is small dispatch. Spartans and Spaniards have been noted to be of small dispatch. ‘ Mi venga la muerte de Spagna,’<sup>3</sup> for then it will be soon long in coming.

Give good hearing to those that give the first information in business ; and rather direct them in the beginning than interrupt them in the continuance of their speeches ; for he that is put out of his own order will go forward and backward more tedious while he waits upon his memory, than he would have been if he had gone on in his own course. But so it is seen that the moderator is more troublesome than the speaker.

Iterations<sup>4</sup> are commonly loss of time : but there is

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<sup>1</sup> Because. *That ; in order that.* ‘ The multitude rebuked them, that they should hold their peace.’—*Matt. xx. 31.*

<sup>2</sup> Sir Amyas Paulet.

<sup>3</sup> ‘ May my death come from Spain.’

<sup>4</sup> Iteration. *Repetition.*

‘ What means this iteration, woman?’—*Shakespeare.*

gain of time as to iterate often the state of the question; for it chaseth away many a frivolous speech as it is coming forth. Long and curious speeches are as fit for dispatch as a robe or mantle with a long train is for a race. Prefaces, and passages,<sup>1</sup> and excusations,<sup>2</sup> and other speeches of reference to the person, are great wastes of time; and though they seem to proceed of<sup>3</sup> modesty, they are bravery.<sup>4</sup> Yet beware of being too material<sup>5</sup> when there is any impediment or obstruction in men's wills; for pre-occupation of mind ever requireth preface of speech, like a fomentation to make the unguent enter.

Above all things, order and distribution, and singling out of parts, is the life of dispatch, so as the distribution be not too subtle; for he that doth not divide will never enter well into business, and he that divideth too much will never come out of it clearly. To chuse time is to save time; and an unseasonable motion is but beating the air. There be three parts of business—the preparation, the debate, or examination, and the perfection,—whereof, if you look for dispatch, let the middle only be the work of many, and the first and last the work of few. The proceeding upon somewhat conceived in writing doth for the most part facilitate dispatch; for though it should be wholly rejected, yet that negative is more pregnant of direction than an indefinite, as ashes are more generative than dust.

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<sup>1</sup> Passages. *Introductory approaches.*

‘And with his pointed dart  
Explores the nearest *passage* to her heart.’

<sup>2</sup> Excusations. *Excuses; apologies.* ‘The punishment of his *excusations*.’—*Brown.*

<sup>3</sup> Of. *From.* ‘I have received of the Lord that which I also delivered unto you.’—1 Cor. xi. 23. ‘A blow whose violence grew not of fury, not of strength; or of strength proceeding of fury.’—*Sidney.*

<sup>4</sup> Bravery. *Boasting.* ‘For a *bravery* upon this occasion of power they crowned their new king in Dublin.’—*Bacon.*

<sup>5</sup> Material. *Full of matter.*

‘A *material* fool.’—*Shakespeare.*

‘His speech even charmed his cares,  
So order’d, so *material*.’—Chapman’s version of the 24th *Iliad.*

## ANNOTATIONS.

'*Time is the measure of business.*' . . . . . '*To chuse  
save time, and unseasonable motion is but beating*

Some persons are what is called 'slow and sure;' is, in cases that will admit of leisurely deliberation they require so much time for forming a right judgment, devising right plans, that in cases where promptitude for, they utterly fail. Buonaparte used to say, that principal requisites for a general, was, an accurate estimate of *time*; for if your adversary can bring a powerful attack a certain post ten minutes sooner than you can a sufficient supporting force, you are beaten, even though the rest of your plans be never so good.

So also, if you are overtaken by an inundation, time spent in deciding on the best road for escaping, is an escape impossible.

Some again, are admirable at a bright thought—guess—an ingenious scheme hit off on the spur of the moment, but, either will not give themselves time for quiet deliberation in cases where there is no hurry, or cannot deliberate for any purpose. They can shoot flying, but cannot take deliberate

And some again there are who delay and deliberate, promptitude is essential, and make up for this by taking a step when they have plenty of time before them; or go bold first, and prudent afterwards; first administering the dose, and then, when the step cannot be re-called, carefully examining the patient's tongue and pulse.

It is worth remarking, that many persons are of this disposition as to be nearly incapable of *remaining* in any point that is not wholly uninteresting to them. They speedily make up their minds on each question, and reach some conclusion, whether there are any good grounds or not. And judging—as men are apt to do, in all matters, from themselves, they usually discredit the most assurances of any one who professes to be in a state of doubt on some question; taking for granted that if you do not give your opinion, you must be of the opposite.

not the only requisite in food,—that a certain degre  
*sion* of the stomach is required to enable it to act  
 powers,—and that it is for this reason hay or str  
 given to horses as well as corn, in order to supply  
 sary bulk. Something analogous to this takes  
 respect to the generality of minds,—which are in  
 thoroughly digesting and assimilating what is present  
 in a very small compass.<sup>1</sup> Many a one is capable  
 that instruction from a moderate-sized volume, which  
 not receive from a very small pamphlet, even more  
 ously written, and containing everything that is to th  
 It is necessary that the attention should be detained  
 tain time on the subject; and persons of unphilosoph  
 though they can attend to what they read or hear, are  
 dwell upon it in the way of subsequent meditation.'

‘*True dispatch is a rich thing.*’

It is a rare and admirable thing when a man is able  
 discern which cases admit, and which not, of calm delib  
 and also to be able to meet both in a suitable manner.  
 character is most graphically described by Thucydide  
 account of Themistocles; who, according to him, was s  
 none in forming his plans on cautious inquiry and cal  
 tion, when circumstances allowed him, and yet excel  
 men in hitting off some device to meet some sudden em  
 [αὐτοσχεδιαζειν τὰ δεοντα.]

If you cannot find a counsellor who *combines* these t  
 of qualification (which is a thing not to be calculated  
 should seek for some of each sort; one, to devise and  
 measures that will admit of delay; and another, to make  
 guesses, and suggest sudden expedients. A bow, su  
 approved by our modern toxophilites, must be *backed*—  
 made of *two* slips of wood glued together: one a ver  
 but somewhat *brittle* wood; the other much less el  
 very *tough*. The one gives the requisite spring, the oth  
 it from breaking. If you have two such counsellors as  
 spoken of, you are provided with a *backed* bow.

And if you yourself are of one of the two above-m  
 characters—the slow-hound or the grey-hound—you

especially provide yourself with an adviser of the opposite class : one to give you warning of dangers and obstacles, and to caution you against precipitate decisions, if that be your tendency ; or one to make guesses, and suggest expedients, if you are one of the slow and sure.

Those who are clever [in the proper sense—*i.e.* *quick*] are apt to be so proud of it as to disdain taking time for cautious inquiry and deliberation ; and those of the opposite class are perhaps no less likely to pride themselves on their cautious wisdom. But these latter will often, in practice, obtain this advantage over those they are opposed to—that they will defeat them without direct opposition, by merely asking for postponement and reconsideration, in cases where (as Bacon expresses it) ‘ not to decide, is to decide.’ If you *defer* sowing a field till the seedtime is past, you have decided *against* sowing it. If you carry the motion that a Bill be read a second time this day six months, you have thrown it out.

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## ESSAY XXVI. OF SEEMING WIS

**I**T hath been an opinion, that the French are wiser seem, and the Spaniards seem wiser than they howsoever it be between nations, certainly it is so bet and man; for, as the Apostle saith of godliness, 'Havi of godliness, but denying the power thereof,'<sup>1</sup>—so there are, in points of wisdom and sufficiency,<sup>2</sup> that d or little, very solemnly, *Magno conatu nugas.*<sup>3</sup> It is a thing, and fit for a satire to persons of judgment, to shifts these formalists have, and what prospectives<sup>4</sup> superficialities to seem body that hath depth and bulk. I so close and reserved, as they will not show their war a dark light, and seem always to keep back somewhat when they know within themselves they speak of that not well know, would nevertheless seem to others to that which they may not well speak. Some help th with countenance and gesture, and are wise by signs; s saith of Piso,<sup>5</sup> that when he answered him he fetched o brows up to his forehead, and bent the other down to h 'Respondes, altero ad frontem sublato, altero ad men presso supercilio, crudelitatem tibi non placere.' Son to bear<sup>6</sup> it by speaking a great word, and being per and go on, and take by admittance that which they make good. Some, whatsoever is beyond their reach, w to despise, or make light of it, as impertinent<sup>7</sup> or curio so would have their ignorance seem judgment. Some a

<sup>1</sup> 2 Timothy iii. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Sufficiency. *Ability; adequate power.* 'Our sufficiency is of God iii. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Trifles with great effort.

<sup>4</sup> Prospectives. *Perspective glasses.*

'They speke of Alhazen and Vitellon,

Of queinte mirrours, and of *prospectives.*'—Chaucer.

<sup>5</sup> In Pis. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Bear. *To manage; to contrive.*

'We'll direct her how 'tis best to bear it.'—Shakespeare.

<sup>7</sup> Impertinent. *Irrelevant.*

'Without the which, this story

Were most *impertinent.*'—Shakespeare.

<sup>8</sup> Curious. *Over-nice.* See page 91.

without a difference,<sup>1</sup> and commonly by amusing men with a subtlety, blanch<sup>2</sup> the matter; of whom A. Gellius saith, 'Hominem delirum, qui verborum minutiis rerum frangit pondera.'<sup>3</sup> Of which kind also Plato, in his *Protagoras*,<sup>4</sup> bringeth in Prodicus in scorn, and maketh him make a speech that consisteth of distinctions from the beginning to the end. Generally, such men, in all deliberations, find ease to be of the negative side, and affect a credit to object and foretell difficulties; for when propositions are denied, there is an end of them; but if they be allowed, it requireth a new work; which false point of wisdom is the bane of business. To conclude, there is no decaying merchant, or inward beggar,<sup>5</sup> hath so many tricks to uphold the credit of their wealth, as these empty persons have to maintain the credit of their sufficiency. Seeming wise men may make shift to get opinion; but let no man chuse them for employment; for, certainly, you were better take for business a man somewhat absurd than over-formal.

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## ANNOTATIONS.

*'Seeming wise men may make shift to get opinion.'*

There is a way in which some men seem, to themselves, and often to others also, to be much wiser than they are; by acting as a wise man does, only, on wrong occasions, and altogether under different circumstances. Such a man has heard that it is a wise thing to be neither too daring nor too timid; neither too suspicious nor too confiding; too hasty nor too slow, &c.,

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<sup>1</sup> Difference. *A subtle distinction.*

<sup>2</sup> Blanch. *To evade.* 'A man horribly cheats his own soul, who upon any pretence whatever, or under any temptation, forsakes or *blanches* the true principles of religion.'—Goodman's *Conference*.

<sup>3</sup> 'A senseless man who fritters away weighty matters by trifling with words.' (This expression not in Aulus Gellius. A passage like it occurs in Quintilian—ix. i.)

<sup>4</sup> Plato, *Protag.* i. 337.

<sup>5</sup> Inward beggar. *One secretly a bankrupt.*

'To the sight unfold  
His secret gems, and all the *inward* gold.'—*Lansdowne*.



and he ventures and holds back, trusts and distrusts and delays, spends and spares, &c., just in the same a wise man does,—only, he is venturesome where danger, and cautious where there is none; hasty when no cause, and dilatory when everything turns on trusting those unworthy of confidence, and suspicious trustworthy; parsimonious towards worthy objects, and towards the worthless; &c.

Such a character may be called 'the reflection of a mirror.' He is the figure of a wise man shown by a *mirror*; an exact representation, except that it is *left-handed*.

The German child's-story of *Hans und Grettel*, and other childish tales, contains, under a surface of mere an instructive picture of real life. Hans stuck a knife in his sleeve, having been told that was the proper place for it, and put a kid in his pocket, because that was the proper place for a knife, &c.

It may be said, almost without qualification, that truth consists in the *ready* and *accurate* perception of things. Without the former quality, knowledge of the past is destructive; without the latter, it is deceptive.

One way in which many a man aims at and pretends to wisdom, who 'has it not in him,' is this: he has heard 'the *middle course* is always the best;' that '*extremes* are avoided,' &c.; and so he endeavours in all cases to keep an *equal distance* from the most opposite parties. As observed in 'Annotation' the second on Essay XI., he will quite agree, nor very widely disagree with either: and almost always each party is right in *something*, he maintains the *truth* on both sides; and while afraid of being guided by one party, he is in fact guided by both. His mimic wisdom consists in sliding alternately towards each extreme. But if his orbit be a true circle, independent of the eccentric orbits of others, this will make sundry *nodes* with their times falling within and sometimes without the same orbit. That is, in some points you will approach nearer to one than to the other; in some you will wholly agree with one party, and in some with another; in some you will be equally from both; and in some you will even go further from the one party than the opposite one does. For, true

locked, and which had always been supposed full of tell you the truth,' said he, 'the chest is *empty*: but *the secret*, the secret will keep you.'

As to this, and other tricks by which men (in phrase) 'puff themselves,' they might have been in Bacon in the essay 'On Cunning.' But it is worth that those who assume an imposing demeanour, and puff themselves off for something beyond what they often succeed), are, not unfrequently, as much *und* some, as they are over-rated by others. For, according to what Bacon says in the essay 'On Diskeeping back some knowledge which he is believed to may gain credit for knowing something of which he ignorant, so, if he is once or twice detected in pretending to know what he does not, he is likely to be set down as pretender, and as ignorant of what he does know.

'Silver gilt will often pass  
Either for gold or else for brass.'<sup>1</sup>

*'You were better take for business a man somewhat than over-formal.'*

By 'absurd' Bacon probably means what we express 'inconsiderate;' what the French call 'étourdi.'

The 'over-formal' often impedes, and sometimes hinders business by a dilatory, tedious, circuitous, and (what colloquial language is called) fussy way of conducting the transactions. They have been compared to a dog, which lie down till he has made three circuits round the spot

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<sup>1</sup> See *Proverbs and Precepts*, as Copy-pieces for National Schools

## ESSAY XXVII. OF FRIENDSHIP.

IT had been hard for him that spake it, to have put more truth and untruth together in few words, than in that speech, 'Whosoever is delighted in solitude, is either a wild beast or a god ;'<sup>1</sup> for it is most true, that a natural and secret hatred and aversation towards<sup>2</sup> society, in any man, hath somewhat of the savage beast ; but it is most untrue, that it should have any character at all of the divine nature, except<sup>3</sup> it proceed, not out of a pleasure in solitude, but out of a love and desire to sequester a man's self for a higher conversation ;<sup>4</sup> such as is found to have been falsely and feignedly in some of the heathens—as Epimenides, the Candian ; Numa, the Roman ; Empedocles, the Sicilian ; and Apollonius, of Tyana ; and truly, and really, in divers of the ancient hermits and holy fathers of the Church. But little do men perceive what solitude is, and how far it extendeth ; for a crowd is not company, and faces are but a gallery of pictures, and talk but a tinkling cymbal, where there is no love. The Latin adage meeteth with it a little : ' Magna civitas, magna solitudo,'<sup>5</sup>—because in a great town friends are scattered, so that there is not that fellowship, for the most part, which is in less neighbourhoods ; but we may go farther, and affirm most truly, that it is a mere<sup>6</sup> and miserable solitude to want true friends, without which the world is but a wilderness ; and, even in this scene also of solitude, whosoever, in the frame of his nature and affections, is unfit for friendship, he taketh it of the beast, and not from humanity.<sup>7</sup>

A principal fruit of friendship is the ease and discharge of the fulness of the heart, which passions of all kinds do cause

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *Eth.*, B. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Aversation towards. *Aversion to.* 'There is such a general *aversation* in human nature towards contempt, that there is scarcely anything more exasperating.'—*Government of the Tongue.*

<sup>3</sup> Except. *Unless.* 'Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.'—*John* iii. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Conversation. *Course of life.* 'What manner of persons ought we to be in all holy *conversation* and godliness.'—*2 Pet.* iii.

<sup>5</sup> 'A great city, a great solitude.'

<sup>6</sup> Mere. *Absolute.* See 'Merely,' page 22.

<sup>7</sup> Humanity. *Human nature.* 'Look to thyself ; reach not beyond *humanity.*'—*Sir Philip Sidney.*

and induce. We know diseases of stoppings and s are the most dangerous in the body; and it is not m wise in the mind: you may take sarza<sup>1</sup> to open the to open the spleen, flower of sulphur for the lungs, for the brain; but no receipt openeth the heart k friend, to whom you may impart griefs, joys, fears, l picious, counsels, and whatsoever lieth upon the heart it, in a kind of civil shrift or confession.

It is a strange thing to observe how high a rate g and monarchs do set upon this fruit of friendship w speak,—so great, as<sup>2</sup> they purchase it many times at t of their own safety and greatness: for princes, in reg distance of their fortune from that of their subjects and cannot gather this fruit, except, to make themselve thereof, they raise some persons to be as it were co and almost equals to themselves, which many times s inconvenience. The modern languages give unto suc the name of favourites, or privadoes,—as if it were grace or conversation; but the Roman name attaineth use and cause thereof, naming them ‘participes curar it is that which tieth the knot: and we see plainly hath been done, not by weak and passionate princes by the wisest and most politic that ever reigned, who h times joined to themselves some of their servants, w themselves have called friends, and allowed others li call them in the same manner, using the word which is between private men.

L. Sylla, when he commanded Rome, raised Pom surnamed The Great, to that height that Pompey vaun self for Sylla’s over-match; for when he had carried th ship for a friend of his, against the pursuit of Sylla, Sylla did a little resent thereat, and began to spea Pompey turned upon him again, and in effect bade quiet; for that more men adored the sun rising than

<sup>1</sup> Sarza. *Sarsaparilla*. ‘Sarza is both a tree and an herb.’—*Ains*

<sup>2</sup> As. *That*. See page 23.

<sup>3</sup> Sorteth. *To result; to issue in*.

‘Sort how it will,  
I shall have gold for all.’—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>4</sup> ‘Participators in our cares.’

setting.<sup>1</sup> With Julius Cæsar, Decimus Brutus had obtained that interest, as he set him down in his testament for heir in remainder after his nephew; and this was the man that had power with him to draw him forth to his death; for when Cæsar would have discharged the senate, in regard of some ill presages, and especially a dream of Calpurnia, this man lifted him gently by the arm out of his chair, telling him he hoped he would not dismiss the senate till his wife had dreamed a better dream;<sup>2</sup> and it seemed his favour was so great, as Antonius, in a letter, which is recited verbatim in one of Cicero's Philippics, called him '*venefica*,' witch,—as if he had enchanted Cæsar.<sup>3</sup> Augustus raised Agrippa, though of mean birth, to that height, as,<sup>4</sup> when he consulted with Mæcenas about the marriage of his daughter Julia, Mæcenas took the liberty to tell him, that he must either marry his daughter to Agrippa, or take away his life,—there was no third way, he had made him so great. With Tiberius Cæsar, Sejanus had ascended to that height as they two were termed and reckoned as a pair of friends. Tiberius, in a letter to him, saith, '*Hæc pro amicitia nostra non occultavi*;<sup>5</sup>' and the whole senate dedicated an altar to Friendship, as to a goddess, in respect of the great dearness<sup>6</sup> of friendship between them two. The like, or more, was between Septimus Severus and Plautianus; for he forced his eldest son to marry the daughter of Plautianus, and would often maintain Plautianus in doing affronts to his son; and did write also, in a letter to the senate, by these words,<sup>7</sup> 'I love the man so well, as I wish he may over-live<sup>8</sup> me.' Now, if these princes had been as a Trajan, or a Marcus Aurelius, a man might have thought that this had proceeded of<sup>9</sup> an abundant goodness of nature: but being men so wise, of such strength and severity of mind, and so extreme lovers of themselves, as all these were, it proveth, most plainly, that they found their own felicity, though as great as ever happened to mortal men, but as a half piece, except they might

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 19.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Vit. J. Cæs.* 64.

<sup>3</sup> Cic. *Philip.* xiii. 11.

<sup>4</sup> As. *That.* See page 23.

<sup>5</sup> 'On account of our friendship, I have not concealed these things.'—Tacit. *Ann.* iv. 40.

<sup>6</sup> Dearness. *Fondness.* 'He must profess all the *dearness* and friendship.'—South.

<sup>7</sup> *Dion Cass.* lxxv.

<sup>8</sup> Overlive. *Survive.* 'Musidorus, who showed a mind not to *overlive* Prorus, prevailed.'—Sir P. Sidney.

<sup>9</sup> Of. *From.* See page 270.

have a friend to make it entire; and yet, which<sup>1</sup> i were princes that had wives, sons, nephews, yet all not supply the comfort of friendship.

It is not to be forgotten what Comineus obse first master, Duke Charles the Hardy—namely, th communicate<sup>2</sup> his secrets with none; and, least c secrets which troubled him most. Whereupon h and saith, that towards his latter time, that closeness and a little perish<sup>3</sup> his understanding. Surely Comi have made the same judgment also, if it had pleas his second master, Louis XI., whose closeness was tormentor. The parable of Pythagoras is dark, but ne edito<sup>4</sup>—eat not the heart.<sup>4</sup> Certainly, if a man it a hard phrase, those that want friends to open unto, are cannibals of their own hearts; but one thi admirable (wherewith I will conclude this first fruit of f which is, that this communicating of a man's self to works two contrary effects, for it redoubleth joys, ar griefs in halves; for there is no man that imparteth l his friend, but he joyeth the more, and no man that his griefs to his friend, but he grieveth the less. So in truth, of operation upon a man's mind of like virt alchymists use to attribute to their stone for man's l it worketh all contrary effects, but still to the good a of nature. But yet, without praying in aid<sup>5</sup> of alchym is a manifest image of this in the ordinary course o for, in bodies, union strengtheneth and cherisheth an action, and, on the other side, weakeneth and dulleth a impression—and even so is it of<sup>6</sup> minds.

<sup>1</sup> Which. *What.*—Chaucer.

<sup>2</sup> Communicate *with.* *Communicate to; impart to.* 'He commun thoughts only *with* the Lord Digby.'—Clarendon.

<sup>3</sup> Perish. *To cause to decay: to destroy.*

'Thy flinty heart, more hard than they,  
Might in thy palace *perish*, Margaret.'—Shakespeare.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, *De Educat. Puer.* 17.

<sup>5</sup> Pray in aid. *To be an advocate for.* (A term in law for calli help who has interest in a cause.)

'You shall find  
A conqueror that will *pray in aid* for kindness,  
When he for grace is kneeled to.'—Shakespeare.

<sup>6</sup> Of. *With regard to.*

'This quarrel is not now *of* fame and tribute,  
But for your own republick.'—Ben Jonson.

The second fruit of friendship is healthful and sovereign for the understanding, as the first is for the affections; for friendship maketh indeed a fair day in the affections from storm and tempests, but it maketh daylight in the understanding, out of darkness and confusion of thoughts. Neither is this to be understood only of faithful counsel, which a man receiveth from his friend; but before you come to that, certain it is, that whosoever<sup>1</sup> hath his mind fraught with many thoughts, his wits and understanding do clarify and break up, in the communicating and discoursing with another; he tosseth his thoughts more easily—he marshalleth them more orderly—he seeth how they look when they are turned into words—finally, he waxeth<sup>2</sup> wiser than himself; and that more by an hour's discourse than by a day's meditation. It was well said by Themistocles to the king of Persia, 'That speech was like cloth of Arras, opened and put abroad'<sup>3</sup>—whereby the imagery doth appear in figure, whereas in thoughts they lie but as in packs. Neither is this second fruit of friendship, in opening the understanding, restrained<sup>4</sup> only to such friends as are able to give a man counsel (they indeed are best), but even without that a man learneth of himself, and bringeth his own thoughts to light, and whetteth his wits as against a stone, which itself cuts not. In a word, a man were<sup>5</sup> better relate himself to a statue or picture, than to suffer his thoughts to pass in smother.<sup>6</sup>

Add now, to make this second fruit of friendship complete, that other point which lieth more open, and falleth within

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<sup>1</sup> Whosoever. *Whoever*. 'Whosoever hath Christ for his friend shall be sure of counsel; and whosoever is his own friend will be sure to obey it.'—*South*.

<sup>2</sup> Wax. *To grow; to become*.

'Nature, crescent, does not grow alone  
In thews and bulk; but as this temple waxes,  
The inward service of the mind and soul  
Grows wide withal.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Vit. Themist.* 28.

<sup>4</sup> Restrained. *Limited; confined; restricted*. 'Upon what ground can a man promise himself a future repentance who cannot promise himself a futurity; whose life is so *restrained* to the present that it cannot secure to itself the reversion of the very next moment.'—*South*.

<sup>5</sup> Were. *Had*.

'I were best not call.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>6</sup> Smother (not used as a noun.) *A state of being stifled*.

'Then must I from the smoke into the *smother*;  
From tyrant duke unto a tyrant brother.'—*Shakespeare*.

asking counsel in one business of one man, and in another business of another man ; it is as well (that is to say, better, perhaps, than if he asked none at all), but he runneth two dangers ; one, that he shall not be faithfully counselled—for it is a rare thing, except it be from a perfect and entire friend, to have counsel given, but such as shall be bowed and crooked<sup>1</sup> to some ends which he hath that giveth it ; the other, that he shall have counsel given, hurtful and unsafe (though with good meaning), and mixed partly of mischief and partly of remedy—even as if you would call a physician, that is thought good for the cure of the disease you complain of, but is unacquainted with your body,—and therefore, may put you in a way for present cure, but overthroweth your health in some other kind, and so cure the disease, and kill the patient : but a friend, that is wholly acquainted with a man's estate,<sup>2</sup> will beware, by furthering any present business, how he dasheth upon other inconvenience,—and, therefore, rest not upon scattered counsels, for they will rather distract and mislead than settle and direct.

After these two noble fruits of friendship (peace in the affections and support of the judgment), followeth the last fruit, which is, like the pomegranate, full of many kernels—I mean, aid and bearing a part in all actions and occasions. Here, the best way to represent to life the manifold use of friendship, is to cast and see how many things there are which a man cannot do himself, and then it will appear that it was a sparing speech of the ancients, to say ' that a friend is another himself,' for that a friend is far more than himself. Men have their time, and die many times in desire of some things which they principally take to heart ; the bestowing of a child, the finishing of a work, or the like. If a man have a true friend, he may rest almost secure that the care of those things will continue after him ; so that a man hath, as it were, two lives in his desires. A man hath a body, and that body is confined to a place ; but where friendship is, all offices of life are, as it were, granted to him and his deputy ; for he may exercise them by his friend. How many things are there which a man cannot, with any

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<sup>1</sup> Crook. *To pervert.* See page 241.

<sup>2</sup> Estate. *State ; condition ; circumstances.*

' His letter there  
Will show you his estate.'—*Shakespeare.*



face or comeliness, say or do himself? A man can his own merits with modesty, much less extol himself; he cannot sometimes stoop to supplicate or beg, and the like: but all these things are graceful in a friend which are blushing in a man's own. So, again, a man hath many proper<sup>1</sup> relations which he cannot put off; he cannot speak to his son but as a father; to his wife as a husband: to his enemy but upon terms: whereas a philosopher speak as the case requires, and not as it sorteth the person. But to enumerate these things were endless: given the rule, where a man cannot fitly play his part, he have not a friend, he may quit the stage.

ANTITHETA ON FRIENDSHIP.

PRO.

'Pessima solitudo, non veras habere amicitias.

'The worst solitude is to have no real friendships.'

'Digna malæ fidei ultio, amicitia privari.

'To be deprived of friends is a fit reward of faithlessness.'

CONTRA.

'Qui amicitias arctas necessitates sibi imponit.

'He who forms close friendships poses on himself new duties.'

'Animi imbecilli est, pa-

'It is the mark of a foolish man to go shares in one's fortune.'

ANNOTATIONS.

'It had been hard for him that spake it to have put in and untruth together in few words than in that  
'Whosoever is delighted in solitude is either a wise or a god.'

Aristotle had been so unduly and absurdly worshipped at Bacon's time, that it was not inexcusable to be carried by the ebb-tide, and unduly to disparage him. But, in truth

<sup>1</sup> Proper. Peculiar.

'Faults proper to himself.'—Shakespeare.

<sup>2</sup> Sort. To suit; to fit.

'For different styles with different subjects sort,  
As several garbs with country, town, and court.'—P

(for it is of him Bacon is speaking) was quite right in saying that to Man, such as Man is, friendship is indispensable to happiness; and that one who has no need, and feels no need of it, must be either much *above* human nature, or much below it.<sup>1</sup> Aristotle does not presume to say that no Being can exist so exalted as to be wholly independent of all other Beings, and to require no sympathy, nor admit of it; but that such a Being must be a widely different Being from Man.

*'It is most untrue, that it should have any character at all of divine nature.'*

Well might Bacon doubt, or deny, that incapacity for friendship could assimilate Man to the divine nature. We do not find that true Christians—those whom Peter describes as 'partakers of a divine nature through the great and precious promises given unto them'<sup>2</sup>—become less and less capable of friendship in proportion as they, in any measure, attain to that resemblance to their divine Master, which is yet to be their perfection and their happiness, when they 'shall see Him as He is;'<sup>3</sup> and after which they are now, here below, continually striving. We do not find that, as they increase in universal charity, particular friendships are swallowed up in it, or that any progress to higher and more exalted christian attainment makes a partial regard towards one good man more than another, unworthy of them, and too narrow a feeling for them to entertain. Far from it, indeed: it is generally observed, on the contrary, that the best Christians, and the fullest, both of *brotherly* love towards all 'who are of the household of faith,' and of universal tenderness and benevolence towards all their *fellow-creatures*, are also the warmest and steadiest in their friendships.

Nor have we any reason to believe that in the future state of blessedness and glory, when the saint is indeed made perfect, any part of his perfection will consist in being no longer capable of special individual friendship. There are many persons, however, who believe that it will be so; and this is one of the

<sup>1</sup> 'Ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μὴθὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν, οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως' ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.—Arist. *Politics*, Book i. Bacon probably quoted from a Latin translation; 'Homo solitarius, aut Deus aut bestia.'

<sup>2</sup> 2 *Pet.* i. 4.

<sup>3</sup> 1 *John* iii. 2.

many points in which views of the eternal state of salvation are rendered more uninteresting to our feelings consequently, more uninviting, than there is any need of them. Many suppose that when we have attained the eternal state, the more concentrated and limited affections will be lost in brotherhood with that 'multitude which no number, redeemed out of every nation, and kindred, and tongue.' But if we find, as we do find, that private friendship interferes with christian brotherhood, nor with universal love on earth, why should it do so in heaven?

But 'we have more decisive proof than this:' no one can suppose that a Christian in his glorified state will be more than his great Master while here on earth; from Him he will ever remain at an immeasurable distance: we hope, to be free from the sufferings of our blessed Lord in his humiliation here below; but never to equal his pain. Yet He was not incapable of friendship. He certainly loved, indeed, all mankind, more than any other man ever (as Paul says) 'while we were yet enemies, He died for us.' He loved especially the disciples who constantly followed Him, but even among the Apostles, He distinguished one peculiarly and privately his *friend*—John was 'the disciple whom Jesus loved.' Can we then ever be too highly exalted by the capability of friendship?

'I am convinced, on the contrary, that the eternal perfection of friendship will constitute great part of the happiness of the blest. Many have lived in various ages and countries, perfectly adapted (I mean not only to their being generally estimable, but in the agreeable tastes, and suitableness of dispositions) for friendship with one other, but who, of course, could never meet in this world. Many a one selects, when he is reading history,—a true Christian, most especially in reading sacred history,—one or two favourite characters, with whom he feels that an acquaintance would have been peculiarly delightful to him. Should not such a desire be realized in a future state? to see and personally know, for example, the Apostle John, is the most likely to arise in the noblest and purest

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<sup>1</sup> From *A View of the Scripture Revelations of a Future State*

between those companions who have trod together path to Glory, and have 'taken sweet counsel walked in the house of God as friends.' A chance towards those who have fixed their hearts objects with ourselves during this earthly pilgrimage given and received mutual aid during their course as little, I trust, to be expected, as it is to be certainly is not such a change as the Scriptures prepare for.

'And a belief that, under such circumstances, attachments will remain, is as beneficial as it is real is likely very greatly to influence our choice of friends surely is no small matter. A sincere Christian would be, at any rate, utterly careless whether those who are Christians also, with whom he connected himself: his attachment is likely to be much greater, if he hopes, that, provided he have selected such as are treading the same path, and have studied to promote their eternal welfare, he will never again, never to part more, those to whom his heart has been engaged here below. The hope also of rejoining in the next state, the friend whom he sees advancing towards the same, is an additional spur to his own virtuous exertions. The hope which can make heaven appear more desirable, is a hope which can make his progress in christian excellence; and as one of the objects of earthly enjoyments to the best and most exalted Christian is to witness the happiness of a friend, so, one of the objects of his hopes will be, that of exulting in the most perfect of those most dear to him.

'As for the grief, which a man may be supposed to feel at the loss—the total and final loss—of some who may be dear to him on earth, as well as of vast multitudes of his fellow-creatures, I have only this to remark: that a good man in this life, though he never ceases to endeavour to reclaim the wicked, and to diminish evil and suffering, yet, in cases where it is clear that no good can be done by him, strives, as far as possible (though often with much success), to *withdraw* his thoughts from evil which he cannot lessen, but which still, in spite of his efforts, clouds his mind. We *cannot* at pleasure draw off our minds entirely from painful subjects which it is in vain to

about. The power to do this completely, when we will, would be a great increase of happiness; and this power, therefore, it is reasonable to suppose the blessed will possess in the world to come—that they will occupy their minds entirely with the thoughts of things agreeable, and in which their exertions can be of service; and will be able, by an effort of the will, completely to banish and exclude every idea that might alloy their happiness.’

*‘A desire to sequester a man’s self for a higher conversation such as is found . . . really and truly in divers of the ancient hermits and holy fathers of the Church.’*

Bacon here seems to agree in that commendation of a monastic life which is sometimes heard even now from Protestants. On this subject I take leave to quote a passage from the *Cautions for the Times*.

‘The monks are represented by Roman-catholic writers as all pious men, who, bent upon the cultivation of a religious temper of mind, withdrew from the world for that purpose; as if the business and duties of this world were not the very discipline which God has appointed for cultivating real righteousness in us. And then, the learning, peace, and piety of the monasteries is strongly contrasted with the ignorance and irreligion and perpetual wars, of the dark and troublous times, which are commonly called ‘the middle ages,’ in such a manner that even Protestants are sometimes led to think and say that, at least in former times, and *for* those times, the monasteries were commendable institutions. But they forget that it was the very system of which these were a part, which *made* the world so dark and unquiet; and then, like the ivy which has reduced a fine building to a shattered ruin, they held together the fragments of that ruin.

‘Of course, if you teach men that holiness can be only, or can be best attained by withdrawing from the world into a cloister, all those who are bent on living a holy life *will* withdraw from the world; and they will, in so withdrawing, take from the world that which should reform it—the benefit of their teaching, and the encouragement of their example. One after another all those most promising men, who should have been, each in

greater comfort in their native land, than that which *some* of them now possess, as slaves, in a foreign land.

‘So, also, in the case of the monasteries. Those who shut themselves up there might have exercised a much better and more rational piety (like the Apostles and first Christians) out of them, and in the world ; and if they had lived amongst their fellow-men, would have helped to raise the whole tone of society around them. And it was just the same evil system which buried some good men (like lamps in sepulchres) in the cells of monasteries, and made the general mass of society outside the walls of those establishments so bad, that it seemed to excuse their withdrawal from it.

‘It is to be acknowledged, indeed, that some monks sometimes did some good for the rest of the world. They were often engaged in education, attendance on the poor, copying of manuscripts, agriculture, &c., and all these were really *useful* occupations. It is not to these things we object, when we object to monasteries ; for with monasteries these have no necessary connection.

‘Let associations be formed ~~for~~ a good object, when needful ; instead of first forming an association as an end in itself, and *then* looking out for *something* for it to do ; else, that something, being a secondary matter, will sometimes be ill done, or neglected, and sometimes will be what had better be left undone.’

*‘There is as much difference between the counsel that a friend giveth, and that a man giveth himself, as there is between the counsel of a friend and of a flatterer. For there is no such flatterer as a man’s self.’*

I have already remarked, in the notes on ‘Truth,’ that men are in danger of exercising on themselves, when under the influence of some passion, a most pernicious oratorical power, by pleading the cause, as it were, each, before himself, of that passion. Suppose it anger, for instance, that he is feeling ; he is naturally disposed to dwell on, and amplify the aggravating circumstances of the supposed provocation, so as to make out a good case for himself. This of course tends to *heighten* his resentment, and to satisfy him that he ‘doth well to be angry ;’

temptations of others that we may the better understand our own.

'How is it, men, when they in judgment sit  
On the same faults, now censure, now acquit?  
'Tis not that they are to the error blind,  
But that a different object fills the mind.  
Judging of others, we can see too well  
Their grievous fall; but not, how grieved they fell:  
Judging ourselves, we to our minds recall,  
Not how we fell, but how we grieved to fall.'<sup>1</sup>

But though ten thousand of the greatest faults in others are, to us, of less consequence than one small fault in ourselves, yet self-approval is so much more agreeable to us than self-examination—which, as Bacon says, 'is a medicine sometimes too piercing and corrosive,'—that we are more ready to examine our neighbours than ourselves, and to rest satisfied with finding, or fancying, that we are better than they; forgetting that, even if it really is so, *better* does not always imply *good*; and that our course of duty is not like a race which is won by him who runs, however slowly, if the rest are still slower. It is this forgetfulness that causes bad examples to do much the greatest amount of evil among those who do *not* follow them. For, among the four kinds of bad examples that do us harm—namely, those we *imitate*—those we proudly *exult* over—those which drive us into an *opposite* extreme—and those which lower our *standard*,—this last is the most hurtful. For *one* who is corrupted by becoming as bad as a bad example, there are ten that are debased by being content with being better.

But though this observing of faults in another is thus 'sometimes improper for our case'—and though, at any time, to *dwell* on the faults of another is wrong,—yet in the case of a friend, though not of a stranger, we are perhaps ready to fall into the opposite error, of overlooking them altogether, or of defending them. Now, it is absolutely necessary to perceive and acknowledge them: for, if we think ourselves bound to vindicate them in our friend, we shall not be very likely to condemn them in ourselves. Self-love will, most likely, demand fair play, and urge that what is right in our friend is not wrong in us; and we shall have been perverting our own principles of morality; thus turning the friendship that might yield such 'fair fruit' into a baneful poison-tree.

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<sup>1</sup> Crabbe, *Tales of the Hall*.

*'The two noble fruits of friendship (peace in the support of the judgment) follow the last fruit, w the pomegranate, full of many kernels . . . .'*

*'The manifold use of friendship.'*

One of these manifold uses of friendship is, the not noticed by Bacon, to be derived from a very, v and pure-minded friend; that you may trust him from you some things which you had better not know are cases in which there is an advantage in knowing advantage in not knowing; and the two cannot of combined, except by the thing being known to your—your 'alter ipse,'—and kept back from you.

For instance, a man may have done something and a friend may say to him, 'I have not told my friend of will not, provided you take care to discontinue the practice rectify what is done wrong,—to keep clear of any &c., as the case may be.' And he will be more encouraged do so if he knows that your estimation of him is not impaired. And yet such a person has need to be looked after; which of course your friend will take care

And there are other cases also in which such a course will be advantageous. But of course one who can be so must be, as has been said, one of consummate wisdom integrity.

It may be worth noticing as a curious circumstance persons past forty before they were at all acquainted together a very close intimacy of friendship. For growth to *take*, there must be a wonderful congeniality the trees.

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will revert to his customs; but he that cleareth b  
duceth a habit of frugality, and gaineth as well up  
as upon his estate. Certainly, who<sup>1</sup> hath a state t  
not despise small things: and, commonly, it is lea  
able to abridge petty charges than to stoop to pe  
A man ought warily to begin charges which, once  
continue; but in matters that return not, he is  
magnificent.

## ANNOTATIONS.

*' Riches are for spending, and spending for ho*

For those who are above the poorest classes, the he  
some of the heaviest—expenses are, as Bacon expres  
honour'—i. e. for the display of wealth. We do i  
commonly speak of 'display of wealth' except when  
and the display of it are something unusually great.  
rather of 'living in a decent, or in a handsome style.  
does certainly imply the purchase of many articles  
provide ourselves with *because* they are *costly*;—whic  
vided in order to be *observed*, and observed *as* costly;  
comes to the same thing, because the absence of then  
observed as denoting shabbiness. For instance, a sil  
or a gilt one, is as *useful* as a gold one; and beech  
tree makes as useful furniture as mahogany or rose-w  
as for the mere gratification to the eye, of the super  
of these latter, this is, to persons of moderate mean  
ficient set-off against the difference of cost. Moreove  
of wild flowers, or a necklace of crab's-eye-seeds, &  
pretty to look at, and as becoming, as jewels or cor  
these latter were to become equally cheap, some oth  
decoration would be sought for, and prized on acco  
known costliness.

For, though people censure any one for making  
*beyond* his station, if he falls below it in what are cons

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<sup>1</sup> Who. *He who.* See page 91.

*decencies* of his station, he is considered as either absurdly penurious, or else very poor.

And why, it may be asked, should any one be at all ashamed of this latter,—supposing his poverty is not the result of any misconduct? The answer is, that though poverty is not accounted, by any persons of sense, *disgraceful*, the exposure of it *is* felt to be a thing indecent: and though, accordingly, a right-minded man does not seek to make a *secret* of it, he does not like to expose it, any more than he would to go without clothes.

The Greeks and Romans had no distinct expressions for the ‘disgraceful’ and the ‘indecent:’ ‘turpe’ and *αισχρον* served to express both. And some of the ancient philosophers, especially the Cynics (see Cic. *de Off.*) founded paradoxes on this ambiguity, and thus bewildered their hearers and themselves. For it is a great disadvantage not to have (as our language has) distinct expressions for things really different.

There are several things, by the way, besides those just attended to, which are of the character of, not disgraceful, but indecent: that is, of the existence of which we are not ashamed, but which we should be ashamed to *obtrude* on any one’s notice: *e. g.* self-love, which is the deliberate desire for one’s own happiness; and regard for the good opinion of others. These are not—when not carried to excess—vices, and consequently are not disgraceful. Any vice a man wishes to be thought not to *have*; but no one pretends or wishes to be thought wholly destitute of all regard for his own welfare or for the good opinion of his fellow-creatures. But a man of sense and delicacy keeps these in the background, and, as it were, clothes them, because they become offensive when prominently displayed.

And so it is with poverty. A man of sense is not ashamed of it, or of deliberately confessing it; but he keeps the marks of it out of sight.

These observations a person was making to a friend, who strenuously controverted his views, and could not, or would not, perceive the distinction above pointed out. ‘I, for my part,’ said he, ‘am poor, and I feel no shame at all at its being known. Why, this coat that I now have on, I have had *turned*, because I could not well afford a new one; and I care not who

if you look to the *proportions*, it is quite the reverse numbers of persons of each amount of income, classes, from £100 per annum up to £100,000 per annum you will find the *per centage* of those who are under such difficulties *continually augmenting* as you go up when you come to sovereign States, whose revenue by millions, you will hardly find *one* that is not dead in debt ! So that it would appear that the larger the harder it is to live within it.

Bacon himself affords a most deplorable instance. With a very large income, he was involved by his extravagance in such pecuniary difficulties as drove him to practising corruption.

When men of great revenues, whether civil or ecclesiastical, live in the splendour and sensuality of Sardanapalus, it is apt to plead that this is *expected* of them ; which is perhaps, sometimes true, in the sense that such a course is anticipated as *probable* ; not true, as implying that it is required or approved. I have elsewhere<sup>1</sup> remarked the ambiguity in the word ‘expect :’ but it is worth noting that it sometimes leading, in conjunction with other causes, to a fatal bad effect upon this point of expenses as well as many others. It is sometimes used in the sense of ‘calculate on,’ &c. (ἐλπίζω), in short, ‘consider as probable,’ sometimes for ‘require or demand as reasonable,’—‘claim as right’ (ἀξιῶ). Thus, I may fairly ‘expect’ (ἀξιῶ) that he who has received kindness from me, should protect me in the future ; yet I may have reason to expect (ἐλπίζειν) that he will not ; ‘England expects every man to do his duty ;’ but it would be chimerical to expect, that is, anticipate a uniform performance of duty. What may reasonably be expected (in the proper sense of the word), must be precisely the practice of the majority : since it is the majority of instances that determine the *probability* : what may reasonably be expected (in the proper sense), is something much beyond the practice of the great majority as long, at least, as it shall be true, that ‘narrow is the way that leadeth to life, and few there be that find it.’

<sup>1</sup> *Elements of Logic*, Appendix.

## ESSAY XXIX. OF THE TRUE GREATNESS OF KINGDOMS AND ESTATES

THE speech of Themistocles, the Athenian, which is so bold and arrogant, in taking so much to himself, grave and wise observation and censure, applied to others. Desired at a feast to touch a lute, he said he would not fiddle, but yet he could make a small town a great one. These words (holpen<sup>3</sup> a little with a metaphor) show two differing abilities in those that deal in business: for, if a true survey be taken of counsellors and statesmen, may be found (though rarely) those which can make a State great, and yet cannot fiddle,—as, on the other side, will be found a great many that can fiddle very cunningly, yet are so far from being able to make a small State great, that their gift lieth the other way—to bring a great and flourishing estate to ruin and decay. And, certainly, those degenerate and shifts, whereby many counsellors and governors buy favour with their masters and estimation with the people, deserve no better name than fiddling, being thus pleasing for the time, and graceful to themselves, but tending to the weal and advancement of the State to ruin and serve. There are also (no doubt) counsellors and statesmen which may be held sufficient, *negotiis pares* [able in affairs], and to keep them from precipices and manifold inconveniences, which, nevertheless, are far from the ability to amplify an estate in power, means, and fortune. Let workmen what they may be, let us speak of the work of the true greatness of kingdoms and estates, and of the thereof. An argument<sup>6</sup> fit for great and mighty

<sup>1</sup> Estates. *States*. See page 135.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Vit. Them.*

<sup>3</sup> Holpen. See page 212.

<sup>4</sup> Cunningly. *Skilfully*.

<sup>5</sup> And many bards that to the trembling chord  
Can tune their timely voices *cunningly*.—*Spenser*.

<sup>6</sup> As. *That*. See page 23.

<sup>7</sup> Argument. *Subject*.

‘Sad task! yet argument  
Not less, but more, heroic than the wrath  
Of stern Achilles.’—*Milton*.

have in their hand ; to the end that neither by over-measuring their forces, they lose themselves in vain enterprises ; nor, on the other side, by undervaluing them, they descend to fearful and pusillanimous counsels.

The greatness of an estate, in bulk and territory, doth fall under measure ; and the greatness of finances and revenue doth fall under computation. The population may appear by musters, and the number and greatness of cities and towns by cards and maps ; but yet there is not any thing, amongst civil affairs, more subject to error, than the right valuation and true judgment concerning the power and forces of an estate. The kingdom of heaven is compared, not to any great kernel, or nut, but to a grain of mustard seed ;<sup>1</sup> which is one of the least grains, but hath in it a property and spirit hastily to get up and spread. So are there States great in territory, and yet not apt to enlarge or command : and some that have but a small dimension of stem, and yet are apt<sup>2</sup> to be the foundation of great monarchies.

Walled towns, stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horse, chariots of war, elephants, ordnance, artillery, and the like—all this is but a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike.

Nay, number (itself) in armies importeth<sup>3</sup> not much, where the people are of weak courage ; for, as Virgil saith, ' It never troubles the wolf how many the sheep be.'<sup>4</sup> The army of the Persians, in the plains of Arbela, was such a vast sea of people, as it did somewhat astonish the commanders in Alexander's army, who came to him, therefore, and wished him to set upon them by night ; but he answered, ' He would not pilfer the victory '<sup>5</sup>—and the defeat was easy. When Tigranes, the Armenian, being encamped upon a hill with four hundred thousand men, discovered the army of the Romans, being not above fourteen thousand, marching towards him, he made himself merry with it, and said, ' Yonder men are too many for an

<sup>1</sup> *Matt.* xiii. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Apt. *Qualified for; adapted to.* 'All that were strong and apt for war.'—*2 Kings.*

<sup>3</sup> Import. *To be of importance.* See page 21.

<sup>4</sup> Virgil, *Ecl.* vii. 51.

<sup>5</sup> *A. L.* i. vii. 11.

conclude, that no people overcharged with tribute is fit for empire.

Let States, that aim at greatness, take heed how their nobility and gentlemen do multiply too fast; for that maketh the common subject grow to be a peasant and base swain, driven out of heart, and, in effect, but a gentleman's labourer. Even as you may see in coppice woods, if you leave your straddles too thick, you shall never have clean underwood, but shrubs and bushes; so in countries, if the gentlemen be too many, the commons will be base—and you will bring it to that, that not the hundredth poll will be fit for an helmet, especially as to the infantry, which is the nerve of an army,—and so there will be great population and little strength. This which I speak of hath been no where better seen than by comparing of England and France; whereof England, though far less in territory and population, hath been, nevertheless, an overmatch; in regard<sup>1</sup> the middle people of England make good soldiers, which the peasants of France do not: herein the device of King Henry VII. (whereof I have spoken largely in the history of his life) was profound and admirable, in making farms and houses of husbandry of a standard, that is, maintained with such a proportion of land unto them, as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty, and no servile condition; and to keep the plough in the hands of the owners, and not mere hirelings; and thus indeed you shall attain to Virgil's character, which he gives to ancient Italy:—

‘Terra potens armis atque ubere glebae.’<sup>2</sup>

Neither is the estate<sup>3</sup> (which for anything I know, is almost peculiar to England, and hardly to be found anywhere else, except it be, perhaps, in Poland) to be passed over—I mean the state of free servants and attendants upon noblemen and gentlemen, which are no ways inferior unto the yeomanry for arms; and therefore, out of all question, the splendour and magnificence and great retinues, the hospitality of noblemen and gentlemen received into custom, do much conduce unto martial

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<sup>1</sup> In regard. *For the reason that; on account of.* ‘Change was thought necessary in regard of the injury the Church had received.’—Hooker.

<sup>2</sup> Virg. *Æneid*, i. 335.

‘For deeds of arms, and fertile soil renown’d.’

<sup>3</sup> Estate. *Order of men.* See page 135.

invasion offered, did implore their aids severally, yet the Romans would ever be the foremost, and leave it to none other to have the honour. As for the wars, which were anciently made on the behalf of a kind of party, or tacit conformity of state, I do not see how they may be well justified; as when the Romans made a war for the liberty of Græcia,<sup>1</sup> or when the Lacedæmonians and Athenians made war to set up or pull down democracies and oligarchies; or when wars were made by foreigners, under the pretence of justice or protection, to deliver the subjects of others from tyranny and oppression, and the like. Let it suffice, that no estate expect to be great, that is not awake upon any just occasion of arming.

No body can be healthful without exercise, neither natural body nor politic; and certainly, to a kingdom or estate, a just and honourable war is the true exercise. A civil war, indeed, is like the heat of a fever; but a foreign war is like the heat of exercise, and serveth to keep the body in health; for in a slothful peace, both courages will effeminate,<sup>2</sup> and manners corrupt: but howsoever it be for happiness, without all question for greatness, it maketh to be still for the most part in arms: and the strength of a veteran army (though it be a chargeable business), always on foot, is that which commonly giveth the law, or, at least, the reputation amongst all neighbour States, as may be well seen in Spain; which hath had, in one part or other, a veteran army almost continually, now by<sup>3</sup> the space of six-score years.

To be master of the sea<sup>4</sup> is an abridgment of a monarchy. Cicero, writing to Atticus of Pompey's preparation against Cæsar, saith, '*Concilium Pompeii plane Themistocleum est; putat enim, qui mari potitur, eum rerum potiri;*' and without doubt, Pompey, had tired out Cæsar, if upon vain confidence he had not left that way. We see the great effects of battles by sea: the battle of Actium decided the empire of the world; the battle of Lepanto arrested the greatness of the Turk. There be many

<sup>1</sup> Græcia. *Greece*. 'And the rough goat is the King of *Grecia*.'—*Dan.* viii. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Effeminate. *To become effeminate or weak.*

'In a slothful prince, courage will *effeminate*.'—*Pope*.

<sup>3</sup> By. *During*. 'By the space of three years I ceased not to warn every one, night and day, with tears.'—*Acts* xx. 31.

<sup>4</sup> 'Pompey's plan is plainly from Themistocles; for he judges that whoever becomes master of the sea is master of all things.'—*Ad Attic.* x. 8.

triumphs to themselves and their sons, for such wars as they did achieve in person, and left only for wars achieved by subjects some triumphal garments and ensigns to the general.

To conclude. No man can by care-taking (as the Scripture saith) 'add a cubit to his stature,' in this little model of a man's body; but in the great frame of kingdoms and commonwealths, it is in the power of princes, or estates, to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms; for by introducing such ordinances, constitutions, and customs, as we have now touched,<sup>1</sup> they may sow greatness to their posterity and succession. But these things are commonly not observed, but left to take their chance.

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## ANNOTATIONS.

*'All States that are liberal of naturalization towards strangers are fit for empire.'*

What Bacon says of naturalization is most true, and important, and not enough attended to. But he attributes more liberality in this point to the Romans than is their due. He seems to have forgotten their 'Social War,' brought on entirely by their refusal to admit their subjects to civil rights.

It is remarkable that, under the kings, and again under the emperors, there was the most of this liberality, and under the Republic, the least. This is quite natural: when it is the citizens that govern, they naturally feel jealous of others being admitted to an equality with them; but the sovereign has no reason to wish that one class or portion of his subjects should have an invidious advantage over another. There is an exception to this in cases where religious fanaticism comes in; as is to be seen in the Turkish empire, where christian subjects have always been kept as a kind of Helots.

On the ruinous results of keeping a portion of the people in such a state, I have already dwelt in the notes to the Essay on 'Seditions and Troubles.'

A somewhat similar disadvantage in respect of advancement

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<sup>1</sup> Touch. *To treat slightly.* 'If the antiquaries have *touched* it, they have immediately quitted it.'—*Addison.*



But there is nothing in which this providential guidance is more liable to be overlooked—no case in which we are more apt to mistake for the wisdom of Man what is, in truth, the wisdom of God.

In the results of instinct in brutes, we are sure, not only that, although the animals themselves are, in some sort, agents, they could not originally have designed the effects they produced, but that even afterwards they have no notion of the combination by which these are brought about. But when *human* conduct tends to some desirable end, and the agents are competent to perceive that the end *is* desirable, and the means well adapted to it, they are apt to forget that, in the great majority of instances, those means were not devised, nor those ends proposed, by the persons themselves who are thus employed. The workman, for instance, who is employed in casting printing-types, is usually thinking only of producing a commodity by the sale of which he may support himself. *With reference to this object*, he is acting, not from any impulse that is at all of the character of instinct, but from a rational and deliberate choice: but he is also, in the very same act, contributing most powerfully to the diffusion of knowledge; about which, perhaps, he has no anxiety or thought: *in reference to this latter object*, therefore, his procedure corresponds to those operations of various animals which we attribute to instinct; since *they*, doubtless, derive some immediate gratification from what they are doing. Indeed, in all departments connected with the acquisition and communication of knowledge, a similar procedure may be traced. The greater part of it is the gift, not of human, but of divine benevolence, which has implanted in Man a thirst after knowledge for its own sake, accompanied with a sort of instinctive desire, founded probably on sympathy, of communicating it to others, as an ultimate end. This, and also the love of display, are no doubt inferior motives, and will be superseded by a higher principle, in proportion as the individual advances in moral excellence. These motives constitute, as it were, a kind of scaffolding, which should be taken down by little and little, as the perfect building advances, but which is of indispensable use till that is completed.

It is to be feared, indeed, that Society would fare but ill if none did service to the Public, except in proportion as they

## ESSAY XXX. OF REGIMEN OF HEALTH.

THERE is a wisdom in this beyond the rules of physic: a man's own observation, what he finds good of,<sup>1</sup> and what he finds hurt of, is the best physic to preserve health; but it is a safer conclusion to say, 'This agreeth not well with me, therefore I will not continue it,' than this, 'I find no offence<sup>2</sup> of this, therefore I may use it:' for strength of nature in youth passeth over many excesses which are owing a man till his age. Discern of the coming on of years, and think not to do the same things still; for age will not be defied. Beware of sudden change in any great point of diet, and if necessity enforce it, fit the rest to it; for it is a secret, both in nature and state, that it is safer to change many things than one. Examine thy customs of diet, sleep, exercise, apparel, and the like, and try, in anything thou shalt judge hurtful, to discontinue it by little and little; but so as<sup>3</sup> if thou dost find any inconvenience by the change, thou come back to it again; for it is hard to distinguish that which is generally held good and wholesome, from that which is good particularly, and fit for thine own body. To be free-minded and cheerfully disposed at hours of meat<sup>4</sup> and sleep, and of exercise, is one of the best precepts of long lasting. As for the passions and studies of the mind, avoid envy, anxious fears, anger, fretting inwards, subtle and knotty inquisitions, joys and exhilarations in excess, sadness not communicated. Entertain hopes, mirth rather than joy, variety of delights rather than surfeit of them; wonder and admiration, and therefore novelties; studies that fill the mind with splendid and illustrious objects, as histories, fables, and contemplations of nature. If you fly physic in health altogether, it will be too strange for your body when you shall need it; if you make it

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<sup>1</sup> Of. *From*. See page 270.

<sup>2</sup> Offence. *Hurt; damage*. (Now seldom applied to physical injury.) 'The pains of the touch are greater than the offences of other senses.'—*Bacon*.

'To do offence and scath in Christendom.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>3</sup> As. *That*. See page 23.

<sup>4</sup> Meat. *Food; meals*.

'As he sat at his meat, the music played sweet.'—*Old Ballad*.

too familiar, it will work no extraordinary effect cometh. I commend<sup>1</sup> rather some diet for  $\alpha$  than frequent use of physic, except it be grown i for those diets alter the body more, and trouble i no new accident in your body, but ask opinion of nesses, respect<sup>2</sup> health principally, and in health, act that put their bodies to endure in health, may i nesses which are not very sharp, be cured only tendering. Celsus could never have spoken it a had he not been a wise man withal, when he give of the great precepts of health and lasting, that a and interchange contraries, but with an inclination benign extreme; use fasting and full eating, bu eating; watching and sleep, but rather sleep; sitti cise, but rather exercise, and the like; so sha cherished and yet taught masteries. Physicians them so pleasing and conformable to the humou tient, as<sup>3</sup> they press not the true cure of the disea others are so regular in proceeding according to disease, as they respect not sufficiently the cond patient. Take one of a middle temper, or, if it found in one man, combine two of either<sup>4</sup> sort; an to call as well the best acquainted with your body, reputed of for his faculty.

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## ANNOTATIONS.

It is remarkable that Bacon should have said no Essay, of early and late hours; though it is a gener opinion that early hours are conducive to longevity a proverb that

‘Early to bed, and early to rise,  
Makes a man healthy, and wealthy, and wise.’

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<sup>1</sup> Commend. *To recommend.* ‘I commend unto you Phœbe Romans xvi. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Respect. *Have regard to.* ‘In judgment seats, not man causes only ought to be respected.’—*Kettleworth.*

<sup>3</sup> As. *That.* See page 23.

<sup>4</sup> Either. *Each.* ‘On either side of the river.’—*Rev.* xxii. 2.

instinctive perception which most people have, in of the rest-time. It is well known that any one long accustomed to rise at a certain hour, will us that hour, *whatever* may have been the time of *bed*. It might have been expected that one who l to a certain number of hours' sleep, would, if on t he retired to rest an hour or two earlier, or later wake so much the earlier, or the later, when he accustomed time of sleep. But the fact is general. He will be likely to wake neither before nor aft tomed hour.

This, again, may be relied on as a fact: a student the universities, finding that his health was sufferin study and late hours, took to rising at five and goi ten, all the year round; and found his health—the as hard as ever—manifestly improved. But he fo unable to *compose* anything in the morning, thoug *take* in the sense of an author equally well. And write for a prize, he could not get his thoughts to t about his usual bedtime. Thinking that this might thing to do with the digestion, he took to dining earlier, in the hopes that then eight o'clock would the same as ten. But it made no difference. An severing in vain attempts for some time, he altered and for one week, till he had finished his essay, : wrote at night, and lay a-bed in the morning. He and correct in the day-time what he had written: not compose except at night. When his essay was returned to his early habits.

Now this is a decisive answer to those who sa *custom*; you write better at night, because that is t have been accustomed to employ for study;' fo custom was just the reverse. And equally vain is tion, that 'the night hours are *quiet*, and you : having no *interruption*.' For this student was su quite free from interruption from five o'clock till at eight. And the streets were much *more still* th midnight. And again: any explanation connected *light* breaks down equally. For, as far as that is c the winter-time it makes no difference whether you

suffer ; but have led a life of quiet retirement, without of body or mind,—avoiding all troublesome exertions, seeking only a comfortable obscurity. Such men, with strong constitution, and if they escape any remissions, are likely to live long. But much affliction, exertion, and, still more, both combined, will be upon the constitution—if not at once, yet at least, in the end. One who is of the character of an active man, or, still more, both combined, though he may have lived long in everything but years, will rarely reach the age of the neuters.

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he suspects: for thereby he shall be sure to know truth of them than he did before, and withal shew party more circumspect, not to give further cause but this would<sup>1</sup> not be done to men of base nature if they find themselves once suspected, will not. The Italian says, 'Sospetto licencia fede';<sup>2</sup> as if give a passport to faith; but it ought rather to discharge itself.

## ANTITHETA ON SUSPICION.

PRO.					CONTE
*	*	*	*	*	'Suspicio fidem abs'
'Merito ejus fides suspecta est, quam suspicio labefacit.					'He who is suspect honour.'
'The fidelity which suspicion over- throws, deserves to be suspected.'					

## ANNOTATIONS.

*'Suspensions amongst thoughts are like bats among  
they ever fly by twilight.'*

As there are dim-sighted persons, who live in a perpetual twilight, so there are some who, having no clearness of head, nor a very elevated tone of mind, are perpetually haunted by suspicions of everybody and everything. Such a man attributes—judging in great measure from interested and selfish motives to every one. He has no great confidence in his own penetration, and gives no credit for an open and straightforward character. He always suspect some underhand dealings in every transaction, when he is unable to perceive any motive for such conduct, when the character of the party affords no ground for suspicion ('Ill-doers are ill-deemers').<sup>3</sup> One, on the contrary, has a fair share of intelligence, and is himself tho

<sup>1</sup> Would. Should. 'As for percolation, which belongeth to it, would be made by clarifying, by a clarion of milk put into warm water.' *Nat. History.*

<sup>2</sup> 'Suspicion releases faith.'

<sup>3</sup> See *Proverbs for C*

their honour, never thought (except a very few *ones*) of telling a falsehood to *him*.

A person who once held offices of high importance, of great difficulty and delicacy, was enabled to see more than thirty years' experience, that though he had to employ many persons in confidential service, and to part to them some most momentous secrets, he had never had his confidence betrayed. No one of them had ever confided to him, or in any way trusted reposed in him. Of course, this person did not trust indiscriminately; nor did he trust all to an equal degree. He occasionally found men turn out worse than he expected, and often had plots and cabals formed against him, and lies told to him. But he never was, properly *trayed*. He always went on the principle of trusting some men are thoroughly honest, and some utterly dishonest, and some intermediate; and thoroughly trusting, and some distrusting, where he saw good reasons for doing so, reserving his judgment respecting the rest: not putting them in their power—yet not making them objects of suspicion without cause,—but letting them see that he *hoped* in them, and considered the presumption to be on the side of trust till guilt is proved.

A man of an opposite character, who was long in a high and important position, afforded matter for doubt and discussion among those who knew him, as to the opinion he entertained of mankind. Some thought that he had a very good, and very mean, estimate of men in general. And each was right in a certain sense, right. He seems to have regarded as being what a person of truly elevated moral character would have called base and contemptible; but *he* did not show such disapprobation or contempt for them, because he had no notion of anything better. He was a very good-humoured and far from a misanthrope; and he could no more dislike or despise men for being nothing superior to them, than we should be said to do so for being no more than brutes. He might therefore, to have thought very favourably of mankind, in thinking most men to be as virtuous as any man need be—and as doing nothing that he, or any one, need

an attack of pain, or harassing anxieties, or the or their misfortunes and calamities, or signal trial, or signal discomfitures of virtue, or, above all, conscious neglect of duty—a man shall sometimes find himself lost sight even of those primal truths on which he is accustomed to gaze as on the stars of the firmament, serene, and unchangeable; even such truths as tell of God, his paternal government of the world, and the origin of Christianity.

‘In these moods, objections which he thought had been dead and buried, start again into sudden existence and do more: like the escaped genius of the *Arabian Nights*, rises from the little bottle in which he had been imprisoned in the shape of a thin smoke, which finally assumes the form of lines, and towers to the skies, these flimsy objections expand to monstrous dimensions, and fill the whole sphere of his mind. The arguments by which we have been accustomed to support them seem to have vanished, or, if they appear, they are diminished in force and vividness. If we may pursue the simile we have just made, we even wonder how such a vision should ever have been compressed into so narrow a space. The poet tells us, that when his pilgrims, under the perturbation of previous terrible visions, turned the perspective of the Celestial City from the summits of the Delectable Mountains, their hands shook so that they could not steady the instrument; yet they *thought* they saw the gate, like the gate, and also ‘some of the glory of the presence,’ even so with many of the moods in which others attempt to gaze in the same direction; a deep haze has settled over the golden pinnacles and the ‘gate,’ and they, for a moment, doubt whether what others have seen, and what they flatter themselves they have seen, be anything else than a gorgeous vision in the imagination, and ‘faith’ is no longer ‘the substance of things not seen,’ and the evidence of ‘things not seen.’

‘And as there are probably few who have profoundly contemplated the evidences of truth, who have not felt them at a moment at least, and sometimes for a yet longer time, on the verge of universal scepticism, and about to turn away, without star or compass, on a boundless ocean



and perplexity, so these states of feeling are peculiarly apt to infest the highest order of minds. For if, on the one hand, these can best discern and estimate the evidence which proves any truth, they, on the other, can see most clearly and feel most strongly the nature and extent of the objections which oppose it; while they are, at the same time, just as liable as the vulgar to the disturbing influences already adverted to. This liability is of course doubled, when its subject, as in the case of Pascal, labours under the disadvantage of a gloomy temperament.

‘A circumstance which in these conflicts of mind often gives *sceptical* objections an undue advantage is, that the great truths which it is more especially apt to assail are generally the result of an accumulation of proof by induction, or are even dependent on quite separate trains of argument. The mind, therefore, cannot comprehend them at a glance, and feel at once their integrated force, but must examine them in detail by successive acts of mind,—just as we take the measurement of magnitudes too vast to be seen at once, in successive small portions. The existence of God, the moral government of the world, the divine origin of Christianity, are all truths of this stamp. Pascal, in one of his *Pensées*, refers to this infirmity of the logical faculties. He justly observes—‘To have a series of proofs incessantly before the mind is beyond our power.’ D’en avoir toujours les preuves présentes, c’est trop d’affaire.

‘From the inability of the mind to retain in perpetuity, or to comprehend at a glance, a long chain of evidence, or the total effect of various lines of argument, Pascal truly observes that it is not sufficient for the security of our convictions, and their due influence over our belief and practice, that we have proved them, once for all, by a process of reasoning:—they must be, if possible, tinctured and coloured by the imagination, informed and animated by feeling, and rendered vigorous and practical by habit. His words are well worth writing:—‘Reason acts slowly, and with so many views upon so many principles which it is necessary should be always present, that it is perpetually dropping asleep, and is lost for want of having all its principles present to it. The affections do not act thus; they act instantaneously, and are always ready for action. It

is necessary, therefore, to imbue our faith with  
wise it will be always vacillating.'

'It will not, of course, be imagined that, in the  
we have now made, we are disposed to be the  
scepticism; or even, so far as it is yielded to, of  
doubt to which we affirm even the most powerful  
only liable, but liable in defiance of what are the  
strong convictions. So far as such states of mind  
tary (and for an instant they often are, till, in  
collects itself, and repels them), they are of course  
not of blame, but of pity. So far as they are due  
fluctuations of feeling, or upon physical causes  
at all modify or control, it is our duty to summon  
resist the assault, and reflect on the nature of  
which has so often appeared to us little less  
strative.

'We are not, then, the apologists of scepticism,  
approaching it; we are merely stating a psycholog-  
ical proof of which we appeal to the recorded opi-  
nions of many great minds, and to the experience of those  
who have reflected deeply enough on any large and difficult  
question to know what can be said for or against it.

'The asserted fact is, that *habitual* belief of the  
strongest character is sometimes checkered with  
moments of doubt and misgiving, and that, even when there  
is *disbelief*—no, not for a moment; the mind may, in  
moods, form a very diminished estimate of the  
value of the belief which is founded, and grievously understat-  
ing. We believe that both these states of mind  
have been occasionally experienced by Pascal—the latter, however,  
more frequently than the former; and hence, as we appeal  
to him to account for those passages in which he speaks  
of the evidence for the existence of a God, or for the truth of  
Christianity as less conclusive than he ordinarily believed, or  
at other times declared them.

'At such times, the clouds may be supposed to  
lower upon this lofty mind.

'So little inconsistent with a *habit* of intelligent  
faith, such transient invasions of doubt, or such diminis-

learned to exercise thus much of practical faith, partly, on the score of *his* not being able to comprehend truths of which he yet has greater evidence *direct* evidence, of their being truths, than he has contrary. Now, 'if we have had earthly fathers, at them reverence,' after this fashion, and, when we men, have applauded our submission as appropriate of dependence, 'shall we not much rather the Father of Spirits, and live?' If, then, the scene of moral education and discipline, it seems that the evidence of the truths we believe should with difficulties and liable to objections, not strongly force assent, nor so obscure as to elude sincere inquiry.

'God, according to the memorable aphorism of 1 cited, has afforded sufficient light to those whose see, and left sufficient obscurity to perplex those such wish. All that seems necessary or reasonable that as we are certainly not called upon to believe *without* reason, nor without a *preponderance* of evidence shall be such as our faculties are capable with; and that the objections shall be only such as us upon any other hypothesis, or are insoluble only transcend altogether the limits of the human understanding which last circumstance can be no valid reason, apart grounds, either for accepting or rejecting a given doctrine.

'Now, we contend, that it is in this equitable way has dealt with us as moral agents, in relation to all truths which lie at the basis of religion and morality may add, in relation to the divine origin of Christianity evidence is all of such a *nature* as we are accustomed to deal with and to act upon; while the objections either such as reappear in every other theory, or difficulties absolutely beyond the limits of the human understanding. (Pages 217-218.)

.....

'It is much the same with the evidences of Christianity. Whether a certain amount and complexity of testimony is likely to be false; whether it is likely that not one, but a number of men, would endure ignominy, persecution, and

it ought to know best—itself, and finds there the  
 of all mysteries,—when we reflect that when a  
 what itself is, it is obliged to confess that it know  
 the matter—nothing either of its own essence  
 operation,—that it is sometimes inclined to think  
 and sometimes immaterial—that it cannot quite  
 clusion whether the body really exists, or is a  
 what way (if the body really exists) the intimate  
 the two is maintained,—when we see it perplexed  
 sion, even to conceive how these phenomena can  
 —proclaiming it to be an almost equal contradict  
 that matter can think, or the soul be material  
 tion maintained between two totally different su  
 yet admitting that one of these must be true, the  
 satisfactorily determine which,—when we reflec  
 surely we cannot but feel that the spectacle of  
 Being refusing to believe a proposition, merely *beca*  
 its comprehension, is, of all paradoxes, the most pa  
 of all absurdities, the most ludicrous.’ (Pages 219

‘*There is nothing makes a man suspect much, more  
 little ; and, therefore, men should remedy susp  
 curing to know more.*’

This is equally true of the suspicions that hav  
 things as of persons. I extract a passage beari  
 point, from the *Cautions for the Times* :—

‘Multitudes are haunted by the spectres, as it  
 surmises and indefinite suspicions, which continue  
 them, just because they are vague and indefinite,  
 mind has never ventured to look them boldly in  
 put them into a shape in which reason can exami

‘Now, would it not be an act of great charity  
 persons to persuade them to cast away their  
 timidity, and scrutinize such objections, instead  
 banish them by force? For though, no doubt, *so*  
 and objections will always remain that cannot be d  
 up or answered, yet the vastly greatest numbe  
 objections and difficulties can be satisfactorily rem  
 ful examination and increased knowledge ; and t

of this will lead us to be confident that, if we could proportionately enlarge our faculties and acquirements (which is what we may hope for in a better world), the rest would vanish also. And, in the meanwhile, it is of great importance to know exactly what they are, lest our fancies should unduly magnify their number and weight ; and also in order to make us see that they are as nothing in comparison of the still greater difficulties on the opposite side,—namely, the objections which we should have to encounter, if we *rejected* Christianity.

‘ Well, but,’ it is said, ‘ though that course may be the best for well-read and skilful Divines, it is better not to notice objections *generally*, for fear of alarming and unsettling the minds of plain unlearned people, who had probably never heard of anything of the kind. Let them continue to read their Bible without being disturbed by any doubts or suspicions that might make them uneasy.’

‘ Now, if in some sea-chart for the use of mariners, the various rocks and shoals which a vessel has to pass in a certain voyage, were to be wholly omitted, and no notice taken of them, no doubt many persons might happen to make the voyage safely, and with a comfortable feeling of security, from not knowing at all of the existence of any such dangers. But suppose some one did strike on one of these rocks, from not knowing—though the makers of the chart did—of its existence, and consequently perished in a shipwreck which he might have been taught to avoid,—on whose head would his blood lie ?

‘ And again, if several voyagers came to suspect, from vague rumours, that rocks and shoals (perhaps more formidable than the real ones) did lie in their course, without any correct knowledge where they lay, or how to keep clear of them, then, so far from enjoying freedom from apprehension, they would be exposed to increased alarm—and much of it needless alarm,—without being, after all, preserved from danger.

‘ And so it is in the present case. Vague hints that learned men have objected to such and such things, and have questioned this or that, often act like an inward slow-corroding canker in the minds of some who have never read or heard anything distinct on the subject ; and who, for that very reason, are apt to imagine these objections, &c., to be much more formidable than they really are. For there are people of perverse mind, who,

really possessing both learning and ingenuity, will to dress up in a plausible form something which perfectly silly: and the degree to which this is so is what no one can easily conceive without actual examination.

‘ It is, therefore, often useful, in dealing even with learned, to take notice of groundless and fanciful interpretations, contained in books which probably I will never see, and which some of them perhaps will hear of; because many persons are a good deal influenced by reports, and obscure rumours, of the opinions of some learned man, without knowing distinctly what they are likely to be made uneasy and distrustful by the fact that this or that has been disputed, and so and so decided by some person of superior knowledge and talents, who has proceeded on ‘ rational ’ grounds; when, perhaps, they are qualified by their own plain sense to perceive how these fanciful notions are, and to form a right judgment on matters in question.

‘ Suppose you were startled in a dark night by something which looked like a spectre in a winding-sheet,—would you not rather should bring a lantern, and show you that it was no more than a white cloth hanging on a bush, give you far better satisfaction than he who merely exhorted you to ‘ look at it and keep up your heart, whistle, and pass on? ’

No avowedly anti-christian advocate is half so dangerous as those professed believers who deprecate and deride all *evidence*,—all endeavour to ‘ prove all things, and hold fast that which is good,’ and to be always ‘ ready to give a reason for the hope that is in us.’<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See *Elements of Logic*, Appendix iii.

## ESSAY XXXII. OF DISCOURSE.

SOME in their discourse desire rather commendation of wit, in being able to hold all arguments, than of judgment, in discerning what is true; as if it were a praise to know what might be said, and not what should be thought. Some have certain commonplaces and themes, wherein they are good, and want variety; which kind of poverty is for the most part tedious, and, when it is once perceived, ridiculous. The honourablest part of the talk is to give the occasion; and again to moderate and pass to somewhat else, for then a man leads the dance. It is good in discourse, and speech of conversation, to vary and intermingle speech of the present occasion with arguments, tales with reasons, asking of questions with telling of opinions, and jest with earnest; for it is a dull thing to tire, and as we say now, to jade<sup>1</sup> anything too far. As for jest, there be certain things which ought to be privileged from it—namely, religion, matters of state, great persons, any man's present business of importance, and any case that deserveth pity; yet there be some that think their wits have been asleep, except they dart out somewhat that is piquant, and to the quick—that is a vein which would be bridled:—

‘Parce puer stimulis, et fortius utere loris.’<sup>2</sup>

And, generally, men ought to find the difference between saltiness and bitterness. Certainly, he that hath a satirical vein, as he maketh others afraid of his wit, so he had need be afraid of others' memory. He that questioneth much shall learn much, and content much, but especially if he apply his questions to the skill of the persons whom he asketh, for he shall give them occasion to please themselves in speaking, and himself shall continually gather knowledge; but let his questions not be troublesome, for that is fit for a poser;<sup>3</sup> and let him be sure

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<sup>1</sup> Jade. *To over-ride or drive.*

‘I do not now fool myself to let imagination jade me.’—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>2</sup> ‘Boy, spare the spur, and more tightly hold the reins.’—Ovid. *Met.* ii. 127.

<sup>3</sup> Poser. *Examiner.* (From *pose*, to interrogate closely.)\* ‘She posed him, and sifted him to try whether he were the very Duke of York or not.’—Bacon's *Henry VII.*

to leave other men their turns to speak—nay, if that would reign and take up all the time, let him to take them off, and bring others on, as musician with those that dance too long galliards.<sup>1</sup> If you sometimes your knowledge of that<sup>2</sup> you are thought, you shall be thought, another time, to know that your Speech of a man's self ought to be seldom, and I knew one was wont to say in scorn, 'He must wise man, he speaks so much of himself,'—and the case wherein a man may commend himself with a and that is in commending virtue in another, especially such a virtue whereunto himself pretendeth.<sup>3</sup> Speech towards others should be sparingly used; for discourse to be as a field, without coming home to any man. Two noblemen, of the west part of England, where was given to scoff, but kept ever royal cheer in his other would ask of those that had been at the other 'Tell truly, was there never a flout<sup>4</sup> or dry blow given which the guest would answer, 'Such and such a thing. The lord would say, 'I thought he would mar a good

Discretion of speech is more than eloquence; and agreeably<sup>5</sup> to him with whom we deal, is more than in good words or in good order. A good continuance without a good speech of interlocation, shows slow good reply, or second speech, without a good setting showeth shallowness and weakness. As we see in those that are weakest in the course, are yet nimble

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<sup>1</sup> Galliard. *A sprightly dance.*

'Gay galliards here my love shall dance,  
Whilst I my foes goe fighte.'—*Fair Rosamond.*

'What is thy excellence in a galliard, Knight?'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>2</sup> That. *What; that which.* See page 73.

<sup>3</sup> Pretend to. *Lay claim to.* 'Those countries that pretend to Swift.

<sup>4</sup> Touch. *Particular application.* 'Dr. Parker, in his sermon touched them for their being so near that they went near to touch life.'—*Hayward.*

<sup>5</sup> Flout. *Jeer; taunt; gibe.*

'These doors are barred against a bitter flout;  
Snarl if you please; but you shall snarl without.'—*Dryden.*

'Full of comparisons and wounding flouts.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>6</sup> Agreeably. *In a manner suited.*



turn ; as it is betwixt the greyhound and the hare. To use too many circumstances<sup>1</sup> ere<sup>2</sup> one come to the matter, is wearisome ; to use none at all, is blunt.

## ANNOTATIONS.

Among the many just and admirable remarks in this essay on 'Discourse,' Bacon does not notice the distinction—which is an important one—between those who speak because they *wish to say something*, and those who speak because they have *something to say* : that is, between those who are aiming at displaying their own knowledge or ability, and those who speak from fullness of matter, and are thinking only of the matter, and not of themselves and the opinion that will be formed of them. This latter, Bishop Butler calls (in reference to writings) 'a man's writing with simplicity, and in earnest.' It is curious to observe how much more agreeable is even inferior conversation of this latter description, and how it is preferred by many,—they know not why—who are not accustomed to analyse their own feelings, or to inquire why they like or dislike.

Something nearly coinciding with the above distinction, is that which some draw between an 'unconscious' and a 'conscious' manner ; only that the latter extends to persons who are not courting applause, but anxiously guarding against censure. By a 'conscious' manner is meant, in short, a continual thought about oneself, and about what the company will think of us. The continual effort and watchful care on the part of the speaker, either to obtain approbation, or at least to avoid disapprobation, always communicates itself, in a certain degree, to the hearers.

Some draw a distinction, again, akin to the above, between the *desire to please*, and the *desire to give pleasure* ; meaning by the former an anxiety to obtain for yourself the good opinion

<sup>1</sup> Circumstances. *Non-essential particulars ; adjuncts.*

'This peroration, with such *circumstance*.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>2</sup> Ere. *Before.* 'The nobleman said unto him, Sir, come down *ere* my child die.'—*John* iv. 49.

of those you converse with, and by the other, the *them*.

Aristotle, again, draws the distinction between the *Bomolochus*,—that the former seems to thr for his own amusement, and the other for that o It is this latter, however, that is really the ‘consc because he is evidently seeking to obtain credit a diversion of the company. The word seems nea to what we call a ‘*wag*.’ The other is letting things merely from his own fulness.

When that which has been called ‘consciousness with great timidity, it constitutes what we call thing disagreeable to others, and a most intense subject of it.

There are many (otherwise) sensible people who a young person of that very common complaint, him not to be shy,—telling him what an awkward it has,—and that it prevents his doing himself All which is manifestly pouring oil on the fire to For, the very cause of shyness is an over-anxiety people are thinking of you ; a morbid attention t appearance. The course, therefore, that ought to is exactly the reverse. The sufferer should be think as little as possible about himself, and the op of him,—to be assured that most of the comp trouble their heads about him,—and to harden him impertinent criticisms that may be supposed to be taking care only to do what is right, leaving others say what they will.

And the more intensely occupied any one is with matter of what he is saying—the business itself engaged in,—the less will his thoughts be turned and what others think of him.

A. was, as a youth, most distressingly bashful. in Orders, he was staying at a friend’s house, who also another clergyman, who was to preach, and w to him how *nervous* he always felt in preaching church,—asking whether the other did not feel the haps he expected to be complimented on his mod replied, ‘I never allow myself to feel nervous i

on any one or two of these very persons, separate in a great degree, true of all men, which was Athenians, that they were like sheep, of which a easily driven than a single one.

‘ Another remarkable circumstance, connected going, is the difference in respect of the style which respectively, in addressing a multitude, and two of the same persons. A much *bolder*, as well as kind of language is both allowable and advisable to a considerable number; as Aristotle has remarking of the *Graphic* and *Agonistic* styles,—the former the closet, the latter, to public speaking before assembly. And he ingeniously compares them to styles of painting: the greater the crowd, he said distant is the view; so that in scene-painting, coarser and bolder touches are required, and the which would delight a close spectator, would be lost not, however, account for the phenomena in question.

‘ The solution of them will be found by attending to the curious and complex play of sympathies which take place in a large assembly; and (within certain limits), the more the proportion to its numbers. First, it is to be observed that we are disposed to sympathize with any emotion which exists in the mind of any one present; and hence, at the same time otherwise disposed to feel that our disposition is in consequence heightened. In the assembly we not only ourselves feel this tendency, but we feel that others do the same; and thus, we sympathize with the other emotions of the rest, but also with sympathy towards us. Any emotion, accordingly, which is still further heightened by the knowledge that there are present who not only feel the same, but feel it the more in consequence of their sympathy with ourselves. We are sensible that those around us sympathize not only with ourselves, but with each other also; and as we are heightened feeling of theirs likewise, the stimulus to our minds is thereby still further increased.

The case of the *Ludicrous* affords the most obvious

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<sup>1</sup> *Rhetoric*, book iii.

tion of these principles, from the circumstance that the effects produced are so open and palpable. If anything of this nature occurs, you are disposed, by the character of the thing itself, to laugh; but much more, if any one else is known to be present whom you think likely to be diverted with it; even though that other should not know of your presence; but much more still, if he does know it; because you are then aware that sympathy with your emotion heightens his: and most of all will the disposition to laugh be increased, if many are present; because each is then aware that they all sympathize with each other, as well as with himself. It is hardly necessary to mention the exact correspondence of the fact with the above explanation. So important, in this case, is the operation of the causes here noticed, that hardly any one ever laughs when he is quite alone; or if he does, he will find, on consideration, that it is from a *conception* of the presence of some companion whom he thinks likely to have been amused, had he been present, and to whom he thinks of describing, or repeating, what had diverted himself. Indeed, in other cases, as well as the one just instanced, almost every one is aware of the *infectious* nature of any emotion excited in a large assembly. It may be compared to the increase of sound by a number of echoes, or of light, by a number of mirrors; or to the blaze of a heap of firebrands, each of which would speedily have gone out if kindled separately, but which, when thrown together, help to kindle each other.

‘The application of what has been said to the case before us is sufficiently obvious. In addressing a large assembly, you know that each of them sympathizes both with your own anxiety to acquit yourself well, and also with the same feeling in the minds of the rest. You know also, that every slip you may be guilty of, that may tend to excite ridicule, pity, disgust, &c., makes the stronger impression on each of the hearers, from their mutual sympathy, and their consciousness of it. This augments your anxiety. Next, you know that each hearer, putting himself mentally in the speaker’s place,<sup>1</sup> sympathizes with this aug-

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<sup>1</sup> Hence it is that *shy* persons are, as is matter of common remark, the more distressed by this infirmity when in company with those who are subject to the same.

mented anxiety : which is, by this thought, increased. And if you become at all embarrassed, the knowers are so many to sympathize, not only with that but also with each other's feelings on the point, heightens your confusion to the utmost.

'The same causes will account for a skilful orator able to rouse so much more easily, and more passions of a *multitude* : they inflame each other by sympathy and mutual consciousness of it. A speech that a bolder kind of language is suitable to such a passage which, in the closet, might, just at the point, tend to excite awe, compassion, indignation, or any other emotion, but which would, on a moment's cool reflection, be extravagant, may be very suitable for the *Agon*, because, *before* that moment's reflection could take place in the hearer's mind, he would be aware, that every one sympathized in that first emotion ; which would thus be much heightened as to preclude, in a great degree, of any counteracting sentiment.

'If one could suppose such a case as that of a man (himself aware of the circumstance), addressing a crowd each of whom believed himself to be the *sole* hearer, that little or no embarrassment would be the result, but much more sober, calm, and finished style of language would be adopted.'

There are two kinds of orators, the distinction between which might be thus illustrated. When the moon shines at night we are apt to say, 'How beautiful is this *moon-light*!'—at the day-time, 'How beautiful are the trees, the flowers, the mountains!'—and, in short, all the *objects* that are before us. We never speak of the sun that makes them so. In the same way, the really greatest orator shines like the sun, you think much of the *things* he is speaking of ; he best shines like the moon, making you think much of his *eloquence*.

*'To use too many circumstances, ere you come to the matter, is wearisome.'*

Bacon might have noticed some who *never* 'come to the matter.' How many a meandering discourse one hears, in which the speaker aims at nothing, and—hits it.

*'If you dissemble sometimes your knowledge of that you are thought to know, you shall be thought, another time, to know that you know not.'*

This suggestion might have come in among the tricks enumerated in the Essay on 'Cunning.'

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## ESSAY XXXIII. OF PLANTATIONS

**P**LANTATIONS are amongst ancient, primitive works. When the world was young it begeth children, but now it is old, it begets fewer ; for I may call new plantations to be the children of former kingdoms. A plantation in a pure soil, that is, where people are planted<sup>1</sup> to the end to plant in others ; for else is more extirpation than a plantation. Planting of countries is the planting of woods ; for you must make account of twenty years' profit, and expect your recompense for the principal thing that hath been the destruction of plantations, hath been the base and hasty drawing in the first years. It is true, speedy profit is not to be as far as it may stand<sup>2</sup> with the good of the plantation farther.

It is a shameful and unblessed thing to take good people and wicked condemned men, to be the seed whom you plant ; and not only so, but it spoileth the nation ; for they will ever live like rogues, and not like good men, but be lazy, and do mischief, and spend victuals, and grow weary, and then certify over to their country to thank the plantation. The people wherewith you plant are gardeners, ploughmen, labourers, smiths, carpenters, fishermen, fowlers, with some few apothecaries, surgeons, and bakers. In a country of plantation, first look to what kind of victual the country yields of itself to have ; as nuts, walnuts, pine-apples, olives, dates, plums, cherries, honey, and the like, and make use of them. Then to what victual or esculent things there are, which grow without and within the year ; as parsneps, carrots, turnips,

<sup>1</sup> Plantations. *Colonies*. 'Towns here are few, either of plantations.'—*Heylin*.

<sup>2</sup> Displant. 'Those French pirates that *displanted* us.'—*Beauclerk*.

<sup>3</sup> Stand. *To be consistent with*. 'His faithful people, what they ask, they shall receive, as far as may stand with the glory of God everlasting good.'—*Hooker*.

cannot but yield great profit; soap ashes like things that may be thought of; but moil<sup>1</sup> not ground, for the hope of mines is very uncertain make the planters lazy in other things. For it be in the hands of one, assisted with some of them have commission to exercise martial law limitation. And, above all, let men make that in the wilderness, as<sup>2</sup> they have God always, a before their eyes. Let not the government of depend upon too many counsellors and under country that planteth, but upon a temperate number those be rather noblemen and gentlemen, than such they look ever to the present gain. Let there be freedom from custom, till the plantation be of strength, freedom from custom, but freedom to carry their trade where they may make their best of them, except<sup>4</sup> a special cause of caution. Cram not in people, but fast, company after company, but rather hearken waste, and send supplies proportionably; but so as they may live well in the plantation, and not by superfluity. It hath been a great endangering to some plantations, that they have built along the sea in marish<sup>6</sup> and unwholesome grounds; therefore, begin there, to avoid carriage and other like disadvantages build still rather upwards from the stream than downwards. It concerneth likewise the health of the plantation

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<sup>1</sup> Moil. *To toil; to drudge.*

‘Now he must moil and drudge for one he loathes.’—*D*

<sup>2</sup> As. *That.* See page 23.

<sup>3</sup> Undertakers. *Managers of affairs.*

‘Nay, if you be an undertaker, I am for you.’—*Shakes*

—(Now confined to the managers of funerals.)

<sup>4</sup> Except. *Unless.* See page 282.

<sup>5</sup> Hearken. *Watch; observe.*

‘They do me too much injury

That ever said I *hearkened* for your death.’—*Shak*

‘I mount the terrass, thence the town survey,

And *hearken* what the fruitful sounds convey.’—*I*

<sup>6</sup> Marish. *Marshy; swampy.* ‘The fen and quagmire, so made to be drained.’—*Tusser.*

<sup>7</sup> Discommodities. *Inconveniences.* ‘We stand balancing the two corrupt disciplines.’—*Milton.*



have good store of salt with them, that they may use it in their victuals when it shall be necessary.

If you plant where savages are, do not only entertain them with trifles and gingles, but use them justly and graciously, with sufficient guard, nevertheless; and do not win their favour by helping them to invade their enemies, but for their defence, it is not amiss; and send oft<sup>1</sup> of them over to the country that plants, that they may see a better condition than their own, and commend it when they return.

When the plantation grows to strength, then it is time to plant with women as well as with men, that the plantation may spread into generations, and not be ever pieced from without. It is the sinfulness thing in the world to forsake or destitute<sup>2</sup> a plantation once in forwardness; for, besides the dishonour, it is the guiltiness of blood of many commiserable<sup>3</sup> persons.

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## ANNOTATIONS.

*‘It is a shameful and unblessed thing to take the scum of people, and wicked condemned men, to be the people with whom you plant.’*

Yet two-and-a-half centuries after Bacon’s time, the English government, in opposition to the remonstrances of the enlightened and most emphatically experienced philanthropist—Howard,—established its penal colonies in Australia, and thus, in the language of Shakespere, ‘began an impudent nation.’

It is now above a quarter of a century since I began pointing out to the public the manifold mischiefs of such a system; and with Bacon and Howard on my side, I persevered in braving all the obloquy and ridicule that were heaped on me. But successive ministries, of the most opposite political parties,

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<sup>1</sup> Oft. *Often* (chiefly used in poetry).

*‘Oft she rejects, but never once offends.’—Pope.*

<sup>2</sup> Destitute. *To leave destitute.* ‘Suppose God thus destitute us, yet over-anxiety, or solicitude, or using of unlawful means, can never be able to secure us.’—*Hammond.*

<sup>3</sup> Commiserable. *Worthy of compassion.* ‘This commiserable person, Edward.’—*Bacon’s Henry VII.*

agreed in supporting what the most eminent Po of the present day had described as ' a system b of all reason, and persevered in in defiance of al

' *And not only so, but it spoileth the pla*

Bacon has not pointed out one particular disa mode of colonization. The emancipists, as th those who have come out as convicts,—are desc by some advocates of the system, as for the ; unthrifty settlers ; and the *currency*, those born are represented as *generally preferring a seafari the odious associations of crime and slavery conne cultural pursuits*,—a feeling perfectly natural unde stances, but the very last one we would wish to fir One of the results—not, I apprehend, originally when penal colonies were established in New So the English government,—is that these ' wicke men ' have planted for themselves several volun escaping in small craft either to the South S many of which, for a good while past, each native a prime-minister some choice graduate of the Newgate), or, more frequently, to some part of New Holland. Thus the land is certainly plan planted with the worst of weeds, according to experiment suggested, in the *Tempest*, for Prosper

' *Gonzalo*. Had I plantation of this isle, my lord .  
*Antonio*. He'd sow it with nettle seed.'

This was one of the arguments put forward l hope of awakening the public mind to the real extent of the evil, in a pamphlet in the form o dressed to Earl Grey, from which I give some ext

' The defenders of the system generally keep ou inconsistency of professing to aim at the mutual mother country and the colonies, on a plan which in direct opposition : and present, separately an the supposed advantage of ' getting rid ' (as it criminals, and that of encouraging a growing col withdraw the attention from the real incompat two.

‘In other subjects, as well as in this, I have observed that two distinct objects may, by being dexterously presented, again and again in quick succession, to the mind of a cursory reader, be so associated together *in his thoughts*, as to be conceived capable, when in fact they are not, of being *actually* combined in practice. The fallacious belief thus induced bears a striking resemblance to the optical illusion effected by that ingenious and philosophical toy called the ‘*thaumatrope*,’ in which two objects painted on opposite sides of a card,—for instance, a man, and a horse,—a bird, and a cage,—are by a quick rotatory motion, made to impress the eye in combination, so as to form one picture, of the man on the horse’s back,—the bird in the cage, &c. As soon as the card is allowed to remain at rest, the figures, of course, appear as they really are, separate and on opposite sides. A mental illusion closely analogous to this is produced, when, by a rapid and repeated transition from one subject to another, alternately, the mind is deluded into an idea of the actual combination of things that are really incompatible. The chief part of the defence which various writers have advanced in favour of the system of penal colonies consists, in truth, of a sort of intellectual thaumatrope. The prosperity of the colony, and the repression of crime, are, by a sort of rapid whirl, presented to the mind as combined in one picture. A very moderate degree of calm and fixed attention soon shows that the two objects are painted on *opposite sides* of the card.

‘In aid of this and the other modes of defence resorted to, a topic is introduced from time to time in various forms, which is equally calculated to meet all objections whatever on all subjects:—that no human system can be expected to be perfect; that some partial inconvenience in one part or in another must be looked for; and that no plan can be so well devised as not to require vigilant and judicious superintendence, to keep it in effectual operation, and to guard against the abuses to which it is liable, &c. &c.

‘All this is very true, but does not in reality at all meet the present objections. Though we cannot build a house which shall never need repair, we may avoid such a misconstruction as shall cause it to fall down by its own weight. Though it be impossible to construct a time-piece which shall need no winding up, and which shall go with perfect exactitude, we may

guard against the error of making the wheels nece each other's motions. And though a plan of pe which shall unite all conceivable advantages and l abuses, be unattainable, it is at least something g but keep clear of a system which by its very con have a *constant and radically inherent tendency principal object.*

'For, let any one but calmly reflect for a few the position of a governor of one of our penal colo the problem proposed to him of accomplishing twc in reality inconsistent objects: to legislate and g best manner with a view to—1st, *the prosperity o* and also, 2ndly, *the suitable punishment of the con* well known that *slave labour* is the least profitab seldom be made profitable at all, but by the n difficult, troublesome, and odious superintendence. obvious way, therefore, of making the labour of the advantageous as possible to the colony, is to ma unlike slaves as possible,—to place them under such and with such masters, as to ensure their obtainin ample supplies both of necessities and comforts, b spectis favourable and even indulgent treatment; in s them as much as possible in the *comfortable situatio labourers enjoy*, where labour is so valuable, as fron dence of land, and the scarcity of hands, it must b settlement.

'And the masters themselves may be expected, f part, to perceive that their own interest (which is th sideration *they are expected* to attend to) lies in direction. They will derive most profit from their s keeping them as much as possible in a cheerful and state, even at the expense of connivance at many v so much indulgence as it would not, in this countr any master's while to grant, when he might turn a different servant and hire another. The master of t servants would indeed be glad, for his own profit, to them the utmost reasonable amount of labour, and t them in a style of frugality equal to, or even beyon labourer in England: but he will be sure to find that t

feelings,—by his regard for his own ease,—and by popularity with all descriptions of persons around as by his regard for the prosperity of the colony, *that* object the primary and most important one transportation, properly, a penalty. We can seldom find a governor (much less a *succession* of governors) when a choice is proposed of two objects at variance, other, to prefer the situation of keeper of a house to that of a governor of a flourishing colony. The man we can expect is to find now and then one, crippled by the errors of his predecessors and of his successors, by such efforts to attain both objects as will be most likely to defeat both. The individual settlers, to whom is intrusted the chief detail of the system, are not (like the governor) enabled by any requisition of duty, to pay any attention to the most important part of that system. They are not even made to think of anything but their own interest. The punishment of the reformation of convicts are only incidental results. They are trusted that the settler's regard for his own interest will induce him to exact hard labour and good conduct from those assigned to him. But if indulgence is (as we have seen) found to answer his purpose better than rigid discipline, he will be upbraided with any breach of duty in resorting to it.

Of the many extraordinary features in this most singular specimen of legislation, it is one of the most paradoxical that it intrusts a most important public service, in reference to the British nation, to men who are neither selected nor trained for the nation on account of any supposed fitness to discharge the duty. They are even taught to consider that they have any public duty to perform. Even in the most negligently-governed communities the keeper of a house of correction is always, professedly at least, selected with some view to his integrity, discretion, firmness, and other qualifications; and however ill the selection may be, he is at least taught to consider himself intrusted, for the benefit of the community, with an office which it is his duty to discharge on good grounds. However imperfectly all this may be accomplished, no persons would deny that it is, and ought to be, at least a partial remedy. But this is not the case in the land of *ornithomachia* and of other paradoxes. There, each settler, so far as his own household is concerned, the keeper of

we used to shoot them like fun !' It would have been a satisfaction to have seen such a heartless ruffian in an archery ground, with about a score of expert archers at a fair distance from him, if only to witness how well he would personify the representations of St. Sebastian. This man was a shrewd mechanic, and had been some years at Port Stephens: if such people consider the life of a black of so little value, how is it to be wondered at if the convicts entertain the same opinion? It is to be hoped that the practice of shooting them is at an end; but they are still subjected to annoyance from the stock-keepers, who take their women, and do them various injuries besides.<sup>1</sup>

'But to waive for the present all discussion of the moral effects on the settlers, likely to result from the system, let it be supposed that the labour of convicts may be so employed as to advance the prosperity of the colony, and let it only be remembered that this object is likely to be pursued both by governors and settlers, at the expense of the other far more important one, which is inconsistent with it, the welfare of the mother-country, in respect of the repression of crime. This one consideration, apart from all others, would alone be decisive against transportation as a mode of *punishment*; since even if the system *could* be made efficient for that object, *supposing it to be well administered with a view to that*, there is a moral certainty that it never *will* be so administered.

'If there be, as some have suggested, a certain description of offenders, to whom sentence of perpetual exile from their native country is especially formidable, this object might easily be attained, by erecting a penitentiary on some one of the many small, nearly unproductive, and unoccupied islands in the British seas; the conveyance to which would not occupy so many hours, as that to Australia does weeks.

'But as for the attempt to combine salutary punishment with successful colonization, it only leads, in practice, to the failure of both objects; and, in the mind, it can only be effected by keeping up a fallacious confusion of ideas.'

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<sup>1</sup> Breton, p. 200.



*' Plantations are amongst ancient, primitive, and modern works.'*

Bp. Hinds remarks on the great success with which the ancient Greeks colonized : pursuing an opposite policy to that of all nations since, and, accordingly, with opposite results.

An ancient Greek colony was like what gardeners call a *layer* ; a portion of the parent tree, with stem, twigs, and roots imbedded in fresh soil till it had taken root, and then severed. A modern colony is like handfuls of twigs and leaves scattered at random, and thrown into the earth to take their chance.

*' Above all, let men make that profit of being in the world that they have God always, and his service for their eyes.'*

Every settler in a foreign colony is, necessarily, a missionary to the aborigines—a missionary for good, or a missionary for evil,—operating upon them by his example.

It is often said that our colonies ought to provide for their own spiritual wants. But the more is done for them in this way, the more likely they will be to make such provision for themselves. The more they are neglected, the less likely they are to provide for themselves. It is the peculiar nature of the inestimable treasure of truth and religious knowledge, that the more it is withheld from people, the less they wish for it ; and the more it is bestowed upon them, the more they hunger and thirst after it. If you keep upon a short allowance of food, they are content with it ; if you keep a man thirsty, he will become more thirsty ; if he is poor, he is exceedingly anxious to become rich ; but if he is left in a state of spiritual destitution, he will, and still more his children, cease to care about it. It is the last want men can (in the first instance) to supply for themselves.

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## ESSAY XXXIV. OF RICHES.

I CANNOT call riches better than the baggage of virtue; the Roman word is better—*impedimenta*;<sup>1</sup> for as the baggage is to an army, so is riches to virtue—it cannot be spared nor left behind, but it hindereth the march; yea, and the care of it sometimes loseth or disturbeth the victory. Of great riches there is no real use, except it be in the distribution; the rest is but conceit; so saith Solomon, ‘Where much is, there are many to consume it; and what hath the owner but the sight of it with his eyes?’<sup>2</sup> The personal fruition in any man cannot reach to feel great riches: there is a custody of them, or a power of dole,<sup>3</sup> and a donative of them, or a fame of them, but no solid use to the owner. Do you not see what feigned prices are set upon little stones and rarities—and what works of ostentation are undertaken, because<sup>4</sup> there might seem to be some use of great riches? But then, you will say, they may be of use to buy men out of dangers or troubles; as Solomon saith, ‘Riches are as a stronghold in the imagination of the rich man:’<sup>5</sup> but this is excellently expressed, that it is an imagination, and not always in fact; for, certainly great riches have sold more men than they have bought out. Seek not proud riches, but such as thou mayest get justly, use soberly, distribute cheerfully, and leave contentedly; yet have no abstract or friarly contempt of them, but distinguish, as Cicero saith well of Rabirius Posthumus, ‘In studio rei amplificandæ, apparebat, non avaritiæ prædam, sed instrumentum bonitati quæri.’<sup>6</sup> Hearken also to Solomon, and beware of hasty gathering of riches: ‘Qui festinat ad divitias, non erit insons.’<sup>7</sup> The poets feign that when Plutus (which is riches) is sent from Jupiter, he limps, and goes slowly, but when he is sent from Pluto, he runs, and is swift of foot;

<sup>1</sup> *Impedimenta. Hindrances.*

<sup>2</sup> *Eccles. v. 11.*

<sup>3</sup> *Dole. A dealing out, or distribution.*

‘It was your pre-surmise,  
That in the *dole* of blows, your son might drop.’

<sup>4</sup> *Because. For the reason that; in order that.* See page 269.

<sup>5</sup> *Proverbs x. 15; cf. xxviii. 11.*

<sup>6</sup> ‘In his desire of increasing his riches, he sought not, it was evident, the gratification of avarice, but the means of beneficence.’—Cic. *P. Rabir.* 2.

<sup>7</sup> ‘He that maketh haste to be rich, shall not be innocent.’—*Prov. xxviii. 20.*



and instruments to draw them on; put off others cunningly that would be better chapmen,<sup>1</sup> and the like practices, which are crafty and naughty.<sup>2</sup> As for the chopping of bargains, when a man buys not to hold, but to sell over again, that commonly grindeth double, both upon the seller and upon the buyer. Sharings do greatly enrich, if the hands be well chosen that are trusted. Usury is the certainest means of gain, though one of the worst, as that whereby a man doth eat his bread, '*in sudore vultus alieni*,'<sup>3</sup> and besides, doth plough upon Sundays: but yet certain though it be, it hath flaws: for that the scriveners and brokers do value<sup>4</sup> unsound men, to serve their own turn. The fortune in being the first in an invention, or in a privilege, doth cause sometimes a wonderful overgrowth in riches; as it was with the first sugar man in the Canaries: therefore, if a man can play the true logician, to have as well judgment as invention, he may do great matters, especially if the times be fit. He that resteth upon gains certain, shall hardly grow to great riches; and he that puts all upon adventures, doth oftentimes break and come to poverty: it is good, therefore, to guard adventures with certainties that may uphold losses. Monopolies, and coemption of wares for re-sale, where they are not restrained, are great means to enrich; especially if the party have intelligence what things are like to come into request, and so store himself beforehand. Riches gotten by service, though it be of the best rise, yet when they are gotten by flattery, feeding humours, and other servile conditions, they may be placed amongst the worst. As for 'fishing for testaments and executorships,' (as Tacitus saith of Seneca, '*Testamenta et orbos tanquam indagine capi*'<sup>5</sup>) it is yet worse, by how much men submit themselves to meaner persons than in service.

Believe not much them that seem to despise riches, for they despise them that despair of them; and none worse, when they come to them. Be not penny-wise; riches have wings, and sometimes they fly away of themselves, sometimes they must be

<sup>1</sup> Chapmen. *Purchasers.*

'Fair Diomedes, you do as *chapmen* do—

Dispraise the thing that they intend to buy.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>2</sup> Naught or Naughty. *Bad.* 'The water is *naught*, and the ground barren.'  
—*2 Kings* xi. 19.

<sup>3</sup> 'In the sweat of another's brow.'

<sup>4</sup> Value. *Represent as trustworthy.*

<sup>5</sup> 'Wills and childless parents, taken as with a net.'—Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. 42.

poor country, are comparatively rich, are quite as any to the temptation of pride.

‘As for what may be said respecting a worldly-mindedness, &c., it may suffice to reply these vices are found as commonly in poor countries but even in the same country the poor are liable to them than the rich. Those in affluent *may* be absorbed in the pursuit of gain; but and sometimes do, devote themselves altogether to science, or other pursuits, altogether removing those, on the other hand, who *must* maintain labour or attention to business, are at least liable to the temptation of too anxiously taking to-morrow.

‘Luxury, again, is one of the evils represented on wealth. The word is used in so many senses without attaching any precise meaning to it, that it is apt to be introduced into any discussion in which it is wanted. Without, however, entering prematurely on any subject it may be sufficient, as far as the present question to point out that the terms luxury, and luxurious, are differently modified as to their force, according as they are applied to individuals or to nations. As an individual, a man is luxurious, in comparison with other men, of the same rank and in the same walk of life with himself: a nation is luxurious in reference to other nations. The same living which would be reckoned moderate and frugal in the poor country, would be excessive and extravagant among the higher orders, would be excessive and extravagant luxury in a day-labourer: and the laborer who lives in a cottage with glass-windows and a chimney, and wears shoes and stockings, and a linen or cotton shirt, is said to live in luxury, though he possesses what would be called luxuries to a negro-prince. A rich and luxurious country, however, does not necessarily contain more individual luxury (according to the received use of the word) than a poor one; but it possesses more of such things as would be called luxuries in the poor country, while in the rich one they are less common. An inclination for self-indulgence and ostentation is no less strong in poor than in rich nations; the chief difference is that their luxury is of a coarser description, and

. . . . 'Among poor and barbarian nations much avarice, fraud, vanity, and envy, called fit perhaps to a string of beads, a hatchet, or a pipe be found in wealthier communities.'

. . . . 'The savage is commonly found to be frequently rapacious, when his present inclination seek any object which he needs, or which he desires. He is not indeed so *steady* or so *provident*, in his conduct as the civilized man; but this is from the general want and improvidence of his character,—not from his want in higher pursuits. What keeps him poor, in a want of skill and insecurity of property, is not a phantasmic tempt of riches, but a love of sluggish torpor and gratification. The same may be said of such who substitute the dregs of a civilized community; they are thoughtless, improvident, but thievish. Lamentable to see, as we may, for instance, in our own country, Beings of such high qualifications and such high talents as Man, absorbed in the pursuit of merely external temporal objects—occupied in schemes for attaining worldly aggrandizement, without any higher view to them,—we must remember that the savage is not content with life, but *below* it. It is not from preferring virtue to the goods of the mind to those of fortune—their choice in the present—that he takes so little thought for the future, but, from want of forethought and of habitual reflection. The civilized man, too often, directs these qualities to a worthy object; the savage, universally, is deficient in directing them. The one is a stream, flowing, though in a wrong channel, and which needs to have its course straightened; the other is a stagnant pool.'

'There is one antecedent presumption that the course of national wealth should be, on the whole, favourable to improvement, from what we know of the divine plan, both ordinary and extraordinary. I am aware what is called for in any attempt to reason *à priori* from the character and designs of the Supreme Being. In this case there is a clear *analogy* before us. We know that we placed the human species in such a situation, and with such faculties and propensities, as would infallibly

needing in providing against. The most fertile soil does not necessarily bear the most abundant harvest; its weeds, if neglected, will grow the rankest. And the servant who has received but one talent, if he put it out to use, will fare better than he who has been intrusted with five, if he squander or bury them. But still, this last does not suffer *because* he received five talents; but because he has not used them to advantage.'

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## ESSAY XXXV. OF PROPHECY

I MEAN not to speak of divine prophecies, oracles, nor of natural predictions, but on that have been of certain memory, and from Saith the Pythonissa<sup>1</sup> to Saul, 'To-morrow thou shalt be with me.'<sup>2</sup> Virgil hath these verses for

' At domus Æneæ cunctis dominabitur oris,  
Et nati natorum, et qui nascentur ab illis ;'

a prophecy, as it seems, of the Roman empire; the tragedian hath these verses :

' Venient annis  
Sæcula seris, quibus Oceanus  
Vincula rerum laxet, et ingens  
Pateat tellus, Tiphysque novos  
Detegat orbes ; nec sit terris  
Ultima Thule :'<sup>4</sup>

a prophecy of the discovery of America. The Polycrates dreamed that Jupiter bathed her father anointed him ; and it came to pass that he was in an open place, where the sun made his body run with the rain washed it.<sup>5</sup> Philip of Macedon<sup>6</sup> dreamed his wife's belly ; whereby he did expound it, should be barren ; but Aristander, the soothsayer, said his wife was with child, because men do not use to see an empty. A phantom that appeared to Marc Antony, said to him, ' Philippis iterum me videbis ' said to Galba, ' Tu quoque, Galba, degustabis imperium ' in Vespasian's time there went a prophecy in the East that should come forth of Judea should reign on which, though it may be was meant of our Saviour

<sup>1</sup> Pythonissa. *Pythoness*.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Sam.

<sup>3</sup> ' Over every shore the house of Æneas shall reign ; his children their posterity likewise. '—*Æneid*, iii. 97.

<sup>4</sup> ' There shall come a time, in later ages, when Ocean shall reveal a vast continent appear ; and a pilot shall find new worlds, and more earth's bound. '—*Sen. Med.* xi. 375.

<sup>5</sup> *Hesiod*, iii. 24.

<sup>6</sup> *Plut. Vit. A.*

<sup>7</sup> ' Thou shalt see me again at Philippi. '—*Appian, Bell. Civ.* i.

<sup>8</sup> ' Thou, also, Galba, shalt taste of empire. '—*Stat. Vit. Galb.*



expounds it of Vespasian.<sup>1</sup> Domitian dreamed, the night before he was slain, that a golden head was growing out of the nape of his neck;<sup>2</sup> and, indeed, the succession that followed him, for many years, made golden times. Henry VI. of England said of Henry VII. when he was a lad, and gave him water, 'This is the lad that shall enjoy the crown for which we strive.' When I was in France, I heard from one Dr. Pena, that the queen-mother, who was given to curious arts, caused the king her husband's nativity to be calculated under a false name, and the astrologer gave a judgment that he should be killed in a duel; at which the queen laughed, thinking her husband to be above challenges and duels; but he was slain upon a course at tilt, the splinters of the staff of Montgomery going in at his beaver. The trivial prophecy which I heard when I was a child, and Queen Elizabeth was in the flower of her years, was,

'When hempe is spun,  
England's done:'

whereby it was generally conceived, that after the princes had reigned which had the principal letters of that word hempe, which were Henry, Edward, Mary, Philip, and Elizabeth, England should come to utter confusion; which, thanks be to God, is verified in the change of the name, for the king's style is now no more of England, but of Britain. There was also another prophecy before the year of eighty-eight, which I do not well understand:

'There shall be seen upon a day,  
Between the Baugh<sup>3</sup> and the May,  
The Black fleet of Norway.  
When that is come and gone,  
England build houses of lime and stone,  
For after wars shall you have none.'

It was generally conceived to be meant of the Spanish fleet that came in eighty-eight; for that the king of Spain's surname, as they say, is Norway. The prediction of Regiomontanus,

'Octogesimus octavus mirabilis annus';<sup>4</sup>

was thought likewise accomplished in the sending of that great

<sup>1</sup> Tacit. *Hist.* v. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Baugh. *Bough* (probably).

<sup>2</sup> Suet. *Vit. Domit.* 23.

<sup>4</sup> 'Eighty-eight, a wonderful year.'

fleet, being the greatest in strength, though n all that ever swam upon the sea. As for C think it was a jest—it was, that he was devo dragon ; and it was expounded of a maker ( troubled him exceedingly. There are numbers especially if you include dreams, and prediction but I have set down these few only of cer example. My judgment is, that they ought all and ought to serve but for winter-talk by the fi when I say despised, I mean it as for belief—fo spreading or publishing of them is in no sort t for they have done much mischief, and I see m made to suppress them. That that hath given t some credit, consisteth in three things. First, : when they hit, and never mark when they mis generally, also of dreams. The second is, that jectures, or obscure traditions, many times turn t prophecies : while the nature of Man, which cove thinks it no peril to foretell that which indee collect, as that of Seneca's verse ; for so much w to demonstration, that the globe of the earth h beyond the Atlantic, which might be probably co be all sea, and adding thereto the tradition in P and his *Atlanticus*,<sup>3</sup> it might encourage one to tu diction. The third and last, which is the grea almost all of them, being infinite in number, hav tures, and by idle and crafty brains, merely feigned, after the event past.

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<sup>1</sup> Aristoph. *Equit.* 195.

<sup>2</sup> Of. *By*. 'Lest a more honourable man than thou be bidden of h

<sup>3</sup> *Critias*.

viously to the appointment of any of the author's office, the inspectors are bound to look over the produce, as a set-off against a candidate's claim of successful prediction he may have made. Many of whom important public trusts are committed, such an institution had been established, would have formally recorded, under the influence of their own incapacity.

*'Men mark when they hit, and never mark when they miss.'*

This remark, as well as the proverb, 'What is what is missed is mystery,' would admit of much. The most general statement would be nearly the maxim, 'De non apparentibus et non existentibus ratio:' for in all matters, men are apt to treat non-existent, whatever does not come under their notice.

No doubt, if all the pocket-books now exist inspected, some thousands of memoranda would be dreams, visions, omens, presentiments, &c., kept to themselves they are fulfilled; and when one is, out of some of thousands, this is recorded; the rest being never. So Bion, when shown the votive offerings of those saved from shipwreck, asked, 'Where are the records of those who were drowned in spite of their vows?'

Mr. Senior has remarked in his *Lectures on Political Economy* that the sacrifice of vast wealth, on the part of a monopolist, for the gain—and that, comparatively, a trifling gain—of monopolists, is often submitted to patient gain being *concentrated* and the loss diffused. But it would not have occurred so often as it has, were it not for the diffusion of the loss causes its existence—that is, its existence is a loss so increased—to be *unperceived*. If a million of people are each virtually taxed half-a-crown a year in the price of some article, through the prohibition of free trade, perhaps not above a shilling of this goes to those who hold the monopoly. But this million of shillings, amounting

<sup>1</sup> See 'Annotations' on Essay XXIII.



' there are no more particles of dust in the air than in the rest of the room ; though we *see* them better than the rest of the room ;

All these, and a multitude of other cases, are covered by the general formula above stated : the tendency of the amount of whatever is seen and known, as compared with the amount which is unknown, or less known, unseen, and indefinite.

Under this head will come the general tendency to estimate the *preventive* effects of any measure or course of action, for good or for evil. *E.g.* in the prevention of crime, it is plain that every instance of a crime committed, and actually inflicted, is an instance of *failure* in which penalties were denounced. We *see* the crime take place, and the punishments ; we do *not* see what *would* be committed if punishment were abolished.

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because he cannot see about him. There is ambitious men in pulling down the greatness of & overtops; as Tiberius used Macro in the p Sejanus. Since, therefore, they must be used there resteth<sup>1</sup> to speak how they are to be bi may be less dangerous. There is less danger be of mean birth, than if they be noble; and if harsh of nature, than gracious and popular, rather new raised, than grown cunning<sup>2</sup> and fe greatness. It is counted by some a weakness in favourites, but it is, of all others, the best ambitious great ones; for when the way of displeasing<sup>4</sup> lieth by the favourite, it is impos should be over great. Another means to cu balance them by others as proud as they; but th be some middle counsellors to keep things stead that ballast, the ship will roll too much. At the may animate and inure<sup>5</sup> some meaner persons to ambitious men. As for the having of them obno if they be of fearful natures, it may do well, l stout and daring, it may precipitate their desig dangerous. As for the pulling of them down, require it, and that it may not be done with sa the only way is, the interchange continually of

<sup>1</sup> Rest. *To remain.*

‘Fallen he is; and now  
What *rests* but that the mortal sentence pass  
On his transgression.’—Milton.

<sup>2</sup> Cunning. *Experienced; skilful.* ‘Esau was a *cunning* hunter

<sup>3</sup> Pleasure (not used as a verb). *To please; to gratify.* ‘I give him cattle, and to *pleasure* him otherwise.’—2 *Maccabees* :

‘Nay, the birds’ rural music, too,  
Is as melodious and as free  
As if they sang to *pleasure* you.’—Cowley.

<sup>4</sup> Displeasure. *To displease.*

<sup>5</sup> Inure. *To make use of.* (From an old word—‘ure’) sufficient for any man’s conscience to build such proceedings upon been put in *ure* for the establishment of that cause.’—Hooker.

<sup>6</sup> Obnoxious. *Liable to; in peril of; subject to.*

‘But what will not ambition and revenge  
Descend to? Who aspires, must down as low  
As high he soar’d; *obnoxious*, first or last,  
To basest things.’—Milton.

as it were, in a wood. Of ambitions, it is less harmful,<sup>2</sup> the ambition to prevail in great things, than that other to appear in every thing; for that breeds confusion, and mars business; but yet it is less danger to have an ambitious man stirring in business, than great in dependencies.<sup>3</sup> He that seeketh to be eminent amongst able men, hath a great task, but that is ever good for the Public; but he that plots to be the only figure amongst cyphers, is the decay of a whole age. Honour hath three things in it; the vantage ground to do good, the approach to kings and principal persons, and the raising of a man's own fortunes. He that hath the best of these intentions, when he aspireth, is an honest man; and that prince that can discern of these intentions in another that aspireth, is a wise prince. Generally, let princes and States chuse such ministers as are more sensible of duty than of rising, and such as love business rather upon conscience than upon bravery;<sup>4</sup> and let them discern a busy nature from a willing mind.

## ANNOTATION.

*'The vantage-ground to do good.'*

Ambition, meaning a desire to occupy a high station for which one thinks himself fit, is not, in itself, anything bad. But its excess being thought much more common, and being certainly much more *conspicuous* than a deficiency, and having done so much mischief in the world—hence, ambition is commonly regarded as a mere evil. And if all men were both infallible judges of their own, and of other men's qualifications,

<sup>1</sup> Disgraces. *Acts of unkindness; repulses.* 'Her disgraces to him were graced by her excellence.'—*Sir Philip Sidney.*

<sup>2</sup> Harmful. *Hurtful.* See page 82.

<sup>3</sup> Dependencies. *Things or persons under command, or at disposal.* 'The second natural division of power, is of such men who have acquired large possessions, and consequently, dependencies.'—*Swift.*

<sup>4</sup> Bravery. *Ostentation; parade.*

'The bravery of his grief did put me into a towering passion.'—*Shakespeare.*

and also completely devoted to the public go regardless of personal inconvenience and toil, i that there should be no such thing as ambition. are, an excessive dread of indulging ambition, o pected of it, may keep back some from acting a g part for which they were well fitted. Thus, som that it would have been well for America if W had enough ambition to have made himself perpe and established the office as hereditary.

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## ESSAY XXXVII. OF MASQUES<sup>1</sup> AND TRIUMPHS.<sup>2</sup>

THESE things are but toys to come amongst such serious observations; but yet, since princes will have such things, it is better they should be graced with elegance,<sup>3</sup> than daubed with cost. Dancing to song is a thing of great state and pleasure. I understand it that the song be in quire, placed aloft, and accompanied with some broken music, and the ditty<sup>4</sup> fitted to the device. Acting in song, especially in dialogues, hath an extreme good grace—I say acting, not dancing (for that is a mean and vulgar thing); and the voices of the dialogue would<sup>5</sup> be strong and manly (a bass and a tenor, no treble), and the ditty high and tragical, not nice<sup>6</sup> or dainty.<sup>7</sup> Several quires placed one over against another, and taking the voice by catches, anthem-wise,<sup>8</sup> give great pleasure. Turning dances into figure is a childish curiosity; and generally let it be noted, that those things which I here set down, are such as do naturally take the sense, and not respect petty wonderments.<sup>9</sup> It is true, the alterations of scenes, so it be quietly and without noise, are things of great beauty and pleasure; for they feed and relieve the eye before it be full of the same object. Let

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<sup>1</sup> Masque. *A dramatic performance on festive occasions.* ‘Comus. A masque presented at Ludlow Castle, 1634.’

<sup>2</sup> Triumphs. *Public shows.*

<sup>3</sup> What news from Oxford? Hold those justs and triumphs!—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>4</sup> Elegancy. *Elegance.* ‘St. Augustine, out of a kind of *elegancy* in writing, makes some difference.’—*Raleigh.*

<sup>5</sup> Ditty. *A poem to be sung.* (Now only used in burlesque.)

‘Meanwhile the rural ditties were not mute,  
Tempered to the oaten flute.’—*Milton.*

<sup>6</sup> Would. *Should.* See page 333.

<sup>7</sup> Nice. *Minutely accurate.*

‘The letter was not *nice*, but full of charge  
Of dear import.’—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>8</sup> Dainty. *Affectedly fine.*

‘Your *dainty* speakers have the curse,  
To plead bad causes down to worse.’—*Prior.*

<sup>9</sup> Wise. *Ways; manner or mode.* (Seldom now used as a simple word.)

‘This song she sings in most commanding *wise*.’—*Spenser.*

<sup>10</sup> Wonderment. *Astonishment; surprise.*

‘Ravished with Fancy’s *wonderment*.’—*Spenser.*



pigmies, turquets,<sup>1</sup> nymphs, rustics, Cupids, statues moving, and the like. As for angels, it is not comical<sup>2</sup> enough to put them in anti-masques; and anything that is hideous, as devils, giants, is, on the other side, as unfit; but chiefly, let the music of them be recreative, and with some strange changes. Some sweet odours suddenly coming forth, without any drops falling, are, in such a company, as there is steam and heat, things of great pleasure and refreshment. Double masques, one of men, another of ladies, addeth state and variety; but all is nothing, except the room be kept clear and neat.

For justs, and tournies,<sup>3</sup> and barriers, the glories<sup>4</sup> of them are chiefly in the chariots, wherein the challengers make their entry, especially if they be drawn with strange beasts, as lions, bears, camels, and the like; or, in the devices of their entrance, or in bravery<sup>5</sup> of their liveries, or in the goodly furniture of their horses and armour. But enough of these toys.

## ANNOTATIONS.

*'These things are but toys . . . ?'*

Bacon seems to think some kind of apology necessary for treating of matters of this kind in the midst of grave treatises. But his taste seems to have lain a good deal this way. He is reported to have always shown a great fondness for splendour and pageantry, and everything that could catch the eye and

<sup>1</sup> Turquets. (Probably) *Turks*.

<sup>2</sup> Comical. *Comic*.

<sup>3</sup> Tournies. *Tournament*.

*'Not but the mode of that romantic age,  
The age of tourneys, triumphs, and quaint masques,  
Glared with fantastic pageantry which dimmed  
The sober eye of truth, and dazzled e'en  
The sage himself.'*—*Mason*.

<sup>4</sup> Glory. *Splendour; magnificence*. 'Solomon, in all his *glory*, was not arrayed like one of these.'—*Matthew*.

<sup>5</sup> Bravery. *Finery*. 'In that day the Lord will take away the *bravery* of their tinkling ornaments about their feet.'—*Isaiah* iii. 18.

*'A stately ship, with all her bravery on,  
And tackle trim.'*—*Milton*.

make a display of wealth and magnificence accounted, in *such a great philosopher*, something is worth remarking that the term 'frivolous' is (by those who use language with care and correct interest shown about things that are little to the thing. For, little and great,—trifling or important terms. If a grown man or woman were to be a doll, this would be called excessively frivolous; a little girl frivolous for playing with a doll.

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## ESSAY XXXVIII. OF NATURE IN MEN.

NATURE is often hidden, sometimes overcome, seldom extinguished. Force maketh nature more violent in the return, doctrine and discourse maketh nature less importune,<sup>1</sup> but custom only doth alter and subdue nature. He that seeketh victory over his nature, let him not set himself too great nor too small tasks ; for the first will make him dejected by often failing, and the second will make him a small proceeder, though by often prevailing. And, at the first, let him practise with helps, as swimmers do with bladders or rushes ; but, after a time, let him practise with disadvantages, as dancers do with thick shoes, for it breeds great perfection if the practice be harder than the use. Where nature is mighty, and therefore the victory hard, the degrees had need be, first to stay and arrest nature in time ; (like to him that would say over the four-and-twenty letters when he was angry) then to go less in quantity ; as if one should, in forbearing wine, come from drinking healths to a draught at a meal ; and, lastly, to discontinue altogether ; but if a man have the fortitude and resolution to enfranchise himself at once, that is the best :—

‘Optimus ille animi vindex, lædentiæ pectus  
Vincula qui rupit, dedoluitque semel.’<sup>2</sup>

Neither is the ancient rule amiss, to bend nature as a wand, to a contrary extreme, whereby to set it right ; understanding it where the contrary extreme is no vice. Let not a man force a habit upon himself with a perpetual continuance, but with some intermission, for both the pause reinforceth the new onset ; and if a man that is not perfect be ever in practice, he shall as well practise his errors as his abilities, and induce one habit of both, and there is no means to help this but by seasonable intermission. But let not a man trust his victory over his nature too far, for nature will lie buried a great time, and yet revive upon the occasion or temptation ; like as it was with Æsop’s

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<sup>1</sup> Importune. *Importunate ; troublesome.* See page 95.

<sup>2</sup> ‘He is the best assertor of the soul, who bursts the bonds that gall his breast, and suffers all, at once.’—Ovid, *R. Amor.* 293.



## ANNOTATIONS.

*'Neither is the ancient rule amiss, to bend Nature as a wand, to the contrary extreme, whereby to set it right.'*

This 'ancient rule'<sup>1</sup> needs to be qualified by a caution against 'bending the wand' *too far*: an error sometimes committed by well-intentioned persons. If A. confesses, and with truth, that he is conscious of a natural tendency towards parsimony, and B. that his natural leaning is towards careless prodigality, it is yet possible we may find, in practice,—greatly to the astonishment of some—that A. errs, when he does err, generally on the side of profusion, and B. on that of parsimony; each having guarded exclusively against a danger on one side, and thinking that he cannot go too far the other way. So, also, one who is excessively in dread of over-deference for some highly-esteemed and venerated friend, may, perhaps, in practice, 'bend the wand' too far the other way. His veneration will then be *theoretical* and *general*; while, *practically*, and in almost every *particular instance*, he will be cherishing, as a matter of duty, a strong prejudice against every proposal, decision, measure, institution, person, or thing, that his friend approves.

I have noticed in the 'Annotations' on Essay VI. a like error, in carrying to a faulty excess the endeavour to repress all ill feelings towards one who has injured one's self: the error, namely, of breaking down, in his favour, the boundaries of right and wrong, and treating a man as blameless or laudable, because it is to *us* he has done a wrong.

*'A man's nature is best perceived in privateness; . . . in passion: . . . and in a new case or experiment.'*

To this excellent list of things that show nature, Bacon might have added *small* things rather than great. 'A straw best shows how the wind blows.' The most ordinary and unimportant actions of a man's life will often show more of his natural character and his habits, than more important actions

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle's: see *Eth. Nicom.* b. ii.

which are done *deliberately*, and sometimes a inclinations.

On this is founded the art which many per of them probably empty pretenders) now p some '*Graptomancy*'—the judging of char writing. Amidst much delusion and quack that some persons do possess a gift by which some wonderful hits. And to those who matter as absurd, it may easily be proved no is something in it, but that they themselves th are accustomed to speak of a '*man's hand*' a and it is plain the difference must depend on sc since there is no call for muscular strengtl again, speak of a '*genteel*' and a '*vulgar*' hand is, however (as was justly remarked by the late ston), no greater indication of character in a writing, than in his way of walking, or of wipi But the difference is, that, in all the other c the observation of manner is only *momentary*; writing, there is a permanent *record* of it, examined at leisure.

*'A man's nature runs either to herbs or weeds: a seasonably water the one and destroy the*

There are some considerations with regard to unnoticed by Bacon, which are very important, absolute necessity of great watchfulness, candour in those who would, indeed, desire to 'destroy Human nature (as I have observed in a former and everywhere, in the most important points, same; circumstantially and externally, men's conduct are infinitely various in various times as the former were not true,—if it were not for the agreement,—history could furnish no instruction were not true,—if there were not these apparentstantial differences,—hardly any one could fail to instruction. For, few are so dull as not to learn from the records of past experience in cases peculiar to their own. But as it is, much candour and dilig

## ESSAY XXXIX. OF CUSTOM EDUCATION.

MEN'S thoughts are much according to their discourse and speeches according and infused opinions ; but their deeds are afterwards accustomed : and, therefore, as Machiavel (though in an evil-favoured instance), there is no force of nature, nor to the bravery of words, corroborate<sup>1</sup> by custom. His instance is, that for a desperate conspiracy, a man should not restness of any man's nature, or his resolute undertaking such a one as hath had his hands formerly Machiavel knew not of a friar Clement, nor a Jaureguy, nor a Baltazar Gerard ; yet his rule that nature, nor the engagement of words, are as custom. Only, superstition is now so well men of the first blood are as firm as butchers and votary<sup>2</sup> resolution is made equipollent to a matter of blood. In other things, the predominance is everywhere visible, insomuch as a man would men profess, protest, engage, give great words, as as they have done before, as if they were dead engines, moved only by the wheels of custom. A reign or tyranny of custom, what it is. The I the sect of their wise men) lay themselves quietly of wood, and so sacrifice themselves by fire :

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<sup>1</sup> After. *According to.* 'That ye seek not *after* your own he  
'He who was of the bondwoman was born *after* the flesh.'—*Litany.*

<sup>2</sup> As. *That.* See page 23.

<sup>3</sup> Corroborate. *Corroborated ; strengthened ; made firm.*  
'His heart is *corroborate.*'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>4</sup> Nor—are not. This double negative is used frequently by  
'*Nor to no Roman else.*'—*Shakespeare.*  
'Another sort there be, that will  
Be talking of the fairies still,  
*Nor never* can they have their fill.'—*Dryden*

<sup>5</sup> Votary. *Consecrated by a vow.*

strive to be burned with the corpse of their husbands. The lads of Sparta,<sup>1</sup> of ancient time, were wont to be scourged upon the altar of Diana, without so much as queching.<sup>2</sup> I remember, in the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's time of England, an Irish rebel condemned, put up a petition to the deputy that he might be hanged in a withe,<sup>3</sup> and not in a halter, because it had been so used with former rebels. There be monks in Russia, for penance, that will sit a whole night in a vessel of water, till they be engaged with hard ice.

Many examples may be put of the force of custom, both upon mind and body : therefore, since custom is the principal magistrate of man's life, let men by all means endeavour to obtain good customs. Certainly, custom is most perfect when it beginneth in young years : this we call education, which is, in effect, but an early custom. So we see in languages, the tone is more pliant to all expressions and sounds, the joints are more supple to all feats of activity and motions in youth than afterwards ; for it is true, the late learners cannot so well take up the ply, except it be in some minds, that have not suffered themselves to fix, but have kept themselves open and prepared to receive continual amendment, which is exceeding rare : but if the force of custom, simple and separate, be great, the force of custom, copulate and conjoined, and collegiate, is far greater ; for there example teacheth, company comforteth,<sup>4</sup> emulation quickeneth, glory raiseth ; so as in such places the force of custom is in his<sup>5</sup> exaltation. Certainly, the great multiplication<sup>6</sup> of virtues upon human nature resteth upon societies well ordained and dis-

<sup>1</sup> Cic. *Tuscul. Dial.* ii. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Quech (properly quick). *To move ; to stir.*

'Underre her feet, there as she sate,  
An huge great lyon laye, that mote appalle  
An hardy courage ; like captived thrall  
With a strong iron chain and collar bounde—  
Not once he could nor move nor quick.'—*Spenser.*

<sup>3</sup> Withs. *Twigs, or bands of twigs.* 'If they bind me with seven green withs, then shall I be weak.'—*Judges* xvi. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Comfort. *To strengthen as an auxiliary ; to help.* (The meaning of the original Latin word, *Conforto.*) 'Now we exhort you brethren, comfort the feeble-minded.'—*1 Thess.* v. 14.

<sup>5</sup> His. *Its.* 'But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed his own body.'—*1 Cor.* xv. 38.

<sup>6</sup> Multiplication upon. 'Increase and multiply upon us thy mercy.'—*Collect for the 4th Sunday after Trinity.*

ciplined ; for commonwealths and good government  
virtue grown, but do not much mend the seed  
is, that the most effectual means are now a  
least to be desired.

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## ANNOTATIONS.

*‘ Men’s thoughts are much according to their  
discourse and speeches according to their lea  
opinions, but their deeds are after as  
accustomed.’*

This remark, like many others, Bacon has  
Latin into the very brief and pithy apophthegm  
given in the ‘Antitheta on Nature in Men  
secundum naturam ; loquimur secundum præcepta  
secundum consuetudinem.’ Of course, Bacon’s  
words to be taken literally in their utmost extent  
any exception or modification ; as if natural  
instruction had nothing to do with conduct.  
He could not mean anything so self-contradictory  
that *all* action is the result of custom : for it  
in the first instance, it must be *by* actions that  
formed.

But he uses a strong expression, in order to  
our mind that, for practice, custom is the most  
and that it will often overbear both the original  
the precepts which have been learnt : that what  
inwardly think, and (with perfect sincerity) so  
fully depend on his conduct till you know he  
*accustomed* to act. For, continued action is like  
stream of water, which *wears* for itself a channel  
not easily be turned from. The bed which is  
gradually scooped at first, afterwards confines it

Bacon is far from meaning, I conceive, when  
‘ men speak as they have learned ’—to limit him  
of *insincere* professions ; but to point out how  
is to learn to repeat a lesson correctly, than  
practice, when custom is opposed to it.



This is the doctrine of one whom Bacon did not certainly regard with any undue veneration—Aristotle; who, in his *Ethics*, dwells earnestly on the importance of being early accustomed to right practice, with a view to the formation of virtuous habits. And he derives the word ‘ethics’ from a Greek word signifying custom; even as the word ‘morality’ is derived from the corresponding Latin word ‘mos.’

It is to be observed that, at the present day, it is common to use the words ‘custom’ and ‘habit’ as synonymous, and often to employ the latter where Bacon would have used the former. But, strictly speaking, they denote respectively the *cause* and the *effect*. Repeated acts constitute the ‘custom;’ and the ‘habit’ is the condition of mind or body thence resulting. For instance, a man who has been *accustomed* to rise at a certain hour, will have acquired the *habit* of waking and being ready to rise as soon as that hour arrives. And one who has made it his *custom* to drink drams will have fallen into the *habit* of craving for that stimulus, and of yielding to that craving; and so of the rest.

Those are, then, in error who disparage (as Mrs. Hannah More does) all practice that does not spring from a formed habit. For instance, they censure those who employ children as almoners, handing them money or other things to relieve the poor with. For, say they, no one can *give* what is not his own: there is no charity unless you part with something that you might have kept, and which it is a self-denial to part with. The answer is, that if the child does this readily and gladly, he has *already learnt* the virtue of charity; but if it is a *painful* self-denial which you urge him to, as a duty, you are creating an association of charity with pain. On the contrary, if you accustom him to the pleasure of seeing distress relieved, and of being the instrument of giving pleasure, and doing good, the desire of this gratification will lead him, afterwards, to part with something of his own rather than forego it. Thus it is—to use Horace’s comparison—that the young hound is trained for the chase in the woods, from the time that he barks at the deer-skin in the hall.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> . . . . . ‘Venaticus, ex quo  
Tempore cervinam pellam latravit in aula,  
Militat in silvis catulus.’—*Horace*, Book i. ep. 2, l. 65.

The precept is very good, to begin with swi

There is an error somewhat akin to the one bating, which may be worth noticing here. current in the present day against the iniqui to the minds of young persons, by teaching th pretation of the Sacred Volume, instead of lea vestigate for themselves; that is, against end them in the same situation with those to Scriptures were written; instead of leaving with difficulties which the Scriptures nowher provide against. The maintainers of such a p well to consider, whether it would not, if cons prove too much. Do you not, it might be ask of children by putting into their hands the Scrip as the infallible word of God? If you are cor are so, you must be sure that they will stand prejudiced inquiry. Are you not, at least, bou teach them, at the same time, the systems of an the doctrines of the Koran, and those of mod that they may freely chuse amongst all? L is disposed to deride the absurdity of such a p whether there is any objection to it, which wo lie against the exclusion of systematic religiou indeed systematic training in any science or a

It is urged, however, that since a man must system true in which he has been *trained*, his ju unduly biassed by that wish. It would follow fro that no physician should be trusted who is not u whether his patient recovers or dies, and who is from any favourable hope from the mode of tre since else his mind must be unfairly influenced

*'The predominancy of custom is everywhere : as a man would wonder to hear men profess give great words, and then do just as they h as if they were dead images and engines, the wheels of custom.'*

This 'predominancy of custom' is remarkab the case of soldiers who have long been habit if by a mechanical impulse, the word of comm

man, who was expressing his strong disapproval of the leading persons he belonged to, and assuring me that the great subordinates regarded them as wrong and unjust. I said I, 'they will nevertheless, I suppose, do as they are required?' 'Oh, yes, they *must* do

Of course, there are many various *degrees* of party-spirit, and there are also different degrees of custom in the country, and it is not meant that all who are in any party with any party must be equally devoted adherents. I am speaking of the tendency of party-spirit, in a party-man *so far forth* as he is such. And personal experience in human affairs lay it down accordingly that you should be very cautious how you follow a man, however sound his own judgment, and his principles on which he acts, when left to himself. An upright man, who keeps himself quite unconnected with a party, may be *calculated* on as likely to *act* on you as you have found him to take on each point. Perhaps, you find him to differ from you; in each case but when you have learnt what his sentiments are, you know each case what to *expect*. But it is not so well connected with, and consequently controlled by, the proportion as he is so, he is not fully his own master. In some instances you will probably find him taken by surprise, by assenting to some course quite at variance with his sentiments which you have heard him express with perfect sincerity—as his own. When it comes to a formed habit of following the party will be likely to do everything. At least, '*I'd just na advise ye to*

It is important to keep in mind that—as what has been said just above—habits are formed by a stroke, but gradually and insensibly; so that great care be employed, a great change may come over a man without our being conscious of any. For, as I have well expressed it, 'The diminutive chains of habit are so heavy enough to be felt, till they are too strong to be broken.'

And this is often strongly exemplified in the case of a party-spirit. It is not of itself that all at once, resolves to join himself to a party;



in by little and little. Party is like one of those perilous whirlpools sometimes met with at sea. When a vessel reaches the outer edge of one of them, the current moves so slowly, and with so little of a curve, that the mariners may be unconscious of moving in any curve at all, or even of any motion whatever. But each circuit of the spiral increases the velocity, and gradually increases the curve, and brings the vessel nearer to the centre. And perhaps this rapid motion, and the direction of it, are for the first time perceived, when the force of the current has become irresistible.

Some, no doubt, there were, of those who originally joined the Association called 'United Irishmen,' who, entertaining no evil designs, were seduced by specious appearances and fair professions, and did not enough consider that when once embarked on the stream of Party, no one can be sure how far he may ultimately be carried. They found themselves, doubtless most unexpectedly to many of them, engaged in an attempted revolution, and partners of men in actual rebellion.

No doubt many did draw back, though not without difficulty, and danger, and shame, when they perceived whither they were being hurried; though it is also, I think, highly probable that many were prevented by that difficulty and shame from stopping short and turning back in time; and having 'stepped in so far,' persevered in a course which, if it had been originally proposed to them, they would have shrunk from with horror, saying, 'Is thy servant a dog that he should do this great thing?'

'It is true that a man *may*, if he will, withdraw from, and disown, a party which he had formerly belonged to. But this is a step which requires no small degree of moral courage. And not only are we strongly tempted to shrink from taking such a step, but also our dread of doing so is likely rather to mislead our reason than to overpower it. A man will *wish* to think it justifiable to adhere to the party; and this wish is likely to bias his judgment, rather than to prevail on him to act contrary to his judgment. For, we know how much the judgment of men is likely to be *biassed*, as well as how much they are tempted to acquiesce in something *against* their judgment, when earnestly pressed by the majority of those who are acting with them,—whom they look up to,—whose appro-

bation encourages them,—and whose censure dread.

‘Some doctrine, suppose, is promulgated, posed, or mode of procedure commenced, which of a party do not, in their unbiassed judgment any one of them is disposed, first to *wish*, then lastly to *believe*, that those are in the right who are sorry to think wrong. And again, in any case in which the opinion may still be unchanged, he may feel that a concession he is called on to make, and that he will benefit to set against it; and that, after all, he is called on merely to *acquiesce silently* in what he cannot approve; and, he is loth to incur censure, as in a good cause,—as presumptuous,—as unfriendly to those who are acting with him. To be ‘a breaker up’ (*ἑταιρίας διαλυτής*) was a reproach, the dread of which, from the great historian of Greece, carried much weight in the transactions of the party-warfare he is describing. We may expect the like in all similar cases.

‘One may sometimes hear a person say in such a case though far oftener, in his conduct—‘It is true we cannot altogether approve of such and such a step; but it is essential by those who are acting with us; and if we hold out against it, we should lose their co-operation, which would be a most serious evil. There is nothing, therefore, but to comply.’

*‘Certainly custom is most perfect when it begins to be old: this we call education, which is, in effect, custom.’*

Education may be compared to the grafting of a tree. A gardener knows that the *younger* the wilding-stock is, the easier and the more effectual is the grafting, because, then, one scion put on just above the root, near the main stem of the tree, and all the branches will be of the right sort. When, on the other hand, a tree is to be grafted at a considerable age (which may be done), you have to put on twenty or thirty several branches; and afterwards you will have to

same instincts; for all dogs have an instinct to pursue game. But the one kind of dog has been encouraged to run after a hare, and the other chastised if it attempts to do so, and has been still.<sup>1</sup>

But it must not be forgotten that education is like grafting of a tree in this point also, that the affinity between the stock and the graft, though a practical difference may exist; for example, between a crab, and a fine apple. Even so, the new nature called, superinduced by education, must always be in relation to the original one, though differing in points. You cannot, by any kind of artificiality, destroy any thing of any one, and obliterate all traces of his character. Those who hold that this is possible to effect it, resemble Virgil, who (whether in fact or some think, by way of 'poetical licence') talks of grafting an oak on an elm: 'glandesque sues fregere sub uincula'. One of Doctor Johnson's paradoxes, more common in his time than now, but far from being now exploded, is that a given amount of ability may be turned in any direction, as a man may walk this way or that.' And so walking is the action for which the legs are fitted, whether he may use his eyes for looking at this object or that, or hear with his eyes, or see with his ears. And these are not more different than, for instance, the physical and the mathematical. 'Oh, but if Milton had turned to mathematics, and if Newton had turned his talents to poetry, the former might have been the great mathematician, and the latter the great poet.' This is open to the objection that 'If my aunt had been a man, she would have been a man.' For, the supposition implied in these *ifs* is, that if Newton should have been quite different character from what he was, he would have been quite different character from what he was.

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<sup>1</sup> *Lessons on Morals.*

The Canaanites of old, we should remember, dwelt in 'a good land, flowing with milk and honey,' though they worshipped not the true God, but served abominable demons with sacrifices of the produce of their soil, and even with the blood of their children. But the Israelites were invited to go in, and take possession of 'well-stored houses that they builded not, and wells which they digged not;' and they 'took the labours of the people in possession;' only, they were warned to beware lest, in their prosperity and wealth, they should 'forget the Lord their God,' and to offer to Him the first fruits of their land.

Neglect not, then, any of the advantages of intellectual cultivation which God's providence has placed within your reach; nor 'think scorn of that pleasant land,' and prefer wandering by choice in the barren wilderness of ignorance; but let the intellect which God has endowed you with be cultivated as a servant to *Him*, and then it will be, not a master, but a useful servant, to *you*.

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## ESSAY XL. OF FORTUNE

IT cannot be denied but outward accidents con-  
 fortune ; favour, opportunity, death of others,  
 virtue : but chiefly the mould of a man's fortune  
 hands. ' Faber quisque fortunæ suæ,' saith the  
 most frequent of external causes is, that the folly  
 the fortune of another ; for no man prospers so  
 others' errors ; ' serpens nisi serpentem comederit'  
 Overt and apparent<sup>1</sup> virtues bring forth praise ;  
 secret and hidden virtues that bring forth fo-  
 deliveries of a man's self, which have no name.  
 name, ' disemboltura,'<sup>2</sup> partly expresseth them, v  
 not stonds<sup>3</sup> and restiveness in a man's nature,  
 wheels of his mind keep way<sup>4</sup> with the wheels o  
 for so Livy (after he had described Cato Major in  
 ' in illo viro, tantum robur corporis et animi fuit,  
 loco natus esset, fortunam sibi facturus videretur'  
 that he had, ' versatile ingenium.'<sup>5</sup> Therefore, if  
 sharply and attentively, he shall see fortune ; for  
 blind, yet she is not invisible. The way of fortune  
 milken<sup>6</sup> way in the sky ; which is a meeting, :

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<sup>1</sup> ' Every man the artificer of his own fortune.'—*Appius Clau-*  
 buted by Bacon elsewhere (*Advancement of Learning*) to Plautus

<sup>2</sup> ' Unless the serpent devours the serpent, it does not become

<sup>3</sup> Apparent. *Evident ; known ; visible.*

' As well the fear of harm, as harm *apparent*,  
 In my mind ought to be prevented.'—*Shakespeare*

' The outward and *apparent* sanctity should flow from purity of heart

<sup>4</sup> Desenvoltura. *Graceful ease.*

<sup>5</sup> Stonds. *Stops.* The removal of the *stonds* and impeding  
 that often clears the passage and current to a man's fortune.'—*Sir Henry Temple.*

<sup>6</sup> Way. *Time.* The time in which a certain space can be p  
 over.

' A mile-way.'—*Chaucer.*

<sup>7</sup> ' In that man there was so much strength of body and of mi  
 that in whatever place he had been, he would have made fortune h

<sup>8</sup> ' A versatile mind.'

<sup>9</sup> Milken. *Milky.* 'The remedies are to be proposed from a  
 of the *milken* diet.'—*Temple.*

number of small stars not seen asunder, but giving light together: so are there a number of little and scarce discerned virtues, or rather faculties and customs, that make men fortunate: the Italians note some of them, such as a man would little think. When they speak of one that cannot do amiss, they will throw in into his other conditions, that he hath 'Poco di matto;'<sup>1</sup> and, certainly, there be not two more fortunate properties than to have a little of the fool, and not too much of the honest: therefore extreme lovers of their country, or masters, were never fortunate; neither can they be; for when a man placeth his thoughts without himself, he goeth not his own way. A hasty fortune maketh an enterpriser<sup>2</sup> and remover<sup>3</sup> (the French hath it better, 'entreprenant,' or 'remuant'), but the exercised<sup>4</sup> fortune maketh the able man. Fortune is to be honoured and respected, and<sup>5</sup> it be but for her daughters, Conscience and Reputation; for those two felicity breedeth; the first within a man's self, the latter in others towards him. All wise men, to decline<sup>6</sup> the envy of their own virtues, use to ascribe them to Providence and Fortune; for so they may the better assume them: and besides, it is greatness in a man to be the care of the higher powers. So Cæsar said to the pilot in the tempest, 'Cæsarem portas, et fortunam ejus.'<sup>7</sup> So Sylla chose the name of 'felix,' and not of 'magnus.'<sup>8</sup> and it hath been noted, that those who ascribe openly too much to their own wisdom and policy, end unfortunate. It is written, that Timotheus, the Athenian, after he had, in the account he gave to the State of his government, often interlaced this speech, 'And in this fortune had no part,' never prospered in anything

<sup>1</sup> 'A little of the fool.'

<sup>2</sup> Enterpriser. *An adventurer; a bold projector.*

'Wit makes an enterpriser, sense a man.'—*Young.*

<sup>3</sup> Remover. *Agitator.*

<sup>4</sup> Exercised. *Made familiar by use.* 'A heart exercised with covetous practices.'—2 *Pet.* ii. 14.

<sup>5</sup> And. *If.*

'Nay, and I suffer this, I may go craze.'—*Beaumont and Fletcher.*

<sup>6</sup> Decline. *To avoid.*

'Since the Muses do invoke my power,  
I shall no more decline the sacred bower

Where Gloriana, the great mistress, lies.'—*Sir P. Sidney.*

<sup>7</sup> 'You carry Cæsar and his fortunes.'—*Plut. Vit. Cæsar.* 38.

<sup>8</sup> 'Fortunate,' (and not of) 'great.'—*Plut. Syll.* 34.

he undertook afterward. Certainly there be like Homer's verses, that have a slide<sup>1</sup> and than the verses of other poets; as Plutarch sa fortune, in respect of that of Agesilaus, or E that this should be, no doubt it is much in a

ANTITHETA ON FORTUNE.

PRO.

CON.

'Virtutes apertæ laudes pariunt; occultæ fortunas.

'Stultitia uniu

'Virtues that are openly seen obtain praise; but what is called luck is the result of unperceived virtues.'

'The folly of of another.'

'Fortuna veluti galaxia; hoc est, nodus quarundam obscurarum virtutum, sine nomine.

'Fortune is like a galaxy; that is to say, a collection of certain unseen and nameless endowments.'

ANNOTATIONS.

'So are there a number of little and scarce discor customs, that make men fortunat

It is common to hear the lower orders speak of their mode of expressing what Bacon here calls 'customs,' or, as attributing to fortune what is indescrivable and imperceptible skill. You may speak of a woman who has good luck in her business in bread-making; of a gardener who is lucky or in grafting, or in raising melons, &c.

'When they (the Italians) speak of one that conditions, they will throw into his other conditions, that di matto' [a little of the fool].'

This is in accordance with the proverb, 'Fools;' and it would have been well if Bacon

<sup>1</sup> Slide. *Fluency*. 'Often he had used to be an actor in had learned, besides a *slidingness* of language, acquaintance with Sidney.

<sup>2</sup> *Vit. Timol*



thing more of it. Fortune is said to favour fools, because they trust *all* to fortune. When a fool escapes any danger, or succeeds in any undertaking, it is said that *fortune favours him*; while a wise man is considered to prosper by his own prudence and foresight. For instance, if a fool who does not bar his door, escapes being robbed, it is ascribed to his luck; but the prudent man, having taken precautions, is not called fortunate. But a wise man is, in fact, more likely to meet with good fortune than a foolish one, because he puts himself *in the way* of it. If he is sending off a ship he has a better chance of obtaining a favourable wind, because he chuses the place and season in which such winds prevail as will be favourable to him. If the fool's ship arrives safely, it is by good luck *alone*; while both must be in some degree indebted to fortune for success.<sup>1</sup>

One way in which fools succeed where wise men fail is, that, through ignorance of the danger, they sometimes go *coolly* about some hazardous business. Hence the proverb that 'The fairies take care of children, drunken men, and idiots.'

A surgeon was once called in to bleed an apoplectic patient. He called the physician aside, and explained to him that in this particular subject the artery lay so unusually *over* the vein, that there was imminent risk of pricking it. 'Well, but he *must* be bled at all hazards; for he is *sure* to die without.' 'I am so nervous,' said the surgeon, 'that my hand would be unsteady. But I know of a barber hard by who is accustomed to bleed; and as he is ignorant of anatomy, he will go to work *coolly*.' The barber was summoned, and performed the operation readily and safely. When it was over, the surgeon showed him some anatomical plates, and explained to him that he had missed the artery only by a hair's breadth. He never ventured to bleed again.

One sometimes meets with an 'ill-used man;' a man with whom everything goes wrong; who is always thinking how happy he should be to exchange his present wretched situation for such and such another; and when he has obtained it, finding that he is far worse off than before, and seeking a remove; and as soon as he has obtained that, discovering that his last

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<sup>1</sup> See *Proverbs and Precepts for Copy-pieces*.



situation was just the thing for him, and was to him a prospect of unbroken happiness, far state, &c. To him a verse of Shakespere we

‘O thoughts of men accurst !

Past, and to come, seem best, things present,

One is reminded of a man travelling in the A rounded by mirage, with a (seeming) lake t lake before him, which, when he has reache still the same barren and scorching sand. remarked, ‘ This man’s happiness has no prese

out; and warily to provide, that, while we make that which is better, we meet not with that which

The discommodities<sup>1</sup> of usury are, first, that it makes merchants: for were it not for this lazy trade, money would not lie still, but it would in great part be merchandising,<sup>2</sup> which is the *vena porta*<sup>3</sup> of wealth; second, that it makes poor merchants; for a merchant cannot drive his trade so well if he is hindered; the third is incident to the other two, and that is the customs of kings, or estates,<sup>4</sup> which ebb or flow with merchandising: the fourth, that it bringeth the treasure of the State into a few hands; for the usurer being a monopolist, the other at uncertainties, at the end of the game the money will be in the box, and ever a State's wealth is more equally spread: the fifth, that it raises the price of land; for the employment of money in merchandising, or purchasing; and usury waylayeth the sixth, that it doth dull and damp all industries and new inventions, wherein money would be set on; not for this slug: the last, that it is the canker of many men's estates, which in process of time brings to poverty.

On the other side, the commodities of usury, howsoever<sup>5</sup> usury in some respects hindereth men, in some other it advanceth it; for it is certain that a part of trade is driven by young merchants upon interest; so as<sup>6</sup> if the usurer either call in on men's money, there will ensue presently a great standing; second is, that, were it not for this easy borrowing, men's necessities would draw upon them a most sorrow in that<sup>7</sup> they would be forced to sell their me-

<sup>1</sup> Discommodities. *Inconveniences*. See page 357.

<sup>2</sup> Merchandising. *Trading*. 'The Phenicians, of whose example we read so much in ancient histories, were Canaanites, who trafficked and trafficked with merchants.'—*Brerewood*.

<sup>3</sup> *The great vein*.

<sup>4</sup> *Estates. St.*

<sup>5</sup> Howsoever. *Although*. See page 2.

<sup>6</sup> *As. That*

<sup>7</sup> Undoing. See page 300.

<sup>8</sup> In that. *Inasmuch as*. 'Things are preached not in that which they are published.'—*Hooker*.

out to take any penalty for the same. This rowing from any general stop or dryness—the borrowers in the country—this will, in good of land, because land purchased at sixteen yield six in the hundred, and somewhat more, of interest yields but five—this, by like reason and edge industrious and profitable improvement will rather venture in that kind, than take five especially having been used to greater profit there be certain persons licenced to lend to upon usury, at a high rate, and let it be with lowing. Let the rate be, even with the somewhat more easy than that he used formerly that means all borrowers shall have some ease tion, be he merchant or whosoever<sup>1</sup>—let it be common stock, but every man be master of his (that I altogether dislike<sup>2</sup> banks, but they will have in regard<sup>3</sup> of certain suspicions. Let the State some small matter for the licence, and the lender; for if the abatement be but small, it discourages the lender; for he, for example, that or nine in the hundred, will sooner descend hundred, than give over this trade of usury, and gains to gains of hazard. Let these licenced number indefinite, but restrained to certain principal towns of merchandise; for then they will be colour<sup>4</sup> other men's monies in the country, so a

<sup>1</sup> Whosoever. *Whoever*. 'Whosoever should give the blow be his. We are guilty of all the evil we might have hindered

<sup>2</sup> Dislike. *Dislike*.

'And Israel, whom I lov'd so dear,  
Mistaken me for his choice.'—*Milton*.

<sup>3</sup> In regard. *On account*. See page 310.

<sup>4</sup> Answer. *To pay*.

'Who studies day and night

To answer all the debts he owes to you.'—*Shakspeare*

<sup>5</sup> Whit. *In the least; in the smallest degree*. 'I was not very chiefest apostles.'—2 Cor. xi. 5.

'We love, and are no whit regarded.'—*Sidney*.

<sup>6</sup> Colour. *To pass for their own*. 'To colour a strange freeman allows a foreigner to enter goods at the Custom-house'—*Phillips*.

that no man is called hard-hearted for not his *house* rent-free, or for requiring to be his horse, or his ship, or any other kind of p

As for the lending of money making 'few' 'causing money to lie still,' it is evident the reverse of the fact; as indeed is hinted in t part of the trade and manufactures in every p is carried on with borrowed capital, lent by th the skill and leisure to carry on such business who, if they were prevented from thus invest would be driven either to let their 'money lie box, or else to engage in a business for whi fitted.

If I build a mill or a ship, and let it to a merchant, every one would allow that this is a investing capital; quite as fair, and much wis ignorant of manufactures and trade, I were to a facturer or merchant. Now if, instead of this, I money to buy or build a ship for himself, or as the manufacturer to erect his buildings and m probably suit himself better than if I had taken without his experience.

No doubt, advantage is often taken of a ne cessity, to demand high interest, and exact paym But it is equally true that advantage is taken, i town, of a man's extreme need of a night's l is but too well known, that where there is an c tition for *land*, as almost the sole mode of o sistence, it is likely that an exorbitant rent wi that this will be exacted with unbending sev would thereupon propose that the letting of prohibited, or that a maximum of rent should l For, legislative interposition in dealings betwee except for the prevention of fraud, generally i it seeks to remedy. A prohibition of intere only a minor degree of the same error—a pr beyond a certain fixed rate of interest, has an that of a like interference between the buyers a other commodity. If, for example, in a time o enacted, on the ground that cheap food is desi

manebat, neque idem decebat :<sup>1</sup> the third is of high a strain at the first, and are magnanimous of years can uphold ; as was Scipio Africanus saith in effect, ' Ultima primis cedebant.'<sup>2</sup>

ANTITHETA ON YOUTH AND AGE

Pro.

Con.

\* \* \* \* \*  
' Senes sibi sapiunt magis, aliis et reipublicæ minus.

' Old men have more wisdom for themselves, and less for others, and for the public.'

' Si conspici daretur, magis deformat animos, quam corpora, senectus.

' If the mind could be an object of sight, it would be seen that old age deforms it more than the body.'

' Senes omnia metuunt, præter Deos.

' Old men fear everything but the gods.'

' Juventus pœnitentia est.  
' Youth is the repentance.'

' Ingenitus est juvenitatis contemptus.  
toritatis contemptu periculo sapiat.

' A contempt for age is implanted in every one may be wisdom at his own

' Tempus, ad quæcunq; res catur, nec rata habet.

' When Time is counsellor, neither decision.'

ANNOTATIONS.

Many readers of Aristotle's admirable description of the Young and the Old, (in which he gives a preference to the character of the young,) for describing the *same* man at different periods of old must *have* been young. As it is, he gives a view of the character of the ' natural man,' (as the philosopher expresses it,) which is, to become—on the whole

<sup>1</sup> 'He remained the same; but the same was no longer by Cic. *Brut.* 95.

<sup>2</sup> Tract. *Course.*

' My fancies all are fled,  
And tract of time begins to weave  
Grey hairs upon my head.'—*Lord Vaux.*

(This is supposed to be the original of Shakespeare's grave-digger's song in *Hamlet.*)

<sup>3</sup> 'The last fell short of the first.'—*Levy*, xxxviii. 53.

‘ Men are apt not to consider with sufficient it is that constitutes Experience in each point, one man shall have credit for much Experience to the matter in hand, and another, who, perhaps much, or more, shall be underrated as wanting of all ranks, need to be warned, first, that *to* constitute Experience; so that many years make a man’s head, without his even having had the opportunity of acquiring it, as another, much younger: longest practice in conducting any business does not necessarily confer any experience in conducting any way: *e.g.* an experienced Husbandman, or a man in Persia, would be much at a loss in Europe in some things less to learn than an entire novice; and though they would have much to unlearn; but merely being conversant about a certain class does not confer Experience in a case, where the *Opportunity* proposed, are different. It is said that an Amsterdam merchant, who had dealt largely in corn, who had never seen a field of wheat growing, doubtless acquired, by Experience, an accurate knowledge of the qualities of each description of corn,—of the storing it,—of the arts of buying and selling at proper times, &c.; but he would have been greatly at a disadvantage in *navigation*; though he had been, in a certain way, conversant about corn. Nearly similar is the Experience of a lawyer, (supposing him to be nothing more,) in *navigation*. Because he has been long *conversant* with the law, he attributes great weight to his legislative enactments, whereas his constant habits of fixing his thoughts on the law *is*, and withdrawing it from the irrelevant considerations the law *ought* to be;—his careful observance of the rules, (which afford the more scope for the display of his studied indifference as to that which is foreign to the *convenience* or *inconvenience* of those Rules—to operate unfavourably on his judgment in question: and are likely to counterbalance the advantages of superior knowledge, even in such points as are in question.

comparing the results of a *confined*, with the experience;—a more imperfect and crude theory, cautiously framed, and based on a more copious

*'The experience of age in new things at*

The old are more liable to the 'rashness of the younger, to that of the *moth*; the distinction I have before pointed out. The old again are the young, to claim, and to give, an undue judgment, in reference to some *new* plan or who are the most thoroughly familiar with the point I have already dwelt in my remarks

*'Natures that have much heat are not ripe for have passed the meridian of their y*

There is a strange difference in the ages at which persons acquire such *maturity* as they are capable of, which some of those who have greatly distinguished have done, and been, something remarkable. Some have left the world at an earlier age than that at which they have begun their career of eminence. It was related by Dr. Arnold by a friend, as a matter of fact, of several men who have filled a considerable part of the world, have lived but forty-seven years; (Philip of Massachussetts, Addison, Sir William Jones, Nelson, Pitt,) and in a jocular way to beware of the forty-seven. Sir Isaac Newton was at that time in robust health; but he died at thirty-two; Sir Stamford Raffles at five. Sir Isaac Newton did indeed live to a great age, it is said that all his discoveries were made before he was forty, so that he *might* have died at that age, and been as he is.

On the other hand, Herschel is said to have died at astronomy at forty-seven. Swedenborg, if he had lived, would have been remembered by those that did not know him merely as a sensible worthy man, and a very good mathematician. The strange fancies which too

<sup>1</sup> See *Elements of Rhetoric*, Part II., ch. iii., § 5, pp.

This kind of decline is furthered, and some great measure caused, by a man's associating chiefly with persons of inferior mind, and giving their prejudices, and discontinuing such studies exercise as they have no sympathy with. what has been called a *Palimpsest*. A literal as is generally known—a parchment from which a manuscript—perhaps some precious work of art has been scraped off, to make room for some other or mediæval treatise. But by holding it in the person of good eyes, may, by great patience Signor Angelo Maio has) the faint traces of the

A man who in early life has resided in a Metropolis, among men of superior mind, and of scientific tastes, will sometimes retire for the rest of his life to some locality where he is surrounded by persons of an unintellectual and narrow-minded ; and will thus so completely let himself down to their level, that his former associates would hardly recognise him : in the course of conversation he may by degrees recapture some of the former man. He may, as it were, gaze at the *Palimpsest* till he perceives the traces of the former man which had been nearly obliterated, and replaced

The decay which is most usually noticed in a man, by others and by themselves, is a decay of *manly* qualities. It is perhaps partly from its being a defect easily detected, and distinctly proved. When a decay of *judgment* is noticed—which is perhaps oftener the case than is commonly supposed—the party himself is not likely to be conscious of it. His friends are more likely to overlook it, and even when they perceive it, to be backward in giving him warning. Being met with such a rebuff as Gil Blas received from his candour from the Archbishop, his patron.

It is remarkable, that there is nothing less remarkable in early youth, a certain full-formed, settled, and settled, as called, *adult* character. A lad who has, to a degree of wonder and admiration, the character and development of an intelligent man of mature age, will probably continue nothing more, all his life, and will cease according to the thing remarkable, because it was the precocity



## ESSAY XLIII. OF BEAUTY

VIRTUE is like a rich stone, best plain  
 virtue is best in a body that is comely  
 delicate features, and that hath rather dignity  
 beauty of aspect; neither is it almost<sup>1</sup> seen that  
 persons are otherwise of great virtue, as if not  
 busy not to err, than in labour to produce  
 therefore they prove accomplished, but not of  
 study rather behaviour than virtue. But this  
 for Augustus Cæsar, Titus Vespasianus, Philip  
 Edward IV. of England, Alcibiades of Athens,  
 Sophy<sup>2</sup> of Persia, were all high and great spirits  
 most beautiful men of their times. In beauty  
 is more than that of colour, and that of decorum  
 motion more than that of favour. That is  
 beauty which a picture cannot express, no, not  
 of the life. There is no excellent beauty that  
 strangeness in the proportion. A man cannot  
 Apelles or Albert Durer were the more<sup>3</sup> trifler;

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<sup>1</sup> Almost. *For the most part; generally.* 'Who is there  
 at some time or other, love or anger, fear or grief, has not felt  
 that it could not turn itself to any other object.'

<sup>2</sup> Excellency. *Excellence.* 'That the excellency of the  
 and not of us.'—2 Cor. iv. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Sophy. *Sultan.*

'With letters, him in cautious wise,  
 They straightway sent to Persia;  
 But wrote to the *Sophy* him to kill.'

—*St. George and the Dragon.*

<sup>4</sup> Favour. *Countenance.*

'I know your *favour* well, Percy,

Though now you have no sea-cap on your head.'—

<sup>5</sup> Decent. *Becoming; fit.* 'All pastimes, generally, whether  
 labour and in open place, and on the day-lighte, be not only  
 but verie necessarie for a courtly gentleman.'—*Roger Ascham*

'Those thousand *decencies* that daily flow  
 From all her words and actions.'—*Milton*

<sup>6</sup> Gracious. *Graceful.*

'There was ne'er such a *gracious* creature born.'—

More. *Greater; great.* 'The *moreness* of Christ's virtue  
 by worldly moreness.'—*Wickliff.*

## ESSAY XLIV. OF DEFOI

DEFORMED persons are commonly ever as nature hath done ill by them, so being for the most part (as the Scripture saith affection :<sup>1</sup> and so they have their revenge tainly there is a consent<sup>2</sup> between the body a ' where nature erreth in the one she ventur (' Ubi peccat in uno, periclitatur in altero '): I is in man an election touching the frame of necessity in the frame of his body, the stars c tion are sometimes obscured by the sun of disc therefore, it is good to consider of deformit which is more deceivable, but as a cause whi of the effect. Whosoever hath anything fixe that doth induce contempt, hath also a perpet self to rescue and deliver himself from scorn deformed persons are extreme<sup>4</sup> bold—first, a defence, as being exposed to scorn, but in proc general habit. Also, it stirreth in them industr of this kind, to watch and observe the weakne they may have somewhat to repay. Again, in it quencheth jealousy towards them, as persons they may at pleasure despise; and it layeth t and emulators asleep, as never believing the possibility of advancement, till they see them i that upon the matter,<sup>5</sup> in a great wit, deformity to rising. Kings, in ancient times (and at

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<sup>1</sup> Rom. i. 31.

<sup>2</sup> ' Then since the Heavens have shaped my b  
Let Hell make crook't my mind to answer  
Shakespeare's

<sup>3</sup> Consent. *Agreement.*

' With one *consent*, let all the earth  
To God their cheerful voices raise.'—Tate's *Versi*

<sup>4</sup> Extreme. *Extremely.*

<sup>5</sup> Matter. *Whole.* (' Upon the matter '—*On the whole.*)  
to have come so very near the *matter*, that but very few esca

## ESSAY XLV. OF BUILDING

**H**OUSES are built to live in, and not to let use be preferred before<sup>1</sup> uniformity both may be had. Leave the goodly fabric beauty, only to the enchanted palaces of the them with small cost. He that builds a fair seat,<sup>2</sup> committeth himself to prison—neither an ill seat only where the air is unwholesome, but the air is unequal; as you shall see many fine knap<sup>3</sup> of ground, environed with higher hills whereby the heat of the sun is pent in, and thus as in troughs; so as<sup>4</sup> you shall have, and that as diversity of heat and cold as if you dwelt in. Neither is it ill<sup>5</sup> air only that maketh an ill seat ill markets; and if you consult with Momus, will speak not of many more; want of water, want of shelter, want of fruitfulness, and mixture of several natures; want of prospect, want of level of places at some near distance for sports of hunting and races; too near the sea, too remote; having of navigable rivers, or the discommodity of the too far off from great cities, which may hinder

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<sup>1</sup> Preferred before. *Preferred to.*

‘O Spirit that dost prefer  
Before all temples, the upright heart and pure  
Instruct me.’—*Milton.*

<sup>2</sup> Seat. *Site.* ‘It remaineth now that we find out the *Raleigh.*

<sup>3</sup> Knap. *A prominence; a knoll.*

‘Hark, on knap of yonder hill,  
Some sweet shepherd tunes his quill.’—*B.*

<sup>4</sup> As. *That.* See page 23.

<sup>5</sup> Ill. *Bad.*

‘There some ill planet reigns.’—*Shakespeare*

<sup>6</sup> Commodity. *Advantage; convenience.* See page 418.

chambers of presence and ordinary entertainments with some bed-chambers; and let all three sides be a double house, without thorough lights on the sides, that you may have rooms from the sun, both for forenoon and afternoon. Cast<sup>1</sup> it also that you may have rooms both for summer and winter, shady for summer and warm for winter. You shall have sometimes fair houses so full of glass, that one cannot tell where to become<sup>2</sup> to be out of the sun or cold. For embowed<sup>3</sup> windows, I hold them of good use; in cities, indeed, upright do better, in respect of the uniformity towards the street; for they be pretty retiring places for conference, and, besides, they keep both the wind and sun off—for that which would strike almost through the room, doth scarce pass the window; but let them be but few, four in the court, on the sides only.

Beyond this court let there be an inward<sup>4</sup> court, of the same square and height, which is to be environed with the garden on all sides; and in the inside, cloistered on all sides upon decent and beautiful arches, as high as the first storey; on the under storey, towards the garden, let it be turned to a grotto, or place of shade, or estivation; and only have opening and windows towards the garden, and be level upon the floor, no whit<sup>5</sup> sunk under ground, to avoid all dampishness; and let there be a fountain, or some fair work of statues in the midst of the court, and to be paved as the other court was. These buildings to be for privy lodgings on both sides, and the end for privy galleries; whereof you must foresee that one of them be for an infirmary, if the prince or any special person should be sick, with chambers, bed-chamber, 'antecamera' ['anti-chamber'],

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<sup>1</sup> Cast. *To plan.*

'From that day forth, I *cast* in careful mind  
To keep her out.'—*Spenser.*

<sup>2</sup> Become. *To betake oneself.*

'I cannot joy until I be resolved  
Where our right valiant father  
Is become.'—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>3</sup> Embowed. *Bowed.*

'I saw a bull as white as driven snow,  
With gilden horns, *embowed* like the moon.'—*Spenser.*

<sup>4</sup> Inward. *Inner.* 'Though our outward man perish, yet the *inward* man is renewed day by day.'—2 *Cor.* iv.

<sup>5</sup> Whit. *The least degree.* See page 421.

and 'recamera,' ['retiring-chamber,' or 'bring it to it; this upon the second storey. Upon a fair gallery, open, upon pillars; and upon likewise, an open gallery upon pillars, to take the freshness of the garden. At both corners, by way of return, let there be two delicate daintily<sup>1</sup> paved, richly hanged,<sup>2</sup> glazed with and a rich cupola in the midst, and all other be thought upon. In the upper gallery, too, may be, if the place will yield it, some few divers<sup>3</sup> places from the wall, with some fine thus much for the model of the palace; save, before you come to the front, three courts plain, with a wall about it; a second court more garnished with little turrets, or rather upon the wall; and a third court, to make a front, but not to be built, nor yet enclosed, but enclosed with terraces leaded aloft, and finish the three sides, and cloistered on the inside, not with arches below. As for offices, let them be at some distance, with some low galleries to pass from the palace itself.

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<sup>1</sup> Daintily. *Elegantly*. See page 1.

<sup>2</sup> Hanged. *Hung* (with draperies). 'Music is better in a room hanged.'—*Bacon*.

<sup>3</sup> Divers. *Many*. See page 212.

<sup>4</sup> Avoidances. *Water-courses*. 'The two avoidances or Statute, 8th year of King Henry VII.

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parts ; a green in the entrance, a heath or  
 forth, and the main garden in the midst, be-  
 sides ; and I like well that four acres of g  
 to the green, six to the heath, four and fo  
 and twelve to the main garden. The green h  
 the one, because nothing is more pleasant to  
 grass kept finely shorn ; the other, because  
 fair alley in the midst, by which you may g  
 stately hedge, which is to enclose the garden  
 alley will be long, and, in great heat of the  
 ought not to buy the shade in the garden by  
 through the green, therefore you are, of eithe  
 to plant a covert alley, upon carpenters' w  
 feet in height, by which you may go in shade  
 As for the making of knots, or figures, with  
 earths, that they may lie under the windows  
 that side on which the garden stands, they b  
 may see as good sights many times in tarts.  
 best to be square, encompassed on all the f  
 stately arched hedge ; the arches to be upo  
 penters' work, of some ten feet high, and six  
 the spaces between of the same dimensions wi  
 the arch. Over the arches let there be an  
 some four feet high, framed also upon carper  
 upon the upper hedge, over every arch, a litt  
 belly<sup>3</sup> enough to receive a cage of birds : and  
 between the arches some other little figure, w  
 of round coloured glass gilt, for the sun to pla  
 hedge I intend to be raised upon a bank, not  
 slope,<sup>4</sup> of some six feet, set all with flowers.  
 stand that this square of the garden shall n

<sup>1</sup> Either. *Each.* See page 327.

<sup>2</sup> Divers-coloured. *Of various colours.*

*'Smiling Cupids,  
 With divers-coloured fans.'*—*Shakesp.*

<sup>3</sup> Belly. See page 219.

<sup>4</sup> Slope. *Sloping.*

*'Murmuring waters fa  
 Down the slope hills, dispersed, or in a lake  
 That to the fringed banks, with myrtle cro  
 Her crystal mirror holds, unite their stream*

For the side grounds, you are to fill them with variety of alleys, private to give a full shade; some of them wheresoever the sun be. You are to frame some of them likewise for shelter, that, when the wind blows sharp, you may walk as in a gallery; and those alleys must be likewise hedged at both ends, to keep out the wind, and these closer alleys must be ever finely gravelled, and no grass, because of going<sup>1</sup> wet. In many of these alleys, likewise, you are to set fruit-trees of all sorts, as well upon the walls as in ranges; and this should be generally observed, that the borders wherein you plant your fruit-trees be fair, and large, and low, and not steep, and set with fine flowers, but thin and sparingly, lest they deceive<sup>2</sup> the trees. At the end of both the side grounds I would have a mount of some pretty height, leaving the wall of the enclosure breast-high, to look abroad into the fields.

For the main garden, I do not deny but there should be some fair alleys ranged on both sides with fruit trees, and some pretty tufts of fruit-trees and arbours with seats, set in some decent order; but these to be by no means set too thick, but to leave the main garden so as it be not close, but the air open and free. For as for shade, I would have you rest upon the alleys of the side grounds, there to walk, if you feel disposed, in the heat of the year or day; but to make account, that the main garden is for the more temperate parts of the year, and, in the heat of summer, for the morning and the evening, or overcast days.

For aviaries, I like them not, except they be of that largeness as they may be turfed, and have living plants and bushes set in them, that the birds may have more scope and natural nestling, and that no foulness appear on the floor of the aviary. So I have made a platform of a princely garden, partly by precept, partly by drawing—not a model, but some general lines

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<sup>1</sup> Go. *To tend to.*

‘There be some women . . . . .

. . . . would have *gone* near to fall in love with him.’—*Shakespeare.*

<sup>2</sup> Deceive. *To deprive by stealth; to rob.* ‘And so *deceive* the spirits of the body, and rob them of their nourishment.’—*Bacon.* ‘Rather than I would embezzle or *deceive* him of a mite, I would it were moulte, and put into my mouth.’—*Cavendish, Life of Cardinal Wolsey.*

of it—and in this I have spared<sup>1</sup> for no cost for great princes, that, for the most part, workmen, with no less cost set their things to times add statues, and such things, for state but nothing to the true pleasure of a garden.

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## ANNOTATION.

*'I for my part do not like images cut out*

This childish taste, as Bacon rightly calls great degree long after his time. But what 'Landscape-gardening' is, of all the fine arts (may fairly be accounted one), the latest in it arisen not very early in the last century.

The earliest writer, I believe, on the subject Thomas Whately. From his work (which went through several editions) subsequent writers have borrowed largely with little or no acknowledgment. The Abbé de Lille, however, in his poem of *Les Jardins*, dedicates it to him as his master.

Mr. W. was distinguished as a man of taste in one department. Being by many looked up to in such matters, it was he that first brought Thomson's *Seasons*, and thus laid the foundation of its popularity. And the portion that was complete on the *Characters of Shakespere* (left unfinished but edited first by my father, and afterwards by me) is considered by competent judges to be one of the best works that ever appeared.

His Treatise on *Modern Gardening* (as it was) would form the most suitable annotation on Bacon's. But it is far too long to be inserted.

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<sup>1</sup> Spare. *To restrict oneself; to forbear.*

*'We might have spared our coming.'*—Milton



## ESSAY XLVII. OF NEGOTIATION

IT is generally better to deal by speech than by the mediation of a third than by a man's good, when a man would draw an answer by or when it may serve for a man's justification to produce his own letter : or where it may be interrupted, or heard by pieces. To deal in person with a man's face breedeth regard, as commonly in tender cases, where a man's eye upon the man with whom he speaketh may give him a better way to go ; and generally, where a man will reserve either to disavow or expound. In choice of men, it is better to chuse men of a plainer sort, that are not so much committed to them, and to report back the success, than those that are cunning<sup>1</sup> to colour men's business somewhat to grace themselves, and matter in report, for satisfaction sake. Use such as affect<sup>2</sup> the business wherein they are employed quickeneth much ; and such as are fit for the men for expostulation, fair-spoken men for men for inquiry and observation, forward and business that doth not well bear out itself. I have been lucky, and prevailed before in the business I have employed them ; for that breeds confidence and strive to maintain their prescription.

It is better to sound a person with whom one has to deal than to fall upon the point at first, except you can get him by some short question. It is better to deal with those that are where they have an appetite,<sup>3</sup> than with those that are where they

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<sup>1</sup> Cunning. *Skilful*. 'I will take away the *cunning* artifice  
'I will send you a man of mine,  
*Cunning* in music and the mathematics.'—*Shakespeare*

<sup>2</sup> Affect. *To like*. See page 395.

<sup>3</sup> Appetite. *Desire*.

'Dexterity so obeying *appetite*,  
That what he wills, he does.'—*Shakespeare*

able employment of an art?' 'Genius else has remarked, 'where rules end.' But such as Bacon doubtless could have given instead of cramping genius, enable it to ac

One advantage which, in some cases, the writer is, that he can proceed in which he judges to be the best; establishing a succession, and perhaps keeping out of sight which he is advancing, if it be one against prejudice. For sometimes men will feel the arguments which they would not have listened had known at the outset to what they were. Thus the lawyer, in the fable, is drawn to a decision as to the duty of the owner of an ass to a neighbour's. Now, though you may present in a letter or a book, you cannot—it is before the reader at once—prevent his looking to see what your ultimate design is. And you are discomfited, just as a well-drawn-up army man in *the rere*.

Many writers of modern tales have guardedly precluded their readers from forestalling the conclusion by publishing in successive *numbers*. And an advantage may sometimes be secured by writing two volumes in succession, so as gradually to develop the subject in a proper order.

In oral discussions, *quickness* may give an advantage over those who may, perhaps, surpass him in argument, but who take more time to form their conclusions; and, universally, speaking, an advantage over writing, when the arguments are plain. There is a story of an Athenian, who had a case put before him in a cause he was to plead, by a professor of rhetoric which he was to learn by heart. At the first he was delighted with it; but less at the second; and at the third he seemed to him quite worthless. He went to the professor to complain; who reminded him that the judges had heard *it once*.

And hence, as has been justly remarked, the practice of much public speaking, tends to cultivate

arguments, is like King Lear putting a l without eyes, and saying, 'Mark but the which he answers, 'Were all the letters su one.' But it may be well worth while son such a person much that is not likely to it if you have an opportunity of showing it to that he *ought* to have been convinced by it.

As for speeches in public, they may be taking of both characters ; for, as they are t reporters, and printed, they are, so far, of written compositions.

Bacon remarks in his Essay 'On Cunning are two persons only conferring together, it make it clear which of them said what. If trying to *back out* of something he has said, other kind of craft, he will be likely to say, 'to say so and so,' 'You misunderstood me. I so.' And when both parties are honest, the times a real misapprehension of what passed so frequent a cause of quarrels, that the very standing' has come to be used in that sense.

It is to be observed that when the expressic not merely what lawyers call 'obiter dicta'—s and incidentally thrown out,—but contain th general tenor of a full and leisurely discussion it is much more likely—other things being should have forgotten what he said, than have imagined what never took place. some persons who, without any disingenu merely from a groundless confidence in t their own memory, will insist on it that an mistaken the whole drift of their discourse never said anything at all like what he distinc though it is what he closely attended to—an strong impression on his mind. In such a case reply, 'Well, it cannot be denied to be *possi* may mistake another, to any extent, and un stances ; but if this is the case with me, th your *speaking to me at all*, now, or at any tin unable to understand aright the general dri

sion, in plain English, and to which I paid the closest attention, how can I be sure that the sense I understand your words to convey at *this very moment*, may not be something quite as different from your real meaning, as that which I formerly understood you to say? There must be an end therefore of all oral conference between us. Anything that you wish to communicate, you must put down on paper, and let me, on reading it, express, on paper also, in my own words, what it is that I understand from it; and then, these must be shown to one or two other persons, who must declare whether I have rightly understood you or not; and must explain my mistake if I have made any.'

For people who are slippery, either from design or from treacherous memory, there is nothing like writing.

But it may be remarked generally, that a person who is apt to complain of 'not being understood,' even by such as possess ordinary intelligence and candour, is one who does not well understand himself.

A remark of Dr. Cooke Taylor, in *The Bishop*, bears upon this subject:—'Much judgment is required to discriminate between the occasions when business can be best done personally, and when best by letter. One general rule may be noted,—disagreements will be best *prevented* by oral communications, for then each man may throw out what occurs to him, without being committed in writing to something from which he would be ashamed to draw back. There is room for mutual explanation—for softening down harsh expressions—for coming to an understanding about common objects, which very probably are not inconsistent so long as the elements of discord retain the vagueness of spoken words. *Litera scripta manet*.

'When, however, disagreements *actually exist*, the opposite course must be pursued; in such a case conversation has an inevitable tendency to become debate; and in the heat of argument something is likely to be thrown out offensive to one side or the other. Adversaries generally meet, not to end a dispute, but to continue it; not to effect reconciliation, but to gain a victory; they are, therefore, likely to remember differently what is said, to put very varied interpretations on tones and looks, and to find fresh aliment of strife in the means em-

played for its termination. Even when ad-  
express purpose of being reconciled, they  
insensibly into the opposite course, and the  
which you are anxious to have closed. It  
of preventing a fight between game cocks  
the same pit.'

'It is important to observe, that where  
of persons possessed with some strong pi-  
wish to break down, you have a much better  
with them one by one, than together; beca-  
other in countenance in holding out against  
which they can find no answer; and are  
presence of the rest—to go back from what  
own conviction. But if you untie the fag  
the sticks one by one.'

And again, if you wish to make the most  
character, so as to overbear superior reasons  
do not bring them together, lest some of the  
with arguments or objections which you cannot  
rest should be ashamed to decide, through  
you, against what each feels must be the  
but if you take them one by one, each will pre-  
of setting up himself singly against you; you  
prevail at least with each one who cannot hit  
and these will probably be the majority.<sup>1</sup>

But, on the other hand, if there are some per-  
that are on your side, and cool argument would  
then, according to what has been said just above,  
easily manage a number of men together, than

It is told of the celebrated Wilkes, that  
meeting he sat next to a person who, being in

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<sup>1</sup> Some Reviewer, if I recollect rightly, takes for gran-  
scribing my own practice. On the same principle he wrote  
he heard of some anatomist, who had pointed out the situ-  
of the human frame, where a wound was likely to prove  
the man *must be an assassin!*

It is not perhaps wonderful that a person of low moral  
judging from himself—that one who *knows* of some craft  
practise it. But any one of even a moderate degree of  
that a person who does practise such tricks, is not very like  
*tion* of them. Burglars do not send word to the master of  
they design to break in.

course matters were taking, kept exclaiming, 'I cannot allow this to go on! I must take the *sense of the Meeting* on this point.' Whereupon Wilkes is said to have whispered to him, 'Do so, if you will; I'll take the *nonsense* of the Meeting against you, and beat you.'

Some persons have an excessive dread of following in the *wake* of another; wishing to be accounted the originators of any measure they advocate. In dealing with a man of this character, you must be ready (supposing you are more anxious to effect some good object, than to obtain the credit of it) to humour this kind of vanity, by allowing him to take the lead, and to fancy, if he insists on it, that the view he adopts was a suggestion of his own. Many a man's co-operation may be purchased at this price, who would have disdained the thought of favouring another person's scheme. You must be prepared, therefore, if you are acting with true singleness of purpose, to say, with the hero in the *Æneid*,

. . . . 'hæc dira meo dum vulnere pestis  
Pulsa cadat, patriam remeabo inglorius urbem.'

In dealing with those who have prejudices to be got over, and whose co-operation or conviction you wish for, it is well worth remembering that there are two opposite kinds of disposition in men, requiring opposite treatment. One man, perhaps intelligent, and not destitute of candour, but with a considerable share of what phrenologists call the organs of *Firmness*, and of *Combateness*, will set himself to find objections to your proposals or views; and the more you urge him to come to an immediate decision on your side, and own himself overcome by your arguments, the more resolutely he will maintain his first position, and will at length commit himself irrecoverably to opposition. Your wisest course, therefore, with such a man will be, after having laid before him your reasons, to recommend him to reflect calmly on them, and so leave him to consult his pillow. And it will often happen that he will reason himself into your views. Leave the *arrow sticking* in his prejudice, and it will gradually bleed to death.

With another man, of a very different character, it will be wise to pursue an opposite course. If you urge him with the strongest reasons, and answer all his objections, and then leave him apparently a convert, you will find the next time you meet

him, that you have all to do over again ; had said having faded away. Your only man, is to continue pressing him, till he his consent, or plainly declared his acquiesce brought him, as it were, formally to pass liament of his own mind, and to have th in your favour.

Of course, you must watch for any sym dicate which kind of man you have to deal

Another caution to be observed is, that in as a speaker or a writer, deep-rooted prejud ing unpopular truths, the point to be aim adduce what is sufficient, and *not much m* to prove your conclusion. If you can b your opinion is decidedly more probable tha will have carried your point more effectually much beyond this, to demonstrate, by a mu forcible arguments, the *extreme absurdity* of t till you have affronted the self-esteem of so the distrust of others. 'Some will be stu shame passing off into resentment, which against argument. They could have borne their opinion : but not, *so* to change it as opinion with the grossest folly. They wou *think* they had been blinded to such an exces with him who is endeavouring to persuade that these feelings determine them *not* to tl (and it is an attempt which few persons eve shut their eyes against an humiliating cor the very triumphant force of the reasoning harden them against admitting the conclu may conceive Roman soldiers desperately h tenable fortress to the last extremity, fro being made to pass *under the yoke* by the v surrender.

'Others again, perhaps comparatively str tion, and not prejudiced, or not strongly your conclusion, but ready to admit it if sup arguments, will sometimes, if your argum *beyond* what is sufficient, have their suspic

very circumstance. 'Can it be possible,' they will say, 'that a conclusion so very obvious as this is made to appear, should not have been admitted long ago? Is it conceivable that such and such eminent philosophers, divines, statesmen, &c., should have been all their lives under delusions so gross?' Hence they are apt to infer, either that the author has mistaken the opinions of those he imagines opposed to him, or else, that there is some subtle fallacy in his arguments.<sup>1</sup>

This is a distrust that reminds one of the story related by a French writer, M. Say, of some one who, for a wager, stood a whole day on one of the bridges in Paris, offering to sell a five-franc piece for one franc, and (naturally) not finding a purchaser. In this way the very clearness and force of the demonstration will, with some minds, have an opposite tendency to the one desired. Labourers who are employed in *driving wedges* into a block of wood, are careful to use blows of no greater force than is just sufficient. If they strike too hard, the elasticity of the wood will *throw out the wedge*.

It may be noticed here that the effect produced by any writing or speech of an argumentative character, on any subjects on which diversity of opinion prevails, may be compared—supposing the argument to be of any weight—to the effects of a fire-engine on a conflagration. That portion of the water which falls on solid stone walls, is poured out where it is not needed. That, again, which falls on blazing beams and rafters, is cast off in volumes of hissing steam, and will seldom avail to quench the fire. But that which is poured on wood-work that is just beginning to kindle, may stop the burning; and that which wets the rafters not yet ignited, but in danger, may save them from catching fire. Even so, those who already concur with the writer as to some point, will feel gratified with, and perhaps bestow high commendation on an able defence of the opinions they already held; and those, again, who have fully made up their minds on the opposite side, are more likely to be displeased than to be convinced. But both of these parties are left nearly in the same mind as before. Those, however, who are in a hesitating and doubtful state, may very likely be decided by forcible arguments. And those who have not hitherto considered the subject, may be induced to adopt opinions which they

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<sup>1</sup> *Elements of Rhetoric*, Part I. ch. iii.



similar way by cavillers. 'Are these Visitors,' it was said, 'to have the cure of souls? Are they to expound Scripture to the people, and give them religious instruction and admonitions, just as the pastor does? If so, they ought to be regularly ordained clergymen; and should be called curates. Or, are they merely to be the bearers of communications between the people and the pastor, and not to venture, without his express orders, to read a passage of Scripture to a sick man, or to explain to him the meaning of such words as 'Publican' or 'Pharisee?' In that case they will fall into contempt as triflers.'

If you answer that they are not to be so rigidly restricted as that; but are to reserve for the Minister any important or difficult points; the caviller will reply—'And who is to be the *judge* what *are* the most important and difficult points, and what the easier and more obvious. If this is to be left to the discretion of the Visitor himself, he will take everything into his own hands; but if it is to be referred to the Minister, then, the Visitor will be nothing but a mere messenger.' In like manner it might be asked, whether the nurse in an hospital is to administer or withhold medicines, and perform surgical operations, at discretion, and, in short, to usurp all the functions of the physician, or whether she is not to be allowed to smooth a patient's pillow, or moisten his lips, or wipe his brow, without a written order from the doctor.

The Israelites in the Wilderness were perverse enough, no doubt; but if there had been *cavillers* among them, it would have been easy to find plausible objections to the appointment by Moses of the seventy Elders, who were to decide all small matters, and to reserve the weightier ones for him. 'Who is to be the judge,' it might have been said, 'which *are* the weightier causes? If, the Elders themselves, then they may keep *all* matters in their own hands, and leave no jurisdiction at all in Moses: but if *he* is to be consulted on each point, he will not be saved any trouble at all; because every case will have to be laid before him.'

Nevertheless the plan did seem on the whole to work well; and so it was found, in practice, with the institution of Parochial Visitors; and so, with the British Constitution.

One course generally adopted by the caviller, with respect to any proposal that is brought forward, is, if it be made in *general* terms, to call for *detailed particulars*, and to say, 'explain dis-

*E. g.* 'What is wanted, is, not this and that improvement in the mode of electing Members of Parliament,—but a Parliament consisting of truly honest, enlightened, and patriotic men. It is vain to talk of any system of Church-government, or of improved Church-discipline, or any alterations in our Services, or revision of the Bible-translation; *what we want* is a zealous and truly evangelical ministry, who shall assiduously inculcate on all the people pure Gospel doctrine. It is vain to cast cannon and to raise troops; *what is wanted*, for the successful conduct of the war, is an army of well-equipped and well-disciplined men, under the command of generals who are thoroughly masters of the art of war,' &c. And thus one may, in every department of life, go on indefinitely making fine speeches that can lead to no practical result, except to create a disgust for everything that is practical.

When (in 1832) public attention was called to the enormous mischiefs arising from the system of Transportation, we were told in reply, in a style of florid and indignant declamation, that the real cause of all the enormities complained of, was, a 'want of sufficient *fear of God*; (!) and that the only remedy wanted was, an increased fear of God!' As if, when the unhealthiness of some locality had been pointed out, and a suggestion had been thrown out for providing sewers, and draining marshes, it had been replied that the root of the evil was, a prevailing *want of health*;—that it was strange, this—the true cause—should have been overlooked;—and that the remedy of all would be to provide restored health!

As for the penal colonies, all that is required to make them efficient, is, we must suppose, to bring in a Bill enacting that 'Whereas, &c., be it therefore enacted, that from and after the first of January next ensuing, all persons shall fear God!'

It is such Utopian declaimers that give plausibility to the objections of the cavillers above noticed.

It is but fair, after one has admitted (supposing it is what ought to be admitted) the desirableness of the end proposed, to call on the other party to say whether he knows, or can think of, any *means* by which that end can be attained.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Letters to Earl Grey*; and also *Lectures on Political Economy*.

## ESSAY XLVIII. OF FOLLOWERS AND FRIENDS.

**C**OSTLY followers are not to be liked. He that maketh his train longer, he maketh himself reckon to be costly, not them alone which follow. Which are wearisome and importune<sup>1</sup> in their requests. Followers ought to challenge no higher commendation, and protection from their masters. Followers are worse to be liked, which follow to him with whom they range themselves, than to him which is discontent<sup>2</sup> conceived against some other; whereof ensueth that ill intelligence<sup>3</sup> that we may have of great personages. Likewise glorious<sup>4</sup> followers, which feign themselves as trumpets of the commendation of their masters, follow, are full of inconvenience, for they talk want of secrecy; and they export honour from their masters a return in envy. There is a kind of flattery which are dangerous, being indeed espials,<sup>5</sup> which discover secrets of the house, and bear tales of them to their enemies. Men many times are in great favour, for they commonly exchange tales. The following

<sup>1</sup> Importune. *Importunate.*

<sup>2</sup> More shall thy penitent sighs, his endlesse mercy please  
Than their *importune* suits which dreame that wordes

<sup>3</sup> Upon. *In consequence of.* 'Upon pity they were told they were again demanded.'—*Hayward.*

<sup>4</sup> Discontentment. *Discontent.* 'Tell of your enemies' *State Trials, 1600.*

<sup>5</sup> Ill intelligence. *Bad terms.* 'He lived rather in any friendship with the favourites.'—*Clarendon.*

<sup>6</sup> Glorious. *Boastful.*

'We have not  
Received into our bosom, and our grace  
A glorious lazy drone.'—*Massinger.*

<sup>7</sup> Espials. *Spies; spies.*

<sup>8</sup> Officious. *Useful; doing good offices.*

'Yet, not to earth are those bright luminaries  
*Officious*; but to thee, earth's habitant.'

<sup>9</sup> Estates of men. *Orders of men.* See page 204.

men, answerable to that which a great man himself professeth (as of soldiers to him that hath been employed in the wars, and the like), hath ever been a thing civil,<sup>1</sup> and well taken even in monarchies, so it be without too much pomp or popularity : but the most honourable kind of following is to be followed as one that apprehendeth<sup>2</sup> to advance virtue and desert in all sorts of persons ; and yet, where there is no eminent odds in sufficiency,<sup>3</sup> it is better to take with the more passable than with the more able : and, besides, to speak truth in base times, active men are of more use than virtuous. It is true, that in government it is good to use men of one rank equally : for to countenance some extraordinarily is to make them insolent, and the rest discontent,<sup>4</sup> because they may claim a due ; but contrariwise in favour, to use men with much difference<sup>5</sup> and election, is good ; for it maketh the persons preferred more thankful, and the rest more officious ; because all is of favour. It is good discretion not to make too much of any man at the first, because one cannot hold out that proportion. To be governed (as we call it) by one, is not safe, for it shows softness,<sup>6</sup> and gives a freedom to scandal and disreputation ;<sup>7</sup> for those that would not censure or speak ill of a man immediately, will talk more boldly of those that are so great with them, and thereby wound their honour ; yet to be distracted with many, is worse, for it makes men to be of the last impression, and full of change. To take advice

<sup>1</sup> Civil. *Decorous.*

‘ Where civil speech and soft persuasion hung.’—*Pope.*

<sup>2</sup> Apprehend. *To conceive ; to take in as an object.*

‘ Can we want obedience, then,

To Him, or possibly his love desert,

Who formed us from the dust, and placed us here,

Full to the utmost measure of what bliss

Human desires can seek, or apprehend.’—*Milton.*

<sup>3</sup> Sufficiency. *Ability.* See page 275.

<sup>4</sup> Discontent. *Discontented.* ‘ The discountenanced and discontent, these the Earl singles out, as best for his purpose.’—*Hayward.*

<sup>5</sup> Difference. *Distinction.* ‘ Our constitution does not only make a difference between the guilty and the innocent, but even among the guilty, between such as are more or less observed.’—*Addison.*

<sup>6</sup> Softness. *Weakness.*

‘ Under a shepherd *soft* and negligent,

The wolfe hath many a sheep and lambe to rent.’—*Chaucer.*

<sup>7</sup> Disreputation. *Disrepute.* ‘ Gluttony is not in such *disreputation* among men as drunkenness.’—*Bishop Taylor.*

of some few friends, is ever honourable ; times see more than gamesters ; and the the hill. There is little friendship in the all between equals, which was wont<sup>1</sup> to that is, is between superior and inferior, comprehend the one the other.

## ANNOTATIONS.

*' They taint business through want*

Henry Taylor, in the *Statesman*, has a good advantage of trusting *thoroughly* rather than there are some who will be more likely to let one only is confided, than if they felt the altogether. They will then, he thinks, be less boastful proof of the confidence reposed in using it.

*' A kind of followers which bear*

It is observable that flatterers are usually to be found we have in *Proverbs* the caution, ' He that tale-bearer, revealeth secrets ; therefore meddle not that flattereth with his lips.'

*' Lookers-on many times see more than*

This proverbial maxim, which bears witness sometimes possessed by an observant bystander actually engaged in any transaction, has a parallel proverb :

Ἰὺ μαλὶς ἀνὰ τῶμασιν ἔειπε ἀνὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἀνὰ

He is a good hurler that's on the ditch

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<sup>1</sup> Wont. *Accustomed.* See page 43

## ESSAY XLIX. OF SU

MANY ill matters and projects are un-  
suits do putrefy the public good. Many  
undertaken with bad minds—I mean not  
but crafty minds, that intend not perform  
suits, which never mean to deal effectually i  
see there may be life in the matter, by som  
will be content to win a thank,<sup>2</sup> or take a se  
least, to make use in the meantime of the su  
take hold of suits only for an occasion to  
to make<sup>4</sup> an information, whereof they could  
apt pretext, without care what become of  
turn is served; or, generally, to make othe  
kind of entertainment<sup>5</sup> to bring in their own  
take suits with a full purpose to let them  
gratify the adverse party, or competitor.  
some sort a right in every suit: either a righ  
a suit of controversy, or a right of desert,  
petition. If affection lead a man to favour  
justice, let him rather use his countenance  
matter than to carry it. If affection lead a  
less worthy in desert, let him do it without  
abling the better deserver. In suits which  
well understand, it is good to refer them to s

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<sup>1</sup> Mean. *Means*. See page 202.

<sup>2</sup> A thank. *Seldom used in the singular*. ‘The fool s  
all my good deed; and they that eat my bread speak evil c

<sup>3</sup> Second. *Secondary; inferior*.

‘Each glance, each gra  
Keep their first lustre and maintain their p  
Not second yet to any other face.’—*Dryden*

<sup>4</sup> Make. *Give*. ‘They all with one consent began  
xiv. 18.

<sup>5</sup> Entertainment. *Preliminary communication*. ‘The  
some gentle *entertainment* to Laertes, before you fall to pl

<sup>6</sup> Deprave. *To vilify*. ‘And that knoweth conscienc  
ne to *deprave* the persone.’—*Piers Ploughman*. ‘En  
nothing but *deprave* and speak ill of virtuous doing.’—*Be*

and judgment, that may report whether he may deal in them with honour; but let him chuse well his referendaries,<sup>1</sup> for else he may be led by the nose. Suitors are so distasted<sup>2</sup> with delays and abuses,<sup>3</sup> that plain dealing in denying to deal in suits at first, and reporting the success barely, and in challenging no more thanks than one hath deserved, is grown not only honourable, but also gracious. In suits of favour, the first coming ought to take little place;<sup>4</sup> so far forth<sup>5</sup> consideration may be had of his trust, that if intelligence of the matter could not otherwise have been had but by him, advantage be not taken of the note,<sup>6</sup> but the party left to his other means, and in some sort recompensed for his discovery. To be ignorant of the value of a suit is simplicity, as well as to be ignorant of the right thereof is want of conscience. Secrecy in suits is a great mean of obtaining; for voicing<sup>7</sup> them to be in forwardness may discourage some kind of suitors, but doth quicken<sup>8</sup> and awake others; but timing of the suit is the principal—timing, I say, not only in respect of the person who should grant it, but in respect of those which are like to cross it. Let a man, in the choice of his mean,<sup>9</sup> rather chuse the fittest mean than the greatest mean; and rather them that deal in certain things,

<sup>1</sup> Referendaries. *Referees*. 'Who was legate at the dooings, who was referendarie, who was presidente, who was presente.'—*Bishop Jewell*.

<sup>2</sup> Distaste. *To disgust*. 'These new edicts, that so distaste the people.'—*Heywood*.

<sup>3</sup> Abuses. *Deception*.

'Lend me your kind pains to find out this abuse.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>4</sup> Place. *Effect*.

'Yet these fixed evils sit so fit in him,  
That they take place, when virtue's steely bones  
Look bleak in the cold wind.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>5</sup> So far forth. *To the degree*. 'The substance of the service of God, so far forth as it hath in it anything more than the love of reason doth teach, must not be invented of man, but received from God himself.'—*Hooker*.

'Arraied for this feste, in every wise  
So far forth as his connynge may suffice.'—*Chaucer*.

<sup>6</sup> Note. *Notification; information*.

'She that from Naples  
Can have no note, unless the sun were past,  
(The man i' the moon's too slow.)'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>7</sup> Voice. *To report*. 'It was voiced that the king proposed to put to death Edward Plantagenet.'—*Shakespeare*.

<sup>8</sup> Quicken. *To bring to life*. See page 420.

<sup>9</sup> Mean. *Instrument*. 'Pamela's noble heart would needs gratefully make known the valiant mean of her safety.'—*Sidney*.

than those that are general. The repair sometimes equal to the first grant, if a man dejected nor discontented. 'Iniquum petas is a good rule where a man hath strength & wise, a man were better rise in his suit, for ventured at first to have lost<sup>2</sup> the suitor, & conclusion, lose both the suitor and his own form is thought so easy a request to a great person yet, if it be not in a good cause, it is so mutation. There are no worse instruments than trivers of suits, for they are but a kind of *1* to public proceedings.

## ANNOTATIONS.

*'If it be not in a good cause, it is so much reputation.'*

To this very just and important remark I added, that even in 'a good cause,' a *recon* one is likely to be regarded as a *favour* asked, will be expected. Nor is this, perhaps, altogether. For, a Minister of State, for instance, may wanted your advice for our *own* sake, we show you; but if you offer a suggestion *unasked*, or it must be reckoned a kindness done to you, expect a return.' And one who has laid obligation to a Minister, if he is afterwards a dispense patronage, contrary to his own judgment very awkward either to comply or to refuse.

The best course, in general is, to write a *1* *himself* whose views you would promote, opinion of him, with liberty to show the least reference to you for character.

<sup>1</sup> 'Ask for what is unjust, in order that thou mayest

<sup>2</sup> Lost. Ruined.

'Therefore mark my counsel  
... or both yourself and me  
Cry, lost.'—*Shakespeare*.



much cunning, to seem to know that<sup>1</sup> he d  
make men wise ; poets witty ; the mathem  
philosophy deep ; moral, grave ; logic an  
contend : ‘ Abeunt studia in mores’<sup>2</sup>—nay, t  
impediment in the wit, but may be wrought  
like as diseases of the body may have app  
bowling is good for the stone and reins,<sup>3</sup> sh  
and breast, gentle walking for the stomach,  
and the like ; so, if a man’s wits be wander  
the mathematics ; for in demonstrations, i  
away never so little, he must begin again ; i  
to distinguish or find differences,<sup>4</sup> let him st  
for they are ‘ cymini sectores ;’<sup>5</sup> if he be n  
matters, and to call upon one thing to p  
another, let him study the lawyers’ cases—  
the mind may have a special receipt.

# ANTITHETA ON STUDIES.

## PRO.

‘ Lectio est conversatio cum pruden-  
tibus ; actio fere cum stultis.

*‘ In reading, we hold converse with  
the wise ; in the business of life, gene-  
rally with the foolish.’*

‘ Non inutiles scientiæ existimandæ  
sunt, quarum in se nullus est usus, si  
ingenia acuant, et ordinant.

*‘ We should not consider even those  
sciences which have no actual practical  
application in themselves, as without  
value, if they sharpen and train the  
intellect.’*

‘ Quæ unqua-  
vum artis usum

*‘ What art  
suitable use of’*

‘ Artis sæpissi-  
sit nullus.

*‘ A branch of  
to an improper  
idle.’*

<sup>1</sup> That. *What*. See page 73.

<sup>2</sup> ‘ Manners are influenced by studies.’

<sup>3</sup> Stom. *Hindrances*. See page 413.

<sup>4</sup> Wrought. *Worked*. ‘ Who, through faith, wrought r  
33. ‘ How great is Thy goodness, which Thou hast wroug  
in Thee !’—*Psalm xxxi. 19*.

<sup>5</sup> Reins. *Kidneys ; inward parts*. ‘ Whom I shall see  
reins be consumed within me.’—*Job xix. 27*.

<sup>6</sup> Differences. *Distinctions*. See page 468.

<sup>7</sup> ‘ Splitters of cummin.’—*Vid. A. L. I. vii. 7*.

part of the poem turns on his being detained want of his armour.

The contempt of studies, whether of craft minded men, often finds its expression in ing ;' and the couplet is become almost a p

' A little learning is a dangerous thing ;  
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian sy

But the poet's remedies for the dangers of both of them impossible. None can ' drink in truth, anything more than very superficial Being, that is not a downright idiot, must t

It is plainly impossible that any man should know of all that is to be known, on *all* subjects meant that, on each particular subject on which anything at all, he should be perfectly well informed. May fairly be asked, what is the ' well ?'—how much is to be called ' little' or ' much ?' For, in the very utmost that had been acquired by the ancients, a century and a half back, falls short to many a boarding-school miss now. And in the future, posterity, a century and a half hence, will be just as much in advance of us. And in the very utmost knowledge that any man can attain to, ' learning' in comparison of what he remains ignorant in view resembles that of an American forest, in which, as a man cuts down, the greater is the expense he sees around him.

But supposing you define the ' much ' and the reference to the existing state of knowledge in this country, would any one seriously advise that not proficient in astronomy should remain ignorant whether the earth moves or the sun?—that unless you are master of agriculture, as far as it is at present, is no good in your knowing wheat from barley? you are such a Grecian as Porson, you had better not construe the Greek Testament ?

The other recommendation of the poet, ' taste, say, have no learning,—is equally impossible. ' Nobody has, and everybody ought to have, a slight

houses of the nobility, and finding some chlo had been used for the purpose of disinfectin the poison which had caused the disease ; them. Now, that was the sort of 'little l very dangerous.

Again, we cannot prevent people from bel some superhuman Being who has regard Some clowns in the Weald of Kent, who much as possible on the 'taste not' system, gross ignorance,—yet believed that the Deity powers to certain men : and that belief, cou stupidity, led them to take an insane fanatic this case, this 'little learning' actually caus in his favour, in order to make him king, prie the British empire ; and many lives were sac insane insurrection was put down. If a 'li 'dangerous thing,' you will have to keep p state of idiotcy in order to avoid that danger. fore, say that both the recommendations of practicable.

The question arises, what are we to do ? & upon ourselves and upon all people the import in that much neglected branch of human know ledge of our own ignorance ;—and of rememb a confession of real ignorance that real kn gained. But even when that further knowled still even the knowledge of the ignorance is itself ; so great, it seems, as to constitute So of his time.

Some of the chief sources of *unknown* ignoran noticing here. They are to be found in our  
1. How inadequate a medium language is for co  
2. How inadequate our very minds are for th  
of many things. 3. How little we need und  
which may yet be familiar to us, and which  
reasoning. This piece of ignorance is closely co  
two foregoing. (Hence, frequently, men will ac  
nation of a phenomenon, a mere statement of  
other words.) 4. How utterly ignorant we  
causes ; and how the philosopher who refers to

ledge imparted, as in the *kind* and the *n* Habits early engrafted on children, of re steady application to what they are about,— to the directions they receive,—of cleanline and modest behaviour, cannot but be of a after life, whatever their station may be. . familiar acquaintance with the precepts an who, when all stations of life were at his co: the reputed son of a poor mechanic, and t and fishermen ; or, again, of his apostle Pau ‘ministered to his necessities,’ and to those —such studies, I say, can surely never tend a life of humble and contented industry.

What, then, is the ‘smattering’—the impe knowledge—that really does deserve contem superficial knowledge is justly condemned, w place of more full and exact knowledge. Su with chemistry and anatomy, *e.g.*, as would not useless, to a lawyer, would be contemptil and such an acquaintance with law as wou him, would be a most discreditable smatterin

It is to be observed that the word smatt two different kinds of scanty knowledge—th the *superficial* ; though it seems the more st the latter. Now, as it is evident that no things perfectly, it seems best for a man to 1 his main object, according to, first, his *call natural bent* ; or thirdly, his *opportunities* : t slight knowledge of what else is worth it, regu by the same three circumstances ; which shou in great measure, where an elementary, and 1 knowledge is the more desirable. Such as ar nified and philosophical nature are most proj study ; and such as we are the most likely to be tise for ourselves, the most proper for superficial to most men of no practical use, and, conseq while, to learn by heart the meaning of sou characters ; but it might be very well worth 1 principles on which that most singular langua *contra*, there is nothing very curious or in

structure of the Portuguese language ; but if one were going to travel in Portugal, it would be worth while to pick up some words and phrases. If both circumstances conspire, then, both kinds of information are to be sought for ; and such things should be learned a little at *both ends* ; that is, to understand the elementary and fundamental *principles*, and also to know some of the most remarkable *results*—a little of the rudiments, and a little of what is most called for in practice. *E.g.*, a man who has not made any of the physical or mathematical sciences his favourite pursuit, ought yet to know the principles of geometrical reasoning, and the elements of mechanics ; and also know, by rote, something of the magnitude, distances, and motions of the heavenly bodies, though without having gone over the intermediate course of scientific demonstration.

Grammar, logic, rhetoric, and metaphysics, (or the philosophy of mind,) are manifestly studies of an *elementary* nature, being concerned about the instruments which we employ in effecting our purposes ; and ethics, which is, in fact, a branch of metaphysics, may be called the elements of conduct. Such knowledge is far from showy. Elements do not much come into sight ; they are like that part of a bridge which is under water, and is therefore least admired, though it is not the work of least art and difficulty. On this ground it is suitable to females, as least leading to that pedantry which learned ladies must ever be peculiarly liable to, as well as least exciting that jealousy to which they must ever be exposed, while learning in them continues to be a *distinction*. A woman might, in this way, be very learned without any one's finding it out.

It may be worth while to suggest, that any student who is conscious of some indolence, and a disposition to procrastinate, will do well to *task* himself ; laying down some *rules*—not hard ones—which he resolves to conform to, strictly. If, for instance, he has a mind to master some science or language, or to read through some book, or to write one, let him resolve to sit down to this work and do *something* of it, however little, every day, or on certain fixed days in every week, as the case may be. And it will often happen, that when, in compliance with his rule, he does thus set himself, perhaps reluctantly, to the task, he will, on some days, go beyond his resolution, and make a sensible progress. But if he had allowed himself to

wait for the humour, it might, perhaps, be all.

But the rule should be, as I have said lest, like over-severe laws, (and a resolute law,) it should be violated; according to 'Wide will wear, but tight will tear.'

A. B. was a young man of respectable making such encouraging progress in study, his Degree, that he was in a fair way to go. He was obliged, however, to go, for his health in another country, where he had many relations advised him to form a resolution to sit down and happen what might—for *one* hour *every* day, divert him from this; never allowing any extent to compensate for a departure from the rule. He will thus, said he, make sure of at least what he has acquired; which, otherwise, you will, in the end, be liable rapidly to lose.

Oh, he replied, I mean to study hard: I shall do so a day during the whole of my absence. We must keep your resolve to read at least *one* hour, will not that do to your doing more. But I fear that numerous parties, &c., will call you off; and if you cannot resist *much*, it may end in your doing nothing.

He was deaf, however, to this reasoning, and continuing to *design*, for nearly a week to-morrow, or next week, reading eight hours a day, came home without having once opened his books, so disheartened at finding that he had forgotten his resolution, it would cost him several months' hard work to put himself just where he had been before. He then abandoned his studies in disgust, and did nothing to signify for the rest of his life.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Proverbs and Precepts*.

‘There is, in fact, a danger of its proving the profitable study of Scripture ; for, so strapt to be established in the mind between and the *technical* sense to which they have some theological system, that when they read them in Scripture, he at once understands in passages where perhaps an unbiassed context would plainly show that such was meaning. And such a student one may of the most unfeigned wonder at the blind cannot find in Scripture such and such doctrine to him to be as clearly set forth there as which perhaps they are, on the (often ground that those words are everywhere to be understood the sense which he has previously derived system,—a system through which, as through medium, he views Scripture. But this is not for one’s guide, but rather to make one’s Scripture.

‘Others, again, there are, who are habit Bible, and perhaps of little else, but who may be said to *study* anything at all on the subject because, as was observed just above, they do not exercise their mind on the subject, but truly enlightened and guided by the mere act of reading minds remain in a passive state. And some, thus on principle ; considering that they are recipients of revealed truth the less they exercise reason.

‘But this is to proceed on a totally mistaken real province of reason. It would, indeed, be to attempt *substituting* for revelation, conjecture on one’s own mind, or to speculate on matters concerning which we have an imperfect knowledge imparted to us which we could have had, without it, none at all. But it is not to use, but to abuse, our rational faculties and our senses, which are as much the gift of God as anything else we enjoy,—and by employing our faculties on objects around us, we can obtain a certain amount of knowledge. And beyond this, there are certain

'anticipatio naturæ;' that is, instead of and experiment, forming conjectures as to *likely*, or *fitting*, according to some hypothesis. In like manner, in studying an *keep apart* interpretation and conjecture.

A good teacher warns a student of some language that he is learning, not to *guess* likely to have meant, and then twist the word against the idiom of the language; but to look in the first instance; and then, if a difficulty remains, to guess which of the possible meanings is the most likely to be the right.

*E.g.* The words in the original of John μαθητής, plainly signify 'the other disciple commentators, perceiving that this is incorrect opinion he had taken up, that this disciple (since John had not been mentioned before) therefore, would make it refer to Judas, who just above named), boldly suggests that the *wrong* (though all the MSS. agree in it), and ought to be omitted, because it *spoils the sense* which agrees with a *conjecture* adopted from words of the passage.

This one instance may serve as a specimen which some, instead of interpreting an author re-write what he has said.

The like rule holds good in other studies, in that of a language. We should be ever on guard against the tendency to read through *coloured spectacles*.

Educational habits of thought, analogies, feelings, and wishes, &c., will be always form some conjectural hypothesis, which is hurtful, and may sometimes furnish a useful must be most carefully watched, lest it produce and lead you to strain into a conformity with the phenomena before you.

A man sets out with a conjecture as to what are *likely* to have said, or *ought* to have said with the theological system he has learnt; High may have done or designed; or what is



able to the 'analogy of faith ;'<sup>1</sup> i.e., of a piece with the christian system,—namely, that which *he* has been taught, by fallible *men*, to regard as the christian system ; and then he proceeds to examine Scripture, as he would examine, with *leading questions*, a witness whom he had summoned in his cause.

‘As the fool thinketh,  
So the bell chinketh.’

Perhaps he ‘*prays through*’ all the Bible ; not with a candid and teachable mind, seeking instruction, but (unconsciously) praying that he may *find himself in the right*. And he will seldom fail.

‘Hic liber est in quo quærit sua dogmata quisque ;  
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.’

‘In this book many students seek each one to find  
The doctrine or precept that’s most to his mind ;  
And each of them finds what he earnestly seeks ;  
For as the fool thinks, even so the bell speaks.’

It is the same with philosophy. If you have a strong wish to find phenomena such as to confirm the conjectures you have formed, and allow that wish to bias your examination, you are ill-fitted for interrogating Nature. Both that, and *the other volume* of the records of what God does,—Revelation,—are to be interrogated, not as *witnesses*, but as *instructors*. You must let all your conjectures *hang loose* upon you ; and be prepared to learn *from* what is written in each of those volumes, with the aid of the conjectures of reason ; not *from* reason (nor, by the bye, from feelings and fancies, and wishes, and human authority), with Scripture for your *aid*.

This latter procedure, which is a very common one with theological students, may be called making an *anagram* of Scripture,—taking it to pieces and reconstructing it on the model of some human system of ‘Institutes :’ building a Temple of one’s own, consisting of the stones of the true one, pulled down, and put together in a new fashion.

Yet divines of this description are often considered by others as well as by themselves, pre-eminently scriptural, from their continual employment of the *very words* of Scripture, and their readiness in citing a profusion of texts. But, in reality, instead of using a human *commentary* on Scripture, they use Scripture

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<sup>1</sup> See Campbell *On the Gospels*.

above suggested, will have been learnt in have been far the more thoroughly understood incomparably the better in the memory.'

Curiosity is as much the parent of attention of memory; therefore the first business of a teacher is only in point of time, but of importance—not merely a general curiosity on the subject, but a particular curiosity on particular points in which to teach one who has no curiosity to learn, is to get him out ploughing it.

And this process saves a student from being intellectually damaged by having a very good teacher. An unskilful teacher is content to put before them what they have to learn, and ascertaining that they have learned it. And thus those of them whose memory is retained, have their mind left in a merely passive state. A person always carried about in a sedan chair, loses the use of his limbs. And then it is marvellous that a person who has been so well taught, and who is so good in learning and remembering, should not perceive that which is about as reasonable as to expect a cistern, if filled, should be converted into a pump. Many are saved, by the deficiency of their memory, from being spoiled by their education; for, those who have a good memory are driven to supply its defects by their own faculties. If they do not remember a mathematical demonstration, they do not devise one. If they do not exactly retain what Smith has said, they are driven to consider what he *likely* to have said, or ought to have said. The faculties are invigorated by exercise.

Now, this kind of exercise a skilful teacher should use *all*; so that no one shall be spoiled by the want of memory.

A very common practice may be here noticed, which should be avoided, if we would create a habit of study. That of making children *learn by rote* what they are to *stand*. 'It is done on this plea—that they will retain the meaning of what they have been thus taught, and be thus able to make a practical use of it.'<sup>1</sup> But no at

<sup>1</sup> *London Review*, No. xi. pp. 412, 413.

of time can be more injudicious. Let any child whose capacity is so far matured as to enable him to comprehend an explanation,—*e.g.*, of the Lord's Prayer—have it *then* put before him for the first time, and when he is made acquainted with the meaning of it, set to learn it by heart; and can any one doubt that, in less than half a day's application, he would be able to repeat it fluently? And the same would be the case with other forms. All that is learned by rote by a child before he is competent to attach a meaning to the words he utters, would not, if all put together, amount to so much as would cost him, when able to understand it, a week's labour to learn perfectly. Whereas, it may cost the toil, often the vain toil, of many years, to unlearn the habit of *formalism*—of repeating words by rote without attending to their meaning; a habit which every one conversant with education knows to be, in all subjects, most readily acquired by children, and with difficulty avoided, even with the utmost care of the teacher; but which such a plan must inevitably tend to generate. It is often said, and very truly, that it is important to form early habits of piety; but to train a child in one kind of habit, is not the most likely way of forming the opposite one; and nothing can be more contrary to true piety, than the Romish superstition (for such in fact it is) of attaching efficacy to the repetition of a certain form of words as a charm, independent of the understanding and of the heart.

‘It is also said, with equal truth, that we ought to take advantage of the facility which children possess of learning words: but to infer from thence, that Providence designs us to make such a use (or rather abuse) of this gift as we have been censuring, is as if we were to take advantage of the readiness with which a new-born babe swallows whatever is put into its mouth, to dose it with ardent spirits, instead of wholesome food and necessary medicine. The readiness with which children learn and remember words, is in truth a most important advantage if rightly employed; viz. if applied to the acquiring that mass of what may be called *arbitrary* knowledge of insulated facts, which *can only* be learned by rote, and which is necessary in after life; when the acquisition of it would both be more troublesome, and would encroach on time that might otherwise be better employed. Chronology, names of countries, weights and measures,

and indeed all the *words* of any language tion. If a child had even ten times the the faculty in question, a judicious teacher would find a thousandfold chance of useful employment for it, without it could possibly be detrimental to his future progress, or intellectual.'

One very useful precept for students, is to stop puzzling at any difficulty; but to lay the book aside, and return to it some hours after, having turned the attention to something else. A person will weary his mind for several hours (which might have been spared) to make out a point the next day, when he returns to the subject it is very easy.

The like takes place in the effort to recollect. You may fatigue yourself in vain for hours, and then you turn to something else (which you might have done at once) the name will, as it were, flash out an effort.

There is something analogous to this, in the scent of dogs. When a wounded bird, for instance, is lost in the thicket, and the dogs fail, after searching for it, a skilful sportsman always draws them off elsewhere for an hour, and then brings them back to try afresh; and they will often, then, find it though, if they had been hunting for it all the while they have failed.

It seems as if the dog—and the mind—have got on a *wrong* track, continued in the same error till they are completely away elsewhere.

Always trust, therefore, for the overcoming of a difficulty, not to *long continued* study after you have once failed, but to *repeated* trials, at intervals.

It may be here observed that the student of an art, should not only distinctly understand all the principles of the art, and all the rules of the art, but also have them at heart, so that they may be remembered as they are needed, as an alphabet, and employed *constantly* and with ease. Otherwise, technical language will pro-

or ill, in the mind of every man, every reckoned either *less* useful, or, as a mere : the mind (like chess, and other games), less ing, than the examination of the wings of b

It is a pity that Bacon did not more full in which different kinds of studies act on the exercise of the reasoning faculty, pure mathematical exercise, because it consists of *reasoning* and encumber the student with any exercise of *j* well always to begin with learning one thing defer a combination of mental exercises to a then it is important to remember that mathematical exercise the *judgment*; and consequently, pursued, may leave the student very ill qualified reasonings.

<sup>1</sup> The definitions, which are the principles are very *few*, and the axioms still fewer; and most part, *laid down* and *placed before the student* the introduction of a new Definition or Axiom comparatively rare occurrence, at wide intervals, a statement; besides which, there is no room for either. On the other hand, in all reasoning matters of fact, we introduce, almost at *every* fresh propositions (to a very great number), which are elicited in the course of our reasoning, but are *not* viz., facts, and laws of nature, which are here our reasoning, and *maxims*, or 'elements of answer to the axioms in mathematics. If, at a treatise, for example, on chemistry, on agricultural economy, &c., the author should make, as in a formal statement of all the propositions he in as granted, throughout the whole work, both I would be astonished at the number; and, of that be only probable, and there would be much room to the *degree* of probability, and for judgment that degree.

Moreover, mathematical axioms are always *precisely in the same simple form*: e.g., the axiom

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<sup>1</sup> *Elements of Logic.*

equal to the same are equal to one another,' is cited, whenever there is need, in those very words; whereas the maxims employed in the other class of subjects, admit of, and require, continual modifications in the application of them. *E.g.*, 'the stability of the laws of nature,' which is our constant assumption in inquiries relating to natural philosophy, appears in many different shapes, and in some of them does not possess the same complete certainty as in others; *e.g.*, when, from having always observed a certain sheep ruminating, we infer, that this individual sheep will continue to ruminate, we assume that 'the property which has hitherto belonged to this sheep will remain unchanged;' when we infer the same property of all sheep, we assume that 'the property which belongs to this individual belongs to the whole Species:' if, on comparing sheep with some other kinds of horned animals,<sup>1</sup> and finding that all agree in ruminating, we infer that 'all horned animals ruminate,' we assume that 'the whole of a genus or class are likely to agree in any point wherein many species of that genus agree:' or in other words, 'that if one of two properties, &c., has *often* been found accompanied by another, and never without it, the former will be *universally* accompanied by the latter.' Now all these are merely different forms of the maxim, that 'nature is uniform in her operations;' which, it is evident, varies in expression in almost every different case where it is applied, and the application of which admits of every degree of evidence, from perfect moral certainty, to mere conjecture.

'The same may be said of an infinite number of principles and maxims appropriated to, and employed in, each particular branch of study. Hence, all such reasonings are, in comparison of mathematics, very complex; requiring so much *more* than that does, beyond the process of merely deducing the conclusion logically from the premises: so that it is no wonder that the longest mathematical demonstration should be so much more easily constructed and understood, than a much shorter train of just reasoning concerning real facts. The former has been aptly compared to a long and steep, but even and regular, flight of steps, which tries the breath, and the strength, and the per-

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<sup>1</sup> Viz., having horns *on the skull*. What are called the horns of the rhinoceros are quite different in origin, and in structure, as well as in situation, from what are properly called horns.

severance only ; while the latter resembles and uneven, ascent up a precipice, which agile limbs, and a firm step ; and in which now on this side, now on that—ever considering whether this or that projection will afford or whether some loose stone may not slide from are probably as many steps of pure reason longer of Euclid's demonstrations, as in the mentative treatise on some other subject, of considerable volume.

' It may be observed here that mathematics it calls for no exercise of judgment respect the best kind of introductory exercise ; and it is apt, when too exclusively pursued, to mislead moral-reasoners.

' As for those ethical and legal reasoning mentioned as in some respects resembling the (viz. such as keep clear of all assertions and have this difference ; that not only men are *agreed* respecting the maxims and principles but the meaning also of each term cannot for ever, fixed by an arbitrary definition ; a great part of our labour consists in distinguishing various senses in which men employ each term which is the most proper,—and taking care to use them together.

' It may be worth while to add in this place disposition,—a hearty desire to judge fairly, and —are evidently necessary with a view to give reasoning-powers, in subjects where we are liable to interests or feelings, so, a fallacious perversity finds a place in the minds of some persons speak disparagingly of *all* exercise of the reason on moral and religious subjects ; declaiming on the *mere* intellectual power for the attainment of such matters,—on the necessity of appealing to the heart to the head, &c., and then leading their readers to the conclusion that the less we *reason* on such matters the safer we are.

' But the proper office of candour is to pre-

for the *rejection* of all evidence, but for the right *reception* of evidence;—not, to be a *substitute* for reasons, but to enable us *fairly to weigh* the reasons on both sides. Such persons as I am alluding to are in fact saying that since just weights *alone*, without a just balance, will avail nothing, therefore we have only to take care of the scales, and let the weights take care of themselves.

‘This kind of tone is of course most especially to be found in such writers as consider it expedient to inculcate on the mass of mankind what—there is reason to suspect—they do not themselves fully believe, and which they apprehend is the more likely to be rejected the more it is investigated.’

A curious anecdote (which I had heard, in substance, some years before) was told me by the late Sir Alexander Johnstone. When he was acting as temporary governor of Ceylon (soon after its cession), he sat once as judge in a trial of a prisoner for a robbery and murder; and the evidence seemed to him so conclusive, that he was about to charge the jury (who were native Cingalese) to find a verdict of guilty. But one of the jurors asked and obtained permission to examine the witnesses himself. He had them brought in one by one, and cross-examined them so ably as to elicit the fact that they were *themselves* the perpetrators of the crime, which they afterwards had conspired to impute to the prisoner. And they were accordingly put on their trial and convicted.

Sir A. J. was greatly struck by the intelligence displayed by this juror; the more, as he was only a small farmer, who was not known to have had any remarkable advantages of education. He sent for him, and after commending the wonderful sagacity he had shown, inquired eagerly what his studies had been. The man replied that he had never read but one book, the only one he possessed, which had long been in his family, and which he delighted to study in his leisure-hours. This book he was prevailed on to show to Sir A. J., who put it into the hands of one who knew the Cingalese language. It turned out to be a translation into that language of a large portion of Aristotle’s *Organon*. It appears that the Portuguese, when they first settled in Ceylon and other parts of the East, translated into the



native languages several of the works of the European Universities; among which were of Aristotle.

The Cingalese in question said that if he been in any degree cultivated and improved, he owed it.

It is likely, however (as was observed of Bishop Copleston), that any other book, of amount of close reasoning and accurate detail answered the same purpose in sharpening the Cingalese.

It is very important to warn all readers likely to be exercised in the formation of their *rectly*, and by works not professedly arguments Poems and Tales. Fletcher of Saltoun said, one have the making of the laws of a country the making of their ballads.

An observation in the *Lectures on Political* cause which has contributed to foster an error the superior moral purity of poor and half-civilized is equally applicable to a multitude of other subjects. 'One powerful, but little suspected cause, an early familiarity with poetical descriptions of rustic life, in remote, sequestered, and rural districts;—of the manly virtue and practical wisdom of simple forefathers, before the refinements of civilization introduced;—of the adventurous wildness, so stimulating the imagination, of savage or pastoral life, in the forests, lofty mountains, and all the grand and unvarnished nature. Such subjects and scenes are adapted for poets than thronged cities, workshops and iron-foundries. And poets, whose object in their course keep out of sight all the odious or disgusting circumstances pertaining to the life of the savage, clown, and dwell exclusively on all the amiable parts of that simplicity of character which the Early associations are thus formed, whose impressions stronger and the more lasting, from the fact that they are formed *unconsciously*, and do not

of propositions demanding a deliberate assent. Poetry does not profess to aim at conviction ; but it often leaves impressions which affect the reasoning and the judgment. And a false impression is perhaps oftener conveyed in other ways than by sophistical argument ; because *that* rouses the mind to exert its powers, and to assume, as it were, a reasoning mood.’<sup>1</sup>

The influence exercised by such works is overlooked by those who suppose that a child’s character, moral and intellectual, is formed by those books only which are put into his hands with that *design*. As hardly anything can accidentally touch the soft clay without stamping its mark on it, so, hardly any reading can interest a child without contributing in some degree, though the book itself be afterwards totally forgotten, to form the character ; and the parents, therefore, who, merely requiring from him a certain course of *study*, pay little or no attention to story-books, are educating him they know not how.

And here, I would observe, that, in books designed for children, there are two extremes that should be avoided. The one, a reference to religious principles in connexion with matters too trifling and undignified ; arising from a well-intentioned zeal, causing a forgetfulness of the maxim whose notorious truth has made it proverbial, ‘Too much familiarity breeds contempt.’ And the other is the contrary, and still more prevailing, extreme, arising from a desire to preserve a due *reverence* for religion, at the expense of its useful application in conduct. But a line may be drawn which will keep clear of both extremes. We should not exclude the association of things sacred with whatever are to *ourselves* trifling matters, (for ‘these little things are great’ to children), but, with whatever is viewed by *them* as trifling. Everything is great or small in reference to the parties concerned. The private concerns of any obscure individual are very insignificant to the world at large, but they are of great importance to himself. And all worldly affairs must be small in the sight of the Most High ; but irreverent familiarity is engendered in the mind of

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<sup>1</sup> In an article in a Review I have seen mention made of a person who discovered the falsity of a certain doctrine (which, by the way, is nevertheless a true one, that of Malthus), *instinctively*. This kind of instinct, i.e. the habit of forming opinions at the suggestion rather of feeling than of reason, is very common.

as the only true and sure one. 'Is it not because there is no God in Israel, that ye have sent to inquire of Baalzebub, the God of Ekron?' This vital defect in such works should be constantly pointed out to the young reader; and he should be warned that, to realize the picture of noble, disinterested, thorough-going virtue, presented in such and such an instance, it is absolutely necessary to resort to those principles which, in these fictions, are unnoticed. He should, in short, be reminded that all these 'things that are lovely and of good report,' which have been placed before him, are the genuine fruits of the Holy Land; though the spies who have brought them bring also an evil report of that land, and would persuade us to remain wandering in the wilderness.

The student of history, also, should be on his guard against the indirect influence likely to be exercised on his opinions. 'An injudicious reader of history is liable to be misled by the circumstance, that historians and travellers occupy themselves principally (as is natural) with the relation of whatever is *remarkable*, and different from what commonly takes place in their own time or country. They do not dwell on the ordinary transactions of human life (which are precisely what furnish the data on which political economy proceeds), but on everything that appears an exception to general rules, and in any way such as could not have been anticipated. The sort of information which the political economist wants is introduced, for the most part, only incidentally and obliquely; and is to be collected, imperfectly, from scattered allusions. So that if you will give a rapid glance, for instance, at the history of these islands from the time of the Norman conquest to the present day, you will find that the differences between the two states of the country, in most of the points with which our science is conversant, are but very imperfectly accounted for 'in the main outline of the narrative.

'If it were possible that we could have a full report of the common business and common conversation, in the markets, the shops, and the wharfs of Athens and Piræus, for a single day, it would probably throw more light on the state of things

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<sup>1</sup> *Lectures on Political Economy.*

in Greece at that time, in all that politics concerned with, than all the histories together.

‘There is a danger, therefore, that the man who proceeds in the manner I have described even drawn off from the class of facts which are in question, most important to be attended to.’

‘For, it should be observed that, in all danger to be guarded against, which Bacon’s acuteness, has pointed out: that most men make or seek for, some application of what they learn, as not unfrequently to apply it immediately, lest their knowledge should lie by itself, and not bear on some question to which it is applied. Horace’s painter, who, being skilful in drawing, for introducing one into the picture of a man, complains of this tendency among the logicians of his day, who introduced an absurd application of the studies in which they had been brought up into natural philosophy: ‘*Artis sæpe ineptus nullus.*’ But the same danger besets those who study any other study likewise, that may from time to time take up a large share of each man’s attention. He is not content for a solution of every question on every subject to his own favourite science or branch of knowledge, but he is a schoolboy when first entrusted with a knife, and he cuts his edge on everything that comes in his way.

Etymology—which may be reckoned a branch of natural history—is very liable to this kind of abuse. It is curious and interesting, and may be so applied to be useful. It may supply a useful hint—a slight suggestion as to the sense of some word. But etymologists are liable to the error of pretending to decide on the true sense of a word, and even the nature of the thing denoted by the Root to which they have traced it; for the true sense of a word must be, *that which it denotes*. Thus, Horne Tooke, having traced the word *believe* to ‘*trow*’—*i. e. believe*, infers that the thing denoted by the word is absolute ‘truth,’ independent of what another writer has argued that the word *believe*

kind of bias alluded to, was, a decision of the acute Lord Chancellor, that the Court ought to grant an injunction against the piracy of a book, if there was the most remote suspicion that it might be a forgery; and that the piratical Publisher should be restrained accordingly (as was soon after done) himself to desist from an injunction.

Now any man of plain good sense, and free from legal subtleties, would have decided that a person should be *presumed* innocent, in the absence of guilt; and that no one should be allowed to plead wrong-doing in his own defence.

There is a remarkable instance of perverted the interpretation which was once put on the Irish Education-Board. Among the books sanctioned by the unanimous approval of the Commissioners, were some extracts from some other books of a religious character, but controversial. It was provided, however, that if the parents might object, should be obliged to desist. And though it scarcely ever did happen that the application of that rule, this provision was excessive—scruple, gave complete confidence for many years. But when some new Commissioners came into office, with different views, they discovered (which had been worded not very guardedly, or free from special-pleading subtleties) might be brought quite unthought of. It might be interpreted as any *one* child (in a school of, perhaps, hundred children) these books, they were to be altogether withdrawn from the general instruction of *all* the rest! And the rule will bear that meaning, if you lay aside all regard for justice, and the known design of the rule, and the constant practice of many years, and the expectations of the Public. The main object was the gratification of a certain Party. But some objection also was probably felt, at the *ingenuity* of the interpretation of a rule, so wide from its design, who was examined as to this matter before the Committee, remarked to them that hardly any

Again, any man of plain good sense will receive, (at least when his attention is called to the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. i.) is dwelling humanly-speaking, powerless, instruments of the Gospel:—‘the weak things of the Most High to confound the strong;’ that were the superhuman power which alone enabled them to succeed: and that the ‘calling,’ which speaks of, must mean those thus chosen by God to call disciples. But some learned men, without ingenuity, have maintained that by the weak whom Paul is speaking, he meant the common people, if he could have been so silly as to bring forth divine power, that the Gospel was received by the lowest and most ignorant! But this, in order to rouse the emulation of the learned, being just what would have excited their dislike.

As for the supposed miracle of walking on water, is explained to have been merely wading in the lake! And the multitudes who were fed were supplied, it seems, by some of their own provisions brought with them great plenty of provision by the example of Jesus and his Apostles and neighbours!

To represent the whole of the Scriptures as of mere fabrications, is a position which, in every degree less absurd than such theories.

Ingenious explainers of this kind seem to have existed from the earliest days of the Church. Such, no doubt, were mentioned by the Apostle Paul as teaching that ‘the Kingdom of God was past already;’ and to whom he probably alludes in 1 Cor. xv. For, the expression of ‘the Resurrection’ implies that they did not avowedly deny the resurrection of the Christian teachers, but explained them as a Parable; representing the ‘resurrection’ as a term, to denote, perhaps, the raising up of the dead to knowledge, or from vice to virtue. Probably the forerunners and first leaders of the sect read of, who taught (as the Mahometans do) that the Lord did not really suffer death and rise again.

of political economy. Undoubtedly he *has* if he is careful to keep in view the true principle but otherwise he may even labour under forgetting that (as I just now observed) the *facts* which are made most prominent, and occupy the works of historians and travellers, are in every-day life, with which political economy is in the same way that an accurate *map* of a district, or a series of sketches accompanying it, may even serve to mislead one of his knowledge of its *agricultural* condition, if he does not keep in mind the different objects which different kinds of view.

‘Geologists, when commissioning their specimens from any foreign country such as to form an idea of its geological character, are accustomed against sending over collections of *curiosities*—spars, stalactites, &c., which are accounted curious, from being *rarities*, and which convey a correct notion of its general features. When they send specimens of the *commonest* strata,—the stones on the roads are mended, and the houses built, &c. The specimens of these, which in that country are accounted rubbish, they sometimes, with much satisfaction, *adhering* to the specimens sent them as curiosities, for *their* object, the most important information. Histories are in general, to the politician, such collections are to the geologist. The common, and what are considered insignificant to him, the most valuable information.

‘An injudicious study of history, then, may be a hindrance instead of a help to the forming of a correct political economy. For not only are many of the events which are, in the historian’s view, the most important, are the least important to the political economist. A great proportion of them consists of what are the greatest *impediments* to the progress of a society—wars, revolutions, and disturbances of every kind. The consequence of these, but in spite of them, has made the progress which in fact it has made.

taking such a survey as history furnishes of the course of events, for instance, for the last eight hundred years (the period I just now alluded to), not only do we find little mention of the causes which have so greatly increased national wealth during that period, but what we do chiefly read of is, the *counteracting* causes; especially the wars which have been raging from time to time, to the destruction of capital, and the hindrance of improvement. Now, if a ship had performed a voyage of eight hundred leagues, and the register of it contained an account chiefly of the contrary winds and currents, and made little mention of favourable gales, we might well be at a loss to understand how she reached her destination; and might even be led into the mistake of supposing that the contrary winds had forwarded her in her course. Yet such is history!

In reference to the study of history, I have elsewhere remarked upon the importance, among the intellectual qualifications for such a study, of a vivid imagination,—a faculty which, consequently, a skilful narrator must himself possess, and to which he must be able to furnish excitement in others. Some may, perhaps, be startled at this remark, who have been accustomed to consider imagination as having no other office than to *feign* and to falsify. Every faculty is liable to abuse and misdirection, and imagination among the rest; but it is a mistake to suppose that it necessarily tends to pervert the truth of history, and to mislead the judgment. On the contrary, our view of any transaction, especially one that is remote in time or place, will necessarily be imperfect, generally incorrect, unless it embrace something more than the bare outline of the occurrences,—unless we have before the mind a lively idea of the scenes in which the events took place, the habits of thought and of feeling of the actors, and all the circumstances connected with the transaction; unless, in short, we can in a considerable degree transport ourselves out of our own Age, and country, and persons, and imagine ourselves the agents or spectators. It is from consideration of all these circumstances that we are enabled to form a right judgment as to the facts which history records, and to derive instruction from it. What we imagine may indeed be merely *imaginary*, that is, unreal; but it may again be what actually does or did exist. To say that imagination, if not regulated by sound judgment and sufficient



knowledge, may chance to convey to us past events, is only to say that Man is fallible. Impressions are even *much the more* likely in those whose imagination is feeble or uncapt to imagine the things, persons, times, & they read of, as much less different from what they than is really the case.

The practical importance of such an exercise to a full, and clear, and consequently precise transactions related in history, can hardly be overestimated. In respect of the very earliest of all human transactions, it is a matter of common remark how prone many are to mingled wonder, contempt, and indignation of our first Parents; as if they were not a part of the human race; as if any of us would not, if placed in precisely the same circumstances, have acted as they did. The Corinthians, probably, had perused with wonder, the history of the backslidings of the Israelites, & needed that Paul should remind them, that what was written for their example and admonition. In every portion of history they read, have need of a warning, to endeavour to fancy themselves in the place read of, that they may recognise in the account the portraiture of our own. From not putting ourselves in the place of the persons living in past times, & entering into all their feelings, we are apt to forget how things might appear, which we know did not appear, to regard as perfectly chimerical, expectations which were not realized, but which, had we lived in those times, should doubtless have entertained; and to which there was no *danger* of those evils which were, in fact, avoided. We are apt also to make too little allowances for the different associations of ideas, which no longer exist in the same form among ourselves, but which, perhaps, are at variance with right reason than others with which we are infected.

*'Some books are to be tasted.*

For various reasons it will often be necessary to read some books which will be, to the most discerning,

the Jews with having in some instances God of none effect by their Tradition.' *Jeschu* [Generation of Jesus] is the accusing Jews, of our Saviour's history. much blasphemy and nonsense, a most im of what is recorded by our Evangelists, Jesus admitted the fact of his miracles, the resurrection. For, if the *facts* had been it is inconceivable that a subsequent generation should have *admitted* the miracles, and re thesis of Magic. (3.) The *Spurious Gospel* is given in Jones's *Canon of the New Testament*, striking and edifying contrast to our sacred same may be said of *The Koran*; and an imposture, *The Book of Mormon*. It is to observe the absurdities men fall into w themselves to frame a sham-revelation.

' *Studies serve for delight, for ornament, &*

We should, then, cultivate, not only the minds, but the pleasure-grounds also. Every study, however worthless they may be, when the service of God,—however debased and devoted to the service of sin,—become ennobled when directed, by one whose constraining motive is Christ, towards a good object. Let not the student think 'scorn of the pleasant land.' That the ancient and modern literature—of philosophy, of the arts of reasoning and of the fine arts—part of it may be cultivated with advantage in Canaan when bestowed upon God's peculiar people is not commanded to let it lie waste, as incurable abominations of its first inhabitants; but to dwell in it, living in obedience to the divine law, and to offer its choicest fruits to the Lord their God.

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<sup>1</sup> Selections from the *Missa*, with a translation and version found in a publication by Dr. Wotton.

ground of preference of *hereditary* to elective sovereignty. For when a chief—whether called king, emperor, president, or by whatever name—is *elected* (whether for life, or for a term of years), he can hardly avoid being the head of a party. ‘He who is elected will be likely to feel aversion towards those who have voted against him; who may be, perhaps, nearly half of his subjects. And they again will be likely to regard him as an *enemy*, instead of feeling loyalty to him as their prince.

‘And those again who have voted *for* him, will consider him as being under an *obligation* to them, and expect him to show them more favour than to the rest of his subjects; so that he will be rather the head of a party than the king of a people.

‘Then, too, when the throne is likely to become vacant—that is, when the king is old, or is attacked with any serious illness,—what secret canvassing and disturbance of men’s minds will take place. The king himself will most likely wish that his son, or some other near relative or friend, should succeed him, and he will employ all his patronage with a view to such an election; appointing to public offices, not the fittest men, but those whom he can reckon on as voters. And others will be exerting themselves to form a party against him; so that the country will be hardly ever tranquil, and very seldom well-governed.

‘If, indeed, men were very different from what they are, there might be superior advantages in an elective royalty; but in the actual state of things, the disadvantages will in general greatly outweigh the benefits.

‘Accordingly most nations have seen the advantage of hereditary royalty, notwithstanding the defects of such a constitution.’<sup>1</sup>

‘*Kings had need beware how they side themselves.*’

The observation, that kings who make themselves members of a party, ‘raise an obligation paramount to an obligation of sovereignty’—that is, are likely to substitute party-spirit for public-spirit,—is one which applies in a great degree to all partizans, and to all parties, whether political or ecclesiastical.

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<sup>1</sup> Lesson I., *On the British Constitution*, pp. 15, 16.

‘*The even carriage between two factions proceedeth not always of moderation, but of a trueness to a man’s self, with end to make use of both.*’

And thorough-going partizans usually attribute this to *every* one who keeps aloof from Party; or else they suspect him of seeking to set up some *new* party, in which he may be a leader; or they regard him as a whimsical Being, who *differs in opinion* from everybody.

A zealous anti-Calvinist at Oxford denounced as Calvinistic a series of Discourses delivered there some years ago, because they were *not* Arminian: and when those same Discourses were afterwards published, a reviewer spoke of the author as Arminian because he was *not* a Calvinist: ‘since every one,’ he said, ‘must be supposed to be either the one or the other.’

A large portion of mankind enrol themselves in the ranks of a party, to be saved the trouble of examining for themselves each of a great number of particular points. They like to have a ready-made *set* of opinions; like a *lot* of goods at an auction. And they conclude that others must do the like. Moreover, Man is a *classifying* animal. It is a convenience to be able to refer each individual to a Class, whose name describes him, instead of going through all the particulars of his opinions. And one who cannot be so described,—though perhaps he does not differ more from his neighbours than many of them do from each other—is an *inconvenient* individual;—a kind of *odd volume* on a library-table, for which we cannot find a place on any of the shelves. He is one who refuses to say ‘I am of Paul, or I, of Apollos, or I, of Cephas, or, of Luther, or Calvin, or Arminius.’ And those, therefore, who prefer convenience to accuracy, will be likely to place him in the ranks of some Party, according to their fancy; or else they will denounce him as ‘eccentric,’ and affecting ‘singularity.’

From one or other of the above-mentioned causes, he is likely to be regarded with at least as much hostility by the most zealous party-men, as those of an opposite party. And accordingly, Thucydides, in describing the party-contests at Corcyra and other Greek States, remarks that ‘those who held a middle course were destroyed by both parties.’

And it is remarkable that party-spirit tends so much to

lower the moral standard, that it makes abhorrence what is wrong, not only on the one side, but on the opposite. Their feelings towards the opposite party are very much those of a soldier to the hostile army. He fires at them for that he expects that they should fire at *him*. If they out-manceuvre him, he admires their skill. He does not think the worse of them for plundering, ravaging, and slaughtering, just as a soldier does, in their place, and as he does, on the opposite side. The most thorough-going partizans attribute to the enemy, or is supposed to be (often without any ground) the conduct of the opposite party, such conduct as is reprehensible, without thinking at all the worse of him for doing what they would do in his place: and that for *being of the opposite party*, they dislike him.

And as there is often a strong resemblance between the soldiers of two hostile armies, and as a slight circumstance has enrolled in the same parties, will often be found to be very different in the most essential points of personal character. The mountain-streams near the summit of the Pyrenees, which divide Europe, will sometimes send a small fragment of rock, which sends the water to the Atlantic, and of the other into the Mediterranean.

And not only are the *feelings* of zealous partizans to one of moderate views, who keeps clear of party, but their *moral-judgment* also—such as it is. If, for instance, he has been raised to some high office, and unconditionally, and afterwards through thick and thin, with the Party opposed to him, appointed him, against his own judgment, and without regard for justice and the public good, he is denounced as an ungrateful traitor. And if he opposes an enlargement of popular rights, and also some other measures, he will be reproached with '*inconsistency*'. Satyr, in the Fable, rebukes the inconsistent man whose breath warmed his fingers, and cooled his ears.

The effects of party-spirit in lowering the

## ESSAY LII. OF CEREM RESPECTS.<sup>1</sup>

HE that is only real had need have ex-  
 virtue, as the stone had need to be  
 foil; but if a man mark it well, it is in  
 tion of men as it is in gettings and gain  
 true, 'That light gains make heavy purse  
 thick, whereas great come but now and t  
 small matters win great commendation, l  
 tinually in use and in note, whereas the  
 virtue cometh but on festivals. Therefor  
 a man's reputation, and is (as Queen Is  
 petual letters commendatory, to have go  
 them, it almost sufficeth not to despise  
 man observe them in others, and let him  
 rest; for if he labour too much to expres  
 their grace, which is to be natural and un  
 behaviour is like a verse, wherein every  
 How can a man comprehend great matte  
 mind too much to small observations?'<sup>2</sup>  
 at all, is to teach others not to use them a  
 respect to himself; especially they are  
 strangers and formal natures; but the dw  
 exalting them above the moon, is not o  
 diminish the faith and credit of him that s  
 there is a kind of conveying of effectual and  
 amongst compliments, which is of singular  
 upon it. Amongst a man's peers a man s  
 liarity, and therefore it is good a little to

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<sup>1</sup> Ceremonies and respects. *Conventional forms of  
etiquett.*

'The sauce to meat is ceremony;  
 M...ing were bare without it.'—*Sh*

'What art thou, thou idle ceremony?'

Art thou aught else but place, degree an

'The Duke's carriage to the gentlemen was of fair

<sup>2</sup> Observations. *Observances.* 'He freed the chris  
 nal observation.'—*White.*

<sup>3</sup> Imprinting. *Impressive.*

a man's inferiors one shall be sure of reverence, and therefore it is good a little to be familiar. He that is too much in any thing, so that he giveth another occasion of satiety, maketh himself cheap. To apply one's self to others is good, so it be with demonstration, that a man doth it upon<sup>1</sup> regard and not upon facility. It is a good precept generally in seconding another, yet to add somewhat of one's own; as if you will grant his opinion, let it be with some distinction; if you will follow his motion, let it be with condition; if you allow his counsel, let it be with alleging farther reason. Men had need beware how they be too perfect in compliments; for be they never so sufficient<sup>2</sup> otherwise, their enviers will be sure to give them that attribute, to the disadvantage of their greater virtues. It is loss also in business to be too full of respects, or to be too curious<sup>3</sup> in observing times and opportunities. Solomon saith, 'He that considereth the wind shall not sow, and he that looketh to the clouds shall not reap.'<sup>4</sup> A wise man will make more opportunities than he finds. Men's behaviour should be like their apparel, not too strait or point device,<sup>5</sup> but free for exercise or motion.

## ANTITHETA ON CEREMONIES AND RESPECTS.

## PRO.

'Si et in verbis vulgo paremus, quidni in habitu, et gestu?

*'If we accommodate ourselves to the vulgar in our speech, why not also in our deportment?'*

'Virtus et prudentia sine punctis, velut peregrinae linguae sunt; nam vulgo non intelliguntur.

*'Virtue and wisdom without forms of politeness are strange languages, for they are not ordinarily understood.'*

'Puncti translatio sunt virtutis in linguam vernaculam.

*'Forms are the translation of virtue into the vulgar tongue.'*

## CONTRA.

'Quid deformius, quam scenam in vitam transferre?

*'What can be more disgusting than to transfer the stage into common life.'*

'Magis placent cerussatae buccae, et calamistrata coma, quam cerussati et calamistrati mores.

*'Rouged cheeks and curled hair are less offensive than rouged and curled manners.'*

<sup>1</sup> Upon. *In consequence of.* See page 467.

<sup>2</sup> Sufficient. *Able.* 'Who is sufficient for these things?'—2 Cor. ii. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Curious. *Exact; precise.* 'Both these senses embrace their objects with a more curious discrimination.'—Holder.

<sup>4</sup> Eccles. xi. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Point device. *Extremely exact* (with the nicety and precision of a stitch [French *point*] devised or made with the needle). 'Everything about you should demonstrate a careless desolation; but you are rather *point de vise* in your accoutrements, as loving yourself, than the lover of another.'—Shakspeare.

## ANNOTATIONS

*'He that is only real had need have es  
virtue.'*

To attach as much importance (which more, to refined and graceful manners, the qualities ;—to prefer, as it were, a Pump because it has a smoother coat—does, certainly, and a lack of wisdom. But there is less incurring the ill will or contempt of the frivolous and unwise.

*'Not to use ceremonies at all, is to teach  
again.'*

Good manners are a part of good moral too much neglected, true politeness suffers are obliged to bring some back ; or we find The same holds good in a higher department not formed to live without ceremony and spiritual grace' is very apt to be lost without visible sign.' Many are continually setting of ceremonies from this or that, and often they have so multiplied as to grow burdensome they have carried this too far, they have brought back some ceremonies. Upon the whole, all ceremony and form of every kind derive their imperfection. If we were perfectly spiritual God without any form at all, without even we are not, it is a folly to say, 'One may one day as another, in one place, or posture answer, angels may ; Man cannot. Again perfectly benevolent, good-tempered, attentive to others, &c., we might dispense with all breeding ; as it is, we cannot ; we are not able to fight without discipline. Selfishness will we once let the barriers be broken down.



is evident from what has been said, that the *higher our nature is carried, the less form we need.*

But though we may deservedly congratulate society on being able to dispense with this or that ceremony, do not let us be in a hurry to do so, till we are sure we *can* do without it. It is taking away crutches, to cure the gout. The opposite extreme of substituting the external form for the thing signified, is not more dangerous or more common than the neglect of that form. It is all very well to say, 'There is no use in bidding good-morrow or good-night, to those who know I wish it ; of sending one's love, in a letter, to those who do not doubt it,' &c. All this sounds very well in theory, but it will not do for practice. Scarce any friendship, or any politeness, is so strong as to be able to subsist without any external supports of this kind ; and it is even better to have too much form than too little.

It is worth observing, in reference to conventional forms, that the 'vernacular tongue,' in which the forms of civility are expressed, differs in different times and places. For instance, in Spain it is a common form of civility to ask a man to dinner, and for the other to reply, 'Sure you would not think of such a thing.' To accept a first or second invitation would be as great a blunder as if, among us, any one who signed himself 'your obedient servant' should be taken literally, and desired to perform some menial office. If a Spanish gentleman really means to ask you to dinner, he repeats the invitation a *third* time ; and *then* he is to be understood literally.

Serious errors may, of course, arise in opposite ways, by not understanding aright what is and is not to be taken as a mere complimentary form.

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## ESSAY LIII. OF P.

**P**RAISE is the reflection of virtue, but body, which giveth the reflection ; in common people, it is commonly false and misloweth vain persons than virtuous : for they understand not many excellent virtues : to get praise from them, the middle virtues work by flattery or admiration ; but of the highest virtues they are not perceiving<sup>1</sup> at all ; but shows, and 'special service' best with them. Certainly, fame beareth up things light and swollen, and is not so firm and solid ; but if persons of quality and judgment it is (as the scripture saith) 'Nomen bonorum fragrantis ;'<sup>4</sup> it filleth all round about, and for the odours of ointments are more common to flowers.

There be so many false points of praise that they justly hold it in suspect.<sup>6</sup> Some praise by flattery ; and if it be an ordinary flatterer, with common attributes, which may serve even a cunning flatterer, he will follow the arch flatterer's self, and wherein a man thinketh best, the flatterer will uphold him most : but if a man be a flatterer, look wherein a man is conscious to be most defective, and is most out of countenance, will the flatterer entitle him to, perforce, Some praises come of good wishes and respect due in civility to kings and great persons, 'when by telling them what they are, th

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<sup>1</sup> Naught. *Worthless ; despicable.* See page 370

<sup>2</sup> Perceiving. *Perception.* <sup>3</sup> 'A

<sup>4</sup> 'A good name is like a fragrant ointment.'—*Ecclesiastes*

<sup>5</sup> Away. *Pass away.*

'I have a pain upon my forehead here,  
Why that's with watching ; 'twill away

<sup>6</sup> Suspect. *Suspicion.*

<sup>7</sup> 'To instruct in praising.'

conferuntur; sed laudes ubique sunt  
libertatis.

*'Honors are conferred differently  
in different governments; but praises  
everywhere by popular suffrage.'*

\* \* \* \* \*

*'Ne mireris, si vulgus verius loquatur,  
quam honoratioribus; quia etiam tutius  
loquitur.'*

*'It is no wonder that the vulgar some-  
times speak more truly than those of  
high place, because they speak more  
safely.'*

laus est, ma-  
rum sensus

*'The low  
praise; the  
of the high*

## ANNOTATIONS.

*'The common people understand not many of  
lowest virtues draw praise from them,  
work in them astonishment or admiration  
virtues they have no sense or perceiving*

What a pregnant remark is this! By  
virtues he means probably such as hospital-  
tude, good-humoured courtesy, and the like  
the common run of mankind are accustomed  
which they *admire*, such as daring courage,  
friends, or to the cause or party one has espoused  
ranks in the next highest place. But the  
of all, such as disinterested and devoted public  
going even-handed justice, and disregard of  
duty requires, of these he says the vulgar have  
And he might have gone further; for it is  
large portion of mankind not only do not  
highest qualities, but even censure and de-  
may occur in which, though you may obtain  
tion of a very few persons of the most refined  
sentiments, you must be prepared to find them  
such as are not altogether bad men) conceiv-  
natural, unkind, faithless, and not to be  
deriding you as eccentric, crotchety, fanciful  
pulous.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *Lessons on Morals*.

*others.* Of course it is not meant that a man is to think over-highly of himself and 'despise others.' He is not to think his *conduct* better than others, only his *capabilities*. A man who feels himself capable of generous and exalted conduct (I do not mean, feels that he shall always act thus,—for who dares promise himself this?—but who feels that it is not beyond his conception, or unnatural to him), when he measures others by his own standard, and is disappointed with them, will remember that every man shall be judged 'according to that he hath, and not according to that he hath not.' He will feel that more is required of him, as being placed in a higher walk of duty; and will thus be even the less satisfied with his conformity to so lofty a standard.

This is a point which it is important to dwell on, because, besides those who (as Bacon has elsewhere expressed it) are, intellectually, 'soaring angels,' and morally, 'crawling serpents;' there are also some whose moral superiority does not *keep pace* with their intellectual; who are indeed much better men than the common run, but yet not so much above them in that, as they are in intelligence. Such a person has been compared to the Image in the King of Babylon's dream, with a *head* of gold, and a *breast* of silver—a precious metal indeed, but inferior to that of the head.

Although, then, a man of elevated character will be humbled by his frequent failures, yet, as a fair and due sense of dignity, which arises from a consciousness of superior station, is not only right but needful, in a gentleman, a peer, or a king, to make them fill their stations gracefully; so it is here: that proper sense of his own moral dignity is necessary for a great and generous disposition, if he would act up to his character. The excess thereof will be checked by habits of true piety, which cannot but make him feel his own littleness in the strongest manner; and by continually asking himself 'Who made thee to differ from another? or, What hast thou that thou didst not receive?' he will be guarded against despising his inferiors. For, generous and ungenerous pride are not only different (as all would allow), but, in most points, opposite: a man of the former character makes allowances for others which he will not make for himself; the latter, allowances for himself, which he will not, for others: he is ready enough to think that this, and

that, is not good enough for him ; but *that action* not good enough for him, and does not have priority as a privilege to act in a manner which would degrade him from it ; and, while doing his actions himself, as things of course, he makes allowance for others' deficiencies. He is calculating upon much gratitude ; yet with the most generous ardour, himself. To take all stages, or even to take *all* fair ones—to put it to the utmost—to press close to the limits of what he anxiously consider whether he may be able to omit that,—he disdains, and would feel the virtues of such a man as this, the very perception.

He that assails error because it *is* erroneous, persons, must be prepared for a storm from all quarters fanning him with the gentle breath of all errors. He had been dealing with the errors of the past. They say with the rat to the mouse (in a house much infested with rats and mice, it had been brought),—

'Said the other, this cat, if she murder  
Must needs be a very great sinner,  
But to feed upon *mice* can't be counted  
I *myself* like a mouse for my dinner.'

It should be added, however, for the credit of that, by a steady adherence to high principles in the long run, though not speedily,—to the confidence as will give him an influence over all men, of equal or of superior ability.

The following anecdote may be relied on. A law-amendment Bill was going through the House of Lords. Lord Althorp, who was then the minister, was called on to answer a strong objection raised to one of the clauses. He rose and answered. The objection had occurred to himself ; and he stated it to the framers of the Bill, who had already completely met the objection. But when he was, he was sorry to say, he *could not at the time* though he assured the House that it was *perfectly*

of the minor details of every-day life. packing up a trunk, or setting a razor ; arrangements for a journey, &c. And o tions of the hero, he may have perhaps perception.

With some minds, again, mere *familiar* verbal effect. The highest intellectual ar cease to excite any great admiration in o thoroughly *used* to them as to look for th matter of course : while any imperfection strikes him by its contrast, even as ' the s on snow.' It is at a meteor or a comet awe and admiration, who feel little or : spectacle of the sun, moon, and stars, w And to view all such objects with indiffer by Horace—no very profound philosop wisdom.

The above is the description of the most again, who are a little—and *but* a little—m that most people impute to them, as a : over-veneration for any eminent person th with, are not unlikely to think that they c the opposite direction, and (as was observed on Essays IV. and XXXVIII.) rush into t And this dread of partiality, combined with familiarity, sometimes leads to an undue : is excellent.

In one of the comedies of the early : (many of which, though in bad taste, ha and some wisdom) a man is represented co how desperately he is in love with a lady, i though he has noted them, and written a he has dwelt on till quite familiar with complained, he was more and more in lov you a remedy,' says the other : ' marry h *with her virtues*, as you are with her fault will be cured.'

Hence, perhaps, partly, it may be that times applicable, of ' a prophet being without country.'

different from the desire of their applause of their displeasure or contempt. A man may be in agreement with Aristotle, or Bacon &c., whether reasonable or unreasonable, but he does not do with their *approbation* of him. But he may concur with some living friends, whom we dread to differ from, then, it is very difficult to get this feeling is the *presumption formed by* one of the correctness of their views, and how much of their *approbation* and sympathy, and so on. It is the desire of personal approbation,—determining what is thought of ourselves,—and is severely to check.

There is a distinction (alluded to above) between *admiration* and the love of *commendation*, though they are very near to each other. The tendency of the love of commendation is to make a man *exert* himself; of the love of admiration to make him *puff* himself. The love of admiration is more than the love of commendation; but the latter is much more likely to spoil our character by the substitution of an inferior motive. And against this, we must set ourselves resolutely, and care neither for praise nor censure,—for neither is the sweet; and in time a man gets harder and harder, always be the case, more or less, through the love of commendation, but persevere, and *persevere from a right motive*, as the Canadians do to walking in snow. At first a man is almost crippled with the pain and swelling of the feet; but then he goes on walking in them, as if you felt nothing. A few days you do feel nothing.

Much eloquence and ingenuity is often expended on the propriety of not being wholly indifferent to the approbation of us—the impossibility of eradicating the desire of approbation—and the folly of attempting to do it, &c. Now, this is very true; the proper way to avoid approval and escape censure, we are not capable (that being, I conceive, impossible); but pains are better bestowed in *keeping und*

in *vindicating* it. It must be treated like the grass on a lawn which you wish to keep in good order: you neither attempt, nor wish, to *destroy* the grass; but you *mow* it down from time to time, as close as you possibly can, well trusting that there will be quite enough left, and that it will be sure to grow again.

One difficulty in acting upon this principle is, that it is often even a duty to seek the good opinion of others, not as an *ultimate* object for its own sake, but for the sake of influencing them for their own benefit, and that of others. 'Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.' But we are to watch and analyse the *motives* even of actions which we are sure are in themselves right. 'Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them.' And this is a kind of vigilance which human nature is always struggling to escape. One class of men are satisfied so long as they *do* what is justifiable;—what *may* be done from a good motive, and, when so done, *would* be right, and which therefore may be satisfactorily defended. Another class—the ascetic—are for cutting off everything that *may* be a snare. They have heard of 'the deceitfulness of riches,' and so they vow poverty; which is less trouble than *watching their motives* in gaining, and in spending, money. And so on with the rest. But if we would cut off all temptations, we must cut off our heads at once.

The praise of men is not the test of our praiseworthiness; nor is their censure; but either should set us upon *testing* ourselves.

It is to be observed that, in some cases, censure is equivalent to high praise. If, for instance, those who wish to perpetuate some abuse, fiercely assail one who advocates needful reform, or if revolutionists of any description decry some defender of law and order, this affords a presumption that he is a formidable champion. And the more pains they take to assure us that his arguments deserve nothing but contempt, the more they prove that they themselves do not feel any. Again, if any defender of the truth of Christianity, who refuses to join any *Party* in the Church, is thereupon denounced as unsound by



zealous party-men, this adds to the force of indicating that the belief he professes is sincere for the sake of popularity. And if, again, judicious advocates of a good cause are desirous of good, so that it is needful for a wise man to repudiate all connexion with them, no disavowal will have so much weight, as their vehement

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and corrections, even from your inferiors in ability—and never overbearing or uncharitable towards those who differ from you, or ostentatious of superiority.

‘All this will be a more laborious and difficult task than to make fine speeches about your ignorance, and weakness, and sinfulness; but it is thus that true Humility is shown, and is exercised, and cultivated.’

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only grasping at a shadow, still they at least believe to be real. They expect or not—to have an actual consciousness look forward to. The others are *aware* have attained the prize of posthumous perception of it. They *know* that it is *going* at. Yet Hume had this solicitude for fame. ‘Knowing,’ says the *Edinburg*, what is meant by a ruling passion, it is on the die of literary fame. In one way it ; for his prescience of his growing reputation in his last illness. This was somewhat singular. Delusion for delusion, the *man* world are at least an improvement on humorous renown. Immortality on earth light of immortality in a future state. what is to be said but ‘vanity of vanities who has no expectation of a future state contemplating annihilation with complacency, is *going* this, busied on his death-bed about —careful what men may be saying of histories, after he himself is sleeping in things are forgotten !’

‘ . . . Which sort of men are common

‘A sort of man’ that is not only much commonly admired, is a man who, along with of cleverness and plausible fluency, is well-headed :—destitute of sound, clear, cautious puzzle-headedness conduces much to a *rise* to a (short-lived) celebrity.

Such was the description once given of at that time more talked about than almost the empire, and whom many admired as who had fully confuted the doctrines of Mendigous discoveries in political science. took up the speaker very sharply ; observing

<sup>1</sup> See an article on David Hume, *Edinburgh Review*

prepare his way to a just sentence, as God useth to prepare his way by raising valleys and taking down hills: so when there appeareth on either side a high hand, violent persecution, cunning advantages taken, combination, power, great counsel, then is the virtue of a judge seen to make inequality equal; that he may plant his judgment as upon even ground. 'Qui fortiter emungit, elicit sanguinem;'<sup>1</sup> and where the wine-press is hard wrought,<sup>2</sup> it yields a harsh wine, that tastes of the grape-stone. Judges must beware of hard constructions and strained inferences; for there is no worse torture than the torture of laws; especially in case of laws penal, they ought to have care, that that which was meant for terror,<sup>3</sup> be not turned into rigour: and that they bring not upon people that shower whereof the Scripture speaketh, 'Pluet super eos laqueos;'<sup>4</sup> for penal laws pressed, are a shower of snares upon the people: therefore let penal laws, if they have been sleepers of long,<sup>5</sup> or if they be grown unfit for the present time, be by wise judges confined in the execution: 'Judicis officium est, ut res, ita tempora rerum,' &c.<sup>6</sup> In causes of life and death, judges ought (as far as the law permitteth) in justice to remember mercy, and to cast a severe eye upon the example, but a merciful eye upon the person.

Secondly, for the advocates and counsel that plead. Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice, and an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal.<sup>7</sup> It is no grace to a judge first to find that which he might have heard in due time from the bar, or to show quickness of conceit<sup>8</sup> in cutting off evidence or counsel too short, or to prevent<sup>9</sup> information by questions, though pertinent. The parts of a judge in hearing are four:—to direct the evidence; to moderate length,

<sup>1</sup> 'Who wrings hard draws forth blood.' Cf. *Prov.* xxx. 33.

<sup>2</sup> Wrought. *Worked*. 'It had been a breach of peace to have wrought any mine of his.'—*Raleigh*.

<sup>3</sup> Terror. *What may excite dread*. 'Rulers are not a terror to good works, but to evil.'—*Romans* xiii. 3.

<sup>4</sup> 'He shall rain snares upon them.'—*Psalms* xi. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Of. *For; during*. 'He was desirous to see him of a long season.'—*Luke* xxiii. 8.

<sup>6</sup> 'It is the duty of a judge to take into consideration the times, as well as the circumstances, of facts.'—*Ovid, Trist.* l. i. 37.

<sup>7</sup> *Psalms* cl. 5.

<sup>8</sup> Conceit. *Conception; apprehension*. 'I shall be found of a quick conceit in judgment, and I shall be admired.'—*Wisdom* viii. 11.

<sup>9</sup> Prevent. *Forestall*. See *Matt.* xvii. 25.

repetition, or impertinency<sup>1</sup> of speech; and collate the material points of that and to give the rule or sentence. Who is too much, and proceedeth either of<sup>2</sup> g speak, or of impatience to hear, or of s of want of a stayed and equal attention. to see that the boldness of advocates shou whereas they should imitate God, in w represseth the presumptuous, and giveth but it is more strange that judges should which cannot but cause multiplication of by-ways. There is due from the judge commendation and gracing,<sup>4</sup> where cause fair<sup>5</sup> pleaded, especially towards the side for that upholds in the client the reputati beats down in him the conceit<sup>7</sup> of his cau due to the Public a civil reprehension of : appeareth cunning counsel, gross neglex indiscreet pressing, or an over-bold defen counsel at the bar chop<sup>8</sup> with the judge, the handling of the cause anew, after the his sentence; but, on the other side, let n cause half-way, nor give occasion to the p or proofs were not heard.

Thirdly, for that that concerns clerks place of justice is a hallowed place; and 1

<sup>1</sup> Impertinency. *Irrelevancy*. See page 86.

<sup>2</sup> Of. *From*. See page 270.

<sup>3</sup> Glory. *Display; vaunting*. See page 538.

<sup>4</sup> Grace. *To favour*.

<sup>5</sup> *Regardless pass'd her o'er, nor grac'd with ki*

<sup>6</sup> Fair. *Fairly*.

<sup>7</sup> *Entreat her fair.*—*Shakespi*

<sup>8</sup> Obtain. *To prevail; succeed*. 'Thou shalt not —*Ecclesiasticus* xi. 10.

<sup>9</sup> Conceit. *Opinion*. 'Seest thou a man wise in more hope of a fool than of him.'—*Prov.* xxvi. 12.

<sup>10</sup> I shall not fail to approve the fair :  
The king hath of you.'—*Shakesper*

<sup>11</sup> Chop. *To bandy words*.

<sup>12</sup> *The chopping French we do not understan*

bench, but the footpace<sup>1</sup> and precincts, and purprise<sup>2</sup> thereof, ought to be preserved without scandal and corruption; for, certainly, grapes (as the Scripture saith) 'will not be gathered of thorns or thistles;'<sup>3</sup> neither can justice yield her fruit with sweetness amongst the briars and brambles of catching and polling<sup>4</sup> clerks and ministers. The attendance of courts is subject to four bad instruments: first, certain persons that are sowers of suits, which make the court swell, and the country pine: the second sort is of those that engage courts in quarrels of jurisdiction, and are not truly 'amici curiæ,' but 'parasiti curiæ,'<sup>5</sup> in puffing a court up beyond her bounds for their own scraps and advantages: the third sort is of those that may be accounted the left hands of courts: persons that are full of nimble and sinister tricks and shifts, whereby they pervert the plain and direct courses of courts, and bring justice into oblique lines and labyrinths: and the fourth is the poller<sup>6</sup> and exacter of fees, which justifies the common resemblance of the courts of justice to the bush, whereunto while the sheep flies for defence in weather, he is sure to lose part of the fleece. On the other side, an ancient<sup>7</sup> clerk, skilful in precedents, wary in proceedings, and understanding in the business of the court, is an excellent figure of a court, and doth many times point the way to the judge himself.

Fourthly, for that which may concern the sovereign and estate. Judges ought, above all, to remember the conclusion of the Roman twelve tables, 'Salus populi suprema lex;'<sup>8</sup> and to know that laws, except they be in order to that end, are but things captious, and oracles not well inspired: therefore it is a happy thing in a State, when kings and states do often consult

<sup>1</sup> Footpace. *A lobby.*

<sup>2</sup> Purprise. *Enclosure.* 'But their wives and children were to assemble together in a certain place in Phocis, and they filled the *purprises* and precincts thereof with a huge quantity of food.'—*Holland.*

<sup>3</sup> *Matt.* vii. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Polling. *Plundering.* 'Peeling and *polling* were voyded, and in place thereof succeeded liberality.'—*Erasmus.*

<sup>5</sup> 'Friends of the court,' but 'parasites of the court.'

<sup>6</sup> Poller. *Plunderer.* 'With Sallust, he may rail downright at a spoiler of countries, and yet in office to be a most grievous *poller* himself.'—*Burton.*

<sup>7</sup> Ancient. *Senior.* 'Junius and Andronicus were in Christianity his *ancients.*'—*Hooker.*

<sup>8</sup> 'The safety of the people is the supreme law.'

For the second point, the causes and chiefly three : first, to be too sensible of angry that feels not himself hurt ; and, delicate persons must needs be oft<sup>1</sup> angry things to trouble them which more rob sense of ; the next is, the apprehension an injury offered, to be, in the circumstance tempt—for contempt is that which putteth as much, or more, than the hurt itself ; men are ingenious in picking out circumstances they do kindle their anger much ; lastly, of a man's reputation doth multiply and so the remedy is, that a man should have, & to say, ' *telam honoris crassio rem.*'<sup>2</sup> But anger, it is the best remedy to win time, self believe that the opportunity of his revenge but that he foresees a time for it, and so to mean time, and reserve it.

To contain<sup>4</sup> anger from mischief, though man, there be two things whereof you caution : the one of extreme bitterness or they be aculeate<sup>5</sup> and proper ;<sup>6</sup> for 'comm nothing so much ; and again, that in anger secrets ; for that makes him not fit for society you do not peremptorily break off in any anger : but howsoever<sup>7</sup> you show bitterness that is not revocable.

For raising and appeasing anger in another

<sup>1</sup> Oft. *Oftem.* See page 358.

<sup>2</sup> Touch. *Censure.* 'I never bare any touch of conscience.'—*King Charles.*

<sup>3</sup> 'A thicker web of honour.'—*A. L. II. xx. 12.*

<sup>4</sup> Contain. *To restrain.*

'Fear not, my lord, we can contain ourselves.'

<sup>5</sup> Aculeate. *Pointed ; sharp ; stinging.*

<sup>6</sup> Proper. *Appropriate.*

'In Athens all was pleasure, mirth, and play,  
All proper to the Spring and sprightly May.'

<sup>7</sup> 'General reproaches.'

<sup>8</sup> Howsoever. *However.* 'Berosus, who, after Moses ancient, howsoever he has since been corrupted, doth in the  
—*Raleigh.*

by chusing of times when men are forwardest and worst disposed to incense them; again, by gathering (as was touched before) all that you can find out to aggravate the contempt; and the two remedies are by the contraries: the former to take good times, when first to relate to a man an angry<sup>1</sup> business, for the first impression is much; and the other is, to sever, as much as may be, the construction of the injury from the point of contempt; imputing it to misunderstanding, fear, passion, or what you will.

## ANNOTATIONS.

Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric* (book ii. chap. 2)—a work with which Bacon seems to have been little, if at all, acquainted—defines anger to be ‘a desire, accompanied by mental uneasiness, of avenging oneself, or, as it were, inflicting punishment for something that appears an unbecoming slight, either in things which concern one’s self, or some of one’s friends.’ And he hence infers that, if this be anger, it must be invariably felt towards some *individual*, not against a *class* or description of persons. And he afterwards grounds upon this definition the distinction between *anger* and *hatred*; between which, he says, there are several points of comparison. Anger arises out of something having a personal reference to ourselves; whereas hatred is independent of such considerations, since it is borne towards a person, merely on account of the believing him to be of a certain description or character. In the next place, anger is accompanied by pain; hatred is not so. Again, anger would be satisfied to inflict some pain on its object, but hatred desires nothing short of deadly harm; the angry man desires that the pain he inflicts should be *known* to come from *him*; but hatred cares not for this. Again, the feeling of anger is softened by time, but hatred is incurable. Once more, the angry man might be induced to pity the object of his anger, if many misfortunes befel him; but he who feels hatred cannot

<sup>1</sup> Angry. *Provoking anger.*

‘That was to him an *angry* jape (trick).’—*Shakespeare.*



power and effect over the gross<sup>1</sup> and mass of things; but they are rather gazed upon, and waited upon<sup>2</sup> in their journey, than wisely observed in their effects, especially in their respective effects; that is, what kind of comet, for magnitude, colour, version<sup>3</sup> of the beams, placing in the region of heaven or lasting, produceth what kind of effects.

There is a toy, which I have heard, and I would not have it given over, but waited upon a little. They say it is observed in the Low Countries (I know not in what part), that every five and thirty years, the same kind and sute<sup>4</sup> of years and weathers comes about again; as great frosts, great wet, great droughts, warm winters, summers with little heat, and the like; and they call it the prime: it is a thing I do the rather mention, because, computing backwards, I have found some concurrence.

But to leave these points of nature, and to come to men. The greatest vicissitude of things amongst men, is the vicissitude of sects and religions; for these orbs rule in men's minds most. The true religion is built upon the rock; the rest are tossed upon the waves of time. To speak, therefore, of the causes of new sects, and to give some counsel concerning them, as far as the weakness of human judgment can give stay<sup>5</sup> to so great revolutions.

When the religion formerly received is rent by discords, and when the holiness of the professors of religion is decayed and full of scandal, and withal<sup>6</sup> the times be stupid, ignorant, and barbarous, you may doubt<sup>7</sup> the springing up of a new sect; if

<sup>1</sup> Gross. *The chief part; the main body.* 'The gross of the people can have no other prospect in changes and revolutions than of public blessings.'—Addison.

<sup>2</sup> Waited upon. *Watched.* See page 226.

<sup>3</sup> Version. *Direction.*

<sup>4</sup> Sute or suit. *Order; correspondence.* 'Touching matters belonging to the Church of Christ, this we conceive that they are not of one *sute*.'—Hooker. For our expression 'out of sorts,' Shakespere has 'out of *sutes*.'

<sup>5</sup> Stay. *Check.*

'With prudent *stay* he long deferred  
The fierce contention.'—Philips.

<sup>6</sup> Withal. *Likewise; besides.*

'God, when He gave me strength, to shew *withal*,  
How slight the gift was, hung it in my hair.'—Milton.

<sup>7</sup> Doubt. *To fear; to apprehend.* 'This is enough for a project without any name. I *doubt* more than will be reduced into practice.'—Swift.

then also there should arise any extrava  
to make himself author thereof—all w  
Mahomet published his law. If a new  
perties, fear it not, for it will not sprea  
planting, or the opposing of authority a  
is more popular than that; the other i  
pleasures and a voluptuous life: for as  
(such as were in ancient times the Arian  
nians), though they work mightily upon  
produce any great alteration in States, e  
of civil occasions. There be three ma  
new sects—by the power of signs and mira  
and wisdom of speech and persuasion; ar  
martyrdoms, I reckon them amongst  
seem to exceed the strength of human  
the like of superlative and admirable hol  
there is no better way to stop the ris  
schisms than to reform abuses; to comp  
ferences; to proceed mildly, and not w  
tions; and rather to take off the principa  
and advancing them, than to enrage th  
bitterness.

The changes and vicissitudes in wars  
in three things; in the seats or stages  
weapons, and in the manner of the condu  
time, seemed more to move from east to w  
Assyrians, Arabians, Tartars (which were  
eastern people. It is true the Gauls w  
read but of two incursions of theirs—the  
the other to Rome; but east and west h  
of heaven, and no more have the wars, eit  
west, any certainty of observation; but  
fixed; and it hath seldom or never be  
southern people have invaded the norther  
whereby it is manifest that the northern  
in nature the more martial region—be it  
of that hemisphere, or of the great cont  
the north; whereas the south part, for a

almost all sea; or (which is most apparent) of the cold of the northern parts, which is that, which, without aid of discipline, doth make the bodies hardest, and the courage warmest.

Upon the breaking and shivering of a great State and empire, you may be sure to have wars; for great empires, while they stand, do enervate and destroy the forces of the natives which they have subdued, resting upon their own protecting forces; and then when they fail also, all goes to ruin, and they become a prey; so it was in the decay of the Roman empire, and likewise in the empire of *Almaigne*,<sup>1</sup> after Charles the Great, every bird taking a feather, and were not unlike to befall to<sup>2</sup> Spain, if it should break. The great accessions and unions of kingdoms do likewise stir up wars; for when a State grows to an over power, it is like a great flood, that will be sure to overflow, as it hath been seen in the States of Rome, Turkey, Spain, and others. Look when the world hath fewest barbarous people, but such as commonly will not marry, or generate, except they know means to live (as it is almost everywhere at this day, except Tartary), there is no danger of inundations of people; but when there be great shoals of people, which go on to populate, without foreseeing means of life and sustentation,<sup>3</sup> it is of necessity that once in an age or two they discharge a portion of their people upon other nations, which the ancient northern people were wont to do by lot—casting lots what part should stay at home, and what should seek their fortunes. When a warlike State grows soft and effeminate, they may be sure of a war; for commonly such States are grown rich in the time of their degenerating, and so the prey inviteth, and their decay in valour encourageth a war.

As for the weapons, it hardly falleth under rule and observation; yet we see even they have returns and vicissitudes; for

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<sup>1</sup> *Almaigne. Germany.*

‘Then I stoutly won in fight  
The Emperour’s daughter of *Almaigne*.’—*Sir Guy of Warwick.*

<sup>2</sup> Befall to (unusual with to). *To happen.*

‘Some great mischief hath befallen  
To that meek man.’—*Milton.*

<sup>3</sup> Sustentation. *Support.* ‘He (Malcolm) assigned certain rents for the sustentation of the canons he had placed there of the order of St. Augustine.—*Holinshed.*

certain it is, that ordnance was known draces in India, and was that which thunder, and lightning, and magic, and the use of ordnance hath been in Chi years. The conditions of weapons and first, the fetching<sup>1</sup> afar off, for that out seen in ordnance and muskets ; second percussion, wherein likewise ordnance d and ancient inventions ; the third is, t them, as that they may serve in all wea may be light and manageable, and the 1

For the conduct of the war : at the fir upon number ; they did put the wars li and valour, pointing<sup>3</sup> days for pitched 1 out upon an even match, and they 1 ranging and arraying their battles.<sup>5</sup> A upon number rather competent than va tages of place, cunning diversions, and 1 more skilful in the ordering of their bat

In the youth of a State, arms do flou of a State, learning, and then both of the in the declining age of a State, mechanics Learning hath his infancy, when it is bu childish ; then his youth, when it is 1 then his strength of years, when it is s lastly, his' old age, when it waxeth dry not good to look too long upon these tu tude, lest we become giddy. As for the is but a circle of tales, and therefore no

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<sup>1</sup> Fetch. *To strike from a distance.*

<sup>2</sup> Arietation. *The use of battering-rams.*

<sup>3</sup> Point. *To appoint.* See page 441.

<sup>4</sup> Fields. *Battles.*

*'And whilst a field should be dispatch  
You are disputing of your generals.'*

<sup>5</sup> Battles. *Forces.*

*'What may the king's whole battle reach*

<sup>6</sup> Reduced. *Subjected (to rule).* *'The Roma  
Britain by their arms.'*—*Ogilvie.*

<sup>7</sup> His. *Its.* See page 400.

<sup>8</sup> Exhaust. *Exhausted.* See page 87.

things concerning the nature of fame. as<sup>1</sup> there is scarcely any great action & great part, especially in the war. Much by a fame that he scattered, that Vitelli move the legions of Syria into Germany, Germany into Syria; whereupon the legions were infinitely inflamed.<sup>2</sup> Julius Cæsar took Pompey laid asleep his industry and preparations cunningly gave out, how Cæsar's own soldiers and being wearied with the wars, and that Gaul, would forsake him as soon as he could settle all things for the succession of her continually giving out that her husband Augustus and amendment;<sup>3</sup> and it is a usual thing to conceal the death of the great Turk from men of war, to save the sacking of Constantinople, as their manner is. Themistocles of Persia, post apace<sup>4</sup> out of Grecia,<sup>5</sup> by the Grecians had a purpose to break his bridge, had made athwart<sup>6</sup> the Hellespont.<sup>7</sup> These such like examples, and the more they are to be repeated, because a man meeteth with wherefore, let all wise governors have as much care over fames, as they have of the actions themselves.

<sup>1</sup> *As. That.* See page 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Undid. Ruined.* (Not so frequently used in this sense of the verb 'to undo.')

'Where, with like haste, through several wars,  
Some to *undo*, and some to be *undone*.'—

<sup>3</sup> *Tacit. Hist.* ii. 80.

<sup>4</sup> *Cæs. a*

<sup>5</sup> *Tacit. Ann.* i. 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Apace. Speedily.*

'Ay, quoth my uncle Glo'ster,  
Small herbs have grace, great weeds do grow.  
And since, methinks, I would not grow so fast  
Because sweet flowers are slow, and weeds mal

<sup>7</sup> *Grecia. Greece.* 'Through his riches he shall stop  
of *Grecia*.'—*Dan.* xi. 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Athwart. Across.*

• 'Execrable Shape!  
That dar'st, though grim and terrible,  
Thy miscreated front *athwart* my way

<sup>9</sup> *Vid. Herod.* viii. 108, 109.

## ANNOTATIONS.

[This Essay is reckoned a fragment, as it is supposed Bacon must have written much more on the subject: but it is complete as far as it goes; and there are many of the other Essays that would have borne to be much enlarged.]

*'Fame is of that force as there is scarcely any great action wherein it hath not a great part, as . . . a man meeteth with them everywhere.'*

By 'fame,' Bacon means what we call 'report,' or 'rumour,' or the French *on dit*.

One remarkable instance of the effects produced by rumours might be added to those Bacon mentions. When Buonaparte's return from Elba was plotted, his partisans went all about France, pretending to seek to purchase land; and when in treaty for a field, and seemingly about to close the bargain, they inquired about the *title*; and when they found, as they generally did, that it was land which had been *confiscated at the Revolution*, they broke off at once, declaring that the title was insecure: thus spreading throughout France the notion that the Bourbons meditated the resumption of all those lands—the chief part of France—to restore them to the former owners. And thus, most of the proprietors were eager for their downfall.

Some remarks on political predictions, already made in my notes on the Essay 'Of Prophecies,' might come in under this head.

*'Let all wise governors have as great a watch and care over fames as they have of the actions and designs themselves.'*

The necessity of this watchfulness from the effects produced by them seems to have been recognised at a very early period in our legislative history. We have before noticed a statute respecting them made in the reign of Edward the First. It enacts that 'forasmuch as there have been oftentimes found in the country Devisors of Tales, whereby discord [or occasion] of discord hath arisen many times between the King and his people, or great men of this realm; for the damage that hath

and may thereof ensue; it is command  
none be so hardy to tell or publish  
whereby discord, or [matter] of disco  
between the King and his people, or  
realm; and he that doth so shall be t  
until he hath brought him into the C  
which did speak the same.'—3 *Edw.*  
c. xxxiv.

The framing and circulating of 'po  
been set down by Bacon as one of the }

what which is new ; but all the disput brought to light one effect of nature | things are known and found out, the them, they can knit them into certain them to their principles. If any insta against them, they can range it in or But all this is but a web of the wit ;<sup>1</sup> do not doubt but that common notion and the knitting of them together, whi art of reason and studies. But they r gain light to<sup>2</sup> the contemplation of nat

All the philosophy of nature which the philosophy of the Grecians, or that of the Grecians hath the foundations in confutation, in sects, in schools, in cians were, as one of themselves sa *children*.<sup>3</sup> They knew little antiqui fables, not much above five hundred ; They knew but a small portion of th alchemists hath the foundation in impo tions and obscurity. It was catching b principle of it is, *Populus vult decipi*. great difference between these great ph one is a loud crying folly, and the oth The one is gathered out of a few vulga other out of a few experiments of a fu faileth to multiply words, and the other gold. Who would not smile at Arist the eternity and invariableness of the not the like in the bowels of the earth and borders of these two kingdoms, wh tion and incursion are. The superficies earth are full of varieties. The superfi the heavens, which we call the middle of variety. There is much spirit in th be brought into mass. There is much

<sup>1</sup> Wit. *Intellect*. ' Will puts in practice what

<sup>2</sup> To. *For*. See page 248.

<sup>3</sup> Plato. See *Advancement of Learning*, book i.

<sup>4</sup> *The people wish to be deceived.*



notions and blind experiments ; an issue of so honourable a match m consider.

Printing, a gross<sup>1</sup> invention ; artill far out of the way ; the needle, a th what a change have these three mad times ; the one in state of learning, war, the third in the state of treasure gation ! And those, I say, were but : upon by chance. Therefore, no doubt lieth hid in knowledge ; wherein m which kings with their treasure can force command ; their spials<sup>2</sup> and i news of them, their seamen and disc they grow ; now we govern nature in o unto her in necessity ; but if we woul tion, we should command her in actio

ANTITHETA.

PRO.

'Ea demum voluptas est secundum naturam, cujus non est satietas.

'The only pleasure which can be conformable to nature is that which knows no satiety.'

'Con

'Co

lence.'

'Ber

quam l

'Th

from d

'Omnes affectus pravi, falsæ estimationes sunt ; atque eadem sunt bonitas et veritas.

'Bad tendencies are, in fact, false judgments of things ; for truth and goodness are the same.'

<sup>1</sup> Gross. Probably palpably obvious ; which it v as soon as a cheap paper was invented.

<sup>2</sup> Spials. Scouts.

'For he by faithful spials was assu That Egypt's king was forward o

<sup>3</sup> Thrall. Slave.

'No thralls like them that inwar

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